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RESUMO: O objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar porque o problema do 
tempo é o calcanhar de Aquiles no sistema Hegeliano. A filosofia da 
história em Hegel dá margem a crítica rigorosa porque estruturas lógicas 
atemporais devem ser aplicadas a um processo que se desenvolve no 
tempo. Mas não se pode pensar em Hegel aplicando a dialética à história; 
esta noção pressupõe a existência de nossa consciência histórica pos-
Hegeliana. Para nós, tempo é aquilo no qual os eventos ocorrem, um 
processo infinito estendendo-se para o futuro. Para Hegel, “tempo” emerge 
somente quando a Idéia Absoluta externaliza-se na filosofia da natureza e 
nosso “futuro” é meramente um “mau infinito”. Uma investigação 
arqueológica da compreensão do tempo em Hegel enfatiza que ele foi 
herdeiro de uma longa tradição filosófica que era absolutamente hostil à 
mudança, fenômenos temporais e tempo. Nós somos tão profundamente 
influenciados pelas implicações do pensamento do próprio Hegel que é 
agora difícil para nós entendermos que ele mesmo não tinha consciência 
dessas implicações. A hostilidade de Hegel para com o tempo revela-se em 
sua filosofia da história porque seu próprio sistema é, e somente pode ser, o 
término da história da filosofia. Mas o escândalo do “fim da história” 
depende inteiramente de um prévio e muito menos visível escândalo: a 
falha de Hegel em perceber o que tornou possível para ele conceituar um 
processo cronológico como a história foi a temporalidade já implícita na 
dialética Hegeliana em si. 
 
Palavras-chave: Hegel, filosofia da história, tempo, dialética, das Moment, 
Hegelianismo de esquerda, Hegelianismo de direita, “o fim da história.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The aim of this work is to show why the problem of time is 
the Achilles heel of the Hegelian System. Hegel’s philosophy of history is 
the correct point of entry for a rigorous critique because timeless logical 
structures must here be applied to a process that enfolds in time. But it is 
wrong to think of Hegel applying the dialectic to history; this notion 
presupposes the existence of our own post-Hegelian historical 
consciousness. For us, time is that within which events occur, an endless 
process extending into the future. For Hegel, “time” emerges only when the 
Absolute Idea externalizes itself in the philosophy of nature and our 
“future” is merely his “bad infinite.” An archeological investigation of 
Hegel’s understanding of time emphasizes that he was heir to a long 
philosophical and tradition that was resolutely hostile to change, temporal 
phenomena, and time. We have been so deeply influenced by the temporal 
implications of Hegel’s own thought that it is now difficult for us to grasp 
that he was unconscious of these implications himself. Paradoxically, 
Hegel’s hostility to time is revealed in his philosophy of history because his 
own System is and can only be the culmination of the history of 
philosophy. But the scandal of “the end of history” depends entirely on a 
prior and far less visible scandal: Hegel’s failure to realize that what made 
it possible for him to conceptualize a chronological process like history was 
the temporality implicit in the dialectic itself. 
 
Key Words: Hegel, philosophy of history, time, dialectic, das Moment, 
Left Hegelianism, Right Hegelianism, “the end of history.” 
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Preface 
 
 If it were not relevant to the problem of time in Hegel, even a brief 
Entstehungsgeschichte of this dissertation would probably be justly 
regarded as superfluous and perhaps might even seem like fiction. It truly is 
a remarkable tale: a philosophical Märchen whose heroine is my treasured 
wife Zoraide. She brought me, along with this thesis, back to life. My 
gratitude to UFSC likewise knows no measure; never in my entire life have 
I been extended the opportunity to live out a fairy-tale. The first night I 
spent in Florianópolis, I knew that philosophy was alive on this island 
thanks to Alexandre Lima, a student of Luis-Filipe Ribeiro. The amiable 
Sarah Albieri was the first professor who extended her hand in welcome to 
us and then came the fateful meeting with Marco Antonio Franciotti, now a 
dear friend, who introduced me to Maria Borges and set the whole process 
in motion. My course with Luiz Hebeche was an enlivening “provocation” 
and a pure delight. Thanks to Décio Krause, a brilliant educator in his own 
right, I had the great privilege of learning from the legendary Newton de 
Costa. Although I did not formally study with either Celso Braida or 
Cláudia Drucker, both have given generously of their time and insights; 
Maicon Engler, a most promising student, has provided delightful company 
as well as invaluable assistance. To Alessandro Pinzani I owe a special debt 
of gratitude as a teacher, a member of my Qualification Committee, and as 
a friend. His kindness, insight, and support are deeply appreciated. 
Everyone who has met the second member of my Committee knows that 
Delamar Dutra is both a gentleman and a scholar; never have I been treated 
with more kindness, warmth, and respect. And Maria Borges has been quite 
simply the ideal Supervisor: wise, simpático,1 and perfectly direct. So many 
heroes! And behind them all, the wise and beautiful woman who brought 
me to Floripa and shared with me the open-minded and big-hearted country 
she calls home.  
 This dissertation was born at Wesleyan University in wintry 
Connecticut, home of History and Theory and thus the ideal place to 
discover the philosophy of history. At the University of Toronto, it became 
“The Shape of History: A Platonic Critique of the Speculative Philosophy 
of History.” Although he wasn’t mentioned in that title, this early version 
was already a critique of Hegel: since nothing can be better without the 
                                                
1 It was, for example, extremely fortuitous that our first conversations took place 
during the writing of BORGES, Maria de Lourdes Alves Borges, War and Perpetual 
Peace: Hegel, Kant, and Contemporary Wars, ethic@, v. 5 n. 1, p. 81-90, 2006. See 
also BORGES, Maria de Lourdes, A Atualidade de Hegel, Florianópolis: Editora da 
UFSC, 2009. 
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good (such was my youthful “thesis”) his “shape of history” couldn’t, 
despite appearances, be progressive. Although it did little for me in the 
profession, this thesis proved a wonderful basis for living my life and I 
never saw my failure to receive the doctorate as a symptom of decline. But 
when, many decades later, Brasil opened its arms to me, the long forgotten 
thesis sprang again to life, reappearing first as “The Rejection of Ethical 
Idealism in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” Maria Borges showed a keen 
eye for what was alive in this version and the result is what follows. But 
before letting the dissertation speak for itself, I want to make a few remarks 
about its future: it already has had enough of a past that it is easy to see 
where it is headed.  
 Extrapolating, then, from recent developments, it is easy to see that 
this thesis is moving from ethics to metaphysics and from the philosophy of 
history to the philosophy of religion. To begin with the first, it is turning 
into “The Problem of Time in Hegel.” Like my original interest in the 
ethical presuppositions of his philosophy of history, my concern with 
Hegel’s philosophy of history has revealed itself to be little more than the 
means for bringing “the problem of time” to the forefront. In attempting to 
show that this problem is the Achilles heel of his thought, Hegel’s use of 
the word das Moment proves to be of decisive importance. The first 
appearance of this word in the characteristically Hegelian sense occurs in 
the last paragraph of Glaube und Wissen (1802)2 and this passage will be 
                                                
2 HEGEL, G.W.F.H. [hereafter “GWFH”], Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1970 (hereafter “HW”), volume 2, p. 431-2: “Der reine Begriff 
aber oder die Unendlichkeit als der Abgrund des Nichts, worin alles Sein versinkt, 
muß den unendlichen Schmerz, der vorher nur in der Bildung geschichtlich und als 
das Gefühl war, worauf die Religion der neuen Zeit beruht - das Gefühl: Gott selbst 
ist tot (dasjenige, was gleichsam nur empirisch ausgesprochen war mit Pascals 
Ausdrücken: “la nature est telle qu’elle marque partout un Dien perdu et dans 
l’homme et hors de l’homme” 224)—, rein als Moment, aber auch nicht als mehr 
denn als Moment der höchsten Idee bezeichnen und so dem, was etwa auch 
entweder moralische Vorschrift einer Aufopferung des empirischen Wesens oder 
der Begriff formeller Abstraktion war, eine philosophische Existenz geben und also 
der Philosophie die Idee der absoluten Freiheit und damit das absolute Leiden oder 
den spekulativen Karfreitag, der sonst historisch war, und ihn selbst in der ganzen 
Wahrheit und Härte seiner Gottlosigkeit wiederherstellen, aus welcher Härte 
allein—weil das Heitere, Ungründlichere und Einzelnere der dogmatischen 
Philosophien sowie der Naturreligionen verschwinden muß - die höchste Totalität 
in ihrem ganzen Ernst und aus ihrem tiefsten Grunde, zugleich allumfassend und in 
die heiterste Freiheit ihrer Gestalt auferstehen kann und muß.” Hereafter, citations 
of this edition will be of the form: “HW 2.431-2.” For the “first appearance” claim, 
see BORSCHE, Tilman, “Moment” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, Basel / Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 
1984, volume 6, p. 100-108 at p. 105.    
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briefly discussed in Chapter 9. There I will argue that the mere fact that 
there actually was a precise chronological moment when Hegel himself 
introduced the word “das Moment” is highly significant. But what will not 
be found in Chapter 9 is an adequate discussion of the theological origins 
of this momentous transformation. The need for such a project is indicated 
by Hegel’s reference to both a historical and speculative “Good Friday”3 or 
rather to the transition between the one and the other in the same sentence 
in which the new meaning of das Moment first appears.4   
Ironically, Franz Rosenzweig may provide the best commentary on 
this transition; the irony, to be sure, resides only in the fact that 
Rosenzweig was Jewish since his credentials as a Hegel scholar are 
impeccable.5 After quoting a couplet from Angelus Silesius,6 Rosenzweig 
describes the temporal implications of Christian life: 
 
Nicht als Augenblick also wird der Augenblick dem Christen zum 
Vertreter der Ewigkeit, sondern als Mittelpunkt der christlichen Weltzeit; 
und dies Weltzeit besteht, da sie nicht vergeht sondern steht aus lauter 
solchen “Mittelpunkten”; jedes Ereignis steht mitten zwischen Anfang 
und Ende des ewigen Wegs und ist durch diese Mitstellung im zeitlichen 
Zwischenreich der Ewigkeit selber ewig.7 
 
Rosenzweig is explaining what might be called “the antinomy of Christian 
time”: each Augenblick in the life of a Christian is at one and the same time 
(zugleich) both momentary and eternal, both zeitlich and zeitlos. As a 
                                                
3 Karfreitag at HW 2.431; cf. FACKENHEIM, Emil L. The Religious Dimension in 
Hegel’s Thought, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, p. 143: “…the life, 
death, and resurrection of Christ has initiated a process which seeks completeness 
once it is explicitly initiated. And it will not have reached completeness until an 
infinite, transcendent heaven has descended to a finite, transfigured earth.” See also 
p. 149. HALPER, Edward, The Logic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature in 
HOULGATE, Stephen (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, p. 29-49, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1998, at p. 35 revealingly mistakes the 
resurrection for “the second coming;” the resolution cannot be in the future.  
4 AHLERS, Rolf, Hegel’s theological Atheism, Heythrop Journal v. 25, p. 158-177, 
1984. 
5 ROSENZWEIG, Franz, Hegel und der Staat, München / Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 
1920.  
6 ROSENZWEIG, Franz, Der Stern der Erlösung in Der Mensch und sein Werk; 
Gesammelte Schriften II, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 377: “Das Wort des 
Cherubinschen Wandersmanns “Wär’ Christus tausendmal in Bethlehem geboren / 
und ists nicht auch in dir, so bist du doch verloren” ist dem Christen nur in der 
kühnen Prägnanz des Ausdrucks, nicht im Gedanken paradox.” Cf. the couplet from 
Martin LUTHER cited by GWFH that follows.  
7 ROSENZWEIG, Der Stern der Erlösung, p. 377. 
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radical critic of German Idealism,8 Rosenzweig himself did not require the 
merely historical Good Friday to be zugleich the eternal fact of God’s 
passing over into His speculative entombment in the World in accordance 
with Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Rosenzweig can keep God, Man, and 
World in permanent temporal play precisely because they are eternally and 
intrinsically distinct. Rosenzweig’s Christian, an individual believer,9 thus 
lives in an eternal moment made possible by a strictly temporal event and 
the Augenblick of worldly time thus becomes eternal through divine 
redemption. It was easy for Rosenzweig to imagine living this 
chronological antinomy precisely because, as a pious Jew, he was already 
experiencing himself as having passed over, by means of the eternal Torah, 
the flood of time.10  
I would like to suggest that Hegel invented his own characteristic sense 
of the word das Moment to capture what Rosenzweig would later call “der 
Mittelpunkt der christlichen Weltzeit” or rather to capture its antithesis.11 In 
the “Systemfragment von 1800,”12 Hegel is grappling with a rather more 
spatial form of the paradox Rosenzweig would later explain: how can one 
worship the unseen God in the temple’s empty space.13 He indicates his 
solution by referring back (wie oben) to an earlier passage: 
                                                
8 PÖGGELER, Otto, “Between Enlightenment and Romanticism: Rosenzweig and 
Hegel” in MENDES-FLOHR, Paul (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, 
Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1988, p. 107-123. 
9 Cf. the importance of die Gemeinde in GWFH’s “Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion” (hereafter “VPR”) at HW 17.305-19. 
10 ROSENZWEIG, Der Stern der Erlösung, p.  376: “Diesem Leben entzog Gott 
den Juden, indem es die Brücke seines Gesetzes himmelhoch über den Strom der 
Zeit wölbte, unter deren Bogen sie nun in alle Ewigkeit machtlos dahinrauscht.” 
11 BAUM, Manfred. Zur Vorgeschichte des Hegelschen Unendlichkeitsbegriff. 
Hegel-Studien v. 11, p. 89-124, 1976, p. 109: “Die Religion schöner Menschlichkeit 
ist die Religion der Menschwerdung des unendlichen Gottes, der nicht bloß 
räumlichen Gestaltung, sondern auch Verzeitlichung des Ewigen als Mensch.” 
12 HW 1.418-427. 
13 HW 1.422-3. “... ein[en] objektiven Mittelpunkt; allen Völkern war er die 
Morgengegend des Tempels und für die Verehrer eines unsichtbaren Gottes nur dies 
Gestaltlose des bestimmten Raums, nur ein Platz. Aber dies bloß Entgegengesetzte, 
rein Objektive, bloß Räumliche muß nicht notwendig in dieser Unvollständigkeit 
der völligen Objektivität bleiben, es kann selbst, d. h. als für sich bestehend, durch 
die Gestalt zur eigenen Subjektivität zurückkehren. Göttliches Gefühl, das 
Unendliche vom Endlichen gefühlt, wird erst dadurch vervollständigt, daß 
Reflexion hinzukommt, über ihm verweilt; ein Verhältnis derselben zum Gefühl ist 
aber nur ein Erkennen desselben als eines Subjektiven, nur ein Bewußtsein des 
Gefühls, getrennte Reflexion über dem getrennten Gefühl; die reine, räumliche 
Objektivität gibt den Vereinigungspunkt für viele, und die gestaltete Objektivität ist 
zugleich, was sein soll, durch die mit ihm verbundene Subjektivität nicht eine 
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Und damit ist auch, so wie oben die Antinomie der Zeit, der Moment und 
die Zeit des Lebens als notwendig gesetzt wurde, die objektive Antinomie 
in Ansehung des Gegenstands gesetzt; das in der Unermeßlichkeit des 
Raums unendliche Wesen ist zugleich im bestimmten Raume, etwa wie in 
dem: “Den aller Himmel Himmel nicht umschloß, / Der liegt nun in 
Mariä Schoß.”14 
 
For Hegel, God will soon enough die in Nature and be reborn in Spirit;15 
empty space will be filled with God the Son. The entombment of the 
infinite in the finite, the historical incarnation, is thus already becoming a 
moment of a timeless process, i.e. der Moment (Rosenzweig’s Augenblick) 
is already passing over the bridge of die Zeit des Lebens and becoming his 
equivalent of Rosenzweig’s Mittelpunkt der christlichen Weltzeit: i.e. das 
Moment.16 Hegel already knew where he needed to go; the problem was 
that he didn’t yet have the right word to justify his getting himself there.17 
                                                                                                   
wirkliche, sondern nur eine mögliche Objektivität, sie kann als solche gedacht 
werden, aber es ist nicht notwendig, weil sie nicht rein ist.”  
14 HW 1.423. 
15 HARRIS, H.S. Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight 1770-1801. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 393-4: “What reflection cannot grasp in its rational use, 
when it rises from the concept of ‘Nature’ to that of ‘pure life’, is the necessity of 
embodiment: this is what it captures, in its imaginative use, in the Vorstellung of 
God’s Incarnation. But the gulf [sc. at this stage of GWFH’s development] between 
the rational and the imaginative employment of reflection remains. This was the 
unsolved problem from which Hegel’s conception of ‘absolute’ knowledge’ sprang. 
The ‘Father’ and the ‘Son’, the two aspects of this antinomy, have yet to be united 
in the ‘Spirit’.” See also MARCUSE, Herbert, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity, translated by Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, 212-8. 
16 Cf. HARRIS, Hegel’s Development, p. 394. 
17 On an earlier passage in the same 1800 fragment, T.M. KNOX comments: 
“Desperately but as yet unsuccessfully, Hegel gropes for a method which would 
understand life by both positing and uniting opposites. Nowhere else can the 
fountainhead of Hegel’s dialectic be better studied than in the intellectual struggle 
reflected in this paper.” See HEGEL, G.W.F. Early Theological Writings, translated 
by T.M. KNOX. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 312 n. 6. This view 
is attacked by HARRIS, Hegel’s Development at p. 388-94, culminating in the 
observation at p. 391: “…we must not allow ourselves to be misled by the fact that 
the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘religion’ are put in the one relation at this stage in his 
development, and in the opposite relation a year later; we must attend to what the 
words mean. When we do this we find that what is called ‘philosophy’ in the first 
instance does not subsequently change its status, and that what is called 
‘philosophy’ later grows out of what was called ‘religion’ before.” I am inclined to 
synthesize the views of HARRIS and KNOX: a change in vocabulary (das Moment) 
was “the fountainhead of Hegel’s dialectic.” Unfortunately, this aspect of the 
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The contrast between Rosenzweig and Hegel is therefore absolute: Hegel 
needs a moment of time to vanish into eternity while his student and critic 
needs to show how eternity emerges in time for the recipient of Revelation. 
As it happens, the discussion of die Antinomie der Zeit to which Hegel here 
refers the reader is irretrievably lost18 and perhaps that’s just as well. For 
the thesis I have written is not “The Theological Origins of the Problem of 
Time in Hegel’s Thought”; this title merely suggests a purely speculative 
future towards which this long, strange, trip is tending, unfolding 
wondrously in the march (or Märchen) of tick-tock time I call my life. 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
problem is not emphasized by BAUM, Manfred, Die Entstehung der Hegelschen 
Dialektik, Bonn: Bouvier, 1986. 
18 HARRIS, Hegel’s Development, p. 394 n. 1; but see II.1.2.2.3 (in Chapter 9) 
below. Naturally I am in complete agreement with his conclusion: “Some of it [sc. 
the missing parts of the “Systemfragment von 1800”] probably survives in the 
Differenzschrift and in Glauben und Wissen.” 
      1 
Introduction 
 
 Hegel’s Philosophy of History is commonly regarded as teleological. 
Charles Taylor’s description can be taken as typical or even canonical on 
this point: “Thus history is to be understood teleologically as directed in 
order to realize Geist.”1 But there are important questions: what is the 
precise nature of Hegel’s τελος and where is it to be found? Is it the 
Kingdom of Prussia as fulfillment of the German World? Is it Absolute 
Knowledge as the culmination of Hegel’s own System? Or is it the 
explicitly anti-Kantian perpetuation, according to plan, of Warring States?2  
None of these answers can simply be excluded at the outset. For the 
present, in the words of Shakespeare, “it sufficeth that the day will end.” In 
other words: the specific nature of the Hegelian τελος is less important 
than the fact that his Philosophy of History unquestionably depends on one. 
As I will show, the answer to this question ultimately depends on whether 
one thinks that History for Hegel has an independent existence—i.e. the 
traditional view of every sensible person—or whether one is prepared to 
recognize the significance of Hegel’s “Absolute Idealism” by embracing 
what Jean Hypollite calls “the immanence of history.”3 The latter will 
locate the τελος in the System itself, the former either in the status quo of 
Hegel’s own time or in some as yet to be realized future.  
It will be noted that the three answers I proposed about Hegel’s 
τελος are all spatial: they indicate a place—if not geographical, then at 
least a generalized locus—but not a time. In saying this, I indicate the 
problem at the center of this dissertation: where is the τελος of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History to be found in Time? This question inevitably brings 
to mind the difference between Left and Right Hegelians: the former 
famously read Hegel in an open-ended fashion that postpones the temporal 
τελος by locating it in the future. My response is negative: it is my purpose 
to show that Hegel does not locate it in the Future.4 In fact, I wish to deny 
that the Hegelian τελος takes place in Time at all. 
                                                
1 TAYLOR, Charles, Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; p. 389.  
2 As claimed by WENDT, Alexander, Why a World State is Inevitable, European 
Journal of International Relations, v. 9, n. 4, p. 491-542, 2003. 
3 HYPPOLITE, Jean, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1974; p. 39-40. 
4 The Left Hegelian position is naturally pervasive. In addition to Taylor, p. 425-6, 
see VINCENT, Andrew, The Hegelian State and International Politics, Review 
of International Politics, v. 9, p. 191-205, 1983 and BRAUER, Oscar Daniel, 
Dialektik der Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Metaphysik der Weltgeschichte, 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1982, p. 192: “Die hegelsche 
      2 
In his Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (1998), Michael 
Forster attempts to read the entire text historically:5 i.e. he claims that 
Hegel has arranged the various stages of Spirit’s manifestation in 
chronological order.6 It is easy to see why Forster wants to do this: taking 
an historical approach to the most historical and systematic of great 
philosophers—especially when such an approach brings unity of purpose to 
a text that other critics have insisted on dividing—seems natural. The 
problem is that it was precisely Hegel who first made History a matter of 
central philosophical concern. Forster is trying to make Hegel more 
historical, in a post-Hegelian sense, than he possibly could have been. The 
problem with Forster’s approach is that it is both historical and profoundly 
unhistorical at the same time albeit in two different respects. 
As I have suggested previously, Hegel succeeded only too well: the 
19th century’s obsession with History, an obsession that has hardly lost its 
grip today, owes more to Hegel than to anyone else. But that very success 
has obscured our sense, as Hegel’s heirs, of what Hegel himself was really 
doing. We tend to assume that Hegel was incorporating into Philosophy a 
fully independent and important branch of knowledge called “History”7—
as we would be doing if we had been in his place—rather than extending 
the boundaries of Philosophy by showing that it always already included its 
own chronological past as moments in its own logical development. The 
difference between these two alternatives constitutes the central problem 
considered in this dissertation. 
                                                                                                   
Philosophie steht also nicht am Ende der Zeit doch am Ende einer Zeit, und zwar 
als Bewußtsein einer Welt, die untergeht und in Bewußtsein des Untergangs das 
Prinzip der neuen Zeit vorbereitet.” 
5 FORSTER, Michael, Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. I deliberately use the word “entire” to 
distinguish FORSTER’s approach from Jean HYPOLLITE’s, who sees a shift in 
Hegel’s (hereafter “GWFH”) approach midway through the Phenomenology of 
Mind (hereafter “PhG”). 
6 A similar approach to HEGEL, G.W.F. Hegel’s Science of Logic. Translated by 
A.V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin, 1969 (hereafter “WdL”) is found in 
BUTLER, Clark, Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and History, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1996.  
7 SPEIGHT, Allen, The Philosophy of Hegel, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2008, p. 87: “If there is anything for which Hegel is 
thought to be most philosophically guilty, it is for enmeshing philosophy more 
deeply than almost any of his predecessors in the problems and contingencies of 
history.”  
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The essence of this problem is Time.8 As children of the 19th century 
Darwinian Revolution, a revolution in which Hegel played the role of 
prophet or midwife, we see Time—huge and mighty masses of it—
everywhere. We even see Time when we look out into Space: the Speed of 
Light is our cosmology’s only constant and every twinkling star twinkles 
precisely in accordance with its distance from us as measured in light-
years. Einstein’s relativity has not banished Time, except in a very one-
sided and exclusive sense, from our thoughts; it has rather temporalized 
Space. Time, in sufficient quantities, even becomes productive. It is 
tempting to regard “billions and billions of years” as our new God: the 
mighty miracle-worker that has made both species and galaxies.  
For those who regard Time as an objective and perhaps even creative 
reality, it is difficult to conceive or rather remember how deep the classical 
prejudice against Time—triumphant in Medieval thought—really was. 
Shakespeare captured this perfectly when he described philosophers as 
those who’ve “writ in the style of gods and made a pish at time and 
chance.” In the traditional philosophic view, significant things always 
happened inevitably for eternal reasons. This habit of mind endured: there 
was, for example, nothing chronological about the optimism of Leibniz.9 
Nor was there any place for an historical event, let alone “History” in the 
timeless truths of dogmatic Philosophy. The very fact that the Lisbon 
earthquake of 1755 could literally rock the foundations of 18th century 
metaphysics should alert us to the great historical divide that separates our 
time from Voltaire’s. The philosophy of Leibniz, as A.O. Lovejoy has 
shown,10 indicates the coming crisis: an implied chronological meliorism 
keeps uneasy company with an explicit eternal optimism. And then came 
Kant.11 
                                                
8 McTAGGART, J. Ellis, Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. Mind (n.s.) vol. 2, n. 8, 
pp. 490-504, 1893 remains the most thoughtful treatment of the subject, marred by 
the author’s famous denial of the actual existence of time. See McTAGGART, J. 
Ellis, The Unreality of Time, Mind (n.s.), vol. 17, n. 68 (Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474, 
1908. ROSENFIELD, Denis L. Politique et liberté; Une étude sur la structure 
logique de la Philosophie du droit de Hegel, Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1984, 70-3 
discusses McTAGGART.  
9 For an interesting juxtaposition of GWFH and LEIBNIZ, see BOURGEOIS, 
Bernard, Hegel; les actes de l’esprit. Paris: J. Vrin, 2000; 261-72. 
10 LOVEJOY, A.O. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936: p. 256-262. 
11 SOLOMON, Robert C. In the Spirit of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983; p. 14 (emphasis mine): “On the other hand [SOLOMON’s hypothesis of 
“Two Hegels” will receive further attention and be confirmed in Part II], he [sc. 
HEGEL] is the philosopher of change, the phenomenologist of forms, who 
appreciates, as Kant and most philosophers did not, the rich variety of forms of 
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As if the philosophical prejudice against Time were not already deep 
enough, Kant gave idealists a new reason to reject time’s empirical 
reality.12 The essence of Kant’s Copernican Revolution in metaphysics was 
the claim that just as previous astronomers had failed to account for their 
own movement in explaining celestial motion,13 so also had previous 
philosophers failed to consider the fact that a belief in the transcendental 
reality of Space and Time (along with the Categories) was as unscientific 
as a belief in the Earth’s immobility. First as “sublunary,” then as “Form of 
Intuition,” Time’s pre-Hegelian position was once as questionable and 
precarious as it is dominant and unquestioned today. Hegel’s thought must 
be understood not only as belonging to this moment of transition but also as 
being this transition’s greatest artifact. What was inconsistency in Leibniz 
became a coherent whole in Hegel. But his whole was hardly ours. We 
accept, almost without being able to conceive any alternative, the pervasive 
historicity of the universe, of our species, and of ourselves. Hegel’s system 
incorporates Time but does so in a profoundly atemporal way.14 To explore 
this atemporality, to recover its basis through a kind of philosophical 
archeology, is the purpose of this dissertation: to rediscover “The Problem 
of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.”  
Precisely what makes Hegel a great historian is that he obliterates the 
barrier between the Past and the Present by acknowledging that barrier’s 
existence and then thinking through it. By saying that “Homer is the 
element in which the Greek World lives, as man does in air,”15 he is 
showing that he has entered knowingly into a profoundly contextualized 
world not as a merely dazed stranger but as himself. What else would we 
expect of Hölderlin’s roommate? It was precisely an awareness of historical 
                                                                                                   
experience and the complex transformations between them.” The reader needs to 
detect Time as the condition for the possibility of SOLOMON’s discussion of 
“change” and “transformations.”  
12 For the inaccuracy of this reading, see KANT, Immanuel, Critique of Pure 
Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929; 78 (B 52). 
13 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 25 (B xxi-ii, n.): “The latter [sc. “the 
Newtonian attraction”] would have remained for ever undiscovered if Copernicus 
had not dared, in a manner contradictory to the senses, but yet true, to seek the 
observed movements, not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator.” 
14 Compare BOURGEOIS, Bernard, Éternité et Historicité de L’Esprit selon Hegel. 
Paris: J. Vrin, 1991; p. 108: “l’histoire non historique de la philosophie” and 
BOUTON, Christophe, Éternité et present selon Hegel, Revue philosophique, n. 1, 
p. 49-70, 1998; p. 65: “L’histoire anhistorique.” 
15 HEGEL, G.W.F. The Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. New York: 
Dover, 1956 (hereafter “Philosophy of History”); p. 223. 
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differences—as Herder had demonstrated16—that made such hermeneutic 
communion with the past possible. When the Crusaders stand at the Church 
of the Holy Sepulchre drenched in Muslim blood and find the tomb 
empty,17 Hegel stands there with them. The event does not simply belong in 
the Past: the unenlightened eternally seek the Good outside themselves and 
“the unhappy consciousness” belongs—always has and always will—to 
every theological dualist who has not achieved Absolute Knowledge. It is 
precisely the eternity of “history”—i.e. its ever-present accessibility to 
Spirit in the present—that Hegel embodied qua historian and taught qua 
philosopher. 
If Hegel can join his German forebears in Jerusalem, it shouldn’t be 
impossible for us to join him in Berlin: once we do so, History will have 
reached its End for us as well. The real obstacle we confront in approaching 
Hegel is not that he is out of date but that we rely too much on our own 
one-sided Verstand, an understanding that owes its very existence to the 
emancipation of History and the independent reality of Time. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to show that Hegel’s Philosophy of History belongs to 
a unique moment in European Intellectual History when the integration of 
Philosophy and History first became possible. But we must recognize that 
this integration did not take place—as it would for us—on History’s terms: 
we must beware of granting “History” an ontological reality that we, as 
post-Hegelians, inevitably take for granted but that Hegel did not.18  
In order to recover “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History,” we must realize that the integration of Philosophy and History did 
not involve and could not have embraced Time’s independent and actual 
existence. The reason that it did not takes us to the dead center of Hegel’s 
thought, i.e. his Absolute Idealism.19 In order to grasp why Time—and by 
extension, what we call “History”—has no independent existence for 
                                                
16 BEISER, Frederick C. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to 
Fichte, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987; esp. p. 141-44.  
17 One can learn how to read GWFH by comparing PhG p. 131-2 (§217) with 
Philosophy of History, p. 392-3. 
18 Hence the inadequacy of an otherwise sensible statement like the following, 
found in WILKINS, Burleigh Taylor, Hegel’s Philosophy of History, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974; 175 (emphasis in the original): “Thus, if we are to 
make sense of Hegel’s claim that he knows the whole of history, this claim must be 
construed as meaning that he knows certain properties, aspects, and relations of 
history, namely those which make it an organized structure.” 
19 Defined in Zusatz to §45 of the Encyclopedia; this reference will hereafter be in 
the form: “Zusatz to E §45.” The translation used is: HEGEL, G.W.F. Hegel’s 
Logic; Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). 
Translated by William Wallace. Third Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 
(hereafter “Encyclopedia Logic”).  
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Hegel, we must be prepared to reject, as Hegel did qua Idealist, the 
object/subject distinction and grasp the True as Substance and Subject as 
well.20 Only in “Absolute Knowing,” does it become possible to think the 
Tilgung of Time.21  
It is for reasons like these that I cannot say that Hegel’s teleological 
Philosophy of History ends in the Present while Kant’s is moving towards 
the Ideal Future. Perhaps this statement would be more somewhat more 
acceptable if the “Present” were understood not only to include Past and 
Future but also to annihilate them along with itself. But, for the most part, 
our temporalized sensibilities are only capable of imagining Eternity itself 
as endless Time stretching into the infinite Future. As long as we imagine 
Time as the infinite series of moments connecting past, Present, and Future, 
we will never understand Hegel’s conception or conceptualization of 
History. For Hegel, what we call “Time,” the tick-tock time of the clock, is 
completely unreal. To be more accurate, an endless succession of temporal 
moments is only Hegel’s “spurious Infinite.” 
On the other hand, Hegel’s “True Infinite” is just another name for 
what I will call “Logical Completeness.” This topic is central to this 
dissertation. I will show that the true τελος in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History is not Chronological Completeness—i.e. “the End of History” in 
Time—but rather the Logical Completeness characteristic of and essential 
to Hegel’s Dialectic as a whole. To put it another way: the End of History 
is a scandalous22 but inevitable side effect of the Logical Completeness of 
the Hegelian Dialectic, i.e. of Hegel’s thought as a whole. 
                                                
20 G.W.F. HEGEL, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated by J.B. Baillie. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1967 (hereafter “Baillie”): p. 80: “In my view—a view which 
the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify—everything depends 
on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as 
well.” See FREY, Christopher, Reflexion und Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum 
Selbstvertändnis der Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung vor allem mit Hegel, 
Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1973, pp. 132-141. 
21 The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977 (hereafter “Miller”); p. 487 (§801): “Time is the Notion 
itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for 
this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long 
as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e. has not annulled [tilgt] Time.” For a 
balanced discussion, see GRIER, Philip T. Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s 
Logic in Di Giovanni, George ed. Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 59-75. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990; p. 73 and, in the same volume, HARRIS, 
Errol E. A Reply to Philip Grier, p. 77-84; p. 84. 
22 For a similar use of “scandal” (albeit ultimately deflected from GWFH), see 
FACKENHEIM, Emil L., The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, pp. 76 and 207n.   
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The distinction between the two parts of this dissertation is based on 
the words “scandalous but inevitable” found in the previous sentence. In 
“Part I,” I will show why the End of History is an inevitable result of 
applying the Hegelian Dialectic to a process that we know unfolds in tick-
tock Time and that the reason that Hegel did not perceive this result as 
scandalous is because he does not grant Time—and by extension the events 
of History that unfold within Time—any independent existence or 
ontological reality apart from his own conception of Absolute Idealism. 
“Part I” is therefore an attempt to recover, as a matter of philosophical 
archeology, how Hegel conceptualized the Philosophy of History in terms 
of Logical Completeness by systematically ignoring the distinction between 
Logical and Chronological Priority. “Part II” will then offer a critique of 
Hegel’s solution based on our awareness of tick-tock Time’s independent 
ontological existence, an awareness that Hegel’s thought paradoxically 
both helped to make possible and yet could not bring to self-consciousness.   
The “problem of Time” is therefore central to Hegel’s entire project 
whether that project is regarded as metaphysical, logical, ethical, or 
political: he clearly did not conceive of the Dialectic in temporal terms 
even while applying the Concept to the ethical-political realm of World-
History. His failure to do so—or rather, his failure to return, with questions, 
to the allegedly timeless Concept after having conceptualized the events of 
World History in relation to it—is precisely why the relationship between 
Logical and Chronological Priority is the Achilles’ heel of his thought. But 
it is only if we can first think in his terms (Part I) that we can see that for 
Hegel, it is Logical Priority—completely divorced from its Chronological 
origins—that was real for him. It is for this reason that the only τελος of 
World History is not to be located in either Hegel’s Future, or ours. But the 
remainder of this Introduction will provide some preliminary indication of 
the critique contained in Part II. A textual indication of Hegel’s scandalous 
hostility to the independent existence of Time as conceived as an infinite 
series of moments extending from the Past through the Present to the 
Future is to be found in his revealing comments about astronomy in his 
Philosophy of Nature, second part of the Encyclopedia.  
For Kant, “the starry heavens above me” were famously a perennial 
source of “awe and wonder.” Hegel’s reaction to the stars is very different. 
Consider the following passage from the Wissenschaft der Logik: 
  
Kant, for example, at the close of the Critique of Practical Reason, 
represents it as sublime “when the subject raises himself in thought above 
the place he occupies in the world of sense, reaching out to infinity, to 
stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, systems beyond systems, and 
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then also to the limitless times of their periodic motion, their beginning 
and duration.”23  
 
Although the quotation from Kant continues (and will be quoted in full 
immediately hereafter), let’s pause for a moment and consider what is 
happening here. Not only is it noteworthy that Kant makes the jump from 
“stars beyond stars” to “worlds beyond worlds” but also from Space to 
Time. The certainty that Outer Space is the great unknown is closely related 
to the Future, in which time alone can we hope to know its secrets or even 
whether its secrets are worth knowing. Here, however, Kant is not forming 
a bridge to what might be called “Astronomy’s Epistemological Future;” it 
is Hegel who does so. Kant is content to show why “the starry heaven” 
excite our wonder:  
 
“Imagination fails before this progress into the infinitely remote, where 
beyond the most distant world there is a still more distant one, and the 
past, however remote, has a still remoter past behind it, the future, 
however distant, a still more distant future beyond it; thought fails in the 
face of this conception of the immeasurable, just as a dream, in which one 
goes on and on down a corridor which stretches away endlessly out of 
sight, finishes with falling or fainting.”24 
 
Perhaps most significant in this passage is Kant’s characteristic 
epistemological humility: he is perfectly comfortable with the notion that 
“beyond the most distant world there is a still more distant one” for the 
exact same reason that he is comfortable with the Ding-an-sich. In this 
context, the most striking (and philosophically significant) feature of this 
passage is Kant’s repeated use of jenseits; “beyond.” For Kant, not only are 
God and the Thing-in-Itself beyond our geocentric inability to think of 
things outside of Time and Space, but (providentially?) even Time and 
Space themselves cannot be thought without a self-contained beyond of 
their own. 
 Kant’s admission that the human mind “finishes with falling or 
fainting” gives Hegel an opening he knows well how to exploit:25 
“epistemological humility” is not in his line: 
 
                                                
23 WdL, p. 229 (see n. 6 above). I have found HARRIS, Errol E. An Interpretation 
of the Logic of Hegel. Lanham: University Press, 1983 a particularly useful guide.  
24 WdL, p. 229. 
25 WdL, p. 229: “This exposition, besides giving a concise yet rich description of 
such quantitative exaltation, deserves praise mainly on account of the truthfulness 
with which it states how it fares finally with this exaltation: thought succumbs, the 
end is falling and faintness.”  
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What makes thought succumb, what causes falling and faintness, is 
nothing else but the wearisome repetition which makes a limit vanish, 
reappear, and then vanish again, so that there is a perpetual arising and 
passing away of the one after the other and of the one in the other, of the 
beyond in the here and now, and of the here and now in the beyond, 
giving only the feeling of the impotence of this infinite or this ought-to-
be, which would be master of the finite and cannot.26 
 
What makes this passage striking is that it borders, quite unconsciously, on 
the self-referential. After all, what is Hegel’s Logic except “the 
[wearisome] repetition which makes a limit vanish, reappear, and then 
vanish again, so that there is a perpetual arising and passing away of the 
one after the other and of the one in the other”? Hegel’s answer might be 
that this repetition is not strictly speaking ad infinitum: it comes full circle 
in Logical Completeness.27 Here Hegel comes as close as he can to 
admitting that the only Good Infinite is actually finite.  
But the real reason that this passage cannot be self-referential is not 
only that Hegel’s vanishing and reappearing limits finally come full circle. 
There is one pair of opposites here that does not and cannot apply to Hegel: 
“of the beyond in the here and now, and of the here and now in the 
beyond.” With his own identification of Subject and Object, the real and 
the rational, and indeed the Tilgung of Time, Hegel can undoubtedly 
achieve the first. But it is not only impossible for Hegel to achieve the 
second alternative (the presence of “the here and now in the beyond”): it is 
impossible by nature. No matter how balanced his reflections may appear 
to be, there can be no beyonds in Hegel’s System. A transcendent and 
inscrutable God is no less unacceptable than the terra incognita of the 
starry heavens; even the Future itself must bow before Hegel’s will to 
knowledge.28 As described by Hegel, Kant is Hegel’s own reversed 
                                                
26 WdL, p. 229. One is tempted to say that GWFH wishes to would be master of the  
infinite but cannot. 
27 It is not the “coming into being” and “passing away” that GWFH therefore finds 
objectionable in KANT’s infinites, it is that this kind of Werden is not completed in 
die absolute Idee; this is just one of the reasons why there is more to be learned 
about GWFH’s Logic from the last Triad than the first; see I.1.1.2. 
28 For the contrary point of view, based on linking the Future to “Potentiality,” see 
HOFFMEYER, John F. The Advent of Freedom: The Presence of the Future in 
Hegel’s Logic, Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994; the 
principal weakness of this approach is admitted at p. 56 (cf. p. 69): “This 
demonstration will sometimes require reading the Logic against the grain of Hegel’s 
understanding of what he is doing in the text, since he insists that the logical 
element is atemporal.” Hence his chimerical “real possibility (2)” of p. 32. On 
“Potentiality,” see CHAFFIN, Deborah G. A Reply to Gabriella Baptist in George 
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reflection. If Kant is comfortable with “the feeling of the impotence of this 
infinite or this ought-to-be,” then Hegel will accept nothing less than “the 
reality of the omnipotence of this finite or this what-is.” But even for 
Hegel, there is a limit to reflection: there is no getting beyond the beyond. 
But he tries his best. 
Hegel’s most interesting comments on the Stars are found in §268 of 
the Encyclopedia: it is from the section about “Fall” (Gravity) in the 
Philosophy of Nature. Not surprisingly, the negative moment of Gravity’s 
Center of Attraction is Repulsion. But Hegel next introduces an interesting 
distinction between “formal” and “living Repulsion.”  
 
Aber das einfache Fürsichsein des Zentrums ist als diese negative 
Beziehung auf sich selbst wesentlich Repulsion seiner selbst;—formelle 
Repulsion in die vielen ruhenden Zentra (Sterne);—lebendige Repulsion, 
als Bestimmung derselben nach den Momenten des Begriffs und 
wesentliche Beziehung dieser hiernach unterschieden gesetzten Zentra 
aufeinander.29 
 
What separates the Stars is a merely formal Repulsion; the separate but 
nonetheless connected moments of the Concept are both bound and 
separated by a “lebendige Repulsion.” Not only is it interesting that the 
Stars are lifeless—there is no trace of Kant’s intuition that there may be 
other Worlds in Space as well—but that they are so precisely in comparison 
with the Hegelian Dialectic. More important is the fact that Hegel is 
preparing us to accept that the Stars are not susceptible to being 
conceptualized. The relations between them lacks the “wesentliche 
Beziehung” of the Concept.30 They are thus beyond its scope. And this is 
potentially disastrous, as we have already indicated. But Hegel is no fool: it 
is precisely because he cannot conceptualize the Stars that he contrasts 
what separates them from what separates the moments of the Concept: the 
“starry heavens” are merely the negative reflection of the Concept’s 
Logical Completeness. 
 Hegel explains this further in the Zusatz. If the living Repulsion 
binding the Concept creates a Unity,31 the Stars, governed by merely 
                                                                                                   
di Giovanni ed., Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 145-152. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1990.  
29 E §268. 
30 For the problems associated with GWFH’s use of “wesentliche”—Wesen is a 
technical term in his Logic—see I.3.2.3. 
31 Zusatz to E §268: “Das logische Eins ist unendliche Beziehung auf sich selbst, 
welche Identität mit sich, aber als sich auf sich beziehende Negativität, somit 
Abstoßen von sich selbst ist; das ist das andere im Begriffe enthaltene Moment.”  
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formal Repulsion, are a multiplicity.32 And this leads Hegel to another 
remarkable distinction: the “dead Repulsion” among the Stars is the realm 
of Verstand33 and therefore they, unlike the Concept, cannot be die 
Vernünftige. 
 
Ihre Figurationen können Ausdruck wesentlicher Verhältnisse sein; sie 
gehören aber nicht der lebendigen Materie an, wo der Mittelpunkt sich in 
sich unterscheidet. Das Heer der Sterne ist eine formelle Welt, weil nur 
jene einseitige Bestimmung geltend gemacht ist. Dies System müssen wir 
durchaus nicht dem Sonnensystem gleichstellen, welches erst das System 
realer Vernünftigkeit ist, was wir am Himmel erkennen können.34 
 
The great Hegel, he who wanted to know so much, allows that the 
constellations might be “the expression of essential relations” but he 
immediately retracts the possibility. Unlike the Solar System—the only 
heavenly configuration that Hegel deems rational—there is no center 
(Mittelpunkt) of the “starry heavens” and therefore their multiplicity is the 
mere one-sidedness of lifeless formality. And this is the essential point: are 
the Stars exempt from rationality because they are not yet rationalized or 
are they not yet rationalized because they are intrinsically irrational? Not 
only is it a scandal that he who famously proclaimed the rationality of the 
real is now compelled to implicitly withhold reality from the stars, but he is 
transparently doing so because he himself cannot prove that their 
configurations are rational. He cannot wait, like the humble Kant was 
willing to wait, for Astronomy’s Epistemological Future because he can 
tolerate no beyonds. But the self-imposed scandal of this thought is too 
much even for Hegel and he will be forced into self-contradiction before 
the Zusatz is finished. For the present, however, he turns his fire directly on 
Kant: 
 
Man kann die Sterne wegen ihrer Ruhe verehren; an Würde sind sie aber 
dem konkreten Individuellen nicht gleichzusetzen. Die Erfüllung des 
Raums schlägt in unendlich viele Materien aus; das ist aber nur das erste 
                                                
32 Zusatz to E §268: “Die formale Repulsion hat auch ihr Recht; denn die Natur ist 
eben dies, ein abstraktes vereinzeltes Moment für sich bestehen zu lassen. Solches 
Dasein der formellen Repulsion sind die Sterne, als noch ununterschieden, 
überhaupt viele Körper, die hier aber noch nicht als leuchtend in Betracht kommen, 
was eine physikalische Bestimmung ist.”  
33 Zusatz to E §268 (emphasis mine): “Wir können meinen, es sei Verstand im 
Verhalten der Sterne zueinander; sie gehören aber der toten Repulsion an.”  
34 Zusatz to E §268; emphases mine. The remainder of the Zusatz will now be 
considered in its entirety; citations are therefore unnecessary for all remaining block 
quotations in this section. 
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Ausschlagen, das den Anblick ergötzen kann. Dieser Licht-Ausschlag ist 
so wenig bewundernswürdig als einer am Menschen oder als die Menge 
von Fliegen.35 
 
If Hegel had left out the remark about flies, it would have been better: its 
addition raises the ugly possibility that he is not so much elevating the 
individual human being as simply showing his contempt for the stellar. It is 
also noteworthy that this attack on idolizing the heavens—which might 
appeal to those inclined to worship the Almighty God—is coming from a 
man who did the same to World-History: the battle-deaths of thousands of 
individuals is God’s Work according to Hegel,36 but the Stars cannot be!  
   
Die Stille dieser Sterne interessiert das Gemüt näher, die Leidenschaften 
besänftigen sich beim Anschauen dieser Ruhe und Einfachheit. Diese 
Welt hat aber auf dem philosophischen Standpunkt nicht das Interesse, 
das sie für die Empfindung hat. 
 
The assault on Kant continues: it was precisely Kant’s Gemüt that was 
doubly provoked to Bewunderung by the moral law within and the starry 
heavens above.37 But it is the second sentence that is striking: the unknown 
is of no philosophical interest. Worst of all, Hegel now feels compelled to 
prove it: to know that the unknown is unknowable.  
 
Daß sie in unermeßlichen Räumen als Vielheit ist, sagt für die Vernunft 
gar nichts; das ist das Äußerliche, Leere, die negative Unendlichkeit. 
Darüber weiß sich die Vernunft erhoben; es ist dies eine bloße negative 
Bewunderung, ein Erheben, das in seiner Beschränktheit steckenbleibt 
[emphases mine]. 
 
                                                
35 To listen to GWFH explain why the stars are not “bewundernswürdig” reminds 
me of listening to an alcoholic who never earned a B.A. explain why a University 
education is a waste of time. It’s not so much that the drunk is wrong that repels—
we all know that going to University hardly makes a fool well-educated—it’s the 
fact that he needs his argument to be true that inspires pity or contempt.     
36 Philosophy of History, p. 457: “That the History of the World, with all the 
changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the 
realization of Spirit—this is the true Theodicaea, the justification of God in History. 
Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—viz., that that 
what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not ‘without God,’ but 
is essentially His Work.” 
37 On the “Conclusion” of KANT, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, see 
BECK, Lewis White. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; p. 281-3. 
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And here is the argument: the “spurious Infinite” is not subject to Vernunft, 
only the Good Infinite is.38 In other words, only Logical Completeness is 
Logically Complete. Is it for this implicit tautology that we are being asked 
to feel eine positive Bewunderung? Probably not: any kind of 
Bewunderung, admitting as it does “the beyond,” is antithetical to Hegel’s 
outward position. And “outward” is the word. Although he claims that the 
Stars are irrational, it almost seems that he only arrived at that conclusion 
after a struggle with himself. Could anyone who had not once dreamt—if 
only as a curious and precocious child—of rationalizing the constellations 
have written these words: 
 
Das Vernünftige in Ansehung der Sterne ist, die Figurationen zu fassen, 
in denen sie gegeneinander gestellt sind. Das Ausschlagen des Raumes in 
abstrakte Materie geht selbst nach einem inneren Gesetze, daß die Sterne 
Kristallisationen vorstellten, die eine innere Verbindung hätten. Die 
Neugierde, wie es da aussieht, ist ein leeres Interesse [emphases mine]. 
 
Perhaps it was because he had such a high standard of rationality that he 
now must pronounce his former attempt “empty.” But the outward self-
contradiction into which his words now fall, after a parting shot at Kant, 
suggest that there was still an unresolved struggle within himself. 
Apparently leaving the stars behind, Hegel offers a most uncharacteristic 
lesson: 
 
Die Würde der Wissenschaft muß man nicht darin setzen, daß alle 
mannigfaltigen Gestaltungen begriffen, erklärt seien; sondern man muß 
sich mit dem begnügen, was man in der Tat bis jetzt begreifen kann. Es 
gibt vieles, was noch nicht zu begreifen ist; das muß man in der 
Naturphilosophie zugestehen [emphases mine]. 
 
It is the “bis jetzt” and the “noch nicht” that are remarkable. Does their 
inclusion mean that Hegel is retracting everything he has just said about the 
Stars and that he has embraced the possibility of future discoveries? The 
context belies the view that this sensible position was Hegel’s. Burned once 
                                                
38 Compare JAESCHKE, Walter, World History and the History of Absolute Spirit 
in Robert L. Perkins ed., History and System: Hegel’s Philosophy of History, p. 
101-115. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984; p. 114: “If the 
meaning of history is defined as the realization of a certain goal, this history 
necessarily comes to an end when this goal is achieved—unless one determines this 
goal in such a way that it is unfulfillable, and thus history leads to an infinite 
progress. But nothing is more alien to Hegel than this.” 
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before by astronomy’s epistemological future,39 Hegel doubtless leaves 
himself a bis jetzt where Naturphilosophie is concerned. But he does so 
only after proving that the locus classicus of the noch nicht—the “starry 
heavens above me” celebrated by Kant (who merely captured thereby the 
common sense of mankind)—is not simply “was noch nicht zu begreifen 
ist,” but unbegreifbar. Indeed it is the self-contradiction that reveals the 
depths of Hegel’s commitment to Logical Completeness. The insertion of 
“jetzt” merely proves that he was aware that his remarks on the stars are a 
self-incriminating scandal. He therefore must retreat momentarily into the 
haven of common sense.  
 
Das vernünftige Interesse bei den Sternen kann sich jetzt nur in der 
Geometrie derselben zeigen; die Sterne sind das Feld dieser abstrakten 
unendlichen Diremtion, worin das Zufällige einen wesentlichen Einfluß 
auf die Zusammenstellung hat [my emphasis]. 
 
But even in his unusual admission of the “jetzt,” he leaves no doubt that the 
heavens will never be subject, as World-History will show itself to be, to 
the free necessity of the Concept. 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                
39 A magisterial account of GWFH’s doctoral thesis on astronomy can be found in 
HARRIS, H.S. Hegel’s Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806), Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983. 
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Part I  
Introduction 
 
I have divided Part I of this Dissertation, in good Hegelian fashion, into 
three parts. Also in keeping with the spirit of Hegel, I will begin this overview 
with a description of the third part first. Although contrary to common sense, 
this approach is in keeping with Hegel’s dialectical method: Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History is best understood as the synthesis of previous moments. 
The subject of Part I.3 is therefore “Hegel’s Philosophy of History” itself: how 
Hegel integrates History into his System, and how we are to understand World 
History as progress towards Freedom.  
Although not yet appearing in its complete form—something that takes 
place only in the synthetic third step as the full Concept—the first moment of 
any Hegelian Triad always already contains the Whole implicitly. The first 
section of Part I (I.1) is therefore concerned with the Hegelian Dialectic, the 
basis of Hegel’s Philosophy of History. For example: the Dialectic can explain, 
then reabsorb, and finally abolish any given dichotomy. Dualism comes to rest 
in separation but the Hegelian Dialectic restores and ceaselessly reproduces 
completeness. Apparent opposites are only temporarily—or rather 
momentarily!—separable “moments” of one Logically Complete and timeless 
totality. I intend to show that Hegel’s Philosophy of History is already implicit 
in the Logical Completeness of the Hegelian Dialectic. 
It is the second moment of a dialectical triad that is always the most 
interesting. Here the duality that will be eventually resolved in the final 
Concept temporarily holds the stage. But Hegel, as already hinted above, 
would strongly object to my use of the word “temporarily” in the last sentence: 
he did not regard the Dialectic as unfolding in Time. On the other hand, the 
application of the timeless Dialectic to the temporal pageant of World History 
will require that a Chronological process be explained in Logical—and for 
Hegel that means Dialectical—terms.   
The relationship between the Logical Completeness of the Dialectic and 
the Chronological Completeness of World History is the subject of section I.2. 
There the bizarre question of “the End of History” will be connected 
inseparably with “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” 
Only if World History has in some important sense come to an end can it be 
given the appearance, thanks to the Hegelian Dialectic, of progress towards 
Freedom. By examining what Hegel has to say about both Time and Absolute 
Knowledge, his decision to discount the possibility that the Future could 
possibly bring anything new to light—an example from astronomy has already 
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been presented in the Introduction—becomes not only intelligible but also 
inevitable.  
Any common sense approach to the problem of historical progress is based 
on a distinction between events occurring in time and some objective and 
timeless standard by which temporal developments acquire some meaningful 
direction, i.e. an ever greater degree of whatever objective quality constitutes 
the timeless criterion of progress. Once the necessary presence of the 
philosopher of history is acknowledged, it is worthwhile to point out that this 
analysis is also based on a triad: (1) the philosopher evaluates (2) events 
occurring in time (res gestae) on the basis of (3) an unchanging criterion of 
progress. Although it could be claimed that any conception of historical 
progress is a synthesis of three elements in which the distinctions between 
them are resolved in its Concept, it is precisely the sharp and enduring 
distinctions between them that prove the common sense approach to progress 
antithetical to Hegel’s.  
The common sense approach requires a clear-cut distinction between 
historical events and evaluative standard. The most vulnerable element in this 
kind of analysis is the objective criterion of what constitutes progress; a 
relativist would deny the possibility of such a standard. The claim that any 
alleged evaluative criterion is merely the philosopher’s subjective fancy 
collapses the distinction between two of the three elements involved. Equally 
relativistic—and therefore tending equally to collapse distinctions—is the view 
that any philosopher’s evaluative criterion is merely a product of the historical 
process itself. On the contrary, the common sense approach necessarily 
involves the independence of an unchanging standard not only from the 
historical process that it is used to evaluate but from the philosopher of history 
as well. In other words, all three elements maintain an ontological separation 
despite their temporary—and not altogether unproblematic—synthesis in any 
given vision of progress. 
In Hegel’s thought, however, none of these elements—indeed nothing 
whatsoever besides the Whole—maintains what I have just called “ontological 
separation.” It would be tempting to say that nothing maintains its 
independence in Hegel’s System. But as the first triad in the System proves, 
Hegel’s assault on dualism1—i.e. the presupposition of any enduring 
distinction between one thing and another—is so radical that not even Nothing 
                                                
1 VIELLARD-BARON, Jean-Louis, L’Idee Logique, L’Idee de la Philosophie et la 
Structure Théologico-Historique de la Pensée de Hegel, Hegel-Studien v. 38, p. 61-82, 
2003; p. 70: “L’essence de la philosophie est de dépasser toutes les dichotomies 
dualistes figées [i.e. coagulated].” 
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maintains its separation from everything (i.e. Being): the two are one in 
Becoming. 
Nor is Hegel’s assault on dualism confined to the abstractions of Logic. 
Although an Introduction is hardly the place to prove it, it will be useful for the 
reader to entertain the possibility that, for Hegel, no objective evaluative 
criterion is separable from the temporal historical process of which the 
philosopher who conceives it is likewise an inseparable part. The philosopher, 
in other words, is inseparable from both any evaluative criterion and the 
chronological process of which the philosopher is product, part, and creative 
collaborator. For Hegel, the historical process itself is simply the ongoing 
realization of an evaluative criterion and has no objective existence apart from 
the philosopher, i.e. Hegel, who conceptualizes it. Hegel’s repudiation of the 
presuppositions upon which a common sense approach to the Idea of Progress 
could not possibly be more radical or complete. 
Common sense—to the extent that it has been bewitched by relativism—
may well be uncomfortable with the suggestion that any evaluative criterion of 
progress has an objective existence apart from either the historical process or 
the philosopher. But common sense in any form categorically repudiates the 
notion that the historical process has no objective existence apart from the 
philosopher. It is therefore of decisive importance to remember that 
“Idealism” for Hegel does not mean a commitment to the objective Ideas of 
Platonism: it means the collapse of the subject/object distinction in favor of the 
subject that is substance as well.2  
As I will show in I.3.1, the inclusion of History in the Hegelian System is 
inextricably connected to his explicit rejection of Kant’s vision of what that 
future would—or, better yet, should and will—be like. The relationship 
between the Idea of Progress and any desirable set of future conditions I will 
call “Kantianism.” The distinction between evaluative criterion and historical 
progress I will call “Platonism.” It is no accident that the first triad in Hegel’s 
System presents Becoming, as the triad’s third moment, as explaining, 
reabsorbing, and finally abolishing autonomous Being. An attack on 
Platonism’s separable realm of Being is the very first step in Hegel’s System 
while an attack on Kantianism’s no less ideal Future is the first step in his 
integration of History into that System. Finally, it is only on the basis of 
Hegel’s absolute repudiation of any objective evaluative criterion 
(“Platonism”) or any desirable historical outcome (“Kantianism”) that his 
Philosophy of History can be shown not to be the paradigmatic example of the 
                                                
2 PhG, p. 80 (Baillie): “In my view—a view which the developed exposition of the 
system itself can alone justify—everything depends on grasping and expressing the 
ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well.”  
 18 
Idea of Progress it appears to be and also why it must, to be consistent, teach 
that History has reached its End.    
 
Introduction to I.1 
Logical Completeness in Hegelian Dialectic 
  
Two of Hegel’s most quotable “sound-bites” constitute a convenient basis 
for introducing the two chapters of Part I; Section 1. The first, from the Preface 
to his first book, The Phenomenology of Spirit, is: “The truth is the whole.”3 
The second, from the Preface to his last book, The Philosophy of Right, is: 
“What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.”4 
In Chapter 1 (I.1.1), the Hegelian Dialectic will be explicated in terms of 
what I will call “Logical Completeness.” Beginning with Kant’s Antinomies of 
Pure Reason, I will show how Hegel developed a more comprehensive—
indeed all-pervasive—conception of Dialectic. Crucial for understanding the 
Hegelian Dialectic—or rather (in order to deliberately avoid using a word with 
a pejorative sense in Hegel) for conceptualizing it—is the distinction between 
Understanding (Verstand) and Reason (Vernunft). To speak in Hegel’s terms: 
although the one-sided distinctions of Verstand—each part of which appear to 
be independent of each other—are a necessary moment of the comprehensive 
Begriff , they are sublated in the dialectical Concept that is the Dialectic itself. 
It is Vernunft that is responsible for the Dialectic’s Aufhebung—i.e. the 
simultaneous preservation and elimination—of the dichotomies created by 
Verstand in the Begriff. To put it another way: the merely partial is necessarily 
a product of Verstand. Logical Completeness—the conceptual basis for the 
claim that “the truth is the whole”—is the domain of Vernunft. The chapter 
will also include the textual exegesis of a specific example of a paradigmatic 
Hegelian Triad.   
 Chapter 2 (I.1.2) describes three examples drawn from the Hegelian 
System in which the Logical Completeness of the Dialectic is applied not 
merely to Logical but rather to Chronological development. This application is 
obviously the basis for conceptualizing World History in terms of the Concept 
but is more easily seen in Hegel’s Anthropology, his Philosophy of Religion, 
and his History of Philosophy. Because “What is rational is actual and what is 
actual is rational,” was wirklich ist must at the same time be vernünftig; i.e. 
must unfold in accordance with the Dialectic of Vernunft. By the same token, 
                                                
3 PhG, 81 (Baillie). The passage continues: “The whole, however, is merely the 
essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development.” 
4 HEGEL, G.W.F. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1942 (hereafter “Philosophy of Right”), p. 10. 
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the Dialectic of Vernunft is necessarily embodied in “what is actual” even 
when it unfolds gradually in Time. The fact that the Logical Completeness of 
the Concept is or can be actualized in a Chronological Process—and, by the 
same token, that a Chronological Process is intelligible only in terms of 
Logical Completeness—is at once the basis for Hegel’s application of the 
Dialectic to World History and of World History’s reasonable character.   
    
Chapter 1 (I.1.1) 
The Hegelian Dialectic as Logical Completeness 
 
This chapter on the Hegelian Dialectic will consist of two parts, not three 
and this fact calls for comment at the outset. Hegel is clearly at pains to 
persuade us that the self-enfolding trinities of his System—Triads within 
Triads within Triads etc.— are no mere external form. Perhaps he is right 
about that. But Triads are ubiquitous in Hegel and that indisputable fact is 
essential—although it would be more Hegelian to say “conceptual” because 
“essential” relates to the second moment (Wesen) of each triad and not the 
Triad as a whole; i.e. to Understanding but not to Reason—to grasping 
(although “be-grasping” would better capture the German Begriff) what I am 
calling “Logical Completeness.” Hegelian Triads are ubiquitous because in 
Hegel’s System, the distinction between any two opposites is always 
nullified—although the two alternatives are nevertheless preserved as 
moments—in their synthesis. In other words, both the first and second 
moments are equally, identically, and essentially incomplete; what completes 
them is the third. By definition, then, “Logical Completeness” is simply 
another word for what Hegel accomplishes with his ubiquitous Dialectical 
Triads. 
This chapter will demonstrate how the Hegelian Dialectic achieves 
Logical Completeness in two different ways. In the first section (I.1.1.1), a 
historical overview of Hegel’s Dialectic will be presented. On the grounds that 
such an approach is seldom satisfying due to its vagueness and its reliance on 
mere Prefaces and Introductions, however, it will be followed in section I.1.1.2 
with a more exacting textual exegesis of one particular Hegelian Triad. 
Between the two—or rather by synthesizing the two—the reader should come 
away with a clear understanding (as understood by common sense, not by 
Hegel) of how to conceptualize Hegel,5 or rather how Hegel has 
conceptualized himself or his System, thanks to the Dialectic. 
                                                
5 Despite an unfortunate reference to “understanding’s concepts” at p. 12, a recent and 
useful treatment of Verstand and Vernunft can be found at NUZZO, Angelica, Dialectic, 
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I.1.1.1. The Hegelian Dialectic 
Dialectic is a word often used and seldom conceptualized.6 Without 
conceptualizing it, Hegel’s philosophy is unintelligible. Hegel calls dialectic 
nothing less than “the life and soul of scientific progress, the dynamic which 
alone gives immanent connection and necessity to the body of science.”7 He 
will also call it “the principle of all natural and spiritual life.”8 This section will 
attempt to elucidate these cryptic descriptions using Kant’s mere 
understanding of dialectic as a starting point, an appropriate starting-point, it 
should be added, because Hegel’s conception of Dialectic builds on Kant’s 
more limited understanding of it. 
“Kant rates dialectic higher.”9 With these words Hegel describes “one of 
the most important steps in the progress of modern philosophy,”10 and among 
the greatest of Kant’s services. It is a somewhat curious compliment. The use 
of the comparative “higher” suggests that even Kant’s great achievement is 
incomplete. Hegel hails Kant because he plays an important role in the story of 
a more important thing:11 he valued dialectic more than had his predecessors. 
The explanation for this muted or partial praise is that, in Hegel’s view, Kant 
himself did not conceptualize the true nature of dialectic. Kant’s real 
significance was that he furnished Hegel with a notion of dialectic that he 
could use as a springboard to his own, complete grasp or conception of it. For 
the very reason that Hegel holds Kant’s view of dialectic as inadequate but 
necessary, Kant’s view can also serve us in the office of a springboard towards 
our conceptualizing of the Hegelian Dialectic. 
On the first page of the Science of Logic Hegel sums up the teaching of the 
Kantian Philosophy: “Understanding ought not to float above experience.”12 
Hegel is referring to the importance of sense experience in Kant’s thought. 
Kant argued that when Understanding becomes entranced with abstract 
metaphysical questions, it separates itself from sense experience and 
                                                                                                       
Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel’s Logic Begin? in LIMNATIS, Nectarios 
G. (ed.), The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, p. 12-30. London: Continuum, 2010. 
6 See LIMNATIS, Nectarios G. (ed.), The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, London: 
Continuum, 2010, p. 3: “If there is one concept running throughout Hegel’s writings, it 
is perhaps his often mentioned, but not often studied conception of dialectic.” 
7 Zusatz to E §81; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 116. 
8 WdL, p. 56. 
9 WdL, p. 56. 
10 E §48; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 77. 
11 For GWFH’s use of this polemical technique, see PINKARD, Terry. Hegel. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
12 WdL, p. 25. 
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observation and inevitably meets with disaster.13 If disaster is to be avoided, 
more mundane truths will have to suffice, lest, as Hegel aptly expresses it, “we 
take hold on clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth.”14 Surveying the 
results of his thoroughgoing Critique of Pure Reason’s pretensions, Kant 
writes: 
 
We have found indeed, that although we had contemplated building a tower 
which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a 
dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of 
experience.15 
 
Kant maintains that when the mind detaches itself from sense experience there 
inevitably arise what he calls “pseudo-rational doctrines”16 which can neither 
be confirmed or refuted. Kant calls the most important of these “The 
Antinomies of Pure Reason” and he treats them in the Division of his Critique 
of Pure Reason called “Transcendental Dialectic.” The Antinomies are 
especially important because they originate in four perennial metaphysical 
questions. These may be paraphrased as “Does God exist?,” “Is every action 
predetermined?,” “Are things made up of atoms?” and “Is the universe 
infinite?” Kant readily admits that there are other metaphysical questions; what 
makes the Antinomies so important is that irrefutable arguments can be made 
for answering each both affirmatively and negatively. Kant expresses this 
situation graphically in the Critique of Pure Reason by taking up each 
Antinomy in turn and placing the “pseudo-rational doctrines” pro and contra 
on opposite sides of the page. Since one doctrine is as irrefutable as its 
opposite, Kant argues that pure reason can not resolve these questions with an 
“either/or” decision, but can only realize that both positions rest on an 
unavoidable illusion. 
Rather than look at these arguments and the conclusions Kant draws from 
them in detail, it is best to grasp the significance of Kant’s Antinomies for 
Hegel. It was through them, according to Hegel, that Kant elevated Dialectic. 
What makes the Antinomies dialectical on the simplest level is that they 
juxtapose two doctrines. “Dialectic” comes from a Greek word meaning “to 
converse.” It takes at least two parties to have a conversation. Most simply 
then, the Antinomies are “conversations.” But they are conversations of a 
special kind, and special not so much because of their subject matter, but 
                                                
13 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B349-B355.  
14 PhG (Baillie), p. 131.  
15 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 573 (B735). 
16 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 394 (B449) 
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because of the inconclusive nature of the conversations in question: instead of 
agreeing the two parties flatly contradict one another. 
 Zeno is called the father of Dialectic17 and his paradoxes can help us to 
understand Kant’s Antinomies. Everyday we experience reaching our 
destination. Along comes Zeno proving that it is impossible for anything to 
ever get where it is going. It must first of all, he argued, travel half the distance 
to its goal, and then half the distance again. At this rate, it never arrives. 
Everyone knows that things in fact reach their destinations, but Zeno’s 
argument remains a logical one. Here Dialectic is a conversation not between 
two speakers but between everyday experience and a reasonable argument. 
 Zeno’s Paradoxes should be kept in mind while we listen to Kant 
explaining what the Antinomies are and what they are not. 
 
A dialectical doctrine of pure reason must therefore be distinguished from all 
sophistical propositions in two respects. It must not refer to an arbitrary 
question such as may be raised for some special purpose, but to one which 
human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress. And secondly, both 
it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial illusion such as at once 
vanishes upon detection, but a natural and unavoidable illusion, which even 
after it has ceased to beguile still continues to delude though not to deceive 
us, and which though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be 
eradicated.18 
 
The key to this passage is the distinction between the artificial illusion of 
sophistical propositions (a probable reference to Zeno) and the “natural 
illusion” of the Antinomies. It is this “natural illusion,” expressed by Hegel as 
“the necessity of contradiction,”19 which is the seed of his conception of 
Dialectic. Listen now to the way in which Hegel describes the Antinomies: 
 
The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work 
oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show 
that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, 
naturally veers round into its opposite.20 
 
Both men agree that the Antinomies are unavoidable, but Hegel radically 
expands their domain. Kant has only four Antinomies: Hegel finds as many as 
there are what he calls “abstract propositions of understanding.” 
                                                
17 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, IX.25, attributed to ARISTOTLE. 
18 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 394 (B449-B450). 
19 Werke, IV, p. 54; translation mine, cf. WdL, p. 56. 
20 Zusatz to E §81; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 117. 
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 To account for this discrepancy, Hegel’s criticism of the Antinomies as he 
finds them in Kant must be analyzed. The problem here is that, Hegel identifies 
many errors: Kant has used shabby arguments for each of the speakers pro and 
contra in the conversations,21 he has no good argument as to why there should 
be exactly four,22 the selection of the particular four he finds arbitrary,23 and 
most importantly, Kant has failed to grasp the source of the necessity of the 
contradiction. The remainder of my explication will consider only Hegel’s 
final criticism: on this issue Hegel attacks Kant from the standpoint of his own 
conception of Dialectic. 
Although Kant saw the question “Does God exist?” as the basis for an 
Antinomy, he was neither an atheist nor an agnostic. His point was not that it is 
impossible for God to exist, but only that when reason tries to prove God’s 
existence—or the opposite—it runs into unavoidable contradictions. Of his 
criticism of reason in relation to such questions, Kant wrote: “I have therefore 
found it necessary to deny knowledge to make room for faith.”24 For Kant, the 
Antinomies are merely one phase of a larger project: his Critique of Pure 
Reason.  
Hegel’s reply is swift and sure. Kant’s mistake is identified as “an excess 
of tenderness for the things of this world.”25 Hegel wants to know the things 
that Kant took on faith. From Hegel’s point of view, Kant’s attitude towards 
reason is precisely the opposite of what it should be. That of all people a 
thinker should, when confronting a difficulty, merely throw up his hands and 
pin the blame on thinking, is ridiculous. Rather than distrust our reason, we 
should seek some other explanation for our difficulties. Hegel’s reaction to 
Kant’s critique of reason is simply: “it is not easy to understand why, 
conversely, a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust.”26 How then 
does Hegel propose that our distrust be allocated? How can reason be 
rehabilitated? 
Perhaps the easiest solution would be to do away entirely with all 
“tenderness for the things of the world.” If Kant’s mistake was to denigrate 
reason, the solution must be to turn the tables and denigrate experience of the 
world. Kant had seen contradictions in four problems and had blamed reason 
for them. Perhaps we should see the “things of this world” as the source of 
contradiction, and leave reason, our nearest and dearest friend, untainted by 
illusion. 
                                                
21 Zusatz to E §48; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 79. 
22 E §48; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 77-78. 
23 Werke, VI, p. 45. 
24 KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 29 (Bxxx). 
25 E §48; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 77.  
26 PhG (Baillie), p. 132. 
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Although Hegel is an idealist,27 this is not the solution he proposes. The 
central distinction in Hegel’s philosophy is not between the world and our 
reason—indeed that distinction will be collapsed in his version of “Absolute 
Idealism”—but within the mind itself. The key to Hegel’s rehabilitation of 
Reason [Vernunft] is his distinction between it and Understanding [Verstand].28 
The term Understanding has already been encountered, namely in Hegel’s 
interpretation of the Antinomies quoted above. What the Antinomies show is 
“that every abstract proposition of understanding veers round into its 
opposite.” At first glance, it is the word “every” that is most striking, and the 
contrast between the four Antinomies of Kant and the potentially infinite 
number for Hegel was duly noted. But the ground of the Antinomies is in fact 
what Hegel calls “Understanding.” By grasping the distinction between 
Understanding and Reason, Hegel’s interpretation of the Antinomies, the 
relationship between them and Dialectic, and finally the place of Dialectic 
within the larger framework of Hegel’s Logic, will become intelligible. 
Hegel defines Understanding in the following way: “Thought, as 
Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one 
another: every such limited abstract it treats as though it had a subsistence and 
                                                
27 More specifically, GWFH is an “absolute idealist.” See the Zusatz to E §45 of the 
Encyclopaedia: “Nach der Kantischen Philosophie sind die Dinge, von denen wir 
wissen, nur Erscheinungen für uns, und das Ansich derselben bleibt für uns ein uns 
unzugängliches Jenseits. An diesem subjektiven Idealismus, wonach dasjenige, was den 
Inhalt unseres Bewußtseins bildet, ein nur Unsriges, nur durch uns Gesetztes ist, hat das 
unbefangene Bewußtsein mit Recht Anstoß genommen. Das wahre Verhältnis ist in der 
Tat dieses, daß die Dinge, von denen wir unmittelbar wissen, nicht nur für uns, sondern 
an sich bloße Erscheinungen sind und daß dieses die eigene Bestimmung der hiermit 
endlichen Dinge ist, den Grund ihres Seins nicht in sich selbst, sondern in der 
allgemeinen göttlichen Idee zu haben. Diese Auffassung der Dinge ist dann gleichfalls 
als Idealismus, jedoch im Unterschied von jenem subjektiven Idealismus der kritischen 
Philosophie als absoluter Idealismus zu bezeichnen, welcher absolute Idealismus, 
obschon über das gemein realistische Bewußtsein hinausgehend, doch der Sache nach 
so wenig bloß als ein Eigentum der Philosophie zu betrachten ist, daß derselbe vielmehr 
die Grundlage alles religiösen Bewußtseins bildet, insofern nämlich auch dieses den 
Inbegriff alles dessen, was da ist, überhaupt die vorhandene Welt, als von Gott 
erschaffen und regiert betrachtet.” Although the approach I am taking in this chapter is 
more epistemological, an adequate grasp of GWFH’s thought requires conceptualizing 
his “Absolute Idealism” (as defined by GWFH here) in ontological terms as well.   
28 For a crystal clear analysis of Reflexion, GWFH’s original term for Verstand, see 
HORSTMANN, Rolf-Peter, Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen in PÖGGELER, Otto (ed.), 
Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie, p. 43-58, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1977, 
at p. 50-1. 
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being of its own.”29 One of the examples used by Hegel himself will make this 
compressed statement clear. Biology is the science that studies Life.30 “Life” as 
the object of a science, is, in Hegel's view, an example of one of 
Understanding’s limited abstract entities. Life is treated as though it had a 
being of its own by distinguishing it from Death. Both Life and Death, and the 
resulting dividing-line between them, are the creations of Understanding. Each 
is viewed as wholly outside of the other; as though each were independent. The 
limitation of such a view is expressed in the familiar paradox: “You begin to 
die the day you are born.” Hegel’s manner of saying this is richer, but the basic 
thought is the same: 
 
We say, for instance, that man is mortal, and seem to think that the ground of 
his death is in external circumstances only; so that if this way of looking were 
correct, man would have two special properties, vitality and also mortality. 
But the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death 
and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-
suppression.31 
 
In this example, the “finite” is either Life or Death when viewed “as though it 
had a subsistence and being of its own.” The reason that the Finite is “radically 
self-contradictory” is that such an abstract entity is defined only by affirming 
its opposite; i.e. Death. The abstract propositions of Understanding thus owe 
their existence to a contradiction.32 Since to affirm Life is just as much to 
affirm the opposite, the Finite unavoidably suppresses itself. The same 
relationship that Kant described graphically by means of the two contrary 
arguments on opposite sides of the page is here expanded to all of the 
abstractions of the Understanding. Just as for Kant there was an equally valid 
argument to affirm freedom as there was to deny it, so here there are equally 
valid grounds for seeing death as a part of life as for seeing life as a part of 
death. Hegel’s “Antinomies,” are not, however, caused by turning away from 
experience, as Kant had claimed: they are the inevitable logical result of 
                                                
29 E §80; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 113. 
30 FOUCAULT, Michel, The Order of Things; An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
New York: Pantheon, 1971 demonstrates (p. 265) that this use of “biology” is 
anachronistic.  
31 Zusatz to E §81; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 116-7. 
32 A view that depends on the famous dictum of SPINOZA (Letter to Jarig Jellis of 2 
June 1674) that omnis determinatio est negatio; see the illuminating analysis of 
PARKINSON, G.H.R. Hegel, Pantheism, and Spinoza, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
v. 38, n. 3, p. 449-459, 1977 at p. 451.  
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Understanding’s proclivity to make distinctions between things that must be 
conceptualized as a Whole.33 
Thousands of years earlier, Heraclitus expressed this idea by saying 
“Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest.”34 By 
observing that health is good only because disease is bad, Heraclitus saw that it 
was dependent; in Hegel’s words that it was “finite” and “radically self-
contradictory.” On the very same example of life and death, Heraclitus had 
made the cryptic statement: “Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living their 
death and dying their life.”35 Heraclitus is relevant to the discussion because of 
the conclusion he drew from these observations. He said simply: “Everything 
flows.”36 It is easy to see that if everything flows, there is nothing permanent 
on which the mind can hold. Each thing flows into its opposite and the result is 
that no distinctions can be made. Will the conclusion that Hegel draws from 
similar observations lead to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible? 
The first step is to grasp that for Hegel it is not everything that flows, but 
only the one-sided abstractions of the Understanding when treated as though 
each had a being of its own,37 i.e. when treated in a one-sided or non-
Dialectical manner. For Hegel, every creation of the cut and dried distinctions 
of Understanding is forced, by the very nature of the logical principles that 
make them possible, to converse with its opposite. This is their essence. This is 
what it means to say that the finite characterizations of Understanding 
necessarily pass over into Dialectic. The “necessity of contradiction” has been 
ripped out of the narrow context in which Kant had placed it, and is made by 
Hegel into the distinctive feature of Understanding’s way of understanding 
everything. Hegel’s immediate problem is to put this failure of Understanding 
within a framework that will avoid the Heraclitean conclusion that knowledge 
is impossible. 
                                                
33 For the corresponding “farewell to Hegel” (p. 144) see ADORNO, Theodor W., 
Negative Dialectics, translated by E.B. Ashton, New York: Continuum, 1973, pp. 135-
158.  
34 In KIRK, G. S. and RAVEN, J. E. The Presocratic Philosophers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957; p. 189, Fragment #204.  
35 KIRK and RAVEN, #242 (p. 210).  
36 PLATO, Cratylus, 402a. 
37 DAHLSTROM, Daniel O. Between Being and Essence in Di Giovanni, George ed. 
Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 99-111. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990; 
p. 109: “For what proves contradictory is the notion that the determinations of 
reflection, e.g. the poles of opposition, have a self-sufficiency of their own or have been 
posited by something other than the movement of reflection itself.” The influence of 
SPINOZA should once again be noted. 
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Instead of distinguishing sharply between the mind and the world—as 
Kant had done—Hegel’s solution was to make a distinction within the mind 
itself. One part of the mind has now been defined as Understanding; the key to 
the rehabilitation of knowledge will be the faculty of mind called Reason. 
Introducing distinctions can often help to solve a problem. But Hegel’s account 
of Understanding has created a problem that most philosophers avoid. By 
showing the Dialectic into which the distinctions of Understanding inevitably 
pass, Hegel has undermined his own ability to make distinctions, including the 
one between Reason and Understanding. As a product of Hegel’s 
Understanding, Hegel’s Verstand itself, like any other finite abstraction, should 
be radically self-contradictory. The solution to this difficulty lies in grasping 
that Understanding and Reason are for Hegel both distinct and integrated. They 
are inseparable to such a degree, in fact, that the previous account of 
Understanding has already included an aspect of Reason. The first appearance 
of Reason is the Dialectic in which these abstractions are inevitably involved. 
Reason is that which shows the finite abstractions of Understanding to be self-
contradictory. It is Reason that requires that the abstractions of Understanding 
pass over into their opposites. Reason as Dialectic is the concept of 
Understanding. 
Reason is something more than merely Dialectic, however. Hegel calls 
Dialectic the negative aspect of Reason. There remains its positive aspect. Just 
as negative Reason—in the form of Dialectic—proved to be the essence of 
Understanding, positive Reason is the essence of negative Reason. The very 
nature of Understanding’s creations led to Dialectic: in trying to create self-
subsistent entities, it created a conversation between two interdependent 
entities. In the same way that each entity makes the other possible, positive 
Reason makes the Dialectic between them possible. The reason that two 
opposite abstractions must converse is that neither can stand alone, and the 
Reason for that is: that in reality they are not two at all, but one.38 
Understanding takes one part out of a whole and treats it as a whole. This starts 
up a conversation between the part and the rest of the whole, which is therefore 
one-sidedly treated as another whole. The reason that the two parts must 
converse is that they are, in reality, parts of one whole. In fact, they are the 
whole. In treating its finite abstractions as self-subsistent, Understanding 
sought to create sovereign units; i.e. it treated what were in fact parts of a 
whole as if they were a whole. Negative Reason shows that these units are in 
                                                
38 WdL, p. 835: “The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have 
arrived, is the sublating of the contradiction, but just as little as the contradiction is it an 
act of external relection, but rather the innermost, most objective moment of life and 
spirit, through which a subject, a person, a free being, exists.” 
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no way sovereign; as soon as Understanding defines one unit, another unit—
opposite to it—comes into being. The reason for this inevitable opposition—
this inevitable dialectical “conversation”—is that in reality, no such opposition 
can be made. Positive Reason shows that the two participants in the Dialectic 
are one; it is because they are one that they must converse. 
Understanding, negative Reason, and positive Reason proceed from one to 
two to one. Negative and positive Reason are merely different aspects of the 
relationship of two to one. In its negative aspect, Reason shows that Two is 
inherent in Understanding’s merely momentary One, and in its positive aspect, 
that One is inherent in negative Reason’s Two. Reason is the simultaneity of 
the two ways in which One and Two are simultaneous. Both Reason and 
Understanding therefore end up with unities. But the process from One to Two 
to One is not circular because the One created by Understanding is different 
from the One created by Reason. The “one” of Understanding tried to exclude 
two. The One of Reason is made up of Two. From one to two to one is the soul 
of Hegel’s Logic.39 
 Within this framework, Hegel’s characterization of Dialectic as “the 
principle of all natural and spiritual life” becomes intelligible. The abstractions 
of Understanding 
attempt to reduce life to a series of lifeless units. But life will not be dealt with 
in this way. As the previous example showed: treating life as finite leads 
inevitably to the Dialectic between life and death. But Dialectic between two 
finite abstractions is not the last word of Hegel’s Logic: if it were, knowledge 
would be impossible. Knowledge is grasping the necessity of the movement 
from one to two to one. The truth is the whole of this process, not any one 
merely momentary part of it. The contradictions of Dialectic are grounded in 
the process as a whole, and rather than being hindrances to knowledge,40 
become the life and soul of science. Hegel writes: 
 
The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say the 
former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the 
blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the 
fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not 
merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being compatible with one 
another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at 
                                                
39 The difference between the first “One” and the second is that the latter includes the 
moment of “Two.” The “problem of time” may be said to arise from the fact that it is 
precisely a “process” that separates the two. 
40 WdL, p. 831: “It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is 
once more recognized as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it 
must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant.” 
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the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not 
contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this 
equal necessity of all moments constitutes the life of the whole.41 
 
For Kant, the dialectics of the Antinomies stood squarely in the face of 
Reason’s attempt to know the whole, and thereby played a key role in the 
project of limiting reason to make room for faith. In Hegel’s hands, the 
necessity of contradiction, far from limiting knowledge of the whole, demands 
it. The dialectic of the finite becomes the road to the infinite.  
But once a single step is taken on this road, there is no turning back. For 
how can knowledge be finite? If we would pretend that it was finite, the law of 
the Dialectic would show that our conception of knowledge was itself a mere 
abstraction of the Understanding. To exist at all, knowledge must be complete; 
i.e. Absolute. Moreover, knowledge consists in the infinite repetition of the 
process from one to two to one. The result of these two requirements is the 
Hegelian system. Considering that his logic forces him to begin with the whole 
and work his way down,42 it comes as no surprise that he always had difficulty 
beginning his books. But by grasping that he must know everything to know 
anything, the boundless pretensions of the Hegelian system become less 
mysterious. 
 
I.1.1.2 The Last Triad in Hegel’s Logic 
 
 Too many books devote careful attention to the first Triad in Hegel’s 
System as a way of explaining the Hegelian Dialectic:43 there is no need to 
rehearse this well-worn material one more time. It’s a pity, too: since the 
distinction between Being and Becoming is central to what I have called 
“Platonism,” their synthesis in Hegel’s first Triad would seem to be 
particularly relevant. But the comparison is a specious one: by “Being,” Hegel 
scarcely meant what Plato meant.44 The grounds of Hegel’s rejection of 
Platonic Being are not found in the First Triad but in his attack on Kant’s 
                                                
41 PhG (Baillie), p. 68. 
42 With which the method of Plato’s Eleatic Stranger in Sophist and Statesman should 
be compared; for GWFH on these dialogues, see in particular LPH (Volume 2), 62-8.  
43 See, for example, HOULGATE, Stephen, Freedom, Truth and History: An 
Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1991. 
44 For PLATO in Republic VI-VII, “Being”—sharply opposed to “Becoming,” which 
stands in an intermediate position between “what is” and “what is not”—is unchanging, 
i.e. timeless, and therefore the locus of the Idea of the Good, eternal exemplar of “an 
evaluative criterion.” 
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“Thing-in-itself,”45 in his unmasking of “the Unhappy Consciousness,”46 in the 
whole anti-dualistic tenor of his thought. If any reader requires from me an 
account of Hegel’s “Being, Nothing, and Becoming”—and the latter, I should 
add, is identical to what Plato meant by the same word—I will point them to 
Paul Redding’s version: a miracle of succinct presentation.47 For my part, I will 
try something new: I will use as the paradigmatic example of the Hegelian 
Dialectic not the first but the last triad in Hegel’s Logic as presented in the 
Encyclopedia.48 
 “Die Absolute Idee” has an impeccable genealogy in Hegelian terms: it is 
the synthetic Third moment of a Triad49 that is itself the Third50 of a Third.51 
The “Absolute Idea” is thus the synthesis of Sein and Wesen (as Begriff),  of 
Subjektivität and Objektivität (as Idee), and of Leben and Erkennen (as die 
Absolute Idee). Only “Philosophie” (the final Third of the Third Part of the 
System as a whole; “Die Absolute Idee” is by contrast the culmination of 
Logic, the System’s First Part) can boast a larger number of Thirds in its 
family tree. But “Die Absolute Idee” is specifically mentioned in “Philosophie” 
(the final moment of The Philosophy of Spirit)52 and can therefore scarcely said 
to be absent even at the end. Of course no moment is or could be absent at the 
end: “The True is the Whole.” Moreover, although Logic precedes Nature and 
Spirit in the System, each can be conceived as being the Middle Term that 
connects the other two:53 there is no End or Beginning in a Circle. 
                                                
45 KANT even employs PLATO’s word for the realm of “Being;” it is noumenal as 
opposed to phenomenal, i.e. the “Ding an sich” is a noumenon. 
46 In the PhG, “the Unhappy Consciousness” is the primitive stage wherein a difference 
between God and Man—and by extension, between noumenal and phenomenal 
(KANT) and Being and Becoming (PLATO)—has not yet been overcome “in Christ.” 
47 REDDING, Paul in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
48 Compare WdL, p. 824-44. 
49 Consisting of “Life,” “Knowledge,” and “The Absolute Idea.” 
50 Consisting of “Subjectivity,” “Objectivity,” and “The Idea.” 
51 Consisting of “Being,” “Essence,” and “Concept.” 
52 E §574: “Dieser Begriff der Philosophie ist die sich denkende Idee, die wissende 
Wahrheit (§ 236), das Logische mit der Bedeutung, daß es die im konkreten Inhalte als 
in seiner Wirklichkeit bewährte Allgemeinheit ist.”  
53 See E §575, §576, and §577. In the §577—the last paragraph of the Encyclopedia—
the Logische Idee (i.e. “Die Absolute Idee”) stands in the middle between Nature and 
Spirit. “Der dritte Schluß [the two preceding paragraphs have arranged the three in two 
other syllogisms as Logic, Nature, and Spirit (§575) and Nature, Spirit, and Logic 
(§576)] ist die Idee der Philosophie, welche die sich wissende Vernunft [meaning, 
presumably, that it is the Reason that knows itself while thinking “die sich denkende 
Idee”], das Absolut-Allgemeine [i.e. die Logische Idee] zu ihrer Mitte hat, die sich in 
Geist und Natur entzweit [in other words, “Die Absolute Idee” divides itself into Spirit 
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 Although the System’s First Triad has received more scholarly attention,54 
the last Triad of the Logic is dramatic not only because it is—as shown in the 
preceding paragraph—very much present at the end of the System as a whole; 
i.e. not simply because it is last. It is also very much a fresh beginning: in the 
last paragraph, Hegel describes how the Logical Idea resolves to freely release 
itself into Nature.55 And Nature, of course, is the middle of the System 
                                                                                                       
and Nature], jenen [sc. Spirit] zur Voraussetzung als den Prozeß der subjektiven 
Tätigkeit der Idee [note that “Die Absolute Idee” is the synthesis of subjectivity—here 
linked with Spirit—and objectivity; about to be conjoined by GWFH with Nature] und 
diese [sc. Nature] zum allgemeinen Extreme macht, als den Prozeß der an sich, 
objektiv, seienden Idee [this, as we will see, directly recalls the language of the last 
paragraph of “Die Absolute Idee” as it releases itself freely into Nature]. Das Sich-
Urteilen [a crucial expression preserving the etymology of “Urteil” as primordial 
division; here “Die Absolute Idee” of Logic “sich in Geist und Natur entzweit” and thus 
is the Middle between the two] der Idee in die beiden Erscheinungen (§575/6) [each of 
the three juggled syllogisms is—taken alone—a mere appearance] bestimmt dieselben 
als ihre (der sich wissenden Vernunft) [see above] Manifestationen [the first shall be 
last: Logic has the last word and as true Middle subsumes the other two figures as 
manifestations of it], und es vereinigt sich in ihr [three are one in it], daß die Natur der 
Sache, der Begriff [itself a third that embraces two], es ist, die sich fortbewegt und 
entwickelt [in other words, “Die Absolute Idee” advanced and developed itself into 
Nature and Spirit], und diese Bewegung ebensosehr die Tätigkeit des Erkennens ist [not 
to be confused with “knowledge” of an external object: “der sich wissenden Vernunft” 
is thinking itself (as “Absolute Idee”) in Nature, Spirit, and Logic], die ewige an und für 
sich seiende Idee [GWFH uses this formula for “die Absolute Idee” in the Zusatz to 
§236] sich ewig als absoluter Geist betätigt, erzeugt und genießt.” 
54 But not as insightfully as JANET, Paul, Études sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans 
Hégel, Paris: Librairie philosophiqe du Ladrange, 1861, p. 355: “Il y a une autre idée 
qui entre également dans le devenir, et don’t il n’y a pas trace dans les les deux 
premiers termes; c’est l’idée du temps. Qu’est-ce en effet que le devenir? C’est, suivant 
Hégel, l’identitie de l’être et du néant. Je le nie: le devenir est le passage de l’être au 
néant et du néant à l’être [this notion of time refutes the “proof” offered by 
McTAGGART in 1908], ce qui est bien different. Ce passage ne peut avoir lieu que 
dans le temps: ce n’est que dans le temps que l’être et le néant peuvent se concilier: ils 
se concilient en se succédent.” Vive la France! 
55 E §244: “Die Idee, welche für sich ist [note that it is not, as in E §577, “die ewige an 
und für sich seiende Idee”], nach dieser ihrer Einheit mit sich [as “die sich denkende 
Idee”] betrachtet [in other words, when we consider it as the Idea thinking itself ], ist 
sie Anschauen [in other words, it is not only us who consider it: es sich 
anschaut/betrachtet by being the Anschauen of itself]; und die anschauende Idee Natur 
[insofar as it thinks itself, it does so as Nature: die anschauende Idee]. Als Anschauen 
aber ist die Idee in einseitiger Bestimmung der Unmittelbarkeit oder Negation 
[Anschauen assumes itself to be the immediate Anschauung of something external to 
itself; this only appears to be the case here] durch äußerliche Reflexion [“nach dieser 
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consisting of the Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit. The 
metaphor of circle where every moment is both end and beginning—a 
metaphor that seems very mechanical and hard to take seriously at times56—is 
very palpable in die Absolute Idee: it is the end of the Logic that is (by the 
same token) the beginning of Nature that is itself the middle of the System. 
 The section called “die absolute Idee” consists of nine paragraphs (§236-
§244) of which the first two are introductory. The first (§236) reminds us that 
even die Idee (of which “die absolute Idee” is, as it were, the Concept) was the 
unity of subjectivity and objectivity: this prepares us to accept Hegel’s 
definition of “the absolute Idea” as the Idea that thinks itself: it is, in itself, 
both subject (in that it thinks) and object (in that it is that of which it thinks).57 
                                                                                                       
ihrer Einheit mit sich betrachtet”] gesetzt [just as Nature is the second moment of the 
System, so is Reflexion—the essence of Wesen—the second moment of the Logic]. Die 
absolute Freiheit der Idee [this sentence hearkens back to the prior Triad of Life, 
Knowledge and Idea] aber ist, daß sie nicht bloß ins Leben übergeht, noch als endliches 
Erkennen dasselbe in sich scheinen läßt, sondern in der absoluten Wahrheit ihrer selbst 
sich entschließt, das Moment ihrer Besonderheit oder des ersten Bestimmens und 
Andersseins [i.e. as Nature], die unmittelbare Idee [i.e. die Absolute Idee] als ihren 
Widerschein [as its Reflexion; as if it were external to itself and being looked at 
externally by an other whereas in fact it is merely its own Widerschein], sich als Natur 
[Nature is the Absolute Idea as Widerschein of itself] frei aus sich zu entlassen [the 
Absolute Idea that freely releases itself into its own reflection].” See MARCUSE, 
Herbert, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, translated by Seyla Benhabib, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 184-5. 
56 WdL, p. 842 (emphasis mine): “By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, 
the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back 
into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle 
of circles, for each member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in 
returning unto the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. 
Links of this chain are the individual sciences {of logic, nature and spirit}, each of 
which has an antecedent and a successor—or, expressed more accurately, has only the 
antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion.” The fact that GWFH sees this 
circular logical “life”—with its beginnings, returns, conclusions, antecedents, and 
successors—as completely atemporal is precisely “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History.” 
57 E §236 (emphasis mine): “Die Idee als Einheit der subjektiven und der objektiven 
Idee ist der Begriff der Idee, dem die Idee als solche der Gegenstand, dem das Objekt 
sie ist; - ein Objekt, in welches alle Bestimmungen zusammengegangen sind. Diese 
Einheit ist hiermit die absolute und alle Wahrheit, die sich selbst denkende Idee, und 
zwar hier als denkende, als logische Idee”). Note that it is this paragraph to which 
GWFH refers in §574. In the Zusatz, he uses two other expressions that join our passage 
to the end of the System as a whole: he uses νοησιs νοησεωs, the Aristotelian formula 
with which the whole Encyclopedia closes, and defines his subject here as “die an und 
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In addition to using the metaphor of the Old Man that will prove to be 
extremely important hereafter,58 the second paragraph (§237) makes Hegel’s 
meaning more transparent than the first: “the absolute Idea” is in fact 
something that we all know perfectly well. It is the entire Logic that we are 
now almost finished reading.59 If its Content is all that has gone before—all 
that we have read up to this point60—its Form is none other than what Hegel 
calls “the Method of this content.”61 After this introduction, he then devotes the 
                                                                                                       
für sich seiende und hiermit absolute Idee.” The Zusatz as a whole reminds us that we 
are dealing with the synthesis of Life and Knowledge: in so far as the Idea has Life, it 
can (as subject) have Knowledge. But it can also have Knowledge of Life (as object).    
58 GWFH uses der Greis (i.e. the old man) to illustrate the proposition that the whole is 
contained in the end—we will see that GWFH does not see Old Age as enfeeblement 
but as Completion (see I.1.2.1)—at E §237 Zusatz (emphases mine): “Die absolute Idee 
ist in dieser Hinsicht dem Greis zu vergleichen, der dieselben Religionssätze ausspricht 
als das Kind, für welchen dieselben aber die Bedeutung seines ganzen Lebens haben. 
Wenn auch das Kind den religiösen Inhalt versteht, so gilt ihm derselbe doch nur als ein 
solches, außerhalb dessen noch das ganze Leben und die ganze Welt liegt. - Ebenso 
verhält es sich dann auch mit dem menschlichen Leben überhaupt und den 
Begebenheiten, die den Inhalt desselben ausmachen. Alle Arbeit ist nur auf das Ziel 
gerichtet, und wenn dies erreicht ist, so ist man verwundert, nichts anderes zu finden als 
eben dies, was man wollte. Das Interesse liegt in der ganzen Bewegung. Wenn der 
Mensch sein Leben verfolgt, dann kann ihm das Ende als sehr beschränkt erscheinen, 
aber der ganze decursus vitae ist es, welcher darin zusammengenommen ist. - So ist 
denn auch der Inhalt der absoluten Idee die ganze Ausbreitung, die wir bisher vor uns 
hatten. Das Letzte ist die Einsicht, daß die ganze Entfaltung den Inhalt und das 
Interesse ausmacht.” The emphasized passages illustrate the proposition that “the True 
is the Whole” and “the Greis metaphor” (as it will be called hereafter) adds a 
Chronological dimension to Logical Completeness. 
59 E §237: “Für sich ist die absolute Idee, weil kein Übergehen noch Voraussetzen und 
überhaupt keine Bestimmtheit, welche nicht flüssig und durchsichtig wäre, in ihr ist, die 
reine Form des Begriffs, die ihren Inhalt als sich selbst anschaut.” GWFH suggests that 
the Form (that ceaselessly flows through its Triads treating none as fixed 
determinations) is a living thing that beholds itself in its Content. It must be 
remembered that die absolute Idee is the synthesis of Leben and Erkennen: it both lives 
and knows (itself) as living. 
60 Zusatz to E §237: “…der wahre Inhalt ist indes kein anderer als das ganze System, 
dessen Entwicklung wir bisher betrachtet haben.” 
61 E §237 (emphasis mine): “Sie ist sich Inhalt, insofern sie das ideelle Unterscheiden 
ihrer selbst von sich [i.e. all the various Bestimmtheiten that have, each in turn, become 
flüssig and durchsichtig, are all merely moments of the absolute Idea] und das eine der 
Unterschiedenen die Identität mit sich ist [the absolute Idea can only be a Totality if it 
combines its Content in a Form that thinks itself], in der aber die Totalität der Form 
als das System der Inhaltsbestimmungen enthalten ist [i.e. the System itself]. Dieser 
Inhalt ist das System des Logischen. Als Form bleibt hier der Idee nichts als [only as] 
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bulk of the section (5 paragraphs: §238-§242) to describing “the Moments of 
the speculative method” (naturally, there are three such moments). Finally 
there are two concluding paragraphs (§243 and §244) the second of which has 
already been considered.62  
 It is the middle section—the five paragraphs containing Hegel’s discussion 
of the speculative Method’s three moments—that contains the section’s Triad 
and therefore illustrates the Hegelian Dialectic. Abstract as the Content of the 
first Triad of “Being, Nothing, and Becoming” undoubtedly was, the last Triad 
is—in the common sense understanding of the word, at any rate—even more 
abstract: its only Content is the System’s own dialectical movement. Hegel, to 
be sure, does not consistently look at it as abstract: the last Triad is to some 
extent the most concrete in the Logic because it contains the rich content of all 
that has preceded it. But it is also his description of a Method: a Form that has 
been (and will be) used again and again. The actual Triad is therefore in no 
way different from the First (or any other) in Form. But he is describing a 
Form that now, for the first time, knows itself as Content. He therefore 
discusses the Last Triad with the objectivity and generality of a critic 
describing “Hegel’s Dialectic” from the outside. Despite its complex position 
                                                                                                       
die Methode dieses Inhalts,—das bestimmte Wissen von der Währung ihrer Momente.” 
It is precisely the Form as System—or rather the Method that thinks itself as Content—
that is described in the section we are considering. Thus it is an ideal passage for 
illustrating the Dialectic: GWFH is not just using the Dialectical Method (as in the First 
Triad) but explaining the moments of that Method itself. Cf. WdL, p. 825: “Therefore 
what remains to be considered here is not content as such, but the universal aspect of its 
form—that is, the method.” 
62 For E §244, see earlier note on the transition to Nature. The other concluding 
paragraph (E §243) is intended to make sure we don’t think the Method (as Form) is 
external to the Content. The only basis on which these two can be distinguished is that 
as Content, each moment within the Concept appeared to possess the Wholeness of the 
Concept; see E §243: “Die Methode ist auf diese Weise nicht äußerliche Form, sondern 
die Seele und der Begriff des Inhalts, von welchem sie nur unterschieden ist, insofern 
die Momente des Begriffs auch an ihnen selbst in ihrer Bestimmtheit dazu kommen, als 
die Totalität des Begriffs zu erscheinen.” In fact, the Form is the flüssigkeit of the 
Content thought (systematically) as Begriff. Thus Content leads back (zurückführt) to 
Form and the Absolute Idea is really just the unity of these two: the particular moments 
are the Content without which “the dialectic of the Concept” could not be Form. “Indem 
diese Bestimmtheit oder der Inhalt sich mit der Form zur Idee zurückführt, so stellt sich 
diese als systematische Totalität dar, welche nur eine Idee ist, deren besondere 
Momente ebensowohl an sich dieselbe sind, als sie durch die Dialektik des Begriffs das 
einfache Fürsichsein der Idee hervorbringen. - Die Wissenschaft schließt auf diese 
Weise damit, den Begriff ihrer selbst zu fassen, als der reinen Idee, für welche die Idee 
ist” (E §243). 
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in the System as a whole—a position I have tried to briefly elucidate above—
the Triad itself is therefore no more complicated than any other. But because it 
is concerned with the dialectical Method itself, it can be elucidated in Hegel’s 
own words without generalizing from them from the outside. After all, 
commentators discuss the First Triad only in order to explain Hegel’s Dialectic 
in general. But Hegel’s discussion of die absolute Idee is Hegel’s own 
discussion of the Dialectic; this makes it a much better Triad to consider as 
paradigmatic. 
 The First Moment of any Triad based on the Speculative Method appears 
to itself (für sich) to be something it is not: an immediate, self-standing 
existent.63 But from the perspective of the Absolute Idea (whose Form is the 
Method), it is judged (urtheilt) to be the mere negative of itself: its crime—i.e. 
the cause of its inadequacy or one-sidedness—is simply that it is the 
Beginning.64 Because it merely begins a process—without the whole of which, 
it merely masquerades as independent—its immediacy is nullified and it itself 
is merely posited as a presupposition of the entire process: it is less Sein than 
Gesetztsein.65 The First Moment, whether it is “Being” in the First Triad or any 
other content informed by the Speculative Method, is conceptually as much the 
Logically Complete Concept as the Second and even the Third (synthetic) 
moment. But its negativity—the fact that it inevitably leads to the dialectic of 
the Second Moment—is implicit in itself simply because as Beginning it must 
necessarily be one-sided in its apparent but fraudulent immediacy. Hegel calls 
it “the (not yet as Concept) posited Concept” and “Begriff an sich.”66 It is not 
                                                
63 E §238: “Die Momente der spekulativen Methode sind α) der Anfang, der das Sein 
oder Unmittelbare ist; für sich aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil er der Anfang ist.”  
64 E §238: “Von der spekulativen Idee aus aber ist es ihr Selbstbestimmen, welches als 
die absolute Negativität oder Bewegung des Begriffs urteilt und sich als das Negative 
seiner selbst setzt.” Posited as immediate beginning—which in fact it is not—it is both 
positive (as being put forward as beginning) and negative (the fact of its “being put 
forward as beginning” means equally that it is not the beginning at all). This division of 
itself into Positive and Negative (one might say that the Negative is implicit in the 
Positing of the Positive) is where the First Moment is judged to be one-sided and 
therefore is subjected to a primal bifurcation. The word “Urteil” is crucial here: it is a 
condemnatory judgment that finds the defendant guilty of being one-sided and therefore 
primordially divides it into two parts.    
65 E §238: “Das Sein, das für den Anfang als solchen als abstrakte Affirmation 
erscheint, ist so vielmehr die Negation, Gesetztsein, Vermitteltsein überhaupt und 
Vorausgesetztsein.”  
66 E §238 (emphasis mine): “Aber als die Negation des Begriffs, der in seinem 
Anderssein schlechthin identisch mit sich und die Gewißheit seiner selbst ist, ist es der 
noch nicht als Begriff gesetzte Begriff oder der Begriff an sich.” It is the Concept, but 
since, as first, it must enter as the merely posited Concept, it is the concept that is not 
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yet the Begriff that knows itself as Begriff and is therefore a mere incomplete 
generality.67 But this self-misunderstanding belongs to the First Moment only 
as determinate Content. As Form—and that is what we are now considering —
the whole process has now become transparent to itself and therefore even the 
First Moment knows itself to be what it is: a merely First Moment.  
Of the five paragraphs that constitute Hegel’s discussion of the 
Speculative Method, the first (§238) and last (§242) are devoted, respectively, 
to the First and Third moments of the Dialectic. This division means that the 
Second moment—he calls it “the second sphere”—receives three full 
paragraphs (§239-§241) and therefore the most attention. The virtues of using 
die absolute Idee as paradigm quickly become apparent when these three 
central paragraphs are considered.  
Hegel introduces the Second Moment as the Progress (Fortgang) into 
bifurcation of the Idea—or indeed any other Content—arising automatically 
from the fact that it was posited as a beginning in the first place. “Der 
Fortgang ist das gesetzte Urteil der Idee.”68 Its bifurcation (the German word 
“Ur-teil” means “primal division”) is simultaneously a judgment (“Urteil” as 
“guilty verdict”) on its merely posited (gesetzt) status as immediate Universal. 
It is therefore subject to the Dialectic: “Das unmittelbare Allgemeine ist als der 
Begriff an sich die Dialektik, an ihm selbst seine Unmittelbarkeit und 
Allgemeinheit zu einem Momente herabzusetzen.”69 It is most refreshing to 
attend to the way Hegel himself introduces die Dialektik. Because the First 
Moment is not the complete Concept but merely the Begriff an sich, its 
“immediate universality” is the Dialectic! Dialectic is not something that 
                                                                                                       
yet itself. In the “Absolute Idea,” this is all transparent: the Method knows that the 
Beginning can only be posited and therefore must progress to the negation of itself. The 
First Triad lacks this self-knowledge.   
67 E §238: “Dies Sein ist darum als der noch unbestimmte, d. i. nur an sich oder 
unmittelbar bestimmte Begriff ebensosehr das Allgemeine.” As a Universal, it might be 
said to be a Whole that contains the other two moments. On the other hand, the one-
sidedness of this Universal—lacking the further Content inevitably developing from its 
one-sidedness—shows it to be a Part lacking a Whole. Therefore GWFH spends the rest 
of the paragraph (and the Zusatz) explaining how the Speculative Method is both 
analytic (First Moment as Whole) and synthetic (First Moment as Part). “Die 
philosophische Methode [i.e. the Speculative Method] ist sowohl analytisch als auch 
synthetisch, jedoch nicht in dem Sinn eines bloßen Nebeneinander oder einer bloßen 
Abwechslung dieser beiden Methoden des endlichen Erkennens [a synonym for 
Verstand], sondern vielmehr so, daß sie dieselben als aufgehoben in sich enthält und 
demgemäß in einer jeden ihrer Bewegungen sich als analytisch und synthetisch zugleich 
verhält” (E §238, Zusatz).     
68 E §239. 
69 E §239. 
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happens to some Content from outside: the Speculative Method is no merely 
external Form. The First Moment is the Dialectic by virtue of its one-sidedness 
wherein its so-called “universality” and “immediacy” are what they are: mere 
moments of the complete Concept that knows itself as complete, i.e. as 
Concept. The Second Moment is merely a negative judgment on the 
“immediacy” of the First: it is thus the First Moment’s mirror image (both 
different and the same, identical and opposite). “Es ist damit das Negative des 
Anfangs oder das Erste in seiner Bestimmtheit [compare Spinoza’s omnis 
determinatio est negatio] gesetzt; es ist für eines, die Beziehung 
Unterschiedener, - Moment der Reflexion.”70 This, then, is the first of three 
paragraphs on the Second Moment.71 
But it is the second of the three paragraphs (§240)—as it were, the middle 
of the middle of this middle72—that will prove to be most revealing.   
                                                
70 E §239. GWFH returns to the analytic/synthetic question in the last sentence of the 
paragraph: “Dieser Fortgang ist ebensowohl analytisch, indem durch die immanente 
Dialektik nur das gesetzt wird, was im unmittelbaren Begriffe enthalten ist, - als 
synthetisch, weil in diesem Begriffe dieser Unterschied noch nicht gesetzt war.” Here 
again, the Dialectic is immanent in the one-sided Gesetztsein of the Beginning.  
71 Another important aspect of GWFH’s treatment of the Last Triad in the Logic is that 
he connects his discussion of the Speculative Method with his System as a whole. This 
is readily apparent in the Zusatz to E §239. He begins by reminding us that the Second 
Moment proves that the First was not what it appeared to be. “Im Fortgang der Idee 
erweist der Anfang sich als das was er an sich ist, nämlich als das Gesetzte und 
Vermittelte und nicht als das Seiende und Unmittelbare.” These pairings—“mediated” 
and “immediate,” “posited” and “existent”—are extremely important; the second pair in 
particular. As gesetzt, the First Moment is not seiende: its Sein is in fact Gesetztsein. 
GWFH then proceeds to apply these distinctions to the other two parts—Nature and 
Spirit—of the System as a whole. “Nur für das selbst unmittelbare Bewußtsein ist die 
Natur das Anfängliche und Unmittelbare und der Geist das durch dieselbe Vermittelte.” 
Only because our own immediate consciousness is itself a fraudulent immediacy does 
Nature appear to be a self-standing “Thing-in-itself” in relation to which our Minds are 
merely derivative. “In der Tat aber ist die Natur das durch den Geist Gesetzte, und der 
Geist selbst ist es, der sich die Natur zu seiner Voraussetzung macht.” In the context of 
the System as a whole, this sentence is of great importance. On the verge of releasing 
itself into Nature as its own intuiting reflection, the Logical Idea will only be recovered 
at the end of Spirit. GWFH rejects a Cartesian dualism between immediate 
consciousness as Subject and Nature as Object. Not only is Nature posited by Spirit—a 
Spirit that has come to know Nature’s true nature as mere Reflection of the Logical 
Idea—but Nature is the precondition of its own self knowledge. Viewing Nature as 
derivative justifies viewing Time the same way; the Absolute Idea’s self-release into 
Nature is the origin of “the externality of space and time” (WdL, p. 843).  
72 The five paragraphs dealing with the three moments of the Speculative Method are 
the middle of the nine-paragraph section on the Absolute Idea. The middle of those five 
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Die abstrakte Form des Fortgangs ist im Sein ein Anderes und Übergehen in 
ein Anderes, im Wesen Scheinen in dem Entgegengesetzten, im Begriffe die 
Unterschiedenheit des Einzelnen von der Allgemeinheit, welche sich als 
solche in das von ihr Unterschiedene kontinuiert und als Identität mit ihm 
ist.73           
 
The crucial words in this paragraph are “im Sein,” “im Wesen,” and “im 
Begriff[e].” These—Being, Essence, and Concept—are the three constitutive 
parts of the Logic as a whole. Because every Triad in the System has a Second 
Moment, that Second Moment can appear in a variety of ways.74 By 
distinguishing precisely three of these ways, we are not only witnessing Hegel 
describing the Dialectic but describing it dialectically. To use the First Triad as 
an example: Being can be presented (im Sein) as a transition into Nothing as 
Another (Übergehen in ein Anderes). But such “Another” merely appears to 
be such: it is essentially (im Wesen) merely itself as mirror image (Scheinen in 
dem Entgegengesetzten). But in complete Concepts (im Begriffe), even this 
reflected difference in identity is superseded by identity in difference: the 
opposites are not conceptually distinct but continuous, not different but 
identical with themselves. In the Concept of the Second Moment, therefore, the 
Universality of the First is reconciled with the two Particulars of the Second. 
Every Moment of the Triad is thereby conceptualized. To put it another way, 
no Part of the Dialectic can be conceptualized (im Begriffe) without the Whole. 
 It is §240 that clearly illustrates the proposition that the true Content of the 
Absolute Idea is “nothing else than the entire System of whose unfolding we 
have up until now been witnessing.”75 The Second Moment can indeed be 
looked at merely as “the Second Sphere” (as it is in §241).76 But the entire 
Logic—all of Being, Essence, and Concept—are included in the Speculative 
Method as the inevitable and inseparable Form to its Content. That same Form 
                                                                                                       
consists of the three paragraphs about the Second Moment. The middle of these three is 
E §240.  
73 E §240 (complete). 
74 This is what Rolf-Peter HORSTMANN is getting at by saying that Sein, Wesen, and 
Begriff are in fact three different Syntaxes, each with its own Semantics (“The 
Metaphysics of the self: Hegel’s Metaphysical of Self-consciousness,” Lecture at 
UFSC, 14 March 2006).  
75 Zusatz to E §237; translation mine. 
76 E §241: “In der zweiten Sphäre ist der zuerst an sich seiende Begriff zum Scheinen 
gekommen und ist so an sich schon die Idee.” It is the Absolute Idea but only an sich. 
In E §240, by contrast, he described the Second Moment from the perspectives of the 
First, Second, and Third Moments (Sein, Wesen, and Begriff) in turn. Note that here, the 
Second Sphere is Scheinen only.  
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was already implicit in Being, Nothing, and Becoming. In the Second Moment 
of the First Triad, Being passed over into Nothing and Nothing passed back 
into Being. In the Absolute Idea, this “doubled movement” is this Content and 
many others as well: the inevitable means through which alone the Whole is 
whole and Unity can shed its immediate one-sidedness.77 
 To illustrate the Logical Completeness of the Hegelian Dialectic, one 
would suppose that Hegel’s description of the Third Moment was particularly 
important. It is the negation of negativity of the First Moment that both annuls 
and preserves its implicit Dialectic.78 Including within itself both its one-sided 
Beginning and its resulting Difference as merely posited determinations of its 
own reality, it is “the realized Concept.”79 It therefore produces what is really 
“first” although it appears to be a Result.80 As Idea, it consists of its moments; 
as sich denkende Idee, it is that same Idea as a single Totality.81 Logical 
Completeness so pervades the Hegelian Dialectic that Completeness is not 
                                                
77 E §241: “Die Entwicklung dieser Sphäre wird Rückgang in die erste, wie die der 
ersten ein Übergang in die zweite ist; nur durch diese gedoppelte Bewegung erhält der 
Unterschied sein Recht, indem jedes der beiden Unterschiedenen sich an ihm selbst 
betrachtet zur Totalität vollendet und darin sich zur Einheit mit dem anderen betätigt. 
Nur das Sichaufheben der Einseitigkeit beider an ihnen selbst läßt die Einheit nicht 
einseitig werden.” We can think this as the First Triad but it is, in fact, every Triad. 
Note that although difference must be given its due (sein Recht) it must be completed in 
a Totality (zur Totalität vollendet).  
78 E §242: “Es ist das Negative des Ersten und als die Identität mit demselben die 
Negativität seiner selbst; hiermit die Einheit, in welcher diese beiden Ersten als ideelle 
und Momente, als aufgehobene, d. i. zugleich als aufbewahrte sind.”   
79 E §242 (emphasis mine): “Der Begriff, so von seinem Ansichsein vermittelst seiner 
Differenz und deren Aufheben sich mit sich selbst zusammenschließend, ist der 
realisierte Begriff, d. i. der Begriff, das Gesetztsein seiner Bestimmungen in seinem 
Fürsichsein enthaltend,…” The First Moment possessed only Ansichsein: the realized 
Concept, knowing the determinations within it to be flüssig by virtue of their 
Gesetztsein, possesses Fürsichsein. As Complete, it knows itself to be what it is. 
80 E §242: “…die Idee, für welche zugleich als absolut Erstes (in der Methode) dies 
Ende nur das Verschwinden des Scheins ist, als ob der Anfang ein Unmittelbares und sie 
ein Resultat wäre;” In the Speculative Method (as Form of the Absolute Idea), it is the 
“realized Concept” that is appears “as absolute First.” But from the perspective of 
Content (as we saw), the Beginning was falsely but inevitably taken as immediate (and 
hence was implicitly the Dialectic) and the Third appeared “as if it was a was a Result.” 
In fact, the End is always already implicit in the Beginning. GWFH must insist on this 
to avoid the appearance of even logical movement or development in Time.  
81 GWFH adds another clause that completes the sense at E §242 (my emphasis): “…die 
Idee, für welche zugleich als absolut Erstes (in der Methode) dies Ende nur das 
Verschwinden des Scheins ist, als ob der Anfang ein Unmittelbares und sie ein Resultat 
wäre; - das Erkennen [however], [knows] daß die Idee die eine Totalität ist.”  
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simply the Result of a process but the reality of each moment of the process: 
only as a Totality can the process be what it is. It should be noticed that 
although Hegel employs the words “first,” “result,” and “moment” repeatedly, 
he conceives—and this conception is the origin of “The Problem of Time in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History”—that this process is strictly logical and has 
nothing whatsoever to do with Time.  
 The problem with Logical Completeness is that it is singularly unsuitable 
for describing processes that do not or even have not yet come to an end.82 This 
will become a crucial consideration when the Logical Completeness of the 
Dialectic is applied to History. The human drama of World History not only 
begins in the distant Past but it can only be understood as continuing into the 
endless Future. Hegel’s thought is so dominated by Logical Completeness that 
he has no place—at least no respectable place, for the Endless. This becomes 
very apparent in the language he uses to describe the transition from Second to 
Third Moments:  
 
Die zweite Sphäre entwickelt die Beziehung der Unterschiedenen zu dem, 
was sie zunächst ist, zum Widerspruche an ihr selbst—im unendlichen 
Progreß,—der sich γ) in das Ende auflöst, daß das Differente als das gesetzt 
wird, was es im Begriffe ist.83 
                         
Hegel emphasizes the fact that the Third Moment puts an end to the “doubled 
movement”—i.e. to the back and forth transitions, for example, between Being 
and Nothing—of the oppositions of the Second. He raises the possibility that 
the back and forth movement of this reflected self-contradiction could go on 
forever only to immediately end it. But there is a problem here. It is difficult to 
imagine Becoming, for example, as finite or coming to an end. The same is 
even truer of Time. It is crucial to bear in mind that there is no room for the 
Endless in Hegel’s thought: unendlichen Progreß is quickly reduced to a mere 
logical “moment”—with no hint of chronological infinitude—within the 
completed Concept.  
                                                
82 When a syllogism closes with the conclusion that “Socrates is mortal,” it may be said 
to bridge the gap between logic and the future only because the object in question, i.e. a 
mortal man, is both temporal and finite: the proof depends precisely on the latter. But if 
“history” is admitted to be temporal, there can be no such limitation.    
83 E §242; first sentence. 
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Chapter 2 (I.1.2) 
The Hegelian Dialectic in Action 
 
 It was only in the Rechtsphilosophie—the last of his published 
books—that Hegel clearly stated the principle governing the Dialectic’s 
actual operation: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, and was wirklich ist, 
das ist Vernünftig.”1 This famous statement must be understood as putting 
the Dialectic into action: Vernunft (and it’s precisely the Dialectic that, for 
Hegel, is was vernünftig ist) becomes operative (wirkt) in was wirklich ist. 
The identity of Vernunft and Wirklichkeit means that Reason is no idle by-
stander and does not inhabit a world apart: the central point to grasp is that 
Vernunft wirkt. The Wissenschaft der Logik could conceivably give 
someone the wrong idea: that it is Logic alone daß Vernünftig ist. The truth 
is that whatever is wirklich is, by the same token, Dialectical (vernünftig). 
Thus, Wirklichkeit (was wirklich ist) must always be explicable in terms of 
the Dialectic. Conversely, whatever—like the Absolute Idea of the 
Wissenschaft der Logik—has been shown to be reasonable, must, as it 
were, manifest itself as was wirklich ist; e.g. as Nature or, as the return to 
itself of Spirit, even in History.  
 In this chapter, the application of the Dialectic to three distinct but 
actual or chronological processes will be considered. In the first section 
(I.1.2.1), Hegel’s Anthropology will be used to show how Dialectical or 
Logical Completeness can be applied to the four stages of human 
development. In the second (I.1.2.2), the application of the three basic 
moments of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik to the History of Religion will 
show how easy it is for Hegel to build a bridge between Logic and History. 
Finally (in I.1.2.3), an analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy will demonstrate just how close the connection 
between Logic and History can be. 
  
I.1.2.1. Anthropology: the Four Ages of Man 
 In As You Like It, Shakespeare puts his famous speech about the seven 
ages of man in the mouth of the melancholy Jacques (Act II scene 7). 
Jacques emphasizes the circularity of this process: old age is “second 
childishness,” and the follies of youth and manhood are ended in the futility 
of “mere oblivion.” It is a sense of resignation to this futility that leads to 
the pronouncement, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women 
merely players.” 
 Hegel gives his version of the same story in the third part of his 
                                                
1 Philosophy of Right, p. 10 (see p. 18 n. 4). 
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Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.2 Although he reduces the 
number of ages to four, he would seem to agree that the whole process is 
circular. Old Age, the final act, “leads back to childhood.”3 The most 
interesting part of Hegel’s account of the four ages of man is neither its 
beginning nor its end, but rather what happens between them. In the eyes of 
Jacques, the follies of the youthful lover are simply succeeded in Manhood 
by the follies of reputation and pride. For Hegel also Youth is a time of 
fancies,4 but unlike Jacques, he sees the transition from Youth to Manhood 
as a fruitful step. He characterizes the Man as possessing a “true 
relationship to his environment.”5 The transition from the Youth to the Man 
dramatizes one of Hegel’s most important doctrines: that the rational is the 
real and the real is the rational.6 Because this dictum is the ultimate basis of 
the position accorded to World History in the Hegelian system, Youth is a 
good subject with which to begin the discussion of his integration of Logic 
with the Philosophy of History. 
 Hegel characterizes Youth as the age of high ideals. Whether it be the 
ideal of love, or the quest for a “universal state of the world,”7 the 
discrepancy between the way things are and the way they ought to be 
contrast sharply with the oblivion experienced in Childhood and Old Age. 
Unlike the Child, the Youth is “no longer at peace with the world,” and 
therefore attempts to transform it in accordance with his ideals.8 Manhood, 
according to Hegel, brings with it a decisive change. The youth’s desire to 
realize his ideals having been frustrated, a progressive submission to the 
world-as-it-is heralds the appearance of the Man. Gradually “the plan for 
completely transforming the world” is abandoned, and the Man recognizes 
that the world is “a self-dependent world which in its essential nature is 
                                                
2 HEGEL, G.W.F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. Translated by William Wallace and 
A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Pressford, 1971 (hereafter “Philosophy of Mind”); 
p. 55-64 
3 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 64. 
4 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, pp. 61-63. 
5 E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 55. 
6 For the parallel passage in the Encyclopaedia, see Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of 
Mind p. 62: “The world is this actualization of divine Reason; it is only on the 
surface that the play of contingency prevails.” 
7 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 61. “Dies Ideal hat aber im Jüngling 
noch eine mehr oder weniger subjective Gestalt: möge dahelbe als Ideal der Liebe 
and der Freundschaft, oder eines allgemeinen Weltzustandes in ihm leben.” The 
aged Kant thus becomes the eternal youth. 
8 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 62: “So wird der Friede, in welchem das 
Kind mit der Welt lebt, von Jüngling gebrochen.”  
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already complete.”9  
 As a rule, the Man believes that this submission is only forced on him 
by necessity. But, in truth, this unity with the world must be recognized, 
not as a relation imposed by necessity, but as the rational.10 The very next 
sentence reveals the root of Hegel’s position: 
 
The rational, the divine, possesses the absolute power to actualize itself 
and has, right from the beginning, fulfilled itself; it is not so impotent that 
it would have to wait for the beginning of its actualization.11 
 
It is against this backdrop that the dictum that the rational is the real and the 
real is the rational is most easily understood. Just as the man turns away 
from the ideal ought-to-be’s of Youth and achieves a “unity with the 
world” as it actually is, so Hegel demands that philosophy explore the real, 
the “present and the actual,” rather than indulge in “the erection of a 
beyond, supposed to exist, God knows where . . .”12 The rational is no 
otherworldly ideal, if ideals are truly rational, they would be potent enough 
to realize themselves. The Encyclopaedia states: “The world is the 
actualization of divine reason.”13 Rather than look beyond it, the 
philosopher should look within it: “The great thing is to apprehend in the 
show of the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and 
the eternal which is present.”14 
 It is important to emphasize the Dialectical aspect of this four-part 
process. The opposition that always characterizes the second moment 
appears in the guise of the conflict between Youth and Manhood. Once 
                                                
9 “…die Welt als eine selbstandige, im wesentlichen fertige unerkennen . . .”, 
Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 62. For the importance of the idea of 
progress in this transformation, cf. the later passage in the same paragraph: “For 
although the world must be recognized as already complete in its essential nature 
(im wesentlichen fertig), yet it is not a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life 
process, a world which perpetually creates itself anew, which while merely 
preserving itself, at the same time progresses [zugleich Fortschreitendes].”  
10 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 62. 
11 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 62: “Das Vernünftige, Göttliche besitzt 
die Absolute Macht, sich zu verwirklichen, and hat sich von jeher vollbracht; es ist 
nicht so ohnmächtig, daß es erst auf dem Beginn seiner Verwirklichung warten 
mußte.”  
12 Philosophy of Right, p. 10: “…das Aufstellen eines Jenseitigen. . . das Gott weiß 
wo sein sollte.” Actually, GWFH tells exactly where this “beyond” exists: “in dem 
Irrthum eines einseitigen, leeren Raisonnirens.” 
13 Zusatz to E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 62: “Die Welt ist diese Verwirklichung 
der göttlichen Vernunft…” 
14 Philosophy of Right, p. 10: “…in dem Scheme des Zeitlichen and 
Vorübergehenden die substanz, and das Ewige, das gegenwärtig ist, zu erkennen.”  
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again, the beginning and the end of the process are free of this  opposition, 
but the manner in which each is free is different. The Child makes no 
distinction between the real and the rational, simply because it is unable to 
do so; Childhood is “mind wrapped up in itself.”15 Old Age is also free 
from this conflict, but only because it has lived through it: it has already 
recognized “the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world”16 and 
that it can only do by having endured a moment of negativity: of seeing the 
World as merely external. The Last stage thus removes and contains 
(aufhebt) the opposition of the second, and indeed it is only because this 
opposition is retained that it can be resolved. For at the end of the process, 
unity is not the thoughtless and subjective unity of Childhood; it is the self-
conscious apprehension of the real in the rational and the rational in the 
real.17 That is the legacy of the Man’s triumph over the Youth.18 
 
I.1.2.2. The Logical Articulation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion 
 Although Hegel’s Anthropology describes a chronological process, it 
is by no means an historical one: like the lifecycle of natural growth, it is 
endlessly repeated and by no means unique, as an historical process would 
be. In História e Metafísica em Hegel: Sobre a Noção de Espírito do 
Mundo, Maria Borges emphasizes an instructive example of the application 
of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic to a unique chronological process: the History 
of Religion.19 
 The three Parts of Hegel’s Logic (as we saw in considering §240 of the 
Encyclopedia in I.1.1.2) are Being, Essence, and Concept. In the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel uses Sein, Wesen, and Begriff to 
describe three types of Religion that are, moreover, arranged in 
chronological order.20 Just as Hegel will place Asian history before that of 
Greece in his Philosophy or History, he deals first with the religions of 
                                                
15 E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 55: “…dem in sich eingehüllten Geiste.” For the 
dialectical/ logical function of youth see the words which follow: “His next step is 
the fully developed antithesis . . .” 
16 E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 55: “…der objectiven Nothwendigkeit and 
Vernünftigkeit der bereits vorhandenen fertigen Welt.” 
17 Referred to at E §396; Philosophy of Mind, p. 55 as the “…Vollbringung der 
Einheit mit dieser Objectivitat.”  
18 One might well imagine GWFH’s anthropology as a Bildungsroman. 
19 BORGES, Maria de Lourdes Alves, História e Metafísica em Hegel: Sobre a 
Noção de Espírito do Mundo, EDIPUCRS, Porto Alegre, 1998 (hereafter 
“BORGES”).  
20 BORGES, p. 164: “Segundo o nosso propósto, mostraremos que, novamente, o 
precurso temporal das religões não é um precurso aleatório, mas seque, para Hegel, 
as grandes divisões da Ciência da Lógica: teremos as religiões do ser, da essência e 
do conceito.”  
 45 
China and India on the basis of their antiquity; it is these he links with 
Sein.21 The religions of Greece and Israel—where the divine is no longer 
immediately present as it is in the religions of the East—he links with 
Wesen.22 The opposition that always characterizes the Second Moment is 
here expressed as the division between human and divine.23 Finally 
Christianity appears on the scene and resolves this separation through 
Christ;24 this is therefore the Religion of the Concept.25 The Concept—as 
the logical basis of Christianity—becomes the culmination of an historical 
process and therefore the expression of a distinct advance on Judaism, the 
Greco-Roman Pantheon (as Essence), and the religions of the East (as 
Being).26   
Hegel introduces Time into the System only at the beginning of the 
Philosophy of Nature and it is abundantly clear that Hegel doesn’t want us 
to think of the Logic as unfolding chronologically. But by using Being, 
Essence, and Concept to describe a chronological movement like the 
History of Religion, he blurs the distinction between timeless logic and 
historical development, as Borges has shown.  
 
I.1.2.3. Chronology and Concept in Hegel’s History of Philosophy 
Hegel’s Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
contains the fullest treatment he ever gave to the central methodological 
question arising from the application of his Dialectical Logic to events 
                                                
21 BORGES, p. 164-5: “As religiões do ser são aquelas nas quais há uma 
imediatidade do divino: el epode aparecer na forma de um fenômeno natural, como 
na religião chinesa, onde o céu (Tien) é a própria divinidade; ou, mesmo na forma 
de um homen, como na religião budista.”  
22 BORGES, p. 165-6: “Áo religões do ser, Hegel opõe as religiões da essência, as 
quais, introduzindo o elemento de diferença, tentam a separação entre o divino e o 
natural.”  
23 BORGES, p. 166: “Se nas religiões orientais havia uma identidade sem diferença 
entre sensível e o humano, aqui a diferença entre estes dois termos é levadoa ao seo 
extremo: de um lado, o terreno, o natural, o humano; de outro o divino.”  
24 BORGES, p. 168: “Hegel, ao contrário de Schiller, não considera os deuses 
gregos como mais humanos do que o Deus cristão. Christo é realmente a 
encarnação do divino no humano: não se trata apenas de uma forma humana, tal 
como o antropomorfismo grego, mas do homen concreto. A Apaição do divino 
encarnado, esse é o atestado da superioridade da religião cristã frente à grega.” 
25 BORGES, p. 168: “Por fim, na história das religiões, chegamos à própria religião 
do Conceito.”  
26 BORGES, p. 169: “Ela [sc. Christianity] é a culminação de um processo 
histórico, na qual houve um amadurecimento da Idéia de Deus, até que essa idéia 
possa ser tomada no sau mais alta signifição. Para Hegel, isto significa conceber a 
idéia de divinidade como aquela que tem força de expor-se num mundo, de tornar-
se sensível e retornar a si.”   
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unfolding in Time. To what extent does the Chronological Order found in 
the History of Philosophy, or even History itself, replicate the Logical 
Order arising from the Dialectic, that determines the sequence in which his 
System as a whole unfolds? To prove that the study of the History of 
Philosophy is in fact the study of Philosophy itself,27 Hegel’s Introduction 
to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy contains some unusually clear 
statements about the close relationship between Dialectical and 
Chronological Progression. In other words, he makes it explicit that the 
History of Philosophy is Philosophy itself precisely to the extent that the 
order of presentation found in the Logic—the Dialectical Order appropriate 
to Philosophy28—is replicated in the order of presentation found in the 
History of Philosophy, i.e. the Chronological Order appropriate to 
History.29 It is this claim that makes the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy no less important than his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History for understanding Hegel’s Philosophy of History as a whole. 
 Hegel’s defense of this claim is found in a single paragraph that 
begins, appropriately enough, with the claim itself. 
 
Now in reference to this Idea, I maintain that the sequence in the systems 
of Philosophy in History is similar to the sequence in the logical 
deduction of the Notion – determinations in the Idea.30  
 
It is noteworthy that Hegel is cautious enough to use the word “similar” 
rather than “identical.” This manner of speaking suggests a distinction 
between what might be called the strong and weak forms of his claim. He 
                                                
27 HEGEL, G.W.F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. 
Haldane and Frances H. Simson. London: Routledge, 1955 (hereafter “LHP”), p. 
30: “I would only remark this, that what has been said reveals that the study of the 
history of Philosophy is the study of Philosophy itself, for, indeed, it can be nothing 
else.”  
28 LHP, p. 29: “The one kind of progression which represents the deduction of the 
forms, the necessity thought out and recognized, of the determinations, is the 
business of Philosophy; and because it is the pure Idea which is in question and not 
yet its mere particularized form as Nature and as Mind, that representation is, in the 
main, the business of logical Philosophy.” 
29 LHP, p. 29-30: “But the other method, which represents the part played by the 
history of Philosophy, shows the different Stages and moments in development in 
time, in manner of occurrence, in particular places, in particular people or political 
circumstances, the complications arising thus, and, in short, it shows us the 
empirical form. This point of view is the only one worthy of this science. From the 
very nature of the subject it is inherently the true one, and through the study of this 
history it will be made manifest that it actually shows and proves itself so.” 
30 LHP, p. 30. 
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seems to be aware that a strong form of the claim—that the Chronological 
Order in “the sequence in the systems of Philosophy in History” is identical 
with  “the sequence in the logical deduction of the Notion”—would be 
difficult to prove and perhaps even counterproductive. But he does offer the 
outlines of a proof that would, when fleshed out, apply to both strong and 
weak forms of the claim. 
The first step in showing the similarity between the two sequences is to 
strip the History of Philosophy of what might be called its contingent 
elements.    
 
I maintain that if the fundamental conceptions of the systems appearing in 
the history of Philosophy be entirely divested of what regards their 
outward form, their relation to the particular and the like, the various 
stages in the determination of the Idea are found in their logical Notion.31  
 
Hegel is intentionally vague about what these systems would look like once 
“entirely divested of what regards their outward form.” But it is worthwhile 
to state the obvious: he cannot mean by “the particular and the like” the 
Chronological Order of their appearance. Appearance at a specific Time 
may well make a system “particular” but this itself is not merely a question 
of a system’s “outward form,” an example of which would be the 
geometrical form of Spinoza’s Ethics. If it were, it would vitiate his 
argument entirely.32  
Having shown under what circumstances—after being “divested of 
what regards…outward form”—the historical will come more closely to 
resemble the logical progression, Hegel then closes the gap from the other 
side:    
 
                                                
31 LHP, p. 30. See DE LAURENTIIS, Allegra, Metaphysical Foundations of the 
History of Philosophy: Hegel’s 1820 Introduction to the “Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, Review of Metaphysics, v. 59, n. 1, p. 3-31, 2005; p. 23 n. 53: “On the 
margin of this passage in the manuscript Hegel notes: “only because of this do I 
bother to deal with it, to lecture on it [nur darum gebe ich mich damit ab, halte 
Vorlesungen darüber]” (HW 18:51), that is on the history of philosophy.” 
32 Nor does it seem likely that he means by “outward form” the nationality of the 
philosopher in question. See the analogy between Logic and Grammar presented in 
WdL (HW 5.52): “Wer dagegen einer Sprache mächtig ist und zugleich andere 
Sprachen in Vergleichung mit ihr kennt, dem erst kann sich der Geist und die 
Bildung eines Volks in der Grammatik seiner Sprache zu fühlen geben; dieselben 
Regeln und Formen haben nunmehr einen erfüllten, lebendigen Werth. Er kann 
durch die Grammatik hindurch den Ausdruck des Geistes überhaupt, die Logik, 
erkennen.”  
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Conversely in the logical progression taken for itself, there is, so far as its 
principal elements are concerned, the progression of historical 
manifestations; but it is necessary to have these pure Notions in order to 
know what the historical form contains.33  
 
Hegel seems to be making a distinction between the logical progression’s 
“principal elements” and the whole of “the logical progression taken for 
itself.” This distinction suggests that both Chronological and Logical 
sequences must be divested of the merely outward or contingent (hence the 
use of the word “conversely”) in order for the similarity between them to 
become visible. Since Hegel has already claimed that the logical 
progression is precisely necessary,34 it is difficult to guess what he means 
by distinguishing within it its “principal elements;” it would appear to 
vitiate the claim that the whole sequence is self-generating.35 But the 
second, and vastly more important, part of the sentence restores the 
primacy of the Logical Order: the philosophical Historian of Philosophy—
i.e. Hegel himself—must, he now suggests, have a prior knowledge of this 
“logical progression…in order to know what the historical form contains.” 
This is a very large claim, and for those, like ourselves, who take the 
objective existence of Time as a given, a potentially scandalous one.36 By 
                                                
33 LHP, p. 30. 
34 LHP, p. 29: “That is to say, the progression of the various stages in the advance 
of Thought may occur with the consciousness of necessity, in which case each in 
succession deduces itself, and this form and this determination can alone emerge.” 
35 WdL at HW 5.49 (emphases mine): “Wie würde ich meinen können, daß nicht 
die Methode, die ich in diesem Systeme der Logik befolgt, - oder vielmehr die dieß 
System an ihm selbst befolgt, - noch vieler Vervollkommnung, vieler Durchbildung 
im Einzelnen fähig sey, aber ich weiß zugleich, daß sie die einzige wahrhafte ist. 
Dieß erhellt für sich schon daraus, daß sie von ihrem Gegenstande und Inhalte 
nichts Unterschiedenes ist; - denn es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dialektik, die er an 
ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt. Es ist klar, daß keine Darstellungen für 
wissenschaftlich gelten können, welche nicht den Gang dieser Methode gehen und 
ihrem einfachen Rhythmus gemäß sind, denn es ist der Gang der Sache selbst.” See 
also HOULGATE, Stephen, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to 
Hegel’s Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1991. 
36 LHP, p. 31: “It is shown from what has been said regarding the formal nature of 
the Idea, that only a history of Philosophy thus regarded as a system of development 
in Idea, is entitled to the name of Science: a collection of facts constitutes no 
science. Only thus as a succession of phenomena established through reason, and 
having as content just what is reason and revealing it, does this history show that it 
is rational: it shows that the events recorded are in reason. How should the whole of 
what has taken place in reason not itself be rational? That faith must surely be the 
more reasonable in which chance is not made ruler over human affairs, and it is the 
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saying that History can only be made intelligible for one who already 
understands “these pure Notions” as they unfold in Logic, he is admitting 
that his approach to history is a priori37 and not empirical. I intend to show 
that the real difference between a logical and empirical approach to history 
is actually rooted in “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History.”  
 Rather than plunge more deeply into these dangerous waters, Hegel 
contents himself at this time with simply restating his claim.  
 
It may be thought that Philosophy must have another order as to the 
stages in the Idea than that in which these Notions have gone forth in 
time; but in the main the order is the same.38 
 
This formulation is a compromise between what I have called the strong 
and weak forms of Hegel’s claim: the phrase “the order is the same” (my 
emphasis) suggests the strong form while the qualifying words “in the 
main” suggests the weak one. Already committed to Chronological Order 
in his presentation of the History of Philosophy, Hegel next explicitly 
refuses to elaborate on what the alternative mode of presentation—i.e. in 
terms of the Logical Order dictated by the Dialectic—would look like in 
practice.  
 
This succession undoubtedly separates itself, on the one hand, into the 
sequence in time of History, and on the other into succession in the order 
of ideas. But to treat more fully of this last would divert us too far from 
our aim.39 
 
This sentence leaves open the possibility that Hegel has already presented 
the “succession in the order of ideas” in The Science of Logic.40 
                                                                                                   
business of Philosophy to recognize that however much its own manifestations may 
be history likewise, it is yet determined through the Idea alone.” 
37 LHP, p. 30-31: “But in order to obtain a knowledge of its progress as the 
development of the Idea in the empirical, external form in which Philosophy 
appears in History, a corresponding knowledge of the Idea is absolutely essential, 
just as in judging of human affairs one must have a conception of that which is right 
and fitting.” 
38 LHP, p. 30. 
39 LHP, p. 30. 
40 Note that GWFH has already made a similar claim, as it were from the other side, 
in Wissenschaft der Logik at HW 5.89-90 (emphasis mine): “Das Denken oder 
Vorstellen, dem nur ein bestimmtes Seyn, das Daseyn, vorschwebt, ist zu dem 
erwähnten Anfange der Wissenschaft zurück zu weisen, welchen Parmenides 
gemacht hat, der sein Vorstellen und damit auch das Vorstellen der Folgezeit zu 
dem reinen Gedanken, dem Seyn als solchen, geläutert und erhoben, und damit das 
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 Having proved to his satisfaction the claim that the two orders of 
presentation are “in the main…the same,” Hegel next provocatively 
broaches the subject of how this can possibly be true.  
 
The first question which may be asked in reference to this history, 
concerns that distinction in regard to the manifestation of the Idea, which 
has just been noticed. It is the question as to how it happens that 
Philosophy appears to be a development in time and has a history.41 
 
The priority of the Logical Order is here simply assumed; it is the very 
possibility that the Idea could unfold itself in a Chronological Order—i.e. 
“that Philosophy appears to be a development in time and has a history” 
(emphasis mine)—that must be given philosophical justification. 
Unfortunately, Hegel has no intention of giving us a complete justification 
of this possibility; he is, however, willing to identify the locus of any such 
justification. 
     
The answer to this question encroaches on the metaphysics of Time, and 
it would be a digression from our object to give here more than the 
elements on which the answer rests.42 
 
Given the great importance that History unquestionably has for Hegel, it is 
much to be regretted that he seems to have found no place in his writings 
where his “answer to this question” would not be “a digression.” His failure 
to provide such an answer indicates his failure to solve adequately or 
persuasively “The Problem of Time.” Therefore, the reader must be content 
only with “the elements” of the answer found here; it offers us little 
comfort that Hegel tells us he himself unquestionably possesses the answer 
in its full form. But if the answer in the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy is admittedly incomplete, the existence of this particular 
question is revealing enough and it is this question that constitutes the 
subject of this dissertation. Since it is unquestionably the Logical 
development of the Idea that is prior for Hegel; the question is: how can 
this development also occur in Time? This is a perfect example of Marx’s 
                                                                                                   
Element der Wissenschaft erschaffen hat. - Was das Erste in der Wissenschaft ist, 
hat sich müssen geschichtlich als das Erste zeigen. Und das Eleatische Eine oder 
Seyn haben wir für das Erste des Wissens vom Gedanken anzusehen; das Wasser 
und dergleichen materielle Principien sollen wohl das Allgemeine seyn, aber sind 
als Materien nicht reine Gedanken; die Zahlen sind weder der erste einfache noch 
der bei sich bleibende, sondern der sich selbst ganz äußerliche Gedanke.” For the 
anachronism involved here, see II.1.2.3.  
41 LHP, p. 32. 
42 LHP, p. 32. 
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critique of Hegel: Philosophy is here walking on its head. Hegel is not 
justifying his Philosophy by saying that it incorporates all previous systems 
of philosophy as they have unfolded chronologically in History but rather 
feels called upon to justify the possibility that Philosophy (i.e. his System) 
could ever have appeared in Time in the first place. It is therefore a 
question of “the metaphysics,”43 i.e. “the problem of Time.”   
 As will be discussed in more detail hereafter (I.2.2.1), Hegel’s fullest 
treatment of “the metaphysics of Time” is found in his Philosophy of 
Nature. This is not a very promising place to find an answer to a question 
about Philosophy’s appearance; Philosophy is an artifact of Mind, not a 
manifestation of Nature. Therefore, before giving the outlines of his 
answer, Hegel must first situate Time, previously considered only as part of 
Nature, in the context of Mind.44 Mind presupposes Nature but, unlike 
Nature, must come to know itself as Mind.45 As such, Mind reflects (on) 
itself: an inevitable doubling, apparently synonymous with existence, 
therefore occurs.46 By doubling itself, Mind appears to be externalizing 
itself. It is this externality to itself that links Mind back to what Hegel has 
already told us of Nature and therefore to Time.47 In other words, 
Philosophy, as Mind’s attempt to “know itself,” presupposes a moment of 
externality to itself that is reminiscent of Nature’s relationship to Logic.48 
Moreover, the essence of this externalization is—in the case of Nature—
precisely Time. It therefore makes sense that, by analogy, finite Mind’s 
                                                
43 See BODEI, R. Die “Metaphysik der Zeit” in Hegels Geschiche der Philosophie 
in Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds.), Hegels Logik der Philosophie. 
Stuttgart, 1984.  
44 LHP, p. 32: “It has been shown above in reference to the existence of Mind, that 
its Being is its activity. Nature, on the contrary, is, as it is; its changes are thus only 
repetitions, and its movements take the form of a circle merely.” 
45 LHP, p. 32: “To express this better, the activity of Mind is to know itself. I am, 
immediately, but this I am only as a living organism; as Mind I am only in so far as 
I know myself. Know thyself, the inscription over the temple of the oracle at 
Delphi, is the absolute command which is expressed by Mind in its essential 
character.” 
46 LHP, p. 32: “But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to 
myself. In forming this absolute division between what is mine and myself, Mind 
constitutes its existence and establishes itself as external to itself.” 
47 LHP, p. 32: “It postulates itself in the externality which is just the universal and 
the distinctive form of existence in Nature. But one of the forms of externality is 
Time, and this form requires to be farther examined both in the Philosophy of 
Nature and the finite Mind.” 
48 MARCUSE, Herbert, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, translated 
by Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, p. 306. 
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externalization from itself—the precondition of its coming to “know itself” 
through Philosophy—also unfolds in Time. Hegel’s proof of this begins as 
follows: 
 
This Being in existence and therefore Being in time is a moment not only 
of the individual consciousness, which as such is essentially finite, but 
also of the development of the philosophical Idea in the element of 
Thought.49  
 
This then, is Hegel’s claim; it hardly seems important. But we would 
do well to carefully scrutinize his answer to this peculiar question (“How 
can Philosophy appear in Time?”) if we wish to fully understand him. This 
is difficult because his question is not our question; for us, the appearance 
of Philosophy in Time—the History of Philosophy—is simply a given. But 
if not for us, then at least Hegel’s problem is undoubtedly a problem for 
Hegel; his claim was therefore problematic for him. He is asking how the 
Idea, which is not finite, could conceivably take on the attributes—above 
all the finitude—of “Being in time”? This is hardly its normal, or 
immediate condition.  
 
For the Idea, thought of as being at rest, is, indeed, not in Time. To think 
of it as at rest, and to preserve it in the form of immediacy is equivalent to 
its inward perception.50  
 
Hegel here seems to be saying that the Idea’s own “inward perception” 
of itself is unquestionably that it is “at rest.” In “the form of immediacy”—
i.e. as it is to itself—it is unquestionably “not in Time.” The Idea does not 
inwardly perceive itself or think of itself as being in Time. We assimilate its 
own way of thinking about itself when we think of it “as being at rest.” But 
this perception fails to take account of the fact that the Idea is concrete; i.e. 
it is Dialectical. 
 
But the Idea as concrete, is, as has been shown, the unity of differences; it 
is not really rest, and its existence is not really sense-perception, but as 
differentiation within itself and therefore as development, it comes into 
existent Being and into externality in the element of Thought, and thus 
pure Philosophy appears in thought as a progressive existence in time.51  
 
Just as Logic passes over into Nature—i.e. the realm of Time—so also does 
the negative or self-differentiating moment of the Dialectic require that 
                                                
49 LHP, p. 32-3. 
50 LHP, p. 33. 
51 LHP, p. 33. 
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Philosophy appears to unfold in Time. In the full concreteness of the 
infinite Idea, it is safe to say that Time is merely a vanishing moment 
provided that we embrace Hegel’s practice of disconnecting the word 
“moment” from any merely temporal sense. But, like each moment in the 
Dialectic, it is a necessary moment. It is particularly important to 
understand why Hegel uses the word “appears” in this proof. The Logical 
Order of the Idea is reflected in the self-differentiation characterized by 
finite existence in Time. Philosophy—the highest artifact “in the element of 
Thought”—therefore appears in Time simply because the Dialectic, by 
which it and everything else is moved, is “the unity of differences” and thus 
requires a “development” that “comes into existent Being and into 
externality.” It is only in order for those differences to be united that there 
must be the moment of self-differentiation: it is from this moment—parallel 
to Nature in the System as a whole—that Time inevitably appears. For 
Hegel, “Time” is derived from the dialectical necessity of a Logical 
Process;52 it does not occur to him that a Logical Process necessarily 
presupposes the objective existence of Time. He therefore continues:      
 
But this element of Thought is itself abstract and is the activity of a single 
consciousness. Mind is, however not only to be considered as individual, 
finite consciousness, but as that Mind which is universal and concrete 
within itself; this concrete universality, however, comprehends all the 
various sides and modes evolved in which it is and becomes object to the 
Idea.53  
 
The individual philosopher, being finite, lacks the full concreteness of 
the dialectical Idea. But it is not only the individual philosopher who 
thinks. Divested of the inevitable particularity of its apparent creator, which 
is itself merely a question of “outward form,” the Thought embodied in 
each philosophical system is not simply “the activity of a single 
consciousness.” Considered as such, each system of Thought is in fact an 
artifact of Mind itself: of a “concrete universality” that contains within 
itself, that in fact is, the Idea thinking itself. This is precisely what 
Philosophy is. And enclosed within the externality of this very reflection of 
itself is the merely finite existence in Time of the many individual 
philosophers.  
 
                                                
52 It would be interesting to consider the difference between Hegelian and 
traditional syllogistic logic with respect to time; it is clearly not logic per se that 
presupposes movement and development. Similar questions might arise from 
considering the temporality of analytic and synthetic judgments.  
53 LHP, p. 33. 
 54 
Thus Mind’s thinking comprehension of self is at the same time the 
progression of the total actuality evolved. This progression is not one 
which takes its course through the thought of an individual and exhibits 
itself in a single consciousness for it shows itself to be universal Mind 
presenting itself in the history of the world in all the richness of its form.54  
 
This “richness of…form,” the delight of the scientist who strives to know 
the reason for things, is further accentuated by the fact that each individual 
philosopher must think the Thoughts required by a particular time and 
place. The unfolding of Philosophy in Chronological Order is just the 
externalized form of Thought thinking itself. But the fact that Hegel 
specifically refers to “the history of the world” and not simply the History 
of Philosophy indicates just how important this unique passage really is. 
It is probably no accident that Hegel chose to give his only account—
brief and incomplete as it is—of the crucial connection between Logical 
and Chronological Development in the case of the History of Philosophy 
rather than in History as a whole as treated, for example, in his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History. To take an example he himself uses, it is easier 
to show that Mathematics is identical to the History of Mathematics than it 
is to show the History of Philosophy is Philosophy.55 Mathematics is 
precisely not an accumulation of errors and false steps made by those 
calling themselves “Mathematicians.” If development is less obvious in 
Philosophy,56 it is even less obvious in World History.57 It is not only that 
                                                
54 LHP, p. 33. 
55 LHP, p. 30: “Whoever studies the history of sciences such as Physics and 
Mathematics makes himself acquainted with Physics and Mathematics themselves.” 
56 GWFH asserts development in LHP repeatedly. LHP, p. 41: “From this it 
follows—since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination, 
and this means further immersion in, and a fuller grasp of the Idea itself—that the 
latest, most modern and newest philosophy is the most developed, richest and 
deepest. In that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must 
be preserved and retained, and it must itself be a mirror of the whole history.” 
57 Here again GWFH justifies the errors (to use no stronger word) of the past by 
means of the end result of the whole process of development; LPH, p. 21: “But even 
regarding History as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the 
wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized—the question 
involuntarily arises—to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices 
have been offered. From this point the investigation usually proceeds to that which 
we have made the general commencement of our enquiry. Starting from this we 
pointed out those phenomena which made up a picture so suggestive of gloomy 
emotions and thoughtful reflections—as the very field which we, for our part, 
regard as exhibiting only the means for realizing what we assert to be the essential 
destiny—the absolute aim, or—which comes to the same thing—the true result of 
the World’s History.” 
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World History contains more apparent errors than the History of 
Mathematics. It is also less easy to eliminate the “outward form” of the 
“particular” from World History than it is in the case of the History of 
Philosophy. Therefore it is important to attend to the fact that Hegel ends 
his one paragraph justification of the claim of that Philosophy can appear in 
Time with categories that call to mind World History rather than 
Philosophy divested of the particular.   
 
The result of this development is that one form, one stage in the Idea 
comes to consciousness in one particular race, so that this race and this 
time expresses only this particular form, within which it constructs its 
universe and works out its conditions. The higher stage, on the other 
hand, centuries later reveals itself in another race of people.58 
 
Although Hegel chooses to bridge the gap between the Logical Order of 
Dialectical Progression (on the one hand) and the Chronological Order of 
Progression in Time (on the other) precisely and distinctively in the case of 
the History of Philosophy, his emphasis in this passage on the racial 
element—the structural principle on which his Lectures on the Philosophy 
of History is based—bridges, in turn, the gap between Hegel’s History of 
Philosophy and his Philosophy of History. Based on the Dialectic itself—
and in particular on its negative moment of reflection and self-
differentiation—Hegel has provided a far reaching theoretical justification 
for his claim about the similarity of Logical and Chronological Progression. 
This justification is far reaching because it applies not simply to the 
presentation of the History of Philosophy but to the unfolding of Mind in 
Time. It also indicates the wide-ranging ramifications of Hegel’s peculiar if 
not scandalous solution to “The Problem of Time.”         
            
                                                
58 LPH, p. 33. 
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Introduction to Part I Section 2 (I.2) 
Chronology and Logic 
 
 As I.1.2.3 showed, a methodological discussion of the parallel between 
the Logical and the Chronological Order of Presentation of the History of 
Philosophy—the two being, as he himself said, either “similar” or “in the 
main…the same”—is as close as Hegel comes to sorting out with any kind 
of rigor the extremely important relationship in his thought between what I 
will call “Logical” and “Chronological Priority.” It is perfectly obvious to 
us that it is one thing to be first in time and quite another to be logically 
prior. But this distinction is hardly clear in Hegel. For example, the first 
moment of the Hegelian System is the perfectly abstract moment of pure, 
undifferentiated Being. But the first philosophical systems were also, 
according to Hegel, perfectly abstract. Does his Science of Logic, for all its 
claims to self-generation, therefore simply mirror the chronological 
development of the way Philosophy actually unfolded in time?1 Or, as is 
more likely, is Hegel’s apparently empirical presentation of the History of 
Philosophy all that remains of the actual truth after having been forced to 
conform to his own System’s a priori commitments?  
 Hegel himself, of course, would choose neither of these insulting 
alternatives. He maintains that Philosophy unfolded in time in accordance 
with the Logical Idea and that an empirical presentation of the History of 
Philosophy is inevitably similar to what unfolds itself in his Science of 
Logic. But if a tendentious set of alternatives like the preceding receives the 
response “neither,” then another set of alternatives can easily be greeted 
with a more properly Hegelian “both.” For example, is Hegel’s Philosophy 
historical or is his vision of History philosophical?2 Hegel would doubtless 
reject these mirrored alternatives as examples of mere Understanding’s 
determination to divide that which is actually one: in the light of Reason, 
both sides are equally true and bound together by the Dialectic and 
grounded in the Absolute. But even if Hegel would reject framing this 
question in terms of alternatives, it is nevertheless important for us to ask 
ourselves, in as naïve a manner as possible—i.e. with loyalty to the truth 
                                                
1 An interesting (and respectful) attempt to show how this could be true is 
BUTLER, Clark, Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and History, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1996. 
2 The merely one-sided answer to this question characteristic of Alexander 
KOJÈVE (to be considered in I.2.1.1) is the basis of JUSZEZAK, Joseph, Hegel et 
la Liberté, Paris: Société d’edition D’enseignement Supérieur, 1980; p. 92: “Hegel 
ne conçoit pas l’histoire à partir de l’Idée eternelle mais el représente l’eternité de 
l’Idée comme ce qui se profile à l’horizon du progrès de l’histoire.” 
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rather than to Hegel—about the problematic relationship of Philosophy and 
History in Hegel’s thought.  
 This is particularly important because Hegel was the first great 
philosopher to accord such an important place in his thinking to History: if 
he is not the first Philosopher of History, then he was undoubtedly the first 
who was also a Historian of Philosophy.3 It is certainly not too much to say 
that Hegel, more than any of his predecessors, made History a crucial part 
of Philosophy itself. But we, living in a world still decisively influenced by 
Hegel’s philosophical embrace of History—i.e. the adoption of World 
History and the History of Philosophy by Philosophy itself—are apt to 
think of History in its fully developed form, as it is for us, and not as the 
mere infant in relation to Philosophy that it was in Hegel’s own time. In 
fact, I want to suggest that its infancy then was precisely the necessary 
precondition for Hegel’s innovative achievement. It was precisely not 
History as we know it today that was absorbed into the Hegelian System. 
For us, History has no need of justifying itself at the tribunal of Philosophy: 
it simply exists. This was hardly the case in Hegel’s time. Hegel is not so 
much bringing History into Philosophy—this would already imply that 
History was a fully independent subject matter, as it is for us—as he is 
extending the boundaries of Philosophy (more specifically of Logic and 
Metaphysics) for the first time into the domain of the totality of human 
actions considered specifically as part of an unfolding chronological 
process. We tend to neglect the deeply entrenched prejudice of the 
philosophical tradition against the merely ephemeral, ceaselessly changing, 
and perpetually impermanent things of this phenomenal world.  
 The real reason that Chronological Priority is not sharply distinguished 
from Logical Priority in Hegel’s thought is that Time itself had always been 
regarded with so much suspicion by previous philosophers, and in 
particular, by Hegel’s great predecessor Kant. This suspicion is still visible 
in Hegel, despite the fact—or rather, precisely because of the fact—that he 
was taking History so seriously for the first time. The question that we find 
amazing: “How can Philosophy unfold in Time?” can only be understood 
in this context. It must also be emphasized that Hegel was not simply 
constructing an unknown and unknowable prehistoric past out of whole 
cloth—like Hobbes’s State of Nature, for example—in order to justify 
some preconceived philosophical position. After all, both his Philosophy of 
History and his History of Philosophy are highly detailed and remarkably 
comprehensive. But these remarkable achievements were made possible 
precisely by blurring the boundary between Chronological and Logical 
Priority. A strong case could doubtless be made for the view that Hegel’s 
                                                
3 A case could be made for the priority of ARISTOTLE. 
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failure to sharply distinguish between the two is the greatest weakness—the 
“Achilles heel,” as I call it—of his entire System. On the other hand, 
philosophical archeology reveals that his System would have been 
undermined and indeed could never have come into existence had he made 
a clear distinction between the two. In order to be properly historical, we 
must recognize that Hegel did not denigrate Chronological Priority by 
allowing it to be indistinguishably absorbed into Logical Priority: 
Chronological Priority had never before been paid the high compliment of 
a great Philosopher’s serious attention. 
 If Hegel’s own failure to clearly distinguish Logical from 
Chronological Priority is understandable, the subsequent lack of attention 
to the question on the part of Hegel scholars is not.4 Nor is it forgivable. 
Rudimentary questions about “The Problem of Time” here remain 
unanswered and even worse, unasked. A clear example of an obvious but 
unexplored problem is Hegel’s ubiquitous use of the word “Moment.” What 
does this word really mean? There is no doubt that Hegel himself wants to 
use it in a strictly Logical sense; he manifestly wishes to divest it of any 
Chronological significance whatsoever. But the word itself is intractable on 
this score and his use of it is therefore revealing: it is impossible for us 
(unless properly Hegelianized) to think of “a Moment” except as a Moment 
of Time. Even if the word “Moment” had been clearly defined by Hegel 
(which it was not) to mean something like “a timeless step in a Dialectical 
process” (which is what his System requires that it mean), the word’s 
etymology, the shadowy nature of its putative referent, and above all the 
probable self-contradiction involved in any notion of a “timeless step”5 
would, one hopes, have caused scholars to give serious attention to “The 
                                                
4 A provocative step in the right direction is found in KOSOK, Michael, The 
Formalization of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic in Alasdair MacIntyre ed., Hegel: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, New York: Doubleday, 1972. 
5 A syllogism reaching the conclusion “Socrates is mortal” deduces this result from 
the finite nature of man; the proof has stages only insofar as we are attempting to 
instantiate a particular truth about Socrates from the finite nature of mortal man in 
general: the analytic deduction does not, therefore, involve time, only the object in 
question does. The synthetic aspect of GWFH’s logic, by contrast, inserts a 
temporal aspect, i.e. a process, even when the object in question is non-temporal. It 
is important to distinguish between “stages” that are necessary in order to prove a 
proposition and those that are intrinsic to the logical process under consideration. If 
one were to ignore GWFH’s determination to integrate Subject and Substance, one 
might say that traditional logic depends on an external synthetic process enacted by 
the logician that derives analytic judgments already implicit in the internal structure 
of the object while in GWFH’s the synthetic process is already implicit in the 
object’s internal structure while the logician’s task is to embed this process in a 
whole that renders it ultimately analytic.  
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Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” Doesn’t every 
process—indeed movement itself, the etymological origin of “moment” in 
the Latin word “movimentum”6—inescapably involve motion in Time and 
therefore the logical priority of Chronological Priority? The answer to this 
question is “Yes.” It is not accidental that Hegel would respond with a 
botanical metaphor at this point. But should we let him do so? Precisely as 
a circle, Hegel chooses the life cycle of a plant to supplant the very notion 
of Chronological Priority; this is why it is a favorite with Hegel. But all 
movement in Time isn’t circular.  The linguistic marker of Hegel’s 
“Achilles heel” is the word “moment,” the word Hegel must use even when 
describing timeless circular movement like the Logical Concept. This 
dissertation constitutes an attempt to give the problem underlying this 
problematic usage the long overdue attention it deserves. Hegel’s failure to 
clearly define the crucial word “moment” should have raised not only the 
problem addressed here but also the most revealing problem of all: what 
does the fact that he doesn’t clearly define it tell us about his level of self-
awareness?  
 Scholarship certainly hasn’t failed to recognize the great influence that 
Aristotle exercised on Hegel. On the specific question of Priority, the 
literature contains countless references to the Aristotelian distinction 
between “first for us” and “first by nature” and how this distinction plays 
out in Hegel’s thought. But nowhere is this Aristotelian distinction properly 
temporalized, as it really should be when applied to Hegel. The Science of 
Logic is a book that is read, written, and thought sequentially; it unfolds in 
Time. At the very least, then, its basis in Chronological Priority is 
something necessary “for us” who read it and also, at least as a matter of 
                                                
6 For the distinction between das Moment and der Moment, see VIELLARD-
BARON, Jean-Louis, Hegel et l’idéalisme allemand; Imagination, speculation, 
religion. Paris: J. Vrin, 1999; p. 171 and n. 4, where he cites HÖLDERLIN’s use of 
the latter. INWOOD, Michael J. A Hegel Dictionary. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1992; p. 311 explains the distinction but notes the decisive etymology shared by 
both. Cf. the remarks about “trailing clouds of etymology” at AUSTIN, J.L. A Plea 
for Excuses, the Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 
57, 1956-1957, 1-30; p. 27-8: “One is that a word never—well, hardly ever—shakes 
off its etymology and its formation. In spite of all changes in and extensions of and 
additions to its meanings, and indeed rather pervading and governing these, there 
will still persist the old idea.” The word “scandalous” applies in this case because 
GWFH needed to blind himself to the temporal implications of das Moment, 
implications of which he was fully aware; see II.1.2.2.  
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exposition,7 for Hegel who writes it. Hegel’s famous comment about the 
Science of Logic containing the Mind of God before the Creation8 is only 
one of many texts that reveal that Hegel insists that the Logic does not 
unfold in Time. But at best it doesn’t unfold in Time “by nature;” it 
unquestionably unfolds in Time “for us.” It is easy to see how Hegel wishes 
us to think of this: it is only at the end of the journey that we can realize 
that the journey itself has only appeared to be sequential. By confining his 
remarks on “the metaphysics of Time” to the Philosophy of Nature—i.e. 
only after the going forth of the Logical Idea into externalization in the 
Physical World—Hegel hoped to avoid the problem of Chronological 
Priority essential “for us” who read no less than for him who writes the 
Logic. But to turn Hegel’s Aristotle on his head for a moment: isn’t it 
obvious that although Time is subsequent to Logic for Hegel, it is prior to 
even its first Dialectical Triad by nature? 
 In Hegel’s Philosophy of History, an obvious feature of Hegel’s 
Logic—what I have called “Logical Completeness”—is necessarily 
superimposed on a Chronological Process. Precisely because Hegel failed 
to adequately distinguish Logical and Chronological Priority, it was easy 
for him to view World History in strictly logical terms. Hegel’s Logic is a 
closed circle; I must now show why History inevitably becomes something 
similar for Hegel. To prove my point, I need only explore what I will call 
“the Chronological Completeness” of Hegel’s Philosophy of History: this is 
an old and hotly debated problem of “the End of History.” But the “end of 
History” is simply the most obvious symptom of Hegel’s prior—in both a 
Logical and Chronological sense—suppression of the chronological 
element in Logical Completeness. In Part II, I will argue that Hegel 
managed to hide from himself the temporal element in the Hegelian 
Dialectic. For the present, however, I can take Logical Completeness as I 
find it in Hegel’s Dialectic (as in I.1.1) and then show that something 
similar is manifest in his account of World History.  
 But it is important to realize that the critique I will present in “Part II” 
is already implicit in “Part I.” In other words, even though I will focus on 
the problematic solution that follows from Hegel’s failure to distinguish 
Logical from Chronological Priority, the problem Hegel ignores in 
constructing that solution is always already implicit. In other words, the 
application of Hegel’s allegedly a-temporal Logic to the ineluctably 
temporal unfolding of History requires Chronological Completeness, as I 
                                                
7 It is not only the literary exposition of the Concept that opens up “the problem of 
time”: the logical momentum of its Momente moves it around.  
8 WdL, p. 50: “It can therefore be said that this content [sc. “logic…understood as 
the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought”] is the exposition of God as 
he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.”  
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will show. And it is hardly difficult to show that this result—the End of 
History—is highly problematic. In fact, it is so obviously problematic that 
Hegel’s defenders—successors to the Left Hegelians of the 19th century 
like Feuerbach and Marx—are simply forced to deny that this was Hegel’s 
position. Their dominance in Hegel scholarship today forces me to discuss 
their denial of Chronological Completeness in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History (see II.3.1) and this I have found to be an infinitely less rewarding 
exercise than discussing Hegel himself. Furthermore, there is doubtless a 
connection here: the failure of Hegel scholars9 to see the prior problem—
i.e. Hegel’s failure to distinguish Logical and Chronological Priority—is 
closely connected with their own refusal to acknowledge the problematic 
character of Hegel’s subsequent solution: the superimposition of Logical 
Completeness on World History as Chronological Completeness. If they 
admitted the problematic nature of Hegel’s solution, they would have been 
forced to return to the problematic presupposition on which that solution is 
based. Conversely, if I have managed to suggest persuasively that Hegel’s 
failure to distinguish the two senses of Priority is in fact problematic, I have 
given the reader additional grounds to believe not only that Hegel’s 
subsequent solution—i.e. the conflation of two senses of completeness—is 
problematic but that it was, despite the denials of his Left Hegelian 
defenders, precisely Hegel’s subsequent solution.  
 My discussion of Logical and Chronological Completeness in Hegel’s 
thought, to which Section 2 of Part I as a whole is devoted and to which the 
foregoing remarks have been merely introductory, will be divided into two 
chapters. In Chapter 3, I will review several approaches taken by important 
scholars to the general connection between Logic and History in Hegel’s 
thought. This will furnish both an empirical basis—i.e. it will indicate the 
literature on which I rely to support my claim that the connection between 
Logic and History actually exists in Hegel’s System—and a theoretical 
context for my own approach to what I will call “the Logical and 
Chronological Parallel.”  
 Next, in Chapter 4, I will offer some new theoretical arguments for 
“the End of History” by showing that Time as most of us think about it—
i.e. the linear process of tick-tock time extending into the infinite future—is 
flatly rejected by Hegel in his Philosophy of Nature and therefore that 
Chronological Completeness, no matter how repugnant such a view may be 
to our own limited understanding, is perfectly consistent with Hegel’s 
theoretical rejection of what he calls “the Spurious Infinite.” Chapter 4 
therefore contains the philosophical archeology to which I have several 
times referred and which will become the basis for the critique of Hegel I 
                                                
9 For example, see Chapter 1 of JARCYK, Gwendoline, Système et Liberté Dans la 
Logique de Hegel (2nd edition), Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2001. 
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will present in Part II. I will also explore a most promising way to think 
about how the Parallel between Logical and Chronological development 
turns into the presence of Completeness in both: Hegel’s revival of “final 
causality” in the Dialectic and how this connects to the teleological 
Theodicy that he claims World History actually constitutes.  
 
Chapter 3 (I.2.1) 
The Logical and Chronological Parallel 
 
Although Logical and Chronological Completeness can and will hereafter 
be meaningfully discussed without attempting to solve the more difficult 
problem from which it arises by nature—i.e. from the blurred distinction 
between Logical and Chronological Priority in Hegel’s thought—it arises 
in the first place from the simple observation of a clear parallel between 
Hegel’s Dialectical Logic on the one hand and the way he treats various 
processes like Religion, the History of Philosophy, or World History in 
general that unfold chronologically on the other. In other words, it is only 
because there is a clear connection between the Hegelian Dialectic and the 
way he presents e.g. World History in the first place, that something 
parallel to the Logical Completeness of the Hegelian Dialectic also 
manifests itself as the Chronological Completeness of World History: i.e. 
the End of History. Moreover, unlike the problem of Logical and 
Chronological Priority, the more general Logical and Chronological 
Parallel in Hegel’s thought has already received serious scholarly attention. 
In História e Metafísica em Hegel: Sobre a Noção de Espírito do Mundo, 
Maria Borges has demonstrated the Logical and Chronological Parallel in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History.10 Revealing a willingness to take Hegel’s 
metaphysics seriously, Borges shows that Hegel’s Philosophy of History in 
fact constitutes what she calls “an indirect proof” of the existence of God 
and, for much the same reason, the truth of the Hegelian System.11 In other 
words, Borges points to the Logical and Chronological Parallel as a reason 
for taking Hegel’s defense of metaphysics more seriously while I am using 
this same Parallel rather to raise the central problem of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of History. But despite the difference in our purposes, the Logical and 
                                                
10 BORGES, Maria de Lourdes Alves, História e Metafísica em Hegel: Sobre a 
Noção de Espírito do Mundo, Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, Porto Alegre, 1998 
(hereafter “BORGES”).  
11 BORGES, p. 232: “Quanto à prova indireta, a filosofia mostra a validade 
histórica das seqüências categorais da Ciência da Lógica; afirma-se a tese desta 
indiretamente, visto que, quem a nega, não poderá dizer algo com sentido do 
mundo. ¶ A prova histórica complementaria a prova da Lógica.”  
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Chronological Parallel remains the same for both and is, moreover, at the 
heart of both our projects. 
 Borges documents this Parallel in the second Part of her book called 
“Tempo e Conceito.” Because she is working specifically with Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History, Borges pays particular attention to “the concept of 
Objective Spirit:” it is at the end of this division that World History enters 
Hegel’s System. In other words, she does not so much consider the Concept 
in itself in relation to Time but describes a particular aspect of the Parallel 
between them primarily in the Philosophy of Mind and The Philosophy of 
Right. But her title “Time and Concept” is nevertheless most appropriate: 
the relationship between “Concept” and “Time” in general is certainly the 
theoretical basis for what I am calling “the Logical and Chronological 
Parallel”—visible throughout Hegel’s account of Objective Spirit as Borges 
has shown—in Hegel’s thought as a whole.  
 And it is under the title “Concept and Time” that some of the most 
serious and illuminating work has been done on the theoretical basis for the 
Logical and Chronological Parallel in Hegel’s thought. Having explicitly 
taken the work of Borges as the basis for the claim that this Parallel 
actually exists in the Hegelian System, I will next discuss three scholars 
who have discussed the more general question of “Concept and Time”—the 
theoretical basis for this Parallel—in Hegel’s philosophy. These are 
Alexander Kojève (whose views are closely related, as I will show, and will 
therefore be discussed in connection to those of Martin Heidegger), Jean 
Hypollite, and, most recently, by Karin de Boer.       
 
I.2.1.1. Kojève and Heidegger 
In his 1938-39 lectures published as Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel,12 
Alexander Kojève offered a bold explanation for what I have called “the 
Logical and Chronological Parallel:” he claimed simply that, for Hegel, the 
Concept is Time.13 The textual basis for this claim he finds in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit and is stated by Kojève as “Die Zeit ist der 
daseinde Begriff selbst” (“Time is the Concept itself which is there [in 
empirical existence]”).14 He also emphasizes another radically 
                                                
12 KOJÈVE, Alexander, Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel. Leçons sur la 
Phénoménologie de l’Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l’École des Hautes-
Études, Paris: Raymond Queneau, 1947. My citations are to KOJÈVE, Alexander, 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. and Allen Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 
1969 (hereafter “KOJÈVE”). 
13 KOJÈVE, p. 102. 
14 KOJÈVE, p. 101. 
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decontextualized phrase from Hegel’s unpublished lecture notes from the 
Jena period to the effect that “Geist ist Zeit” (“Spirit is Time”).15 
In his “Concept and Time in Hegel,” John Burbidge has shown that Kojève 
distorts Hegel’s intentions and I am fully persuaded by Burbidge that 
Kojève’s analysis of Hegel is wrong.16 But I would add that it is wrong in a 
revealing way. Kojève completely ignores what Hegel himself has to say 
about Time. Instead of trying to make sense of Hegel’s rather bizarre 
conception of Time as revealed in the Philosophy of Nature, Kojève takes 
Time and History as givens—as they undoubtedly are—and then claims 
that Hegel is orienting himself to them, which he emphatically is not. “The 
aim of Hegel’s philosophy is to give an account of the fact of History.”17 
As we saw in the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel’s actual aim was the exact opposite: the given for Hegel (what 
Kojève calls a “fact”) was Philosophy as it unfolds in a timeless Logical 
process; Hegel’s aim was to demonstrate how Philosophy can also unfold 
in Time, i.e. in History. Philosophy was Hegel’s given, not History. Kojève 
is therefore correct about the Logical and Chronological Parallel but for 
exactly the wrong reason: Hegel clearly has no intention of claiming that 
the Chronological is prior to the Logical but exactly the reverse.   
Nor is this the only instance of Kojève being right for the wrong reason. 
The most important example of this fascinating phenomenon is the vexed 
question of “the End of History.”18 Kojève’s name has unfortunately 
                                                
15 KOJÈVE, p. 133-34. 
16 See BURBIDGE, John, Concept and Time in Hegel in Dialogue v. 12, p. 403-22, 
1973; p. 404: “A conceptual comprehension of history, however, cannot take place 
if the concept is time.” Hence the erroneous reversal of GWFH at JUSZEZAK, 
Joseph, Hegel et la Liberté, Paris: Société d’edition D’enseignement Supérieur, 
1980; p. 92: “Hegel ne conçoit pas l’histoire à partir de l’Idée eternelle mais el 
représente l’eternité de l’Idée comme ce qui se profile à l’horizon du progrès de 
l’histoire.” 
17 KOJÈVE, p. 133. Perhaps the strongest form of this erroneous claim is found on 
KOJÈVE, p.145: “…there is conceptual understanding only where there is an 
essentially temporal, that is, historical reality…” Although KOJÈVE doubtless 
distorts GWFH’s intentions, he at least offers an answer to the question of Logical 
and Chronological Priority: the chronological kind is unquestionably prior.  
18 As to the possibility of being wrong (about the End of History in Hegel) for the 
wrong reason, see ROSENFIELD, Denis L. Política e Liberdade em Hegel, São 
Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1983; p. 60. “O problema consiste em analisar as 
relações entre o conceito e o tempo, entre o lógico e o histórico. A identificação de 
um com o outro permite, de um lado, mostrar que o espírito é tempo e que o 
conceito forma-se historicamente [i.e. what I am calling “the wrong reason”], mas, 
por outro lado, esta identificação pode também resultar na concepção falsa, mas 
vulgarizada, de sistema hegeliano como um sistema fechado que expressaria o fim 
da história.”  
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become inextricably linked to his correct perception of the End of History 
in Hegel’s thought. This is a great advantage to Hegel’s defenders: they 
would much prefer to attack Kojève19 and those who follow him on this 
point20 rather than be forced to defend Hegel. Conversely, any critic of 
Hegel—as one would think almost anyone who attributes to him the 
remarkable conception of the End of History must be21—must necessarily 
appear to be a defender of Kojève and his followers. It is therefore 
important for me to state categorically: in attributing the End of History, or 
what I call “Chronological Completeness,” to Hegel, I will not be following 
Kojève but simply reading Hegel’s text as I find it. In order to emphasize 
my disagreement with his approach, I will suggest that Kojève sees the End 
of History in Hegel less as a result of a good reading of Hegel—even 
though precisely a good reading of Hegel sustains his conclusion—than as 
a result of illegitimately reading Heidegger into Hegel. In any case, it is in 
Alexander Kojève’s approach to the End of History that Martin 
Heidegger’s influence on him becomes obvious.22  
 On the basis of the Jena fragment, Kojève offers a suspiciously 
Heideggerian formulation for Hegel’s conception of Time:  
 
In the Time of which Hegel speaks, on the other hand, the movement  
is engendered in the Future and goes toward the Present by way of the  
Past: Future→Past→Present (→Future). And this indeed the specific  
                                                
19 See, for examples, MAURER, Reinhart Klemens, Hegel und das Ende der 
Geschichte; Interpretationen zur »Phänomenologie des Geistes«, Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlnammer Verlag, 1965; 139-156 and BURBIDGE, John, Hegel on Logic and 
Religion: The Reasonableness of Christianity, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992. The latter’s attempt to read the future into Hegel’s approach to 
Christianity disproves the old adage that the enemy (BURBIDGE) of my enemy 
(KOJÈVE) is necessarily my friend.    
20 For the most interesting among these, see ROSEN, Stanley, G. W. F. Hegel: An 
Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. 
A more slavish example is COOPER, Barry, The End of History: An Essay on 
Modern Hegelianism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. My point, of 
course, is that one can agree with KOJÈVE on this point (sc. the End of History) 
and not be his follower. 
21 An exception would be FUKUYAMA, Francis, The End of History? in The 
National Interest v. 16, p. 3-18, 1989. Naturally, FUKUYAMA acknowledges the 
influence of KOJÈVE (see II.2.2). 
22 The clearest indication (and first warning) of the Heideggerian orientation of his 
approach to pseudo-Hegel (because GWFH himself often seems to vanish in his 
remarks) is found at KOJÈVE, p. 102, n. 1. Having written in the text: “Third 
Possibility: the Concept is Time, and hence is related neither to Eternity nor Time; 
this is Hegel’s position” (KOJÈVE, p. 102), he adds in the note: “(Hegel and 
Heidegger represent this third possibility).” 
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structure of properly human—that is, historical—Time.23 
 
Although it is well beyond the scope of my present purpose to elaborate the 
point, Kojève’s examples of  “a future war,”24 of Julius Caesar at the 
Rubicon,25 and his emphasis on Arbeit and Kampf26 (all buried in footnotes) 
                                                
23 KOJÈVE, p. 134. Compare HEIDEGGER, Martin, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1976 (hereafter “SZ”), p. 326 as found in HEIDEGGER, Martin, 
Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996; (hereafter “BT”), p. 300: “Futurally coming back to itself, 
resoluteness brings itself to the situation in making it present. Having-been [sc. the 
Past] arises from the future in such a way that the future that has been (or better, is 
in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself.”  
24 See KOJÈVE, p. 136, n. 24. Speaking in 1938-39, KOJÈVE not only points out 
that “in deciding for the future war, one decides against the prevailing peace” but 
he specifically states that “if it [sc. “the prevailing peace”] is humiliating, its 
negation is an act worthy of a statesman.” Moreover, the use of “a future war” as an 
example to illustrate HEIDEGGER’s conception of Time [note that n. 24 is attached 
to the following sentence: “The Time that Hegel has in view, then, is human or 
historical time: it is the time of conscious and voluntary action which realizes in the 
present a Project for the future, which Project is formed on the basis of knowledge 
of the past”] provides supporting evidence for my view that already in Sein und Zeit 
(1927), HEIDEGGER (who joined the Nazis in 1933), was calling for remaking 
Germany’s present by resolutely deciding on a future (World War II) that emerged 
from her past (the World War which would thereby become “the First World War.” 
He was already calling it “the first World War” in 1934 (See “25 Jahre nach 
unserem Abiturium”) in HEIDEGGER, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 16, Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000; p. 280). See also my “Martin Heidegger and 
the First World War; Being and Time as Funeral Oration” (unpublished 
manuscript). 
25 KOJÈVE, p. 135, n. 25: “The moment is historic because the man taking a 
nocturnal walk is thinking about a coup d’etat, the civil war, the conquest of Rome, 
and world wide dominion.”  
26 KOJÈVE, p. 142, n. 33: “In Hegel, on the other hand, the “mediation” is active; it 
is Tat or Tun, action negating the given, the activity of Fighting and Work.” The 
second time he says the same thing in this note, he uses his German more 
revealingly. “Now, the transformation of given Being in terms of the concept-
project is, precisely, conscious and voluntary Action [like Caesar’s decision to cross 
the Rubicon], Tun which is Arbeit and Kampf” (ibid.). It must be kept in mind that 
KOJÈVE was the friend and collaborator of Leo STRAUSS, the master of 
exotericism and “writing between the lines” (see STRAUSS, Leo, On Tyranny; 
Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000). STRAUSS compared the National Socialist Revolution to ancient 
Rome in a 1933 letter to Karl LÖWITH. “And, as to the substance of the matter: i.e. 
that Germany having turned to the right does not tolerate us, that proves absolutely 
nothing against right-wing principles. On the contrary: only on the basis of right-
wing principles—on the basis of fascistic, authoritarian, imperial principles—is it 
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will give the interested reader some political indications of why I have such 
a rooted antipathy to being associated with his views in any way. For the 
present, the important point is that the primacy of the Future (that he 
attributes to Hegel) is in fact thoroughly Heideggerian in origin. “Now, this 
Future, for Man, is his death, that future of his which will never become his 
Present; and the only reality or real presence of this Future is the 
knowledge that Man has in the present of his future death.” It is on this 
thoroughly Heideggerian basis that Kojève announces the End of History in 
Hegel: 
 
If, then, the Concept is in Time, that is, if conceptual understanding is 
dialectical, the existence of the Concept—is essentially finite. Therefore 
History itself must be essentially finite; collective Man (humanity) must 
die just as the human individual dies; universal History must have a 
definitive end.27 
 
Although Kojève gives a superficially Heideggerian reading to Hegel, 
Martin Heidegger himself offered some very useful observations about the 
Concept and Time in Section of §82 of Sein und Zeit. Heidegger accurately 
situates Hegel’s version of Time within the Concept rather than, as is the 
case with Kojève, adapting Hegel’s Concept to Heidegger’s notion of 
Time. To begin with, Heidegger takes seriously the Hegelian problem of 
how Mind can possibly “fall into time.”28 Heidegger also pays due regard 
to treatment of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature29 and emphasizes a 
                                                                                                   
possible with integrity, without the ridiculous and pitiful appeal to the droits 
imprescriptables de l’homme, to protest against the repulsive monster [das meskine 
Unwesen]. I am reading Caesar’s Commentaries with deeper understanding, and I 
think about Virgil: Tu regere imperio…parcere subjectis et debellare superbos. 
There exists no reason to crawl to the cross [zu Kreuze zu Kriechen], to liberalism’s 
cross of as well, as long as somewhere in the world there yet glimmers a spark of 
the Roman idea” (STRAUSS, Leo, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Heinrich 
Meier, with the editorial assistance of Wiebke Meier, Volume 3: Hobbes’ Politische 
Wissenschaft und zugehörige Schriften; Briefe, J. B. Metzlar, Stuttgart and Weimar, 
2001; translation mine). 
27 KOJÈVE, p. 148. This is not to say that KOJÈVE completely misreads GWFH: 
the next sentence puts it very well. “We know that for Hegel the end of history is 
marked by the appearance of Science in the form of a Book—that is, by the 
appearance of the Wise Man or of absolute Knowledge in the World” (KOJÈVE, p. 
148). Hegel himself is the—at once textual and extra-textual—proof of the End of 
History. 
28 HEIDEGGER, SZ, p. 428/BT, pp. 391-92. 
29 HEIDEGGER, SZ, p. 429/BT, p. 392. HEIDEGGER emphasizes that GWFH is 
thereby (i.e. by placing his systematic discussion of Time within the Philosophy of 
Nature) following ARISTOTLE, the locus classicus of what HEIDEGGER calls the 
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crucial fact that Kojève either ignores or suppresses: that Hegel’s vision of 
Time is inseparable from Intuition30 and is therefore not a self-standing 
“fact” as Kojève had called it. Not only does Heidegger place Time in its 
Hegelian context—in the second part of System, i.e. the Philosophy of 
Nature—but he goes on to link it to the second moment of the first Triad in 
Hegel’s Logic (Nichts or “nothing”) and, moreover, comes very close to 
brilliantly linking Time to the second moment of the Logic as whole 
(Wesen or “essence”).31 Both because the discussion of the theoretical basis 
for the Logical and Chronological Parallel it contains is thought provoking 
and because he considers the entire passage from the Phenomenology from 
which Kojève misleadingly extracts his central text,32 an exegesis of a 
single crucial paragraph in Section §82 of Being and Time will not be out 
of place here.33 
 
Since the restlessness of the development of spirit bringing itself to its 
concept is the negation of a negation, it is in accordance with its self-
actualization to fall “into time” as the immediate negation of a negation. 
 
This is a brilliant insight on Heidegger’s part. Taking seriously Hegel’s 
placement of Time at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, itself the 
externalized negation of Logic, he carefully explains how the purely 
abstract and undifferentiated form of this negation (Space) is itself negated, 
and thereby becomes differentiated, as Time.34 Just as the Philosophy of 
                                                                                                   
“vulgar” conception of Time. According to HEIDEGGER, GWFH’s “conception of 
time presents the most radical way in which the vulgar understanding of time has 
been given form conceptually” (SZ, p. 428/BT, p. 292).  
30 HEIDEGGER, SZ, pp. 430-31/BT, pp. 393-94. For criticism of Heidegger’s 
connection of GWFH and ARISTOTLE, see MAJETSCHAK, Stefan, Die Logik 
des Absoluten. Spekulation und Zeitlichkeit in der Philosophie Hegels, Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1992. In his review of MAJETSCHAK’s book in Geschichte, 
Zeit und versöhnende Ewigkeit bei Hegel, Hegel-Studien v. 29, p. 158-169, 1994, 
Stephan BAECKERS points out that Karl JASPERS had earlier criticized 
HEIDEGGER on this score (p. 167). 
31 This link is implied (but not further developed) in the two questions with which 
HEIDEGGER begins his inquiry at SZ, p. 428, BT, p. 392 (emphases mine): “(1) 
How does Hegel define the essence of time? (2) What belongs to the essence of 
spirit that makes it possible for it to “fall into time”?”  
32 As BURBIDGE points out in Concept and Time in Hegel.  
33 This paragraph (HEIDEGGER, SZ, p. 434) will be broken into five parts in the 
following discussion. They will not be cited individually.  
34 HEIDEGGER shows himself to be a skilled exegete of GWFH in the paragraph 
about Space and Time on SZ, p. 430 (BT, p. 393). Emphasizing GWFH’s 
expression “Punktualität” (Space is the condition of the possibility of the individual 
Point rather than being either any one Point or the totality of said Points), 
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Spirit constitutes the negation of Nature’s negation of Logic, so also is 
Time the negation of Space’s negation of the Idea in Itself (Logic) and is, 
therefore, itself accurately positioned as the first moment of Nature. On the 
basis of this parallel—i.e. that both Time and Concept are “the negation of 
a negation”—Heidegger offers us a suggestive explanation, one that seems 
quite faithful to Hegel’s intentions, for the possibility of Spirit “falling 
into” Time.35 
 At this point, Heidegger quotes Hegel himself: the passage from which 
Kojève lifted his excerpt.  
 
For “time is the concept itself that is there, and it represents itself to 
consciousness as empty intuition. For this reason spirit necessarily 
appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its 
pure concept, that is, has not annulled [tilgt] time. Time is the pure self 
that is externally intuited and not grasped by the itself, the concept merely 
intuited” [Heidegger cites “Phänomenologie des Geistes. WW. II, S. 604” 
in a footnote]. 
 
This crucial passage about “annulled time” is central to any adequate 
understanding of Time (and therefore History) in Hegel’s System. Unless 
one grasps that Time is subject to Tilgung (annulment) simply by 
accurately grasping its “pure concept,” one cannot possibly grasp the 
condition for the possibility of what I have called “Chronological 
Completeness.” Time can only become complete—History can have an 
End—because for Hegel, Time is annulled (tilgt) in its pure Concept. At the 
risk of making the exact same point for a third time, the Logical 
Completeness of conceptual Time annuls—and therefore completes—
chronological Time. Although Heidegger does not emphasize Hegel’s debt 
to Kant, his insistence that Time is “the merely intuited” Concept—that 
Time is for consciousness merely “an empty intuition”—shows that Time is 
no more a “fact” for Hegel than it was for Kant. Spirit appears in time—
and the word “appears” is decisive—for us only before we grasp that it is 
                                                                                                   
HEIDEGGER shows how purely undifferentiated “punctuality” becomes distinct as 
(both the individual Point and) Time by “…the positing of itself for itself” as the 
“now-here, now-here, and soon.” Thus: “Every point “is” posited for itself as a 
now-point.” This, by the way, confirms HEIDEGGER’s own view that GWFH, 
while radicalizing it, is simultaneously preserving the vulgar dominance of the 
present in the traditional concept of time. It will be seen that KOJÈVE, by 
collapsing the distinction between HEIDEGGER and GWFH on Time, misreads 
HEIDEGGER. But, in fairness, he seems to do so intentionally (i.e. in full 
knowledge of GWFH’s actual position). See KOJÈVE, p. 143, n. 34 where he 
demonstrates his awareness of that position.  
35 See also WdL, p. 842-3. 
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annulled by its concept. It will be noted that the ambiguity of the word 
“before” reveals the bedeviling reappearance—“bedeviling,” that is, from 
Hegel’s perspective; say rather sublime from ours—of the problem of 
Logical and Chronological Priority.  
 Heidegger comments only briefly on this passage and therefore fails to 
persuade us that his most brilliant insight—the possible connection of Time 
to Wesen, the second moment of Logic—is anything more than an 
undeveloped hypothesis: “Thus spirit appears in time necessarily in 
accordance with its essence.” Time, of course, is external to Hegel’s 
Science of Logic as understood by Hegel himself and therefore as he wants 
us to understand it. In other words, there is no doubt that Hegel’s System 
accords priority to Logical rather than Chronological Priority. But even if 
we are unwilling to see Chronological Priority at work from the very 
beginning of the Logic,36 we could perhaps suggest that Hegel should have 
introduced it (as mere Schein, of course) in the Doctrine of Essence 
(Wesen) rather than wait until the Philosophy of Nature. Be that as it may, 
although Heidegger doesn’t draw our attention explicitly to the problems 
that arise from placing Time in Nature—rather than in the Reflexion of 
Wesen—he does perhaps suggest them by the second quotation from Hegel 
in the paragraph:    
    
“Thus world history in general is the interpretation of spirit in time, just 
as the idea interprets itself in nature as space” [Heidegger cites “Die 
Vernunft in der Geschichte a. a. O. S. 134” in a footnote]. 
 
This passage calls to mind the more famous passage from the last chapter 
of the Phenomenology, to which the discussion of Hyppolite that follows in 
I.2.1.2 will inevitably direct us. Therefore extended comment on this 
passage is unnecessary here. But one crucial point must be made: it is 
obvious that Heidegger offers no support to those who wish to find two 
                                                
36 Or even before the beginning! Is the Phenomenology (i.e. the journey of Spirit 
described therein rather than the 1807 book itself) Logically or Chronologically 
Prior to the Science of Logic? See HARRIS, Errol E. A Reply to Philip Grier in Di 
Giovanni, George ed. Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 77-84. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1990; p. 79: “The beginning of the Logic (with pure Being), 
although it is logically presuppositionless, does at the same time necessarily imply 
at least the dialectical process of the Phenomenology, which has raised 
consciousness to the level of absolute knowing, below which no genuine 
wissenschaftliche beginning can be made at all.” 
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types of Time in Hegel: the Natural and the Historical.37 Without basis in 
Hegel’s text, notoriously sparse on the subject of Time as it is, this 
distinction seems to be the latest development in the attempt to outflank 
“the End of History.” Nor must much time be spent on the last two 
sentences of Heidegger’s paragraph: 
 
The “excluding” that belongs to the moment of development contains a 
relation to nonbeing. That is time, understood in terms of the revolt of the 
now. 
 
The first sentence brilliantly but obscurely links Time to the second 
moment of the Logic’s first Triad: although his meaning is unclear, there is 
definitely something profound in Heidegger’s suggestion that Time’s role 
can only be understood in relation to the second moments of the Hegelian 
Dialectic, i.e. in relation to Nothing, Essence, and Nature. Perhaps 
Heidegger does not fully develop this promising hypothesis because he 
prefers to see Time not simply as belonging to the moment of negativity—
where it is naturally susceptible to a conceptual Tilgung in the synthetic 
moment of Begriff—but as the negation of Space’s negation: only in 
relation to Space can Hegel’s conception of Time, no matter how 
radicalized, promote the vulgar understanding of Time which gives priority 
to the Present that is Heidegger’s real opponent in the historical portions of 
Being and Time. This is the import of the second sentence: what he calls 
here “the revolt of the now” is the self-differentiation of Space’s 
“punctuality” as Time’s this point now. But such questions have nothing to 
do with Hegel.  
 Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that this examination of Heidegger and 
Kojève has helped us clarify the theoretical presuppositions for the Logical 
and Chronological Parallel so basic for grasping Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History. Most importantly, this juxtaposition of Heidegger and Kojève has 
revealed that the true preconditions for a conception of Chronological 
Completeness need not be based on Kojève’s superficial identification of 
Time and Concept: it results from the Tilgung of Time in the pure Concept 
thereof.   
 
I.2.1.2.  Hyppolite 
 Jean Hyppolite and H.S. Harris are the two towering Hegel scholars of 
the second half of the 20th century. By choosing to consider Hyppolite 
                                                
37 See BAEKERS, S.F. Die Zeit als Mitte der Philosophie Hegels, Hegel-Studien v. 
30, p. 121-143, 1995. See also ARANTES, P. A., Hegel: A ordem do tempo. 
Traduçâo e prefácio de Rubens Rodrigues Torres. Sao Paulo: Hucitec, 2000; p. 349.  
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here—the work of H.S. Harris,38 of course, is primarily historical-
biographical and therefore not germane to the immediate question at 
hand—I am making no secret of the fact that I consider his views on the 
place of History in Hegel’s Phenomenology to be fundamentally sound and 
indeed as the basis of my own.  
  In his groundbreaking Genèse et structure de la Phènomenologie de 
l’esprit de Hegel (1946),39 the book I will consider here, Jean Hyppolite is 
very cautious on the question of “the End of History.” Having posed the 
important question: “Are we to think that this stage [sc. absolute 
knowledge] is precisely the end of time and that Hegel naïvely thought that 
history came to end with his system?” Hyppolite thoughtfully responds, 
“Although this accusation has often been made, it seems unjust in certain 
respects” (emphasis mine).40 But Hyppolite does not explain in precisely 
what “respects” such an “accusation” is “unjust.”41 Instead, he provides a 
reason, indeed the decisive reason, for thinking that it’s true: 
 
The difficulty of the last chapter of the Phenomenology (“absolute 
Knowledge”) is not merely due to Hegel’s terminology and the manner of 
his exposition; it is inherent in the very nature of the problem.42  
 
Hyppolite is here politely referring to “the last chapter of the 
Phenomenology” as the difficulty that challenges those who reject the view 
“that Hegel naïvely thought that history came to end with his system.” Nor, 
he insists, is this a mere question of the “terminology” used in that chapter. 
 
To surmount all transcendence and yet to preserve the life of the spirit 
presupposes a dialectical relation between the temporal and the 
supratemporal that cannot easily be thought.43 
                                                
38 I am thinking in particular of HARRIS, H.S. Hegel’s Development: Night 
Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983 (hereafter “HARRIS”) 
although the first volume has been at my hand for years. 
39 My references will be to HYPPOLITE, Jean, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974 (hereafter “HYPPOLITE”). 
40 HYPPOLITE, p. 45. 
41 He was certainly aware that it was unjust when made by KOJÈVE; the two were 
often linked as rivals at the time. 
42 HYPPOLITE, pp. 45-46. 
43 HYPPOLITE, p. 46. After confining himself to the past (in order to avoid the 
question of how GWFH regarded the future), HYPPOLITE returns to this dialectic 
later in the paragraph. “Perhaps the problem of the past of absolute knowledge is 
not [as his previous distinction had suggested] entirely different from the problem 
of the future. There too, the solution must be dialectical” (ibid.). It is unclear to 
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Hyppolite puts the dilemma very well. Ceaseless and infinitely continuous 
dialectical change—the self-abolition that occurs along each stage of “the 
life of the spirit;” i.e. the journey in time described in the 
Phenomenology—“cannot easily be thought” (that states the case very 
tactfully!) alongside Hegel’s absolute commitment “to surmount all 
transcendence.” For all the movement and life within each dialectic, for all 
the one-sidedness of each apparent resolution that drives the process on, 
the simple and irreducible fact is that the Phenomenology, like The Science 
of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, ends and 
can only end with the same “terminology” that always provides the very 
same “difficulty”—at least for the open-ended reading of Hegel favored by 
the Left Hegelians—whether the final topic is “Absolute Knowing,” 
“Absolute Knowledge,” or the “Absolute Idea.” The circle comes round 
and closes on itself. “The Truth is the Whole.” There is no God apart from 
the World; there is not even any equally unknown and inscrutable Future 
transcending our knowledge.44 There can’t be. While there can be no 
question that “infinitely continuous dialectical change” is the doctrine that 
makes Hegel attractive, it is the “absolute commitment to surmount all 
transcendence” that makes Hegel Hegel.  
 Hyppolite knows this, but sees no reason to hit us over the head with 
the fact. His goal, after all, is neither to be Hegel nor to make Hegel 
attractive: he just wants to understand how Hegel came to think as he did. 
And so he tactfully sidesteps the issue:      
 
But this is not precisely the problem that we wish to discuss here. We are 
less concerned here with the future that appears to consciousness that has 
reached absolute knowledge than we are with the past that our 
consciousness has used in the course of its development.45 
                                                                                                   
what extent HYPPOLITE regards “cannot easily be thought” as identical with 
“dialectical.”  
44 The only evidence cited by HYPPOLITE “contradicting the claim that he [sc. 
GWFH] claimed to stop time at his time” (HYPPOLITE, p. 46) is a passage he 
quotes from the Philosophy of Right (p. 11) that, if taken self-referentially (see 
II.3.2) would relativize GWFH’s System to his own time. HYPPOLITE avoids the 
issue with poetry at p. 46: “This does not mean that the conception of what exists is 
merely the conception of a contingent, transitory element [i.e. Time that can bring 
about Future Developments]; on the contrary, in the cross of the present suffering 
[but only from the perspective of GWFH’s Absolute Knowledge!] we must 
recognize the rose and rejoice in it. ¶ Let us return to the problem of the past.”     
45 HYPPOLITE, p. 46. This important passage continues: “Our question [note the 
repetition for emphasis] is to what extent that past—which coincides only in part 
with [the ‘fact’ of] world history and which, properly speaking [as HYPPOLITE 
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What the future looked like to Hegel46 is not Hyppolite’s concern: “the 
problem that we wish to discuss here” is not “the End of History” but rather 
the journey through the past described in Hegel’s breathtakingly brilliant 
Phenomenology of Spirit. He does that very well indeed. 
 It is the place where History is found in Hyppolite’s account of the 
Phenomenology that is particularly relevant to my present purpose. Like the 
rest of us, Kojève accords History an objective existence: he simply 
assumes that it is a “fact” and that its locus is “the outside world.” 
Hyppolite takes Hegel’s assault on the subject/object distinction, itself 
borrowed from Schelling and intrinsic to Idealism, seriously.47 He thereby 
unearths the radical conception that History for Hegel does not constitute 
some external, empirical object: the locus of History is within “the 
substance that is subject as well.”48 In the chapter he calls “History and 
                                                                                                   
himself has discovered], is not a philosophy of [objective and externally existing] 
history but the recollection of world history in an individual consciousness that is 
rising to [Absolute] knowledge—is determined abstractly [i.e. by its place in—and 
therefore relative to its—Time; this is the price incurred by reading the quotation 
from the Philosophy of Right mentioned in the previous note as self-referential] and 
to what extent it evinces a necessity [each step being retrospectively necessitated as 
the process culminating in Absolute Knowledge]” (HYPPOLITE, p. 46). For 
HYPPOLITE’s awareness that the latter is GWFH’s favored alternative, see p. 4: 
“He [sc. GWFH] indicates the necessity of an evolution of consciousness and, at the 
same time, the end point of this evolution. Finally, he specifies the technique of 
phenomenological development, showing how this development is the work of 
consciousness engaged in experience and how the {internal} necessity of this 
development can be thought out retrospectively by philosophy.”    
46 The “consciousness that has reached absolute Knowledge” doubtless had no 
concern for it whatsoever; he had enough to think about by simply thinking himself!   
47 See HYPPOLITE, p. 5-7. 
48 Here again, HYPPOLITE (p. 40) emphasizes the influence of SCHELLING. 
“Individual consciousness [as subject] must become aware within itself of its 
substance, which at first—when this consciousness is still at the beginning of its 
philosophical and spiritual itinerary—appears to it as external. Schelling had 
already insisted on this immanence of history in the individual’s present [this 
immanence will be discussed in greater detail below]: “We assert that no individual 
consciousness could be posed with all the determinations with which it is posed and 
which necessarily belong to it, if the whole of history had not preceded it—as could 
easily be demonstrated by examples if we were discussing works of art” 
[HYPPOLITE cites “Schelling, SW, III, 590”]. It will easily be seen that 
SCHELLING’s radical subsumption of historical development to the individual as 
subject could easily be reversed, as it was by MARX, to become the subsumption of 
the individual to historical development. Between the early SCHELLING and 
MARX, history had become emancipated from Idealism. GWFH is the transitional 
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Phenomenology,” Hyppolite develops the claim that the journey described 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind is not historical because it recapitulates 
the history of what our distant ancestors have objectively done in the Past 
but because it contains the History that we ourselves subjectively are while 
traversing our turbulent path to, and the distinction-devouring moment of, 
Absolute Knowledge wherein we reach an eternal Present that contains both 
Future and Past as mere moments.49  
 And thus it happens that Hyppolite’s Hegel can’t make the outrageous 
claim that History objectively ends because for Hegel History never had 
any objective existence in the first place: the first and last place in Hegel’s 
thought belongs to Idealism.50 Like any other apparently objective thing, 
History appears to be external to the subject. Schelling, following Spinoza, 
had shown Hegel the way to collapse the distinction between subject and 
the apparently external object “Nature.”51 Because the subject at the center 
of Idealism is also Spinozistic52 substance, it always already contains both 
the apparent object—Nature considered as “extension”53—as well as the 
                                                                                                   
figure: his motives were SCHELLING’s but his comprehensive audacity—his 
attempt to subsume all of history, not just art—made an approach like MARX’s 
possible and perhaps inevitable. It is crucial to realize that History is not yet 
emancipated in this sense for GWFH.      
49 HYPPOLITE, p. 40-1: “Thus there is a certain relation between phenomenology 
and the philosophy of history. Phenomenology is the concrete, explicit development 
and formation of the individual, the rise of his finite self to absolute self. But that 
elevation is possible only through the use of the moments of world history, 
moments which are immanent in that individual consciousness.”   
50 HYPPOLITE, p. 7: “In Hegel’s philosophy, the absolute is no longer only 
substance; it is subject as well. Schelling’s Spinozism can be superseded only by a 
return to the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte. Then the absolute will not be beyond 
all knowledge; it will be self-knowledge in the knowledge of consciousness.”   
51 HYPPOLITE, p. 7: “Hegel wanted to prove that Schelling’s absolute idealism 
was still possible if one started, not with nature, but with consciousness, with the I, 
if one deepened Fichte’s subjectivism.”  
52 “To prove the identity of God and Nature was always an essential goal for Hegel” 
(HARRIS, p. 82). For the relationship between SPINOZA, SCHELLING’s 
“Identity Philosophy” [i.e. the identity of Subject and Object], and GWFH, see 
HARRIS, p. 56, especially n. 2. The Spinozist reading of GWFH offered here has 
also been decisively influenced by Leo STRAUSS: “The philosophy of Kant’s great 
successors [STRAUSS means FICHTE, SCHELLING and GWFH] was 
consciously a synthesis of Spinoza’s and Kant’s philosophies” (STRAUSS, Leo, 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 17. 
STRAUSS wrote his doctoral dissertation on F.H. JACOBI.  
53 HARRIS, p. 63 (his emphasis): “The purely bodily reality of the idea is its 
extended existence in cosmic space and time, and especially in the great clock 
constituted by the solar system.”  
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Cartesian subject, i.e. “thought.”54 According to Hyppolite, Hegel’s great 
innovation was to do with History what Schelling had already done with 
Nature: History had never before been subsumed by Idealism.55 This 
subsumption, the knowing internalization of History as a Whole, is what 
occurs in Absolute Knowledge. 
 In section three of the previously mentioned chapter entitled “III. The 
Phenomenology: A History of Individual Consciousness,”56 Hyppolite 
introduces two radical ideas that are particularly important here: what he 
calls the “immanence of history in the individual’s present”57 and “the 
necessity of a mediation through universal history.”58 The first is based on 
the familiar proposition that ontogeny contains phylogeny59 and thus 
provides a fascinating theoretical basis for the Logical and Chronological 
                                                
54 SPINOZA’s (apparent) failure to locate thought in the subject, but only in 
substance, is precisely what GWFH faults in him in LPH: “Spinoza’s defect is 
therefore this, that he takes the third moment as mode alone, as a false individuality. 
True individuality and subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the universal, not 
merely something clearly determinate; for, as clearly determinate, it is at the same 
time Being-for-itself, determined by itself alone. The individual, the subjective, is 
even in being so the return to the universal; and in that it is at home with itself, it is 
itself the universal. The return consists simply and solely in the fact of the particular 
being in itself the universal; to this return Spinoza did not attain.” 
55 See the entire paragraph beginning at HYPPOLITE, p. 30-1: “It is on the subject 
of history that we can best understand the differences between Schelling’s 
philosophy and Hegel’s.”  
56 HYPPOLITE, p. 39-45. 
57 HYPPOLITE, p. 40. He first mentions in on the previous page: “Hegel took the 
immanence of human history in general in the individual consciousness seriously.”  
58 HYPPOLITE, p. 42 (emphasis mine): “The empirical consciousness considered 
was specific consciousness, which must progressively become aware once again of 
the experience of the species and, in forming itself to knowledge, form itself to a 
human wisdom {sagesse}; it must learn its relation to other consciousness and 
grasp the necessity of a mediation through universal history so that it can itself 
become spiritual consciousness.” As the emphasized passage indicates, this second 
idea is dependent on the first.  
59 HYPPOLITE, p. 39 (emphasis mine) brilliantly compares Hegel’s 
Phenomenology to ROUSSEAU’s Emile and also gives due credit to Gustave 
LANSON’s insight about it. “Thus, the problem which the Phenomenology poses is 
not that of world history but that of the education of the specific individual who 
must, necessarily, be formed to knowledge by becoming aware of what Hegel calls 
his substance. This is a specifically pedagogical task not unrelated to the task 
Rousseau set himself in Emile. The “primary idea” [here HYPPOLITE begins to 
quote from “Gustave LANSON, Littérature française, 22d edition, p. 796”] of 
Rousseau’s book has been described as “rigorously scientific; if the individual’s 
development summarily repeats the evolution of the species, then the child’s 
education must largely reproduce the general movement of humanity.””  
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Parallel. History, apparently unfolding as Past Chronology, is actually 
immanent within the Present of the Individual, who—by following the path 
described in the Phenomenology60—experiences that apparently Chrono-
logical Process as a Logical or at least a Phenomeno-logical one.61 In fact, 
“Phenomenology” becomes the first-fruit and intersection of the Logical 
and Chronological Parallel. Hyppolite’s probing reading suggests that what 
we are really dealing with in Hegel’s thought is a Logical and 
Chronological Isomorphism whose locus is Substance as Subject. 
 Lest “the immanence of history” be dismissed as a peculiarity of the 
Phenomenology—or worse yet, of Hyppolite’s interpretation of it—it is 
instructive to consider Hegel’s account of Plato’s theory of recollection in 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Part II will show how and why 
Hegel’s antagonism towards Plato becomes highly instructive; for now, it is 
sufficient to point out that it his critique of Platonic recollection as 
expressed in Meno is characteristic because what is best in Plato merely 
points forward to a fully developed concept in Hegel: 
 
In one sense recollection {Erinnerung} is certainly an unfortunate 
expression, in the sense, namely, than an idea is reproduced which has 
already existed at another time. But recollection has another sense, which 
is given by its [German] etymology, namely of making oneself inward, 
going inward, and this is the profound meaning of the word in thought. In 
this sense it may undoubtedly be said that knowledge of the universal is 
nothing but a recollection, a going within self, and that we make that 
which at first shows itself in external form and determined as a manifold, 
into an inward, a universal, because we go into ourselves and bring what 
is inward in us into consciousness. With Plato, however, as we cannot 
deny, the word recollection has constantly the first and empirical sense.62 
 
The connection to Plato’s Ideas and the related question of whether virtue 
can be taught is quickly severed; once broadened by Hegel, Erinnerung 
means that there is nothing that is not already contained in Geist.63  Hegel’s 
evident sympathy for “the immanent nature of knowledge” is therefore 
                                                
60 HYPPOLITE, p. 41: “The history of the world, which is immanent in the 
individual but of which he has not become aware, then becomes conceptualized and 
internalized history, the meaning of which he is progressively able to elaborate.”  
61 A discussion of HYPPOLITE’s profound speculations about the relationship 
between the PhG and the System as a whole (p. 62) and then (p. 17) between the 
PhG (the domain of which is consciouness) and the WdL (whose domain is the 
concept) would take us too far afield.    
62 LHP vol. 2, p. 34. 
63 LHP vol. 2, p. 33 (emphasis mine): “Mind [Geist] is this absolute species [sc. 
“the Notion of the true universal in its movement”], whose process is only the 
continual return into itself; thus nothing is for it which is not in itself.”  
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explicitly predicated on the claim “the spirit of man contains reality in 
itself.”64 
 But it is Hyppolite’s second idea, i.e. “the necessity of a mediation 
through universal history,” that is his most significant contribution to my 
understanding of Hegel’s Philosophy of History and, quite possibly, of his 
System as a Whole. The “specific I,” the subject that has not yet reached 
Absolute Knowledge,65 can only become substance (what Hyppolite calls 
“the I of humanity”)66 through the necessary67 mediation of History.68 And 
if, as Hyppolite insists, “the spirit is history for Hegel,”69 it is only through 
Spirit, the third moment of the Hegelian System, that the Idea can think 
itself as having passed from Logic into Nature. It is necessarily Mind or 
Spirit conceived as the “immanence of history in the individual’s present” 
that is manifested in the Phenomenology that mediates the union, through 
the Concept, not only of Nature and Logic, but also of Thought and 
                                                
64 LHP vol. 2, p. 32 (emphases mine): “The spirit of man contains reality on itself, 
and in order to learn what is divine he must develop it out of himself and bring it to 
consciousness. With the Socratics this discussion respecting the immanent nature of 
knowledge takes the form of a question as to whether virtue can be taught or not…” 
65 HYPPOLITE, p. 40-1: “Phenomenology is the concrete, explicit development 
and formation of the individual, the rise of his finite self to absolute self.” 
66 HYPPOLITE, p. 42. It is also here that he uses the phrase “the specific I.” See 
also HYPPOLITE, p. 41. 
67 In addition to being (externally) necessary to the process of self-realization 
leading to Absolute Knowledge, History was also, according to HYPPOLITE, p. 
28, conceived of as (internally) necessary already in SCHELLING. “We can easily 
grasp here the difference between Fichte’s point of view, which stops with a moral 
order of the world that ought to exist but does not exist necessarily [an example of 
what I have called “Kantianism”] and Schelling’s point of view, which sees in 
history an actual and necessary realization of freedom, through destiny or 
providence. Hegel follows Schelling on this point.”    
68 HYPPOLITE, p. 31 (emphasis mine): “The [subject/object] duality which is the 
foundation of history and which Schelling eliminates from the absolute is an 
essential moment in the Phenomenology. It characterizes consciousness, but 
consciousness is not therefore alien to the absolute. On the contrary, the historical 
development of consciousness is the reflection back on itself of the absolute—of 
spirit.”  
69 Continuing the passage quoted in the previous note, HYPPOLITE adds at p. 31 
(his emphases): “Before asking ourselves in what way the reflection of 
consciousness is a history, and what kind of history it is [these are the questions he 
answers in “III. The Phenomenology: A History of Individual Consciousness”], we 
must define more closely Hegel’s view of the relation between spirit and history. 
The spirit is history for Hegel—this is a fundamental thesis identical to the thesis 
that the absolute is subject—“but organic nature has no history” (PE, I, 247; PG, 
220; PM, 326).”   
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Extension, Object and Subject, Subject and Substance, and finally the union 
of Substance and “Hegel” who then become one in Absolute Knowledge. It 
will be noted that the word “finally” is ambiguous here: in fact this union is 
Chronologically Prior to all the other pairs.70  
 In conclusion, by taking Hegel’s Idealism seriously, Hyppolite has 
helped us to understand the place of History in Hegel’s thought.     
 
I.2.1.2. de Boer 
 In her important article “Begriff und Zeit” (2002),71 Karin de Boer 
brings the crucial connection between Time and Concept in Hegel’s 
thought into the 21st century. To the extent that she derives Time, perhaps 
following the clues left by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit,72 directly from the 
negativity of the Concept,73 she offers a solid basis for recognizing the 
Concept a Logical Priority as so complete that it becomes the condition for 
                                                
70 In other words, GWFH is chronologically prior to his own System even if that 
which is embodied in his System is logically prior to GWFH. It should also be 
added that GWFH never states that the System could have existed before GWFH 
himself; his LHP suggests the opposite conclusion.   
71 DE BOER, Karin, Begriff und Zeit: Die Selbstentäußerung des Begriffs und ihre 
Wiederholung in Hegels spekulativem System, Hegel-Studien v. 35, p. 11-49, 2002 
(hereafter “DE BOER”). 
72 She never cites actually HEIDEGGER. But she uses the same quotation from the 
Philosophy of History (see DE BOER, p. 46, n. 54) that we saw him use earlier just 
before introducing the claim that: “Deswegen versucht Hegel in der Enzyklopädie, 
die Bewegtheit des Begriffs und die Bewegtheit der Zeit als zwei Gestalten 
derselben negierenden Kraft zu verstehen” (DE BOER, p. 46). It will be recalled 
that HEIDEGGER emphasized the relationship between Time and the (negative) 
second moment. 
73 DE BOER, p. 47: “Mit diesen beiden Formen von Negativität—Begriff und 
Zeit—als Ausgangspunkt hat Hegel genug in Hand, um in seinem System die 
Bewegung zu rekonstruieren, in der der Begriff aufgrund seiner größten 
Entäußerung in der Natur die Macht der Zeit in zunehmenden Maße zu tilgen 
weiß.” DE BOER shows that the Tilgung of Time is a result not so much of it being 
grasped in its Concept but in the Concept itself: Time is the condition for the 
possibility the Begriff’s “Entäußerung in der Natur” but this is in turn the condition 
for the possibility of its return to itself as Begriff. DE BOER, p. 46 (emphasis 
mine): “Während der Raum als größte Selbstentäußerung des Begriffs die 
Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeder (Erfahrung von) Äußerlichkeit konstituiert, ist die 
Zeit diejenige Form des Begriffs, die diese Äußerlichkeit nicht nur möglich macht, 
sondern auch das Mittel bildet, das es dem Begriff ermöglicht, sich als Idee zu 
vollziehen und seine Abhängigkeit von der Äußerlichkeit in immer größerem Maße 
aufzuheben.”  
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the possibility of Chronological Priority itself.74 Time is simply “the 
condition for the possibility of the self-externalization and self-
actualization of the pure Concept.”75 In helping us understand the 
relationship of Time and Concept in Hegel’s thought, de Boer continues the 
process begun by Hyppolite of helping us to see Hegel more clearly as the 
thoroughgoing Idealist he really was.76 Just as History, which necessarily 
unfolds in Time, has no real existence apart from the Absolute Knowledge 
in which it is contained, so also does Time—History’s basis—itself have no 
external existence apart from the Concept.  
 Of particular interest is de Boer’s emphasis on what she calls  “die 
Analogie zwischen KANT und Hegel.”77 It is too easy to conceive of Hegel 
as simply rejecting Kant: de Boer shows that in fact we are witnessing 
“Hegels Radikalisierung KANTS.”78 Just as for Kant Space and Time are 
“Forms of Intuition” within which alone empirical knowledge is possible, 
so also for Hegel are Space and Time the “Forms of Externality”79 through 
which alone Hegel’s Pure Reason can release itself80 into “the external 
Idea” of Nature. The felicitous expression “die Formen der Äußerlichkeit” 
reminds us that that Space and Time are, according to de Boer, no more 
                                                
74 DE BOER, p. 43-4: “Die Phänomenologie des Geistes belegt aber, daß Hegel des 
Geschichte des Geistes versteht, in der Macht der Zeit immer mehr getilgt wird. Das 
bedeutet, daß die selbstbestimmende Kraft des Begriffs, die allen Formen des 
Lebens innewohnt, sich zunehmend in der Geschichte des Geistes verwirklicht, so 
daß der Geist sich in immer geringerem Maße von einer ihm äußerlichen 
Negativität bestimmen zu lassen braucht. Da diese Geschichte Hegel zufolge im 
Grunde durch den Begriff bewegt wird, is die zunehmende Tilgung der Macht die 
Zeit nur möglich, wenn die Zeit selbst eine Gestalt des absoluten Begriffs ist:”  
75 She states her thesis on DE BOER, p. 11 (translation mine).  
76 Like HYPPOLITE, she emphasizes (in a section called “Hegel und Schelling”) 
the role of SCHELLING’s Idealism in shaping GWFH’s views about Time and 
Concept (DE BOER, p. 13-23).  
77 DE BOER, p. 45. Hereafter I will call this “de Boer’s Kant Analogy” or simply 
“the Kant Analogy.” 
78 DE BOER, p. 44. Cf. HOULGATE, Stephen, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: 
From Being to Infinity, West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 2006, pp. 124-9. 
79 DE BOER, p. 45 (emphasis mine): “So wie, nach Hegel, die Formen der 
Anschauung als Momente der Bewegung gefaßt werden müssen, in der die 
Vernunft sich beschränkt, um diese Beschränkung letzendlich auch wieder 
aufzuheben, so müssen Raum und Zeit in ihrem Anundfürsichsein als die Formen 
der Äußerlichkeit gefaßt werden, die es dem reinen Begriff ermöglichen, sich in 
einer ersten Bewegung als äußerliche Idee [sc. in Nature] zu bestimmen.”  
80 DE BOER, p. 45-46 (emphasis mine): “Der reine Begriff, der als Prinzip der 
Selbstbestimmung der Natur und der Geschichte der Geistes vorangeht, kann sich 
also nur als Natur und Geist vollziehen, indem er sich in sich selbst unterschiedet 
und das Andere seiner selbst als Raum und Zeit aus sich entläßt.”  
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real to Hegel than Hegel thought they were real to Kant: Time, according 
to Hegel, is merely “die äußerste Voraussetzung des reinen Begriffs.”81 In 
other words, Hegel’s “Pure Reason” as embodied in the Begriff 
presupposes its own externalization in order to return to itself as the Whole. 
Without Time, the Concept cannot be Complete. To put it another way: 
Time is only a moment of the Concept’s completeness. It bears emphasis 
that this “moment” is logical; it is neither temporal nor temporary.   
 The Analogy described by de Boer is breathtaking in its implications. 
It is well known that Hegel rejects the limits that Kant had placed on Pure 
Reason. De Boer has shown that Hegel does something much more 
ingenious: he manages to turn those apparent limitations into precisely 
their opposites. But Hegel can only do this by preserving the ideality of 
Time and Space discovered by Kant. Perhaps this is not surprising: Kant’s 
approach to Space and Time is the most forward advance of his own 
Idealism. Therefore Hegel, a more thorough Idealist than Kant ever 
dreamed of being, preserves Kant’s approach on precisely this point. But 
the locus of limitation has been radicalized in Hegel. It is only on the basis 
of the self-limitation of the Concept that it can return to itself in its 
completeness.82  Space and Time, which for Kant were actual limitations 
on Pure Reason’s subjective ability to know the Ding an sich become for 
Hegel the apparently limiting but in fact empowering conditions for the 
possibility of Pure Reason’s knowing itself objectively: only through 
externalization in Time and Space and through them, in Nature, can the 
Concept, as unfolded in Logic, return to itself as Spirit.83 As Kant’s “Forms 
of Intuition,” Space and Time confined Pure Reason to the empirical; as 
Hegel’s “Forms of Externality,” they drive Pure Reason on to the 
conceptual.84 De Boer even believes she has discovered why Hegel himself 
                                                
81 DE BOER, p. 44. 
82 DE BOER, p. 46: “Durch diese Selbstbeschränkung erschafft der Begriff sich ein 
Element, innerhalb dessen er sich als äusßerliche Idee vollziehen und im 
menschlichen Geist ein immer vollkommeneres Fürsichsein erlangen kann.”  
83 DE BOER, p. 45 (emphasis mine): “So wie die unmittelbarste Gestalt des 
Bewußtseins noch vollständig bestimmt ist durch die reinen Formen der 
Anschauung [sc. Space and Time], die es dem Denken gestatten, Dinge als neben- 
und nacheinander zu erkennen, und nur nach und nach zu reiner Selbstreflexion 
kommt, so ist der reine Begriff zunächst vollständig in der Äußerlichkeit versunken 
und gewinnt nur allmählich die Kraft, sich als Begriff zu bestimmen.”  
84 DE BOER, p. 44: “Während KANT sich auf Analyse der verschiedenen 
Vermögen, die der empirischen Erkenntnis zugrunde liegen, beschränkt, versteht 
Hegel diese Vermögen also als verschiedenen Momente der Bewegung, in der die 
reine Vernunft sich bestimmt, um dem Bewußtsein die wirklichkeit zugänglich zu 
machen, insoweit diese erkennbar ist.”  
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cannot consistently make the relationship between Time and Concept in his 
thought explicit.85   
 De Boer not only contributes to our understanding of the theoretical 
basis for the Logical and Chronological Parallel, her approach also 
suggests a useful way in which that Parallel will be embodied in the 
doctrine of Chronological Completeness. Her basic point is that it is only 
on the basis of the Concept’s self-externalization in Time that the Concept 
itself becomes Complete. True to Hegel’s own treatment of Time in the 
System, de Boer is thinking primarily of Time’s relationship to the 
Philosophy of Nature. But she also applies her argument specifically to 
Time’s relationship to the Philosophy of Spirit. 
 
Sich immer mehr in dem [sc. “Geschichte des Geistes”] erkennend, was 
er erfährt, wird der Begriff, der sich als Philosophie verwirklicht, letzlich 
imstande sein, Zeit und Raum als Momente der Selbstentäußerung des 
absoluten Begriffs zu erkennen und sogar in diesen Formen sich selbst 
anzuschauen.86 
 
It is useful to consider the words “the Concept that actualizes itself as 
Philosophy” in the context of the problem Hegel discusses in the 
Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy (see Chapter 4; 
section I.1.2.3.).87 By “Philosophy” de Boer means here “the History of 
Philosophy” considered Chronologically: it is the entire phrase—i.e. “the 
Concept that actualizes itself as Philosophy”—that is Philosophy itself. As 
Hegel pointed out, the content of the History of Philosophy, unfolding in 
Time, is “in the main…the same” as “the Concept that actualizes itself as 
Philosophy.”  
 De Boer is making explicit the crucial fact that although the atemporal 
Begriff of Philosophy itself is Logically Prior to the possibility of “the 
History of Philosophy,” that the two are in fact the same. The difference 
between them is not that the Concept of Philosophy is Complete while the 
History of Philosophy is not. The difference between them is that the 
Concept necessarily appears in the Forms of Time and Space that are 
themselves nothing more than necessary “moments of the self-
                                                
85 DE BOER, p. 46: “Da diese Selbstunterscheidung des Begriffs dem unterschied 
zwischen Logik und Realphilosophie [sc. Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of 
Mind] noch zugrunde liegt, kann diese Bewegung innerhalb des Systems kaum 
thematisiert werden; die Selbstentäußerung des Begriffs in Raum und Zeit einerseits 
und Begriff andererseits [understood as the “pure” Concept of Logic] geht der 
Konstitution des Begriffs noch voran, der als absoluter Indifferenzpunkt den 
Anfangs- und Endpunkt des Systems bildet.”  
86 DE BOER, p. 46. 
87 DE BOER emphasizes the importance of this passage (p. 12). 
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externalization of the absolute Concept” in order that, by knowing itself, it 
can be what it is: Complete. The Completeness that the Concept in Time 
lacks is the Logical Completeness of knowing itself to be Complete:88 it is 
Complete—i.e. it is the self-externalized Concept—but does not know 
itself as Complete or anything else except in Absolute Knowledge.  This is 
why de Boer can claim that the Begriff merely “beholds itself in these 
forms” (emphasis mine). Whether in Time or in the Absolute Concept, 
Chronological Completeness is going to follow directly from the Logical 
Completeness of the Begriff itself once it knows itself in Absolute 
Knowledge.  
 Although de Boer does not address the subject of “the End of History” 
directly, she does make reference to the importance of Time in bringing 
Completeness to the Concept. In this context, she calls Time: “die 
Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Bewegung, in der der Begriff sich als 
Begriff vollzieht.”89 Of her insight that the Concept is only Complete 
insofar as it “beholds itself in these forms” of Space and Time, de Boer 
comments:  
 
Diese Einsicht ist es, die schließlich die Macht der Zeit tilgt, das heißt die 
Selbstbeschränkung der Vernunft aufhebt. Im Gegensatz zu KANT 
behauptet Hegel also, daß die ursprünglichste Selbstbeschränkung des 
Begriffs es dem Begriff ermöglicht, in der spekulativen Wissenschaft das 
letzte Ziel seiner Geschichte zu erreichen.90 
 
This crucial text brings together a number of loose ends. Once again, de 
Boer calls attention to the most remarkable aspect of “the Kant Analogy:” 
the limitation previously imposed by Time now makes possible, when 
recognized as “self-limitation,” the Hegelian triumph over Kant’s self-
denying Critique of Pure Reason: the Aufhebung of the Selbstbeschränkung 
der Vernunft. Most importantly, it is only through this process of exile and 
return that the Concept reaches “the ultimate goal of its History.” 
Achieving self-knowledge by beholding itself within the “Form of 
Externality” constitutes the Tilgung of Time referred to in the 
                                                
88 PhG (A.V. Miller), p. 487: “Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity 
of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the necessity to enrich the share 
which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the immediacy of 
the in-itself, which is the form in which substance is present in consciousness; or 
conversely, to realize and reveal what is at first only inward (the in-itself being 
taken as what is inward), i.e. to vindicate it for Spirit’s certainty of itself.” Without 
Time, the Concept cannot be Complete. To put it another way: once the Concept is 
complete, Time has fulfilled its purpose: “Spirit’s certainty of itself.” 
89 DE BOER, p. 46. 
90 DE BOER, p. 46; emphasis mine. 
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Phenomenology of Spirit. De Boer shows how this Tilgung applies to the 
Hegelian System as a whole. By defining the moment in which the Idea of 
Logic passes over into Nature (and therefore into Time) as “die 
ursprünglichste Selbstbeschränkung des Begriffs,” she clearly explains how 
Absolute Knowledge, as the Aufhebung of this Selbstbeschränkung, is at 
once the Tilgung of Time and the End of History. In fact, History is 
completed in a double sense: it has reached its goal—i.e. fulfilled its 
purpose by allowing the Concept to know itself in “the Form of 
Externality”—and been annulled at the same moment. Naturally such a 
“moment” is logical only; this dual annulment could hardly take place, 
given Hegel’s conceptions, “in Time.”  
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Chapter 4 (I.2.2.) 
Logical and Chronological Completeness 
 
 As suggested in a preliminary fashion in the Introduction to Part I, 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History should not be viewed as an instance of the 
Idea of Progress but rather as the completion of a Logical Process. It is 
precisely the fact that History is viewed by Hegel as the completion of the 
Process that gives the process the appearance of Progress: the Process 
achieves or completes its purpose and is realized in a final moment that 
Hegel misleadingly defines in terms that strongly suggest improvement 
based on an objective criterion of progress: “The History of the world is 
none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom.”1 
 The Hegelian Dialectic has now been described in terms of Logical 
Completeness. Each Concept contains the truth only at the end of the 
Process when the moment of synthesis aufhebt the second moment of 
negativity and opposition. To put it another way, what Hegel calls a 
“Concept” is a three-step process where Understanding’s one-sided 
oppositions are subject to and indeed necessitate Aufhebung through 
Reason. The Hegelian System abounds with cogent, persuasive, indeed 
brilliant examples of the inter-relatedness of truth expressed in these 
completed Concepts. The famous statement “The truth is the whole” simply 
means that Logical Completeness is the alpha and omega of the Hegelian 
System. Although apparently remote from History, this analysis of the 
Hegelian Dialectic provided the foundation for the argument that Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History is also based on Logical Completeness. 
 From this foundation, the broad outlines of the developing argument 
contained here are obvious: the application of Logical Completeness to 
History depends on the Logical/Chronological Parallel. Since Hegel is 
committed to Logical Completeness, the Logical/Chronological Parallel is 
the basis for applying Logical Completeness to History. Chronological 
Completeness would simply be the analogue of Logical Completeness as 
mediated by the Logical/Chronological Parallel. The purpose of this 
                                                
1 Philosophy of History, p. 19. The fact that it is precisely “the consciousness of 
freedom” should alert the attentive reader to the Logical basis of the definition: 
Spirit comes to be conscious of itself as Spirit in the Concept. Note also that the 
sentence just quoted continues (emphasis mine): “…a progress whose development 
according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.” This also 
indicates the Logical basis of Hegelian “progress:” it is, like the self-limitation of 
the Concept and its subsequent recognition of itself in “the Form of Externality,” a 
necessary development in (self-) consciousness. See HESPE, Franz, “Die 
Geschichte ist der Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Freiheit”; Zur Entwicklung von 
Hegels Philosophie der Geschichte. Hegel-Studien v. 26, pp. 177-192, 1991.  
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chapter is to further develop this argument. Many of the raw materials 
necessary for this development have already been assembled in the 
previous chapter. 
 Demonstrating that Chronological Completeness is a feature of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History is by no means, then, an end in itself. My 
goal is not to refute Hegel on the basis of his scandalous conception of “the 
End of History.” Nor is my goal to show that this doctrine is at the heart of 
Hegel’s intentions. My goal is simply to reveal that Hegel’s “solution” to 
“The Problem of Time” is the philosophical basis for Hegel’s Philosophy 
of History. In fact, the so-called “End of History” is no less a secondary 
phenomenon for Hegel than it is for me. For Hegel, it is simply a product of 
some of his previous—earlier, that is, in the sense of Logical Priority—
philosophical commitments. 
 As indicated in the previous chapter, this way of looking at Hegel 
depends decisively on the research of Jean Hyppolite. The Completion of 
History in Absolute Knowledge is, broadly speaking, a necessary 
consequence of Hegel’s “Absolute Idealism,” his development of 
Schelling’s “Identity Philosophy”—i.e. the annihilation of the 
subject/object distinction—and his conception of Phenomenology. Having 
decided to use History as a defense of Idealism, he needed to show how the 
process of History culminated in his own position. In other words, he 
needed to show that his own position was the result—the culmination, 
consummation, and completion—of an historical process unfolding in 
Time. Whether regarded as the Philosophy of World History or as the 
History of Philosophy, this process could only be shown to be reasonable if 
it was a manifestation of the Concept. Since Logical Completeness of the 
Concept was the infallible concomitant of Reason—indeed, is Reason 
itself—History made rational could only be Complete. 
 The problem arises for us because the notions “Time” and 
“Completeness” are taken by common sense to be mutually exclusive. 
Time, which proverbially “marches on,” cannot be thought of by us as 
Complete. Moreover, History manifestly does not and did not “end.” It is 
the philosopher Hegel who is finite: he died—came to his end—in 1831. 
He cannot, we somehow feel, have conceived of anything as scandalous as 
the End of History because History has in fact continued after his death and 
Time, as everybody knows, is never complete. 
 The first crucial point to bear in mind is that Hegel agrees with us: he 
did not think that History objectively comes, came, or had come to an End 
in his own lifetime. But he agrees with us for the wrong reason. It is only 
because he rejects the notion of History’s objective existence that he does 
not hold what most of us would regard as the scandalous notion of the End 
of History. We need to recognize that the only reason he does not hold this 
notion is because he holds a notion most of us would regard as even more 
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scandalous. Hegel is not thinking in terms of the End of History per se but 
rather of the Completion of History in Absolute Knowledge. To put it 
another way: it is only for Hegel that History is complete. Those who have 
not attained Absolute Knowledge believe a great many things—indeed the 
very basis of their thoughts about each and every thing—that are false in 
the sense that they are one-sided and consequently incomplete. For them 
(i.e. for us), there is no End of History. Only those who have attained 
Absolute Knowledge, or at least those who take such a thing seriously, can 
hope to understand what Hegel himself meant by what is called “the End of 
History.” In other words, Absolute Knowledge is Logically Prior to the End 
of History.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is to show that “The Problem of Time” 
is at the root of this claim. Hegel’s notion of Time itself is highly 
problematic for us, so problematic that some considerable philosophical 
archeology—i.e. Part I—is required simply to see what Hegel’s conception 
of Time actually was. To put it another way, most of us would regard 
Hegel’s notion of Time to be no less scandalous than his notion of what 
Hyppolite calls “the immanence of history.” I intend to show that the two 
are inextricably linked. It is because Hegel denies the objective existence of 
what we call “History”—i.e. the objective, empirically observable events 
that most of us regard as self-evidently existing outside of us—that he 
rejects our commonsense objection that Time can’t possibly be complete. 
In this chapter I will show that Time has no more objective existence for 
Hegel than History does. Indeed the one depends on the other: the denial of 
Time’s objective existence is Logically Prior to the denial of History’s 
objective existence. 
 It will therefore be seen that my argument for Chronological 
Completeness in Hegel’s thought depends on both Hyppolite’s discovery of 
“the immanence of history” and de Boer’s so-called “Kant Analogy.” The 
two approaches indeed fit together well: what Hyppolite calls “the 
necessity of a mediation through universal history” in the Phenomenology 
is simply given a more properly logical basis in de Boer’s view, as 
illustrated by her in the System as a whole, that the self-externalization of 
the Concept in Time is the necessary condition of the possibility of its 
return to itself. In other words, Hyppolite and de Boer provide a solid 
theoretical justification for the view that neither Time nor History has for 
Hegel what would be regarded by us as objective existence. It will also be 
seen that my argument for Chronological Completeness has nothing to do 
with the views of Kojève. Whether he regards Time as a “fact” that Hegel 
sets out to explain or whether Time has existence only in relation to 
Heidegger’s notion of Sein zum Tode, Kojève gets Hegel wrong; at best, he 
arrives at the right conclusion for the wrong reason.   
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 Because Time is Logically Prior to—and indeed the condition for the 
possibility of—History, the most philosophically compelling approach to 
proving that Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge necessarily entails 
Chronological Completeness involves an investigation of Time rather than 
History per se. Such an approach has the advantage that it involves a return 
to first principles. But this return, so characteristic of the philosophical 
approach to problems, has its own risks: Hegel’s approach to Time is not 
only foreign to our way of looking at History but we are also repeatedly 
troubled by the awareness that our way of looking at History depends 
decisively on Hegel’s influence: only with respect to “the end of History” 
do we feel that something is dreadfully amiss. Considered in abstraction 
from the System of which it is an inseparable part, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History hardly seems as unfamiliar to us as e.g. his Tilgung of Time in 
Absolute Knowledge. In Section 3 of Part I, we will be ready to examine 
how Logical Completeness plays out practically in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History itself by examining it in precisely that context.  
 For the present, however, the emphasis will remain theoretical and will 
emphasize the archeological basis of Hegel’s Philosophy of History: his 
notion of Time. By showing that the commonsense notion of Time—that 
which ceaselessly “marches on”—has no place in Hegel’s System, it 
becomes possible to see how Hegel could have embraced a notion as 
scandalous as Chronological Completeness, a concept that will then be 
connected to his Philosophy of History in the following section (I.3). The 
present chapter is therefore properly viewed as a necessary but preliminary 
step in that direction. It also constitutes the logical center of “The Problem 
of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” 
 Although attention will be paid in this chapter to the insights of both 
Heidegger and de Boer about Hegel’s “Metaphysics of Time,” the 
emphasis will be on texts that played no part in their studies. In the first 
section (I.2.2.1.), the reader’s attention will be drawn to Hegel’s most 
explicit rejection of the actual existence of Time in his youthful Glaube und 
Wissen (1802); this should be considered the best evidence for his negative 
views on the subject. His positive position on Time will be considered 
I.2.2.2; here the mature Hegel’s systematic treatment of the Future in the 
Philosophy of Nature will be examined.2 In the third section (I.2.2.3), I will 
show Hegel’s objections to anything—including Time—“that ceaselessly 
marches on.” This will involve an analysis of the passages in the Science of 
Logic dealing with what Hegel calls the “bad” or “spurious infinite.” 
                                                
2 For a recent overview of GWFH’s approach to nature, see DUDLEY, Will, 
Understanding German Idealism, Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007, pp. 165-9 (“The 
structure of spatiotemporal being: the Philosophy of Nature”). 
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Finally, by way of transition to the Philosophy of History, I will show—
following the approach taken by Borges—how the teleological element in 
Hegel’s Logic constitutes the bridge by which Logical Completeness is 
applied to History in I.2.2.4. 
 
I.2.2.1. Hegel’s early attack on Time 
 Because its last paragraph is the first place that he uses the word das 
Moment in the characteristically Hegelian sense (see Introduction), Faith 
and Knowledge proves to be of central importance for grasping Hegel’s 
solution to “the problem of Time” and this text will therefore receive 
further attention in Chapter 9. Although it is probably no accident that 
Hegel’s most explicit rejection of Time is likewise found here, the possible 
or even likely connection between these two aspects of Glaube und Wissen 
is a complicated question in its own right and therefore nothing more than 
the fact of the young Hegel’s attack on Time will be documented here. 
 Although F.H. Jacobi is the least famous of the three rivals Hegel 
attacks in Faith and Knowledge—the other two are Kant and Fichte—the 
section he devoted to Jacobi is by far the longest and constitutes its center. 
Complicating matters considerably is that Hegel’s critique of Jacobi is 
difficult to separate from his defense of Spinoza: the subject of the central 
section of Glaube und Wissen is best understood as a critique of Jacobi’s 
critique of Spinoza. Time plays a central part in this critique because Hegel 
devotes considerable attention to the way in which Jacobi misunderstands 
Spinoza’s conception of eternity.3 In fact, Hegel does little more here than 
follow Spinoza in regarding Time as a product of “imagination;”4 Jacobi’s 
                                                
3 G.W.F. HEGEL, Faith & Knowledge. Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977, p. 105-6: “Can it possibly be 
that Jacobi, the commentator on Spinoza, understood Spinoza to have placed time 
in God, when according to Spinoza it [sc. Time] belongs only to natura naturata 
[this will become GWFH’s position as well; see I.2.2.2]? We shall in fact see in a 
moment that after having concluded that Spinoza must really affirm time to be 
nothing but appearance, Jacobi still manages to find it in Spinoza, and in the absurd 
form of an eternal time at that.” 
4 After quoting SPINOZA (“Measure and time originate for us when we conceive 
quantity in abstraction from substance, and duration from the way it flows from the 
eternal things”), GWFH comments at Faith & Knowledge, p. 107 (emphasis mine): 
“In other words, it is only imagination, as Spinoza calls it, or, in general, only 
reflection [i.e. the bête noire of Glaube und Wissen] that posits and partially negates 
the finite; and this partially negated thing, which, when posited for itself and 
opposed to what is in itself not negated, to what is strictly affirmative [cf. “the good 
infinite”], turns this infinite itself [cf. “the bad infinite”] into something partially 
negated. The infinite, being thus brought into antithesis with the finite becomes an 
abstraction, the pure Reason, or the infinite of Kant. The eternal [sc. “the good 
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most serious offense is that he does not traverse Hegel’s own path from 
Spinoza’s Substance to “the good infinite”5 or rather to the identity of 
Substance and Subject:  
 
We obtain the abstraction of time if we do not conceive thinking [i.e. 
Subject] as attribute of absolute substance (for as attribute it expresses the 
substance itself) but isolate it from its attributes, and abstract it from the 
substance, i.e., if we fixate thinking as empty thinking, as subjective 
infinity, and place this abstraction in relative connection with the 
particularity (Einzelheit) of being.6 
 
From an early date, then, it is clear that Hegel is following Spinoza in 
rejecting the actual existence of time.7 
 
I.2.2.2. Hegel’s account of the Future in the Philosophy of Nature 
 Central to Hegel’s exposition of Time in the Philosophy of Nature is 
the analogy he makes to the first triad of the Logic: Being, Nothing and 
Becoming. In fact, Hegel defines Time as the external and merely intuited 
form of Werden.8  This analogy, along with the nexus of relationships that 
follow from it, raises once again in a rather acute form the problem of 
Logical and Chronological Priority in Hegel’s thought. Although Hegel no 
doubt wishes us to conceptualize Time in relationship to logically prior 
                                                                                                   
infinite”] is to be posited as the absolute identity of both; and in the eternal the 
infinite on one side, and the finite on the other, are once more nullified as to the 
antithesis between them.” For GWFH’s continuing adherence to this point of view, 
see I.2.2.3. 
5 G.W.F. HEGEL, Faith & Knowledge, p. 109: “He [sc. JACOBI] posits the 
abstract entity “time” and the abstract entity “single thing,” which are [both] 
products of imagination or reflection, as existing in themselves; and then he finds 
that, if the absolute simul of the eternal substance [of SPINOZA] is [also] posited, 
the single thing and time, which only are in virtue of having been removed from it 
[sc. from “the eternal substance” of SPINOZA], are equally posited with it. He 
[therefore] fails to reflect on the fact that when the single thing and time are 
restored to the eternal substance from which they were taken, they cease to be what 
they only are [i.e. for JACOBI, they are “existing in themselves”] if torn away from 
it. So he retains time and singularity and {finite} actuality within infinity and 
eternity itself.”  
6 G.W.F. HEGEL, Faith & Knowledge, p. 110. 
7 See the passage from SPINOZA quoted by GWFH at Faith & Knowledge, p. 111 
n. 51. 
8 Page references are to PETRY, Michael John (editor and translator), Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970 (hereafter “PhN”), p. 229-
30. “Die Zeit, als die negative Einheit des Außersichsein, ist…das angeschaute 
Werden…” 
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Becoming, the analogy that he makes between them threatens to raise in 
our minds the other possibility: that it is Time itself that is logically prior to 
his conception of “Becoming.” Time, which alone makes Chronological 
Priority possible, is in fact the condition of the possibility of a) beginning 
anything, b) beginning the Logic with Being, c) describing, step-by-step, 
the process by which Being passes through Nothing to Becoming, d) 
Becoming as defined by Hegel as the result of two previous moments, and 
e) Becoming in general, whether as defined by Hegel or by anyone else. A 
consideration of how Hegel meets these difficulties, difficulties to which 
his own analogy subjects him, will contribute to conceptualizing why there 
is no space for the Future in Hegel’s Philosophy of History and why that 
exclusion is based on Hegel’s scandalous solution to “The Problem of 
Time.”  
 This approach to Hegel’s “Metaphysics of Time” draws support from 
the insights of de Boer and Heidegger discussed above. Those insights, in 
turn, find ample warrant in the text: Hegel’s very first moves in his 
exposition of Time provide ample evidence of the validity of de Boer’s 
Kant Analogy9 as well as Heidegger’s emphasis on the implications of 
Hegel’s view that Time is “the negation of a negation.”10 Rather than 
reiterate what they have already contributed, it is more enlightening to push 
forward into some unexplored territory: Hegel’s notion of the Future.  
 The most dangerous moment reached by Hegel in the course of 
applying what I will call “the Werden-Zeit Analogy” is when he is 
describing the Future. In Section §259, he introduces Past, Present and 
Future as “the three dimensions of Time.” 
 
Die Dimensionen der Zeit, die Gegenwart, Zukunft und Vergangenheit, 
sind das Werden der Äußerlichkeit als solches und dessen Auflösung in 
die Unterschiede des Seins als des Übergehens in Nichts und des Nichts 
als des Übergehens in Sein.  
                                                
Hegel intends to take the Analogy seriously: he is going to link Present, 
Past and Future to the two movements (“Übergehens in Nichts” and 
“Übergehens in Sein”) that constituted Becoming in the very first Triad of 
the Logic and which are duly repeated here now that we are dealing with 
“das Werden der Äußerlichkeit als solches.” Although he performs the 
                                                
9 PhN, p. 230; Remark to E §258: “Die Zeit ist wie der Raum eine reine Form der 
Sinnlichkeit oder des Anschauens.” 
10 PhN, p. 229; Zusatz to E §257: “Diese reine Quantität, als für sich daseiender 
Unterschied, ist das an sich selbst Negative, die Zeit; sie ist die Negation der 
Negation, die sich auf sich beziehende Negation.” 
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linkage between Becoming and the Present in §259 itself,11 it is only in the 
Zusatz that he does this for Past and Future. It is therefore that passage 
which deserves careful consideration. 
 
Die Dimensionen der Zeit machen das Bestimmte der Anschauung 
vollständig, indem sie den Begriff der Zeit, welcher das Werden ist, für 
die Anschauung in seiner Totalität oder Realität setzen, die darin besteht, 
daß die abstrakten Momente der Einheit, welche das Werden ist, jedes für 
sich als das Ganze gesetzt sind, aber unter entgegengesetzten 
Bestimmungen.12  
 
 All three temporal dimensions are required in order to make Time—as 
a Form of Intuition—complete because all three are required in order to 
capture an Anschauung of Becoming now understood as the completed 
Begriff of Time rather than as Time itself in its full richness (i.e. “in seiner 
Totalität oder Realität”). In Becoming, “Übergehens in Nichts” and 
“Übergehens in Sein” are not two different things: Becoming is their 
identity and their truth. In Time, however, they remain—as Past, Present, 
and Future— “entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen,” each understood, 
doubtless as a result of the negative externality that is their essence, as 
“jedes für sich als das Ganze gesetzt” instead of immediately collapsing 
into the unity that constitutes Becoming (i.e. “die abstrakten Momente der 
Einheit, welche das Werden ist”).  
 
Diese beiden Bestimmungen [sc. “Übergehens in Nichts” and 
“Übergehens in Sein”] sind so jede selbst als Einheit des Seins und Nichts 
[in Werden]; sie sind aber auch unterschieden. Dieser Unterschied kann 
nur der des Entstehens und Vergehens sein.13 
 
 Hegel here introduces the mediating pair that will serve to link up the 
two sides of the Werden-Zeit Analogy: “coming to be” (Entstehens) and 
“passing away” (Vergehens).14 Both in their unity are, as we already know, 
parts of Becoming but now—in the “Metaphysics of Time”—each will, 
                                                
11 GWFH does so with the Present in Section E §259 itself (PhN, p. 233): “Das 
unmittelbare Verschwinden dieser Unterschiede in die Einzelheit ist die Gegenwart 
als Jetzt, welches als die Einzelheit ausschließend und zugleich schlechthin 
kontinuierlich in die anderen Momente [i.e. in Past and Future], selbst nur dies 
Verschwinden seines Seins in Nichts und des Nichts in sein Sein ist.” 
12 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
13 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
14 PhN, p. 230 (Remark to E §258): “Aber nicht in der Zeit entsteht und vergeht 
alles, sondern die Zeit selbst ist dies Werden, Entstehen und Vergehen, das seiende 
Abstrahieren, der alles gebärende und seine Geburten zerstörende Kronos.” 
 93 
when considered separately, constitute two of the “three dimensions of 
time.”   
 
Einmal, in der Vergangenheit (dem Hades), ist das Sein die Grundlage, 
von der angefangen wird; die Vergangenheit ist wirklich gewesen als 
Weltgeschichte, Naturbegebenheiten, aber gesetzt unter der Bestimmung 
des Nichtseins, das hinzutritt.15 
 
Using the etymological relationship made palpable in the German word 
“untergehen,”  “passing away” (Vergehens) now becomes the Past 
(Vergangenheit). By identifying Sein as the Grundlage of Vergangenheit, 
Hegel is showing his hand: the Past is precisely the moment of “des Seins 
als des Übergehens in Nichts.” In order to “pass away” into Hades, a thing, 
whether it belongs to the Natural World or Weltgeschichte, must first 
exist—hence its Grundlage in Sein—and thus as something that actually 
was (wirklich gewesen). Although identical or perhaps contemporaneous in 
Becoming, Übergehens in Nichts and Übergehens in Sein are now to be 
distinguished in Time, now understood as merely the externalized 
Anschauung of Becoming. 
 Before turning to the next sentence—as indicated by the previous 
“einmal,” it will do to the Future what has already been done to the Past—it 
is useful to reflect on what is actually going on here. Hegel is deriving 
definitions of Present, Past, and Future from his own previous account of 
Becoming, Being, and Nothing. The elegance of his Analogy is striking and 
doubtless impressed him. The movement of “Being into Nothing” and of 
“Nothing into Being” are synthesized in Becoming: they collapse into their 
unity and their truth; in the externality of Nature, however, each of these 
three moments will appear to be separate as Past, Future, and Present. But 
we must ask: where is Chronological Priority to be found here? Even 
without an exhaustive Entstehungsgeschichte of Hegel’s System, it seems 
likely that he developed his account of Becoming before he applied it to 
Time. In other words, the First Triad of the Hegelian System should 
probably be considered both Logically and Chronologically Prior for Hegel 
to his account of Time in the Philosophy of Nature. One wonders if the 
strangeness of these circumstances ever crossed his mind. 
 As a matter of fact, Time is unquestionably first for us;16 we 
experience Past, Present, and Future long before we develop a doctrine like 
“Everything is Becoming.” And most of us would also regard Time as first 
                                                
15 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
16 TRENDELENBURG, Adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, v. 1, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 
1862, p. 38: “Es könnte das Werden aus dem Sein und Nicht-Sein gar nicht werden, 
wenn nicht die Vorstellung des Werdens vorausginge.” 
 94 
by nature: “Becoming” is a mere philosophical reflection on the latter. But 
this easy naturalism is scarcely visible in Hegel’s own time. Always 
suspect among Platonists and then among Christians, Time had now 
received the coup de grace from Spinoza to say nothing of Idealism’s 
appropriation of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic. The central point is as 
simple as it is scandalous: Hegel regards Becoming as Logically Prior to 
Time;17 Time is merely “intuited Becoming.” And it is also probably the 
case that, for Hegel, Becoming is Chronologically Prior as well: in the 
Zusatz we are considering, for example, he is elegantly applying his prior—
both chronologically and logically—discussion of Becoming to Time. It is 
therefore fascinating to watch Hegel make the Zeit-Werden Analogy with 
absolutely no awareness of the fact that it is Zeit that is Logically and 
certainly Chrono-logically prior to Werden. Instead of attributing the 
facility with which he can elegantly construct the Zeit-Werden Analogy to 
the derivation of Becoming from the Logical and Chronological Priority of 
Time, he seems to delight in his own ingenuity in defining Time in terms of 
Becoming. But the underlying condition for the possibility of Hegel’s Zeit-
Werden Analogy is precisely the opposite of what Hegel wants it to be: the 
Logical Priority of Time would explain the elegance of the Analogy just as 
well and far more naturally. Once again, it is easy to see why someone like 
Marx would burn with the desire to stand Hegel on his feet once again; he 
is clearly walking on his head! 
 These reflections are occasioned in no small part because of what 
Hegel says next about the Future:     
 
Das andere Mal ist es umgekehrt; in der Zukunft ist das Nichtsein die 
erste Bestimmung, das Sein die spätere, wenngleich nicht der Zeit nach.18  
 
This single sentence is as close as Hegel comes to betraying an awareness 
of the close relationship—and therefore of his own pervasive blurring of 
that relationship—between Logical and Chronological Priority. Having 
already described the Past, this sentence actually had a very simply job to 
perform: it needed to explain that the Zukunft has its Grundlage in 
Nichtsein just as Vergangenheit had its in Sein. But he neglects to use the 
word “Grundlage” on this occasion, and this omission causes him trouble. 
Perhaps he was hesitant to claim that Nichtsein could be even the logical 
Grundlage for anything, even a “thing” as unreal—for Hegel, that is—as 
the Future. Instead, he identifies Nichtsein as “die erste Bestimmung”—and 
                                                
17 See the perceptive discussion of GWFH’s account of Heraclitus in LHP at 
ARANTES, P. A., Hegel: A ordem do tempo. Traduçâo e prefácio de Rubens 
Rodrigues Torres. Sao Paulo: Hucitec, 2000; p. 90-3. 
18 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
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therefore Sein as “die spätere”—of the Future. Because he uses these 
temporal expressions, he is finally forced to explain that he is not using 
“first” and “subsequent” in a chronological sense: “nicht der Zeit nach.” 
This constitutes Hegel’s sole acknowledgement of a critically important 
truth: his language is hopelessly ambiguous on the question of Logical and 
Chronological Priority.19 It is probably only because he is discussing Time 
itself that he feels compelled to explain that “first” and “subsequent” are to 
be and indeed must be taken in a Logical rather than a Chronological sense: 
for the most part, he has simply expected to be understood as referring 
exclusively to Logical Priority. He himself cannot see, much less admit, 
that this ambiguity in speech depends on his pervasive—and indeed 
Logically Prior—ambiguity in thought. But the ambiguity—indeed both of 
them—is there nonetheless. Moreover, he has betrayed the existence of this 
ambiguity while making the basis (Grundlage) of the Zukunft…Nothing. It 
is therefore this sentence that contains the most important evidence 
regarding “The Problem of Time” in Hegel’s thinking.  
 Although based in Being, the Past is no more real than the Future, 
however: neither Past nor Future constitutes anything distinct except within 
the Form of Externality. The truth of both, after all, is Becoming. Of the 
three temporal dimensions, it is therefore the Present that is the closest to 
Werden—understood as the Begriff of Time—because it, like Becoming, is 
the unity of its two moments, i.e. of the Past and Future:    
 
Die Mitte [sc. the Present] ist die indifferente Einheit beider, so daß 
weder das eine noch das andere das Bestimmende ausmacht. Die 
Gegenwart ist nur dadurch, daß die Vergangenheit nicht ist; umgekehrt 
hat das Sein des Jetzt die Bestimmung, nicht zu sein, und das Nichtsein 
seines Seins ist die Zukunft; die Gegenwart ist diese negative Einheit.20 
 
Having described the Present once again, Hegel easily disposes of Past and 
Future along the pre-established lines: 
 
Das Nichtsein des Seins, an dessen Stelle das Jetzt getreten ist, ist die 
Vergangenheit; das Sein des Nichtseins, was in der Gegenwart enthalten 
ist, ist die Zukunft.21  
 
The self-contradiction at the heart of Hegel’s Future (“das Sein des 
Nichtseins”) seems even more vicious than is usual for Hegel.22 The self-
                                                
19 Compare ARANTES, p. 56 n. 3 on “o “gênio” especulativo da lingual.” 
20 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
21 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
22 See DÜSING, Klaus, Dialektik und Geschichtsmetaphysik in Hegels Konzeption 
philosophiegeschichtlicher Entwicklung in Hans-Christian Lucas and Guy Planty-
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contradiction that is Becoming, itself the identity and truth of Being and 
Nothing, was easier to think precisely because it need not be—in fact, 
could not be—conceived to exist in Time: its moments were not 
chronologically sequential. But the Future has no existence apart from 
Time. And while the Future is obviously in some sense Nothing for us—we 
who are entirely ignorant of what it will bring—it is unquestionably 
something by nature. But it cannot be so for Hegel. At most, the Future is a 
vanishing moment of the Present.  
 
Im positiven Sinne der Zeit kann man daher sagen: Nur die Gegenwart ist, 
das Vor und Nach ist nicht; aber die konkrete Gegenwart ist das Resultat 
der Vergangenheit, und sie ist trächtig von der Zukunft. Die wahrhafte 
Gegenwart ist somit die Ewigkeit.23 
 
The three dimensions of Time have thus been collapsed (“as Result’) into 
“die wahrhafte Gegenwart.”24 It now only remains necessary to show why 
Hegel’s conception of Ewigkeit has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
Future. 
 This he does in Section §258. It is here that he makes the distinction—
blurred in the earlier reference to the Past as including both Weltgeschichte 
and Naturbegebenheiten—between Nature and Spirit with respect to Time.  
   
                                                                                                   
Boujour eds., Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System, p. 127-145. Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt: Fromann Holzboog, 1989; p. 149 n. 16 for an illuminating connection 
with PLATO. 
23 Addition to E §259; PhN, p. 235. 
24 Note also that it is this “true present” of eternity in which World History unfolds 
(LPH, p. 78-9): “While we are thus concerned exclusively with the Idea of Spirit, 
and in the History of the World regard everything as only its manifestation, we 
have, in traversing the past, - however extensive its periods, - only to do with what 
is present; for philosophy, as occupying itself with the True, has to do with the 
eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present; Spirit 
is immortal; with it there is no past, no future [N.B.], but an essential now. This 
necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit comprehends within it all earlier 
steps [and, by analogy, all subsequent ones as well]. These have indeed unfolded 
themselves in succession independently [in their Äußerlichkeit]; but what Spirit is it 
has always been essentially; distinctions are only the development of this essential 
nature. The life of the ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments, 
which looked at in one respect still exist beside each other, and only as looked at 
from another point of view [Time as ‘Intuited Becoming’] appear as past. The 
grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its 
present.”  
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Nur das Natürliche ist darum der Zeit untertan, insofern es endlich ist; das 
Wahre dagegen, die Idee, der Geist, ist ewig.25 
 
Hegel has already identified Time as the realm of the merely transient; he 
now exempts Spirit from this temporal transience: “it is only the Natural 
that is therefore subject to Time.”26 But even more important than this is his 
insistence that Eternity—the realm of Spirit—not be taken as either an 
alternative to Time or as an extension of one part of it: the Future.  
 
Der Begriff der Ewigkeit muß aber nicht negativ so gefaßt werden als die 
Abstraktion von der Zeit, daß sie außerhalb derselben gleichsam existiere; 
ohnehin nicht in dem Sinn, als ob die Ewigkeit nach der Zeit komme; so 
würde die Ewigkeit zur Zukunft, einem Momente der Zeit, gemacht.27 
                       
Hegel is very careful to distinguish Eternity from Time; it is so independent 
of Time that it should not even be conceived as being “außerhalb 
derselben.” As Heidegger realized, Hegel’s Time is not real enough to 
stand in opposition to anything except the equally negative Space. And 
Heidegger is also right that—for all of Hegel’s radicalizing of the three 
dimensions of Time—Hegel still embraces the traditional priority of the 
Present. Only in Heidegger will the Future receive pride of place: in Sein 
und Zeit, it is Logically Prior to Past, Present, or even the mysterious 
Augenblick, the closest Heidegger comes to Ewigkeit. For Hegel, on the 
other hand, Ewigkeit is an important reality: it is the realm of the Spirit. Not 
surprisingly, then, it is completely independent from the Future, whose 
Grundlage is Nichtsein.  Moreover, as we will see in the next section, the 
very notion of a Future extending into Eternity is, according to Hegel, 
erroneous and indeed ridiculous. 
 
I.2.2.3. The Future as “Spurious Infinite” in the Science of Logic 
 The movement by which, for example, Becoming is the unity of 
“passing away” (from Sein to Nichtsein) and “coming to be” (from 
Nichtsein to Sein), is an example of what Hegel calls “the genuine infinite” 
or “Being-for-itself.”28 As opposed to this Dialectical reciprocity in which 
                                                
25 Zusatz to E §258; PhN, p. 231.  
26 This text is very damaging to the attempt of Vittorio HÖSLE and Dieter 
WANDSCHNEIDER to link Time and Geist; see II.1.2.5. 
27 Zusatz to E §258; PhN, p. 231. See MARCUSE, Herbert, Hegel’s Ontology and 
the Theory of Historicity, translated by Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1987, pp. 148-50. 
28 E §95; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 138-8: “What we now in point of fact have before 
us, is that somewhat comes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be 
an other. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an other against 
 98 
(apparently) opposite Moments are synthesized in Logical Completeness, 
Hegel distinguishes what he calls the “bad” or “spurious infinite.”29 In the 
“bad” infinite, “Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; 
therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum.”30   
 
But such a progression to infinity is not the real infinite. That consists in 
being at home with itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in 
coming to itself in its other. Much depends on rightly apprehending the 
notion of infinity, and not stopping short at the wrong infinity of endless 
progression.31  
                              
Although he uses the commonsense understanding of Time as an example 
of this “wrong infinity of endless progression” in the Encyclopaedia 
Logic,32 a more interesting discussion of this subject is found in a section 
                                                                                                   
it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both 
have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its 
passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and 
in the other, is the genuine Infinity.”   
29 It is important to remember throughout that just as the “good infinite” is 
characteristic of Reason, so is the “bad infinite” the result of Understanding. 
Compare WdL, p. 158 (emphasis mine): “Damit aber selbst ist das Unendliche nicht 
schon in der That der Beschränktheit und Endlichkeit entnommen; die Hauptsache 
ist, den wahrhaften Begriff der Unendlichkeit von der schlechten Unendlichkeit, das 
Unendliche der Vernunft von dem Unendlichen des Verstandes zu unterscheiden; 
doch Letzteres ist das verendlichte Unendliche, und es wird sich ergeben, daß eben 
indem das Unendliche vom Endlichen rein und entfernt gehalten werden soll, es nur 
verendlicht wird.”  
30 E §93. Compare E §94: “This Infinity is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only 
a negation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, and is never got rid 
of and absorbed. In other words, this infinite only expresses the ought-to-be 
elimination of the finite. The progression to infinity never gets further than a 
statement of the contradiction involved in the finite, viz. that it is somewhat as well 
as somewhat else. It sets up with endless iteration the alternation between these two 
terms, each of which calls up the other.” In the Science of Logic, this “ought-to-be” 
is linked to Kant in “Remark: The Ought” (133-6), beginning with: “The ought has 
recently played a great part in philosophy…” and concluding with: “The philosophy 
of Kant and Fichte sets up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the 
contradictions of Reason; but the truth is that the ought is only the standpoint which 
clings to finitude and thus to contradiction.” See WdL, 142 (A.V. Miller): “This 
spurious infinity is in itself the same thing as the perennial ought; it is the negation 
of the finite it is true, but it cannot in truth free itself therefrom.”  
31 E §94, p. 137 
32 Zusatz to E §94; Encyclopedia Logic, p. 137-8: “When time and space, for 
example, are spoken of as infinite, it is in the first place the infinite progression on 
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called “The High Repute of the Progress to Infinity” found in the 
Wissenschaft der Logik. It is in this passage that Hegel repudiates a notion 
of Ewigkeit based on “die schlechte quantitative Unendlichkeit.”33 
 This subject arises because Hegel quotes several lines of a poem by the 
physician and poet Albrecht von Haller: 
 
Ich häuffe ungeheure Zahlen, 
Gebürge Millionen auf, 
Ich setze Zeit auf Zeit, und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf 
Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh 
Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir seh, 
Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt zu tausendmalen, 
Noch nicht ein Theil von dir. 
Ich zieh sie ab, und du liegst ganz vor mir.34  
           
Although praised by Kant—Hegel calls the lines the “von Kant sogenannte 
schauderhafte Beschreibung der Ewigkeit”35—Hegel uses them instead as a 
refutation, indeed, as a self-refutation, of “the spurious quantitative 
infinite.”36 As Hegel points out, it is only when Haller finally gives up the 
attempt to conceive of Eternity as an infinity of numerical multitude that he 
is vouchsafed any insight.37 Thus the notion of Eternity as the infinite 
extension of the Future—where Time mounts up like so many Numbers, 
one moment after the other—is specifically rejected by Hegel and indeed 
ridiculed.38  
                                                                                                   
which our thoughts fasten. We say, Now, This time, and then we keep continually 
going forwards and backwards beyond this limit.” 
33 WdL, p. 276 (A.V. Miller, p. 228). 
34 WdL, p. 278 (A.V. Miller, p. 230). 
35 WdL, p. 278 (A.V. Miller, p. 229). 
36 WdL, p. 276 (A.V. Miller, p. 228): “Diese Unendlichkeit, welche als das Jenseits 
des Endlichen beharrlich bestimmt ist, ist als die schlechte quantitative 
Unendlichkeit zu bezeichnen.”  
37 WdL, p. 278-9 (A.V. Miller, p. 230): “Wenn auf jenes Aufbürgen und 
Aufthürmen von Zahlen und Welten als auf eine Beschreibung der Ewigkeit der 
Werth gelegt wird, so wird übersehen, daß der Dichter selbst dieses sogenannte 
schauderhafte Hinausgehen für etwas Vergebliches und Hohles erklärt, und daß er 
damit schließt, daß nur durch das Aufgeben dieses leeren unendlichen Progresses 
das wahrhafte Unendliche selbst zur Gegenwart vor ihn komme.” 
38 E §94, Encyclopedia Logic, p. 138: “In the attempt to contemplate such an 
infinite, our thought, we are commonly informed, must sink exhausted. It is true 
indeed that we must abandon the unending contemplation, not however because the 
occupation is too sublime, but because it is too tedious. It is tedious to expatiate in 
the contemplation of this infinite progression, because the same thing is constantly 
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 But the interesting part is yet to come. Hegel continues his assault on 
the infinite Future in a fascinating attack on the pretensions of astronomy:  
 
Es hat Astronomen gegeben, die sich auf das Erhabene ihrer Wissenschaft 
gern darum viel zu Gute thaten, weil sie mit einer unermeßlichen Menge 
von Sternen, mit so unermeßlichen Räumen und Zeiten zu thun habe, in 
denen Entfernungen und Perioden, die für sich schon groß sind, zu 
Einheiten dienen, welche noch so vielmal genommen, sich wieder zur 
Unbedeutenheit verkürzen.39  
                               
Astronomers are inclined to pride themselves on the grounds that their 
science deals with a limitless number of stars existing in infinite Space and 
requiring an infinite amount of Time to study; Hegel rejects the grandeur of 
these “immeasurable multitudes.” In fact, he proceeds to ridicule the 
futuristic dream of space-travel as shallow and ignorant: 
 
Das schaale Erstaunen, dem sie sich dabei überlassen, die 
abgeschmackten Hoffnungen, erst noch in jenem Leben von einem Sterne 
zum anderen zu reisen und ins Unermeßliche fort dergleichen neue 
Kenntnisse zu erwerben, gaben sie für ein Hauptmoment der 
Vortreflichkeit ihrer Wissenschaft aus,—40   
   
It is only in the context of Hegel’s curious notion of the End of History—a 
notion required by his own commitment to the belief that it is his Absolute 
Wissenschaft that is in fact die Vortrefliche—that it becomes easy to see 
why Hegel becomes locked in a zero-sum game with Astronomy. He 
himself, however, seems quite blind to the causes and ramifications of this 
rivalry. The results of this zero-sum rivalry have already been presented in 
the Introduction.  
 It is particularly ironic that he insists that the astronomers of the future 
will not add to Wissenschaft: he claims that they can only expect “neue 
Kenntnisse zu erwerben” (emphasis mine). The irony of this claim resides 
in the fact, of course, that it is Hegel’s own Science from which we can 
expect nothing new! And yet he insists that even if the astronomers of his 
day were to live again and travel the boundless reaches of Outer Space in 
an equally boundless Future (ins Unermeßliche), that they would come to 
know again and again “the exact same thing” (fort dergleichen).41 What 
                                                                                                   
recurring. We lay down a limit: then we pass it: next we have a limit once more, 
and so on for ever.”  
39 WdL, p. 279 (A.V. Miller, p. 230). 
40 WdL, p. 279 (A.V. Miller, p. 230). 
41 GWFH insists on this aspect of the ‘bad quantitative infinite’ at WdL, p. 276-7; 
A.V. Miller, p. 228 (emphasis mine): “Der Progreß [sc. of the bad infinite] ist daher 
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room does his own Absolute Knowledge leave for any new discoveries? 
When Hegel ridicules astronomers for putting off the Hauptmoment of their 
science into the far-distant future, he is tacitly admitting that he himself has 
already had his Hauptmoment, a claim that seems, if anything, even more 
scandalous. To put it another way, Hegel must deny that there is anything 
yet unknown that is still worth knowing. It is no wonder, then, that he must, 
as it were, refute the Future: it is both the unknown in itself and the 
condition of the possibility for learning something not yet known. 
 For these reasons, it is not difficult to see that Hegel’s rejection of “the 
immeasurable” is in fact the necessary consequence of the restriction of his 
interest to the Complete. The “genuine infinite”—the Dialectical 
reciprocity of Fürsichsein—is simply another way of describing Logical 
Completeness whereas “the bad infinite,” explicitly applied by Hegel to the 
Future, is…Chronological Incompleteness! Not only does the Logical and 
Chronological Parallel imply Chronological Completeness but Hegel 
specifically and vividly rejects Chronological Incompleteness. This is what 
makes Hegel’s application of “the bad infinite” to Haller’s poem about 
Eternity in the Wissenschaft der Logik so important. Although he uses 
words like “law” and “measure” in the completion of the sentence fragment 
quoted above, it is really in the name of Completeness that he defends his 
own Wissenschaft by pointing out that it is the pride of the astronomers in 
their spurious infinites   
 
…welche bewundernswürdig ist, nicht um solcher quantitativen 
Unendlichkeit willen, sondern im Gegentheil um der Maaßverhältnisse 
und der Gesetze willen, welche die Vernunft in diesen Gegenständen 
erkennt, und die das vernünftige Unendliche gegen jene unvernünftige 
Unendlichkeit sind.42          
 
What Hegel calls “the reasonable infinite” is the infinite that can be 
conceptualized—the process subject to and indeed defined by Reason’s 
closed circle of Logical Completeness43—and it is this alone that 
constitutes the domain of “measure” and “law.”  
                                                                                                   
gleichfalls nicht ein Fortgehen und Weiterkommen, sondern ein Wiederholen von 
einem und eben demselben, Setzen, Aufheben, und Wiedersetzen und 
Wiederaufheben; eine Ohnmacht des Negativen, dem das, was es aufhebt, durch 
sein Aufheben selbst als ein Kontinuirliches wiederkehrt.”  
42 WdL, p. 279 (A.V. Miller, p. 230). 
43 WdL, p. 173: “Das Unwahre ist das Unerreichbare; und es ist einzusehen, daß 
solches Unendliche das Unwahre ist.—Das Bild des Progresses ins Unendliche ist 
die gerade Linie, an deren beiden Grenzen nur, das Unendliche und immer nur ist, 
wo sie, - und sie ist Daseyn - nicht ist, und die zu diesem ihrem Nichtdaseyn, d. i. 
ins Unbestimmte hinaus geht; als wahrhafte Unendlichkeit, in sich zurückgebogen, 
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 What Hegel doesn’t seem to realize is that “that unreasonable infinite” 
of the astronomers is not lawless or immeasurable by nature, but only for 
us. We simply do not yet know: it will require much Time to solve the 
riddles of Space. For most of us, this limitation on our knowledge is 
tolerable. In fact, Philosophy itself would seem to be the perennial 
expression of mankind’s comfort/anguish with this limitation; at any rate, 
the Greek word for “the love of wisdom” is the explicit acknowledgement 
that it exists. For those whose science does not require Chronological 
Completeness, the infinite Future44 is not so much the refutation of reason 
as an external categorical imperative to wonder, to learn and to explore. But 
Hegel’s System leaves no room for either of the things that filled Kant’s 
Gemüt with Bewunderung and Ehrfurcht.45  
 
I.2.2.4. Logical and Chronological Teleology 
 It should be noted that neither of the two previous sections have any 
direct connection—within the context of the Hegelian System as 
understood by Hegel himself—with World History. For us, of course, the 
connection between Time—as described in the Philosophy of Nature—and 
History is obvious: it is much more evident for us that World History 
unfolds in Time than it is that World History constitutes, as it 
unquestionably constitutes for Hegel—the unfolding and return to self-
recognition of Spirit. The fact remains, however, that for Hegel, Time is 
part of the Philosophy of Nature while World History is described 
explicitly in the context of the Philosophy of Spirit: for him, if not for us, 
they occupy two entirely different domains. The same disjunction—the 
same heterogeneity of domain—exists in the case of the “Spurious Infinite” 
of Hegel’s Logic. It is all very well and good to show that a moment of the 
Logic—and a discarded moment at that—is relevant to the commonsense 
understanding of Time as a series of moments extending into the Future ad 
infinitum and then to suggest that this nexus of thoughts has some relevance 
to the role, or rather the absence of a role, of the Future in Hegel’s notion of 
                                                                                                   
wird deren Bild der Kreis, die sich erreicht habende Linie, die geschlossen und ganz 
gegenwärtig ist, ohne Anfangspunkt und Ende.”   
44 Note that GWFH links the infinitude of Time only to Kant’s Form of Intuition in 
the following passage (quoted at WdL, p. 279; A.V. Miller, p. 230) and not to its 
actual infinitude: “Der Unendlichkeit, die sich auf die äußere sinnliche Anschauung 
bezieht, setzt Kant die andere Unendlichkeit gegenüber, wenn “das Individuum auf 
sein unsichtbares Ich zurückgeht, und die absolute Freiheit seines Willens als ein 
reines Ich allen Schrecken des Schicksals und der Thyrannei entgegenstellt, von 
seinen nächsten Umgebungen anfangend, sie für sich verschwinden, eben so das, 
was als dauernd erscheint, Welten über Welten in Trümmer zusammenstürzen läßt, 
und einsam sich als sich selbst gleich erkennt.” 
45 KANT, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft; “Beschluß.” 
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History. But in Hegel’s universe, these connections are tenuous at best. In 
the third section of this Chapter, therefore, an argument for Chronological 
Completeness will be presented that derives neither from the Logic nor the 
Philosophy of Nature but arises only within the intellectual context of the 
Philosophy of Spirit.  
 I have had previous occasion to mention the contribution made by 
Maria Borges to my understanding of the Logical and Chronological 
Parallel in Hegel’s thinking. In História e Metafísica em Hegel: Sobre a 
Noção de Espírito do Mundo, she uses this Parallel to show that Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History is “an indirect proof” of the existence of God.46 In 
other words, she takes Hegel’s claim to have created a Theodicy seriously: 
“o tratado da Weltgeschichte pode também ser tomado como uma prova do 
domínio da razão divina no mundo.”47 In order to explain the intellectual 
underpinnings of this proof, she shows that Hegel has in fact invented a 
new form of “cosmological” proof based not on Nature, as is the version 
rejected by Kant,48 but rather on Spirit. This leads her to emphasize an 
illuminating difference between the Philosophy of Nature on the one hand 
and the Philosophy of Spirit on the other: one resorts to explanation through 
efficient, the other through final causality.49  
 
Hegel sustentaria, portanto, uma doutrina que postula uma divisão entre 
dois níveis do desdobramento da Idéia no mundo objetivo: um primeiro, o 
reino da natureza, regido pela necessidade exterior, entendida como a 
necessidade do encadeamento dos fenômenos segunda uma causalidade 
eficiente; o segundo, o reino do espírito, do conceito, regido por uma 
necessidade interior, entendida como relação dos eventos com uma 
determinada finalidade.50 
 
 Basing her discussion of the two types of causality on Hegel’s own 
account of Aristotle in the History of Philosophy,51 she shows how two 
types of necessity—she calls them, respectively “exterior” and 
                                                
46 BORGES, p. 124-129. 
47 BORGES, p. 197. 
48 BORGES, p. 197: “Ora, essa prova aproximar-se-ia do argumento da prova 
físico-teológica criticada por Kant, diferenciando-se dessa ao partir da 
conformidade a fins do mundo espiritual, a não do mundo natural.”  
49 See “Causa final e causa eficiente;” BORGES, p. 192-97. 
50 BORGES, p. 195. 
51 BORGES, p. 193: “Segundo Hegel, a idéia da natureza em Aristóteles possuiria 
duas determinações: o conceito de finalidade (Zweck) e o conceito de necessidade.”  
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“interior’52—result from the distinction between efficient and final 
causality.53 These two forms of causality are the characteristic explanatory 
devices in the two distinct parts of “the objective world:” the realms of 
Nature and of Spirit or Concept. In the realm of Nature, efficient causality 
offers explanations based on mere external connection: this neatly explains 
the inferiority of Nature to Spirit in epistemological terms.54 A merely 
external necessity is, she suggests, entirely appropriate on an 
epistemological level to a realm handed over, in metaphysical terms, to 
“the self-externality of the Concept:” not only is the Idea in Nature subject 
to particularity, externality, and mere chance55 in itself but also for us who 
would try to understand it. We can know what occurs in Nature only on the 
basis of a merely exterior efficient causality. 
 But this, according to Borges, is not the case in the realm of Spirit. The 
locus of World History in the Hegelian System is the conceptual realm of 
Spirit governed by a form of causality—final causality—that creates an 
internal necessity that leaves no room for chance. Her discussion of this 
point is indeed worth a more extended commentary. The section’s critical 
paragraph begins with the fact that although we can only analyze Nature in 
terms of efficient causality, we can use both forms of causality to analyze 
an historical event.    
Ao analisarmos a causa do evento, nós podemos analisá-lo segundo sua 
causa eficiente ou sua causa final; a primeira nos daria o que Hegel 
denomina de necessidade exterior, a segunda, a necessidade interior.56  
 
Those who dismiss Hegel’s Philosophy of History as superficial and sloppy 
History fail to realize that unlike the professional historians of today, he 
                                                
52 BORGES refers to “a noção de necessidade exterior, visto que essa é tomado 
como sinônimo de causa efficiente” on p. 193 and does the same for interior 
necessity on p. 194. 
53 BORGES, p. 193: “Temos, segundo o trecho citado, duas determinações, o 
conceito de finalidade (Zweckmäsigkeit) e o conceito de necessidade 
(Notwendigkeit); o primeiro corresponde à expressão latina causae finales e ao 
termo “conceito,” o segundo à expressão causae efficientes.” 
54 BORGES, p. 194: “As particularidades da natureza não estão a serviço de uma 
finalidade conceitual, na filosofia hegeliana; a natureza é sempre inferior ao 
espírito.” 
55 The felicitous expression of BORGES, p. 194 is (my emphasis): “as 
particularidades naturais são produtos de uma irracionalidade típica da 
exteriorização.”  
56 The next two passages quoted in the text are from a single paragraph at 
BORGES, p. 195. They will not be cited in the notes. 
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never intended to analyze historical events in terms of efficient causality:57 
because he was searching for the internal necessity of World Historical 
events, the causes for which he searched were final causes.   
 
Visto que a necessidade exterior é tomada como sinônimo de acaso, 
compreendemos agora em que sentido a Weltgeschichte elimina o acaso: 
o filósofo que a narra não pretende dar conta, no seu relato, de todo 
momento histórico, que tem como causa, enquanto fenômeno empírico, 
obviamente, eventos antecedentes.  
 
 This analysis does not require Hegel to claim that no historical event 
happens as a result of chance; presumably the “exterior necessity” of 
efficient causality still “governs” many such events. Moreover, Hegel can 
defend his approach by saying that the explanatory device—i.e. efficient 
causality—appropriate to Nature (what we would call “science’) is 
inappropriate for explaining World History. But within the universe of 
Hegel’s conception of Wissenschaft—a universe which gives the prominent 
place, indeed the final and ultimate place, to “die Absolute Wissen”—it is 
only the historian of final causality who treats World History scientifically. 
Unlike Nature, World History unfolds according to a Spiritual purpose 
(Zweck) and can only be understood in terms of Zweckmäßigkeit. Naturally 
we can reply that Hegel himself is simply choosing what historical events 
to select for inclusion in World History. But Hegel himself would rebut the 
charge of subjecting history to his own subjective caprice by saying that it 
is historians of efficient causality (no matter how apparently objective) 
who, by virtue of the exteriority of their method and their subject matter, 
make history a matter of caprice.58    
                                                
57 PhG, p. 23 (Miller): “As regards historical truths [GWFH has just given “when 
was Caesar born?” as an example]—to mention these briefly—it will be readily 
granted that so far as their purely historical aspect is considered, they are concerned 
with a particular existence, with the contingent and arbitrary aspects of a given 
content, which have no necessity.”   
58 LPH, p. 75: “It is not of the nature of the all-pervading Spirit to die this merely 
natural death; it does not simply sink into the senile life of mere custom [governed 
by efficient causality] but - as being a National Spirit belonging to Universal 
History - attains to the consciousness of what its work is [and therefore can be 
explained in terms of final causality]; it attains to a conception of itself. In fact it is 
world-historical only in so far as a universal principle has lain in its fundamental 
element, - in its grand aim: only so far is the work which such a spirit produces, a 
moral, political organization [as its end]. If it be mere desires that impel nations to 
activity [merely efficient causes], such deeds pass over without leaving a trace; or 
their traces are only ruin and destruction.”  
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O que é alijado dessa narrativa são os momentos que não contribuem para 
a realização da razão divina no mundo finito.  
 
 The question that arises so naturally for us—is Hegel deriving his 
conception of “the realization of divine reason” from events in “the finite 
world” or is he imposing that schema on them?—entirely misses the central 
point. For us, it is obvious that Hegel is imposing himself on those events 
as well as upon us; he is, as it were, the pseudo-scientific imposter. But by 
our decision to give this insulting answer, we show that we believe (falsely) 
that he would be less of an imposter if he were deriving his schema from 
them. Neither alternative has any basis in the Hegelian conception of World 
History. World History has, for Hegel, no objective existence apart from its 
eternal significance in Absolute Knowledge. It is easy to forget that Hegel 
was the first great philosopher to explain the meaning of World History as 
a whole. His vision of World History—his innovative decision to 
incorporate or rather conceptualize the past in toto into his System—was 
only made possible because he had achieved Absolute Knowledge.59 To put 
it another way: Hegel knew full well that the final cause of his own 
decision to include World History in his System was Absolute Knowledge. 
The events narrated in World History are no doubt Chronologically Prior to 
Absolute Knowledge. But Absolute Knowledge—the only basis upon 
which those events could be explained in terms of final causality—is 
Logically Prior to World History. And that is why Hegel’s conception of 
History entails Chronological Completeness: the events treated in World 
History have Absolute Knowledge as their End.  
                                                
59 There is unquestionably a biographical and historical element to be considered 
here. As HYPPOLITE has shown at p. 47: “Hegel’s entire youthful itinerary 
reappears in the Phenomenology in a rethought and organized form.” In other 
words, GWFH embodied a triumphant vision of his own intellectual development in 
a book organized in accordance with final causality (because that is what “a 
rethought and organized form” actually means). The sheer excitement of GWFH’s 
discovery that everything made sense (as an English speaker would say) and fitted 
in to the Whole—the spiritual exaltation of which the PhG is merely the physical 
relic—was never and could never be forgotten. The distinction between World 
History and his own “youthful itinerary” is very blurry in the PhG; that’s what 
makes the book one of the most fascinating ever written. The one thing that’s clear 
is that both history and autobiography (indeed the unifying “immanence of history” 
discovered by HYPPOLITE) are cognized under the form of final causality. As for 
the question of whether or not GWFH had any basis for believing that his 
achievement deserved to be considered as the finalidade da história, we would do 
well to remember that, like GWFH, Beethoven was born in 1770. On the basis of 
what are we entitled to deny that Beethoven brought the Symphony to the ne plus 
ultra of its development?   
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 It is no accident that Borges’ explanation of Hegel’s use of final 
causality in the Philosophy of History is particularly striking to an English 
speaker: the Portuguese word “finalidade” makes the crowning realization 
easier to grasp. The obvious English cognate is “finality;” a word that has 
only chronological (i.e. “he spoke with an air of finality”) but never logical 
connotations. The Portuguese word “finalidade,” on the other hand, has a 
strictly logical sense that can only be expressed in English either with 
vague words like “intention,” “goal” or “purpose” (as in the German Zweck 
and its cognates) or in a much more technical way, by resorting to a 
cumbersome use of “teleology.” When Borges writes, for example: “Ao 
dizermos que o espírito é o reino do conceito, estamos apontado para uma 
compeensão dos seus eventos segundo uma determinada finalidade 
destes,”60 the confusion inevitably arising naturally for an English speaker 
between the chronological and logical sense creates a useful hybrid word 
that expresses Hegel’s amazing position perfectly. The Hegelian Concept, 
moving in accordance with the Dialectic, necessarily entails Logical 
Completeness. Applying the finalidade do conceito to historical events 
means that those events can only be conceptualized in terms of their 
finality. Hegel does not mean to say, or at any rate emphasize, that History 
is, as we would say, over; rather, as Borges points out, World History is 
conceptualized, i.e. it actually and only is, under (in the sense of “governed 
by”) the interior necessity of final causality. But this requires World 
History’s Logical Completeness and that it can achieve only if it has 
realized, and therefore come to, its End. Hegel’s refusal, so useful to him in 
the construction and exposition of his System, to clearly distinguish 
between Logical and Chronological Priority finally has had the negative 
consequence that his indirection is visible in his confused reader’s failure to 
clearly distinguish Logical and Chronological Finality.   
 The time has come to sum up the results of this Chapter and of Part I 
Section 2 (I.2) as a whole. The Concept, returned full circle in Absolute 
Knowledge, is Logically Prior to World History. Chronological 
Completeness is merely a result—and not necessarily an entirely welcome 
result, one would think—of the application of Logical Completeness to a 
temporal process. The fact that Time itself has for Hegel no objective 
reality and, in any case, that the Future, as a never-ending and non-existent 
Spurious Infinite, cannot be conceived, makes it easier to grasp how Hegel 
could have arrived at this scandalous result.  
                                                
60 BORGES, p. 195. 
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Part I. Section 3 (I.3) 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History 
 
 The third and final section of Part I consists of three chapters. The 
Hegelian overtones of these two sets of three are intentional. In fact, I have 
tried to use Hegel’s own methods to elucidate his ideas. Consider in 
retrospect the first of these two Triads: 
 Section 1 defined Logical Completeness as the basis of the Hegelian 
System. Section 2 established a theoretical basis—the Logical and 
Chronological Parallel—for the application of Logical Completeness to a 
Chronological Process (World-History). I indicated why this application 
would have the scandalous consequence of committing Hegel to the 
Chronological Completeness of World History and offered a theoretical 
basis for making this consequence consistent with the rest of the Hegelian 
System, if not with common sense. Section 3 is therefore intended to show 
that Hegel’s Philosophy of History is simply the practical result of this 
application.  
 In Chapter 5 (I.3.1), I will show that the manner in which Hegel grafts 
World-History into his System demonstrates his commitment to both 
Logical and Chronological Completeness. This demonstration will involve 
an examination of Hegel’s attack on Kant in the Philosophy of Right. It will 
show that the emergence of World-History in the Hegelian System can only 
be understood in the context of that attack. The repudiation of Kantianism 
necessarily commits Hegel to Chronological Completeness: Chronological 
Incompleteness leaves open the possibility of realizing what ought to be in 
the Future.  
 Hegel’s Philosophy of History appears to be an instance of the Idea of 
Progress based on the expansion of Freedom. The steadily increasing 
number of those who are free is an unmistakable feature of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History. In Chapter 6 (I.3.2), I will show why Hegel’s notion 
of Freedom is not what it appears to be. A distinction developed by Borges 
will show why “the steadily increasing number of those who are free” is a 
misleading view of Hegel’s Philosophy of History and then the analysis of 
Ernst Tugendhat will show how Hegel manages an Umkehrung of Freedom 
that literally reverses the meaning of the word. I will also show why 
“Freedom” for Hegel is little more than Chronological Completeness in 
disguise. 
 Finally, in Chapter 7 (I.3.3), these elements will come together. As the 
Third Moment of the Triad of chapters constituting Section 3, “An 
Overview of Hegel’s Philosophy of History” will show how Hegel achieves 
the appearance of Progress by means of Chronological Completeness and 
the Umkehrung of Freedom. The chapter will also complete the Triad 
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defined by the three sections of Part I: although mediated by the Logical 
and Chronological Parallel, the basis of Hegel’s Philosophy of History will 
be shown to be Logical Completeness. The condition for the possibility of 
this solution is: “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” 
 
Chapter 5 (I.3.1) 
The Emergence of History in the Philosophy of Right 
 
In his influential book Hegel, Charles Taylor places a chapter on 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History—he calls it “Reason and History”—between 
“Ethical Substance” and “The Realized State;” together these three chapters 
constitute Part IV (“History and Politics”).1 It is a curious and noteworthy 
placement. The realized State precedes World History in Hegel’s own 
System and Sittlichkeit (“Ethical Substance”) is logically prior to the State. 
As an astute Hegel scholar, Taylor must be presumed to have intentionally 
inverted the correct Hegelian order. We are entitled to ask: “Why?” It 
should also be noted that Taylor has not only followed Hegel’s order in his 
exposition of the Logic in Part III,2 but returns to that order—“Art,” 
“Religion,” and “Philosophy”—when he considers “Absolute Spirit” in 
Part V. But this comparison points out another anomaly: Taylor does not 
call Part IV “Objective Spirit.” Taylor’s idiosyncratic procedure illustrates 
by means of some kind of hermeneutic via negativa the basic proposition of 
this chapter: Hegel’s Philosophy of History can only be fully 
conceptualized if it is considered in context. Its emergence in the System is 
of crucial importance, as will here be shown. 
Naturally Hegel’s fullest treatment of World History is found in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of History. But these lectures and the famous 
Introduction to them called “Reason and History” do not illuminate how 
World History is connected to the System as a whole. The first part of this 
chapter (I.3.1.1) will give a brief overview of the place of World History in 
                                                
1 TAYLOR, Charles, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
2 Although he mysteriously inserts a brief account GWFH’s Philosophy of Nature 
(ch. XIII) into Part III. Surely this is out of place in “Logic.” On the other hand, 
TAYLOR writes well about the transition between Logic and Nature at p. 350: 
“Thus there is really no transition here but an equivalence.” Particularly productive 
is TAYLOR’s suggestion at p. 352 that the Philosophy of Nature stands to Logic as 
“a hermeneutical dialectic.” “Rather it [GWFH’s Philosophy of Nature] 
presupposes what has been proven in the Logic, and also what has been shown by 
natural science and shows how one reflects the other. Rather than a proof, it 
provides an exposition of the agreement of nature [i.e. “what has been shown by 
natural science”] with the Idea [i.e. “what has been proven in the Logic].” This 
“hermeneutical” reading has been developed in an interesting way in REDDING, 
Paul, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.  
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Hegel’s System and suggest, using an observation of Bertrand Russell as a 
clue, why this placement is so important. The second part (I.3.1.2) will 
show why the emergence of World History, although treated in the 
Encyclopedia as well, is best considered in the context of the Philosophy of 
Right. Finally (in I.3.1.3), Hegel’s treatment of “Interstate Relations,” the 
moment that precedes “World History” in the Philosophy of Right, will be 
given a careful reading. The negative role of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” in 
the emergence of History will be emphasized in this exegetical section. 
 
I.3.1.1. World History’s Place in the Hegelian System 
 Like “Concept” in the Logic, World History is the Third Moment of 
one of Hegel's dialectical triads. In fact, “World History” is a Third within 
a Third within a Third. World History is, therefore—like “the Absolute 
Idea” in the Logic—a resolution among resolutions (see I.1.1.2). “Objective 
Spirit,” the Second Division of the Philosophy of Mind, itself the Third Part 
of Hegel’s System, is divided into “Law,” “The Morality of Conscience,” 
and “The Moral Life, or Social Ethics” (Sittlichkeit). The latter is then 
subdivided as: “The Family,” “Civil Society,” and “The State.” Finally, the 
latter is considered under three headings: as “Constitutional Law,” 
“External Public Law,” and, finally, “Universal History.”3  
 In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel remarks that his 
purpose is to provide a “science of the state.”4 Important as the nature of 
the State is for Hegel, it is but the first part of the triad that is consummated 
by World History. The State in isolation and the analysis of its internal 
constitution (“Constitutional Law”) is therefore only a part of political 
science. The treatment of the individual state must pass over into the 
domain of International Relations (“External Public Law”).5 This transition 
marks the entry of that opposition which always characterizes the second 
moment: in this case, the opposition between individual States, the latter 
having already been considered internally, gives rise to international law 
and war. The third stage must then be something that while single, like the 
isolated and individual State, must also resolve the opposition inherent in 
the plurality of States. It would seem that Hegel requires, as it were, a State 
of States. 
 For Hegel, it is World History that provides the only resolution for the 
irresolvable conflicts between States. Is this not a remarkable answer? 
History, even when understood as that which all States do and have done, 
                                                
3 All these section titles are from Wallace’s translation of the Philosophy of Mind. 
4 Philosophy of Right, p. 11. 
5 Philosophy of Right, p. 212-216; see PEPERZAK, Adriaan, Hegel contra Hegel in 
his Philosophy of Right: The Contradictions of International Politics, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, v. 32, n. 2, p. 241-263, 1994. 
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and thereby undoubtedly containing them as moments in a strictly 
Chronological sense, would seem to be a most precarious resolution of the 
opposition between them. Especially since History is primarily the history 
of conflict,6 the type of resolution and unity it affords is of a most equivocal 
and questionable kind. 
 A more consistent answer to the problem would therefore seem to be 
some kind of World State; something like the League of Nations or the 
United Nations. Like the individual nations that it contains, such a World 
State would possess unity and function as the resolution of opposition. By 
containing each individual State within itself, it would also achieve that 
distinct kind of unity that distinguishes the third moment of each triad from 
the first. Unlike World History, a World State would produce an actual 
unity, and not an artificial and equivocal one. 
 Bertrand Russell made this point in his History of Western Philosophy 
in a powerful way.7 Writing in 1946, Russell apparently holds Hegel’s 
conception of the State responsible for the recent horrors of the Second 
World War.8 But this legacy is insufficient to sate Russell’s animus: he 
goes on to attack Hegel on the grounds of internal inconsistency and not 
merely because of the German Philosopher’s pernicious external influence:  
 
The strength of his bias appears in the fact that his theory is largely 
inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all 
such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage. A 
man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to reach 
conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing from logic in order 
to be free to advocate crimes. Hegel’s logic led him to believe that there is 
more reality or excellence (the two for him are synonyms) in wholes than 
in their parts, and that a whole increases in reality and excellence as it 
becomes more organized. This justified him in preferring a State to an 
                                                
6 Hence the inadequacy—to use no stronger word—of WINFIELD, Richard Dien, 
The Theory and Practice of the History of Freedom: On the Right of History in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in Robert L. Perkins ed., History and System: Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History, p. 123-144. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1984; p. 126 (emphasis mine): “Paradoxically, what compels Hegel to secure a 
place for history within the orbit of right is the unprecendented radicalness with 
which he bars historical givenness from playing any role in determining the content 
of justice.” 
7 For RUSSELL as a careful student of GWFH, see McTAGGART, John and 
McTAGGART, Ellis, A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1910; “Preface.”  
8 RUSSELL, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1946; p. 768-69: “Such is Hegel’s doctrine of the State; a doctrine which, if 
accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can 
possibly be imagined.”  
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anarchic collection of individuals, but it should equally have led him to 
prefer a world State to an anarchic collection of States.9 
             
Although Russell no doubt misses the mark with his implicit claim that 
Hegel departs from his own Logic “in order to be free to advocate crimes,” 
there is no doubt that he has put his finger on an interesting problem. We 
are entitled to ask: “For the sake of what End does Hegel place World 
History where Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” could so easily be?” The answer to 
this question becomes apparent by giving careful consideration to the 
emergence of World History in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
  
I.3.1.2. The Philosophy of Right and History 
 Hegel explains the relationship between the Encylopaedia and the 
Philosophy of Right and in his 1820 Preface to the latter (and later) work: 
 
The immediate occasion for publishing these outlines is the need of 
placing in the hands of my hearers a guide to my professional lectures 
upon the Philosophy of Right. Hitherto I have used as lectures that portion 
of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences” (Heidelberg, 1817), 
which deals with this subject. The present work covers the same ground 
in a more detailed and systematic way.10  
 
Although he describes his approach as in the Philosophy of Right as 
“systematic,” indeed as “more…systematic” than was the case in the 
Encyclopaedia; i.e. in exposition of the System itself, he does not spend 
any time elucidating his System as a whole for his readers there: he 
presupposes their familiarity with it. To speak more accurately, he 
presupposes their familiarity with the Speculative Method elucidated in his 
Logic: 
 
In my “Science of Logic” I have developed the nature of speculative 
science in detail. Hence in this treatise an explanation of method will be 
added only here and there. In a work which is concrete, and presents such 
a diversity of phases, we may safely neglect to display at every turn the 
logical process, and may take for granted an acquaintance with the 
scientific procedure.11  
                                                 
Hegel’s meaning here must be understood in terms of “the absolute Idea” 
as the culmination of the Science of Logic: he is presupposing that the 
                                                
9 RUSSELL, p. 769. 
10 Philosophy of Right, p. 1 (emphasis mine). 
11 Philosophy of Right, p. 2. 
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reader grasps what he means by “The Speculative Method.”12 In other 
words, his treatment of politics is based on the Dialectic. Only on this basis 
can the Philosophy of Right be “understood and judged.”  
 
Besides, it may readily be observed that the work as a whole, and also the 
construction of the parts, rest upon the logical spirit. From this standpoint, 
especially, is it that I would like this treatise to be understood and judged. 
In such a work as this we are dealing with a science, and in a science the 
matter must not be separated from the form.13 
 
In other words, not only is the Philosophy of Right the more detailed of 
Hegel’s two accounts of the relationship between World History and the 
rest of the System but he specifically insists that History, like every other 
Inhalt considered in it, cannot be separated from the systematic and 
therefore dialectical Form in which that Content unfolds. Hegel’s treatment 
of World History can only be understood and judged by those who grasp 
that its emergence within and through the Speculative Method is 
inseparable from what it is. 
 This emergence is so important because we are watching Hegel 
integrate an open-ended (at least where the Future is concerned) 
Chronological Process into an otherwise timeless Logical System. When 
Space and Time were introduced at the beginning of the Philosophy of 
Nature, this only meant that the anschauende Idee (i.e. Nature) beholds 
itself as reflection of the Logical Idea in the Forms of Externality. There is 
no chronological progress, no proto-Darwinian evolution of natural forms 
in Time, in Hegel’s conception of Nature. Nor does Time emerge earlier in 
the Philosophy of Spirit except in the form of the Four Ages of Man 
(I.1.2.1). Hegel does not coordinate, as Heidegger later did in Sein und Zeit, 
the “Subjective Spirit” of the finite Dasein with Zeitlichkeit. It is the 
emergence of World History that marks the introduction of a unique and 
non-circular Chronological Development into a System governed by a 
seemingly atemporal Logical Completeness. It emerges, moreover, as a 
Third Moment: it brings Logical Completeness to its Triad. The earlier 
Moments of the Triad of which it is the synthesis (“State” and 
“International Relations”) are manifestly not chronologically but logically 
prior to it. But if World History contains every State, and is, moreover, the 
                                                
12 Philosophy of Right, p. 1-2 (emphasis mine): “This treatise differs from the 
ordinary compendium mainly in its method of procedure. It must be understood at 
the outset that the philosophic way of advancing from one matter to another, the 
general speculative method, which is the only kind of scientific proof available in 
philosophy, is essentially different from every other.”  
13 Philosophy of Right, p. 2. 
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fulfillment or reality of International Relations, it is chronologically prior 
to each and every one of them and will, thanks to the Future, survive those 
that presently exist. Inserting World History into the System, therefore, 
raises serious questions about the way Hegel has juggled Chronological and 
Logical Priority. Unless, that is, World History isn’t the ontologically 
independent and infinitely open-ended thing we assume that it is. And 
that’s just the point: it isn’t. But what exactly is it? 
 A valuable clue to what “World History” really is can be gleaned from 
the structure of the Philosophy of Right even before beginning a thorough 
investigation of Hegel’s description of its emergence. The Philosophy of 
Right is the only one of Hegel’s four books that does not end with a subject 
qualified by the dramatic adjective “absolute.” It does not end with 
“Absolute Knowledge” (like the Encyclopedia), or with “Absolute 
Knowing” (as the Phenomenology did) or even “the Absolute Idea” (as was 
the case with The Science of Logic). Instead, it culminates with or rather in 
“World History.” It turns out that World History is much more Absolute—
much more like the sich denkende Idee of the Wissenschaft der Logik— 
than one might think.  
 
The history of spirit is its overt deeds, for only what it does it is and its 
deed is to make itself as a spirit the object of its consciousness, to explain 
and lay hold upon itself by reference to itself.14 
 
 Like die absolute Idee in Logic, “the history of spirit” has itself as its 
object: it is so self-involved, so Logically Complete, that it can only 
“explain and lay hold upon itself by reference to itself.” But how are we to 
imagine something like World History, even when mediated by a 
transitional synonym like “the history of spirit,” making itself “the object of 
its consciousness”? How can History make itself its own object? Hegel is 
enigmatic about this although he makes it crystal clear that thinking or even 
“laying hold upon” itself is—as was the case with the Absolute Idea—
precisely its being and principle. 
 
To lay hold upon itself is its being and principle, and the completion of 
this act is at the same time self-renunciation and transition.15  
 
What is to be understood as able “to lay hold of itself” in this context? And 
how can History be understood as being capable of anything like “self-
renunciation”? Mysterious though these words seem at first, they are 
rendered transparent by recalling Hyppolite’s important notion of “the 
                                                
14 Philosophy of Right, p. 216 (§343). 
15 Philosophy of Right, p. 216. 
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immanence of history.” World History isn’t something independent and 
external: its contents are implicitly immanent in all of us and explicitly so in 
Hegel himself.  
 
To express the matter formally, the spirit which again apprehends what 
has already been grasped and actualized, or, what is the same thing, 
passes through self-renunciation into itself, is the spirit of a higher stage.16  
 
 Only on the basis of what might be called “an immanentist reading” of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History does this passage make sense or, to put this 
important point another way: this passage is a crucial proof-text for 
Hyppolite’s immanentest reading. Hegel himself is “the spirit which 
apprehends what has already been grasped and realized.” Instead of 
externalizing History—by regarding “what has already been grasped and 
realized” as an independently existing process—the true Historian equipped 
with Absolute Knowledge (i.e. “the spirit of a higher stage”) knows himself 
in History because that History is really immanent or interior where he 
himself—as opposed to the merely contingent aspects of the man 
“Hegel”—is concerned. Because of the “immanence of history” in the fully 
self-conscious knower, i.e. Hegel as opposed to “Hegel,” there is nothing to 
fear by immersing or even submerging oneself in History: as if one would 
lose oneself among its vanished pageants and bygone scenes. In fact, it is 
precisely this process by which “Hegel” has become himself in Hegel, i.e. 
in Absolute Knowledge. It is precisely here that his spirit “passes through 
self-renunciation into itself.” This is how Subject and Substance become 
one. The recognition of the immanence of history involves both “self-
renunciation,” in which “Hegel,” as particular ego, as particular Professor 
of Philosophy,17 is left behind, and also “transition,” in which the real 
Hegel considered only as Subject, becomes one with Substance in Absolute 
Knowledge. Internalized within this transformed or rather self-actualized 
Hegel, History is itself, and by the very same deed, transformed and 
therefore, having been internalized and therefore active in its great 
Philosopher, it accomplishes a mightier deed than Napoleon or Caesar ever 
thought to perform:18 “its deed is to make itself as a spirit the object of its 
                                                
16 Philosophy of Right, p. 216. 
17 In the PhG (§5), GWFH is referring to this “Hegel” when he claims that the 
realized Wissenschaft will be developed “abgesehen von der Zufälligkeit der Person 
und der individuellen Veranlassungen.” 
18 It would seem that GWFH exempts himself from a statement like the following 
passage from Philosophy of Right §344, p. 217: “States, peoples, and individuals are 
established upon their own particular definite principle, which has systematized 
reality in their constitutions and in the entire compass of their surroundings. Of this 
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consciousness, to explain and lay hold upon itself by reference to itself.”19 
 The end of the Philosophy of Right is therefore not so different from 
the more obviously and overtly grandiose endings of Hegel’s other books. 
But it is unquestionably the text that will help us to grasp how Hegel 
conceptualizes History. And “conceptualizes” is, as it turns out, precisely 
the word.  
 
I.2.1.3. The Rejection of “Perpetual Peace” in “International Relations” 
 The fact that Hegel didn’t propose a World State as the Third Moment 
of “The State” can’t be explained on the grounds that he couldn’t imagine 
such a thing. The rejection of this possibility is a deliberate and indeed a 
polemical choice on Hegel’s part. His Philosophy of Right contains, as we 
shall see, repeated negative references to Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” Indeed 
the emergence of World History should be considered as having a double 
aspect. As something like the sich denkende Idee of Absolute Knowing, 
World-History can be shown to have a positive role to play as Spirit’s 
consciousness of itself as Spirit. But there is also a much more tangible 
negative aspect: it is fair to say that Hegel is at war with Kant’s “Perpetual 
Peace” and that it is only World-History’s emergence in the System that 
allows him to win that war. It is therefore somewhat unclear whether (a) it 
was Hegel’s desire to include World-History that required him to reject the 
Kantian ideal that it replaced or (b) whether Hegel incorporated World-
History into his System—an act of incorporation that was hardly 
unproblematic—simply as a plausible way to reject and refute Kant’s 
“Perpetual Peace.” The second alternative should not be completely ruled 
out.  
       I would argue, however, that Hegel’s most pressing priority is 
expressed by neither of these alternatives. My goal has been to show that 
Hegel’s most important philosophical commitment is to Logical 
Completeness and that this, in turn, led him to the bizarre corollary of 
Chronological Completeness. Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” necessarily 
                                                                                                   
systematized reality they are aware, and in its interests are absorbed. Yet are they 
the unconscious tools and organs of the world-spirit, through whose inner activity 
the lower forms pass away. Thus the spirit by its own motion and for its own end 
makes ready and works out the transition into its next higher stage.” GWFH seems 
to know his own end.  
19 This account may lend some support to the ingenious identity between “Egoidade 
e Temporalidade” proposed in ARANTES, P. A., Hegel: A ordem do tempo. 
Traduçâo e prefácio de Rubens Rodrigues Torres. Sao Paulo: Hucitec, 2000. World 
History may still remain temporal for the pre-Absolute Knowledge “Ego,” i.e. for 
“Hegel.” This important book will receive further attention in Part II.   
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involves the Future;20 this made it—like “Astronomy’s Epistemological 
Future” (see Introduction)—ipso facto unacceptable. Of course Hegel could 
hardly say as much; other arguments were therefore required and were 
easily found to make his point. But equally unacceptable was a non-
conceptual account of History: a World-History that has not yet reached its 
End. The most peculiar feature of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, i.e. its 
Chronological Completeness, becomes intelligible both because Logical 
Completeness is the basis of the entire System and because the manner in 
which World-History emerges in that System inevitably makes Hegel’s 
enmity to Kantianism’s reliance on the Future impossible to miss. My 
claim is that both of these are simply aspects or rather symptoms of the 
same scandalous result required by his most primordial philosophical 
commitment. Nor, on this reading, is it accidental that the Philosophy of 
Right contains both the classic expression of the unity of the rational and 
the real and the beautiful passage about the “Owl of Minerva.” The first is 
the theoretical basis for the repudiation of that better tomorrow promised 
by the Idea of Progress while the latter constitutes that repudiation’s most 
poetic, mysterious, and quotable expression.  
      Hegel’s attack on “Perpetual Peace” commences with an unblushing 
defense of War.21 Although Hegel supports standing armies22 and seems to 
praise the willingness of the professional soldier to die for the common 
good,23 he by no means confines the duty to sacrifice life and limb for the 
State to the military class: this duty inheres in the people as a whole.24 He 
                                                
20 REISS, Hans (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; p. 130 (concluding paragraph of 
“Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Sketch”): “If it is a duty to bring about in reality 
a state of public right (albeit by an infinite process of gradual approximation), and if 
there are also good grounds for hoping that we shall succeed, then it is not just an 
empty idea that perpetual peace will eventually replace what have hitherto been 
wrongly called peace treaties (which are actually only truces). On the contrary, it is 
a task which, as solutions are gradually found, constantly draws nearer fulfillment, 
for we may hope that the periods within which equal amounts of progress are made 
will become progressively shorter.” See also p. 108-9 and 123-4. 
21 This defense begins in Philosophy of Right §324. See SMITH, Steven B. Hegel’s 
Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989, pp. 156-64. 
22 Zusatz to Philosophy of Right, §326. 
23 Philosophy of Right, p. 296 (Zusatz to §327): “The military class is the class of 
universality. To it are assigned the defence of the state and the duty of bringing into 
existence the ideality implicit in itself. In other words it must sacrifice itself.” 
24 Philosophy of Right, p. 210-11 (emphasis mine): “Dissensions between states 
may arise out of any one specific side of their relations to each other. Through these 
dissensions the specific part of the state devoted to defense [i.e. the professional 
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acknowledges the courage War engenders in the professional soldier but is 
generously prepared to find a new form of it even in the terrified draftee.25 
Thanks to modern weaponry, the older form of bravery and the personal 
sense of honor that accompanied it has in fact been superseded.26 War is 
neither unethical nor evil.27 Although Hegel suggests that War is 
inevitable28—and therefore immune to the attempts of dreamers like Kant 
                                                                                                   
soldiers of the standing army] receives its distinguishing character. But if the whole 
state, as such, is in danger of losing its independence, duty summons all the citizens 
to its defense.”  
25 Philosophy of Right, p. 296 (Zusatz to §327; emphases mine): “The courage of 
the animal, or the robber, the bravery due to a sense of honour, the bravery of 
chivalry, are not yet the true forms of it. True bravery in civilized peoples consists 
in a readiness to offer up oneself in the service of the state, so that the individual 
counts only as one amongst many. Not personal fearlessness, but the taking of 
one’s place in a universal cause, is the valuable feature of it.” 
26 Philosophy of Right, p. 212 (Note to §328): “The principle of the modern world, 
that is, the thought and the universal, have given bravery a higher form. It now 
seems to be mechanical in its expression, being the act not of a particular person, 
but of a member of the whole. As antagonism is now directed, not against separate 
persons, but against a hostile whole, personal courage appears as impersonal. To 
this change is due the invention of the gun; and this by no means chance invention 
has transmuted the merely personal form of bravery into the more abstract.” Note 
that it is nevertheless more primitive weaponry with which GWFH twits his flabby 
and hypocritical opponents at Philosophy of Right, p. 295-6; Zusatz to §324 
(emphasis mine): “From the pulpit we hear much regarding the uncertainty, vanity, 
and instability of temporal things. At the very same time every one, no matter how 
much he is impressed by these utterances, thinks that he will manage to retain his 
own stock and store. But if the uncertainty comes in the form of hussars with 
glistening sabres, and begins to work in downright earnest, this touching edification 
turns right about face, and hurls curses at the invader.”    
27 Philosophy of Right, p. 209 (Zusatz to §324; emphasis mine): “It is a very 
distorted account of the matter when the state, in demanding sacrifices from the 
citizens, is taken to be simply the civic community, whose object is merely the 
security of life and property. Security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice 
of what is to be secured. Herein is to be found the ethical element in war. War is not 
to be regarded as an absolute evil.” It is precisely the willingness to sacrifice one’s 
own life that makes war ethical. Compare Philosophy of Right §328: “The content 
of bravery as a sentiment is found in the true absolute final end, the sovereignty of 
the state. Bravery realizes this end, and in so doing gives up personal reality. Hence, 
in this feeling are found the most rigorous and direct antagonisms. There is present 
in it a self-sacrifice, which is yet the existence of freedom.” This last sentence alerts 
the reader to the peculiar sense of “freedom” found in GWFH (see I.3.2).  
28 Philosophy of Right, p. 296 (Note to §324): “In spite of this, wars arise, when 
they lie in the nature of the matter. The seeds spring up afresh, and words are 
silenced before the earnest repetitions of history.”  
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to abolish it29—he also claims that perpetual peace, even if it were possible, 
would be a disaster.30 Peace promotes weakness.31 Hegel has made all of 
these points even before his discussion of the State, considered internally, 
passes over into the relations between States. War—and the unitary 
leadership required to successfully prosecute it—is indeed the bridge 
between the two moments.32 
       The eleven paragraphs that Hegel devotes to the subject scarcely lay a 
secure foundation for the covenants of International Law. It is the 
individual State whose claims, according to Hegel, are prior—one should 
add, as of course Hegel does not, that they are both Chronologically and 
Logically prior—to any international agreements and thus the theoretical 
                                                
29 Philosophy of Right, p. 295 (Note to §324): “Everlasting peace is frequently 
demanded as the ideal towards which mankind must move. Hence, Kant proposed 
an alliance of princes, which should settle the controversies of states, and the Holy 
Alliance was probably intended to be an institution of this kind.” GWFH’s motive 
for distorting of KANT’s views—it was to be a federation of Republics, not 
Princes—deserves further consideration. For KANT’s position on war, see The 
Metaphysics of Morals §54-§62 in REISS, Kant’s Political Writings, p. 165-75.  
30 GWFH even uses the expedient of quoting himself to make this point: this 
emphasizes that his opposition to KANT on “Perpetual Peace” is of long standing. 
Philosophy of Right, p. 210 (Zusatz to §324): “Moreover, by it [sc. War], as I have 
elsewhere expressed it, “finite pursuits are rendered unstable, and the ethical health 
of peoples is preserved. Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the corruption 
which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption 
which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace.”” The reference is to 
“On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” (1802-03). See HEGEL, G.W.F. 
Political Writings. Edited by Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet; translated by H.B. 
Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 141. On this crucial text, 
see HARRIS, H.S. Hegel’s Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806), 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984; pp. 148-50, 38-9, 108, 129, 131-2, 205, and 
218.    
31 In addition to the passage quoted in the previous note, see Philosophy of Right, p. 
295 Addition to §324): “As a result of war peoples are strengthened, nations, which 
are involved in civil quarrels, winning repose at home by means of war abroad.” Cf. 
HARRIS, Errol E. Hegel’s Theory of Sovereignty, International Relations, and War 
in STEWART, Jon (ed.), The Hegel Myths and Legends, p. 154-180, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1996, p. 164: “Hegel knew nothing of nuclear 
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles; and short of these, could he have 
foreseen high explosives, aerial bombardment, fragmentation bombs, napalm, 
chemical and bacteriological warfare, he might have concluded, as we should, that 
the patriotic virtues could be of no countervailing advantages.” It is regrettable that 
HARRIS saw fit to venture into such paths; unfortunately the other HARRIS fares 
no better in the same volume: see HARRIS, H.S. The End of History in Hegel, p. 
223-236, especially at p. 232-3.    
32 Consider the connection between Philosophy of Right §329 and §330. 
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basis for Treaties and International Law in general is expressly 
subordinated to the needs of the sovereign State.33 Hegel’s approach 
throughout repudiates “idealism” in the popular sense of that term; indeed 
he seems to delight in his hardheaded approach.34 His attack on Kant’s 
“Perpetual Peace” is further pressed35 and War quickly reappears as the 
perfectly logical counterpart of International Law.36 As for War, Hegel 
makes it clear that only the States involved are arbiters of the casus belli.37 
                                                
33 Philosophy of Right, p. 212; §331: “The nation as a state is the spirit substantively 
realized and directly real. Hence, it is the absolute power on earth. As regards other 
states it exists in sovereign independence.”  
34 Consider as an example the two sentences of Philosophy of Right, p. 213; §333 
(emphasis mine). The first appears to validate the claims of International Law: 
“International law…has at its basis the proposition that treaties, as they involve the 
mutual obligations of states, must be kept inviolate.”  But in the second sentence, he 
corrects this false impression. “But because the relation of states to one another has 
sovereignty as its principle, they are so far in a condition of nature one to the other. 
Their rights have reality not in a general will, which is constituted as a superior 
power, but in their particular wills. Accordingly the fundamental proposition of 
international law remains a good intention, while in the actual situation the relation 
established by the treaty is being continually shifted or abrogated.” Two important 
aspects of KANT’s thinking come together here: morality as “ought” and the 
comparison of a better future to “the actual situation” (i.e. “Kantianism”). Only by 
means of Chronological Completeness can GWFH banish KANT’s “ought” from 
the Philosophy of History. Something similar occurs in the Addition to §330 at 
Philosophy of Right, p. 297: “A relation between states ought also to be intrinsically 
right, and in mundane affairs that which is intrinsically right ought to have power. 
But as against the state there is no power to decide what is intrinsically right and to 
realize this decision.” The first sentence appears to validate what ought to be; the 
second reasserts the omnipotence of what is (“there is no power”).     
35 Philosophy of Right, p. 213; Zusatz to §333 (emphasis mine): “There is no judge 
over states, at most only a referee or mediator, and even the mediatorial function is 
only an accidental thing, being due to particular wills. Kant’s idea was that eternal 
peace should be secured by an alliance of states. This alliance should settle every 
dispute, make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be recognized by 
every state. This idea assumes that states are in accord, an agreement which, 
strengthened though it might be by moral, religious, and other considerations, 
nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will, and was therefore liable to 
be disturbed by the element of contingency.” The key phrase in this passage is, as 
will later become clear, the opening statement: “There is no judge over states.”  
36 The transition from Philosophy of Right §333 to the first sentence of §334; p. 214 
(“Therefore, when the particular wills of states can come to no agreement, the 
controversy can be settled only by war”) is almost comic in effect. 
37 Philosophy of Right, p. 214; §335: “Moreover, the state as a spiritual whole 
cannot be satisfied merely with taking notice of the fact of an injury, because injury 
involves a threatened danger arising from the possible action of the other state.” 
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Even the decision to abrogate existing Treaties belongs exclusively to the 
sovereign State; Hegel makes it plain that he regards raison d’etat as 
sufficient grounds for any such abrogation.38 Although Hegel allows that 
the conduct of modern War is becoming more humane—it is the most 
idealistic remark in the section39—he bases this fact only on the internal 
morality of the States concerned rather than in their respect for 
International Law.40 In fact it is precisely this parting shot at International 
Law that marks the transition to World-History.41 
      Hegel’s views on War and International Law are predicated on a 
hardheaded political realism that another Prussian Civil Servant—the great 
Otto von Bismarck—would later call “Realpolitik.” But it is highly 
significant that Hegel never mentions his predecessor Machiavelli in these 
passages: he defines himself—appropriately enough, given his views42—by 
                                                                                                   
This justifies the State’s decision to make War. 
38 Philosophy of Right, p. 214-5; §337 (emphasis mine): “This particular will of the 
whole [State] is in its content its well-being, and well-being constitutes the highest 
law in its relation to another.” Consider also: “So, too, its end in relation to other 
states, the principle justifying its wars and treaties, is not a general thought, such as 
philanthropy, but the actually wronged or threatened weal in its definite 
particularity.”  
39 Philosophy of Right, p. 297; Addition to §338: “Modern wars are carried on 
humanely.” Note that GWFH presents this as a fact: as what is, in fact, the case. 
GWFH permits a certain amount of political idealism to enter when the modality 
shifts from present indicative, as at §338, p. 215: “Ambassadors, also, are to be 
respected. War is not to be waged against internal institutions, or the peaceable 
family and private life, or private persons.” But the best he can say of International 
Law’s relation to War there is that it makes room for the possibility of Peace. 
“Hence, war, even when actively prosecuted, is understood to be temporary, and in 
international law is recognized as containing the possibility of peace.”  
40 Philosophy of Right, p. 215; §339 (emphasis mine): “For the rest, the capture of 
prisoners in time of war, and in time of peace the concession of rights of private 
intercourse to the subjects of another state, depend principally upon the ethical 
observances of nations. In them is embodied that inner universality of behaviour, 
which is preserved under all relations.”  
41 Philosophy of Right, p. 297; Addition to §339: “The nations of Europe form a 
family by virtue of the universal principle of their legislation, their ethical 
observances, and their civilization. Amongst them international behaviour is 
ameliorated, while there prevails elsewhere a mutual infliction of evils. The relation 
of one state to another fluctuates; no judge is present to compose differences; the 
higher judge is simply the universal and absolute spirit, the spirit of the world.”  
42 Carl SCHMITT’s Concept of the Political (1927) seems much less original after 
reading a sentence like the this one: “Although a number of states may make 
themselves into a family, the union, because it is an individuality, must create an 
opposition, and so beget an enemy” (Addition to §324; Philosophy of Right, p. 295).  
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his enemies, not his friends. And his most important enemy is Kant. Kant 
not only opposed War and supported International Law: more importantly, 
Kant looked forward to a Future in which International Law would put an 
end to War. Kant argued that such a Future, a federation of pacific 
Republics, was a rational End towards which it was our duty to strive: 
“Perpetual Peace” is what ought to be. To paraphrase Hegel: Kant believed 
that “the rational will become real.” The actual form of Hegel’s dictum 
illustrates his best-known move against political idealism and the Idea of 
Progress: only the rational that is actual is the really rational.43 Although 
this move justifies on a theoretical level the repudiation of the Future—
what I have called Kantianism—it does not assert the Chronological 
Completeness of History.44 But Hegel’s explicit and deliberate substitution 
of World-History for Kantianism’s Future—clearly visible in the 
Philosophy of Right—shows the short-term polemical benefits Hegel 
reaped from Chronological Completeness. World-History records what is 
real, not what ought to be. But if World-History leaves room for future 
developments, it then leaves room for Kant’s ought. And Hegel has no 
place in his System for that and therefore no place for the Future in which 
that ought, either in the realm of the moral law or the starry heavens, could 
someday be realized.45 
      In the Philosophy of Right, the transition from International Law to 
                                                
43 Philosophy of Right, p. 11: “Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der 
Philosophie, denn das was ist, ist die Vernunft.”  
44 It does, however, have other unpleasant consequences. A convincing attempt to 
relieve GWFH of the self-imposed “scandal” of affirming the rationality of the 
actual is made by FACKENHEIM, Emil L. On the Actuality of the Rational and the 
Rationality of the Actual, Review of Metaphysics, p. 690-698, 1970 by emphasizing 
the priority of the actuality of the rational. Even his spirited defense concludes with 
the words: “This modest essay has inquired only into the meaning of Hegel's 
philosophy. Any inquiry into its truth must confront its claims with the gas 
chambers of Auschwitz” (p. 698). He quotes ROSENZWEIG, Franz, Hegel und der 
Staat. Oldenburg, 1920; vol. II, p. 79) as writing that the origin of the dictum is “the 
idea of the divine kingdom on earth” and goes on to buttress his defense of Hegel 
by showing its connection to Christian doctrines of divine providence (p. 694). In a 
way, this is the crux of the matter. In the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy Kingdom come!” is 
an imperative: it is prayed for; it has not yet come. The purpose of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History is to convert this imperative into an indicative: the kingdom 
is here. He seeks to prove “…that what has happened, and is happening every day, 
is not only not ‘without God,’ but is essentially His Work” (Philosophy of History, 
p. 457). Despite any distinction between existence and actuality, “what has 
happened,” must include, on FACKENHEIM’s own tacit admission, “the gas 
chambers of Auschwitz.” 
45 GWFH’s hostility to KANT is particularly visible in the intersection of the Ought 
and the Future, i.e. “the bad infinite.”  
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World-History is mediated by the question—to which International Law is 
clearly not the answer—of whether or not there is any “judge” that stands 
above two quarreling States.46 As we have seen, Hegel commenced his 
attack on Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” in the Addition to §324 with the words: 
“There is no judge over states.” In other words, Hegel decisively rejects 
any Ethical Ideal on the basis of which the behavior of States can be 
judged: neither by International Law as it presently exists nor by Kant’s 
proposal of “Perpetual Peace” as a future towards which we ought to work. 
But only if “there is no judge” can be converted to the much less probable 
proposition that “there will be no judge” can Hegel decisively repudiate 
Kantianism. Hegel’s solution is therefore to find a judge that neither stands 
above quarreling States (as does International Law) nor, as it were, beyond 
them (as the Ideal Future in Kantianism).  
      It is useful at this point to return to the overview of the Triad that Hegel 
offered the reader at the outset of the Division under consideration. Hegel 
outlined the three parts of the triad in the following terms: 
 
259. The Idea of the state (a) has immediate actuality and is the individual 
state as a self-dependent organism: the Constitution or Constitutional 
Law; (b) passes over into the relation of one state to other states 
International Law; (c) is the universal Idea as a genus and as an absolute 
power over individual states the mind which gives itself its actuality in the 
process of World History.47  
 
Explaining this arrangement in the accompanying Addition, Hegel begins 
by stating a mechanical principle of the triad: this reminds us that Logical 
Completeness is the sine qua non of the Hegelian System. 
 
States as such are independent of one another, and therefore their relation 
to one another can only be an external one, so that there must be a third 
thing standing above them to bind them together.48 
 
Hegel’s commitment to Logical Completeness requires the existence of this 
third thing. But his decision to banish from philosophy anything 
transcendent, anything that is either above or beyond (jenseits) the world as 
                                                
46 Philosophy of Right, p. 297; Addition to §339: “The relation of one state to 
another fluctuates; no judge is present to compose differences; the higher judge is 
simply the universal and absolute spirit, the spirit of the world.”  
47 §259; Philosophy of Right, p. 160. 
48 Philosophy of Right, p. 279; Addition to §259 (emphasis mine): “…so daß ein 
drittes Verbindenes über ihnen sein muß.”  
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it actually is or even appears to be,49 is the basis for the emergence of 
Chronological Completeness in his System. This can only happen, of 
course, because he has introduced World-History into his System.  
 
Now this third thing is the mind which gives itself actuality in World 
History and is the absolute judge of states.50 
 
History once again becomes active, in this case, as judge: this raises anew 
the hermeneutic power of the “immanentest reading.”51 The more important 
point to grasp, however, is that the only thing “standing above”; the States 
in order to “bind them together” is not really above them at all. It is not the 
otherworldly City of St. Augustine or Plato’s transcendent Idea of the 
Good. But it is no accident that Hegel does not mention those philosophers 
here: it is only Kant who is under attack.  
      And that is why World-History can have no Future: why it stands 
neither above nor beyond the quarreling States. As the context of World-
                                                
49 PIPPEN, Robert B. Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; p. 206: “…there is literally nothing 
“beyond” or “behind” or responsible for the human experience of the world of 
appearances, and certainly not an Absolute Spirit.” Apparently PIPPEN understands 
GWFH’s “Absolute Spirit” as (a non-human) God; an error. 
50 Philosophy of Right, p. 279; Addition to §259. 
51 The mind that actively “gives itself actuality in World History” would, on this 
reading, be GWFH’s: not qua “Hegel” but qua Absolute Knower. As Philosopher of 
History—the source of the magisterial Lectures on the Philosophy of History—this 
transformed “Hegel” is also “the absolute judge of states:” he decides which States 
to include in his Lectures and what to record of them there. Guiding his actions as 
judge is the World-History that he himself is as Subject and Substance as well. 
Although this passage emphasizes the more grandiose aspect of “the immanence of 
history,” there is also the equally important moment of self-renunciation to be 
considered. This aspect is present—in fact both grandiosity and self-renunciation—
in another text that is susceptible to an immanentest reading. “There is present in it 
[the subject is War] a self-sacrifice, which is yet the existence of freedom. In it is 
found the highest self-control or independence [grandiosity of Absolute 
Knowledge], which yet in its existence submits to the mechanism of an external 
order [renunciation of “Hegel” for World History] and a life of service [as Prussian 
Civil Servant]. An utter obedience or complete abnegation of one’s own opinion 
and reasonings [a key element in the self-renunciation phase], even an absence of 
one’s own spirit [i.e. of “Hegel”], is coupled with the most intense and 
comprehensive direct presence of the spirit [i.e. “the mind which gives itself its 
actuality in the process of World History”] and of resolution” (§328; Philosophy of 
Right, p. 211). On this reading, GWFH is a soldier who resolves to sacrifice 
himself—qua “Hegel”—in order to bring about “the most intense and 
comprehensive direct presence of the spirit.”  
 125 
History’s emergence makes clear, Hegel realizes that even the possibility of 
Kantianism’s Future, a pacific federation of States that could actually 
someday become the “third thing standing above them to bind them 
together,” must be rejected. Hegel used, in fact needed, the record of what 
is (World-History) to repudiate what only merely ought to be. But that 
record is chronological and, since Time marches on, it is open-ended 
towards the infinite future. It cannot be complete. But if it is incomplete, it 
will be impossible to conceptualize within the Speculative Method. More to 
the immediate point, if it admits the possibility of future development, it 
cannot banish Kant’s ought. It is obviously no accident that Kant’s 
Philosophy of History connects what out to be with the Future. Nor is it an 
accident that Hegel’s Philosophy of History requires Chronological 
Completeness in order to reject what ought to be for the sake of what is.  
     There is one final point to be considered. When Hegel reveals the 
judge’s identity to the reader,52 he uses a singular and revealing analogy. In 
§340, the last paragraph of International Law, Hegel states: 
 
The destinies and deeds of states in their connection with one another are 
the visible dialectic of the finite nature of these spirits. Out of this 
dialectic the universal spirit, the spirit of the world, the unlimited spirit, 
produces itself. It has the highest right of all, and exercises its right upon 
the lower spirits in world-history. The history of the world is the world’s 
court of judgment.53 
 
Both the temporal and the theological problems of Hegel’s treatment of 
World History are made manifest in this final sentence: a line of poetry 
borrowed from Schiller.54 But this translation misses the mark. 
“Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht” has far deeper implications. In German, 
the word for the Last Judgment is “Weltgericht.” The Last Judgment of the 
                                                
52 Philosophy of Right, p. 279; Addition to §259: “Der alleinige Richter, der sich 
immer and gegen das Besondere geltend macht, ist der an sich seiende Geist, der 
sich als das Allgemeine and die wirkende Gattung in der Weltgeschichte darstellt.”  
53 Philosophy of Right, p. 215-6; Zusatz to §340. 
54 For the source of this line, see Friedrich von SCHILLER, Sämtliche Werke 
(Stuttgart, 1827), Bd. I, p. 176 (“Resignation” from “Gedichte der zweiten 
Periode”). For the importance of this phrase in connection with Historical 
Relativism, see STERN, Alfred. Philosophy of History and the Problem of Values. 
The Hague: Mouton, 1962; p. 160. “In my opinion, Hegel’s dictum that 
‘Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht’ is the keystone of Historicism. If there is no extra-
historical authority above history, then history is the supreme judge of all truth and 
all values. We see, indeed, with what sovereignty history condemns to oblivion the 
truths and values it has produced. It is Chronos devouring his children.” 
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world is no longer entrusted to God, but to its own History.55 God is 
secularized as History.56 This scandalous distortion of the theological 
significance of the Last Judgment—assuming, that is, that we can still 
recognize today any theological distortion as “scandalous”—makes perfect 
sense given his more evidently scandalous solution to “The Problem of 
Time.” History, that is, history intellectually comprehended, is the absolute 
judge of States only because it gives each of them a purpose and a specific 
place. It is only the whole drama of history that justifies the entrances and 
exits of the various players enacting it. But this kind of justification is 
possible only when the final curtain has already fallen: it can only be a Last 
Judgment. Only a poet, fully armed with the requisite poetic license, can 
legitimately make the claim that “Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht”  
(emphasis mine); when a philosopher makes the same claim, we must 
conclude that he has deliberately and scandalously confused Logic and 
Chronology.  
                                                
55 This explains the gap between O’BRIEN, George, Hegel on Reason and History, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975; p. 106: “A more appropriate 
interpretation of Hegel would be to specify the artificer of history as man, not God” 
as opposed to the equally true comment found in HYPPOLITE, Jean, Logic and 
Existence. Translated by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1997; p. 186: “Hegel indeed speaks of history having a sense, 
the Absolute Idea, but this idea is not man.”  
56 STRAUSS, Leo, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989; p. 24-5 (emphasis mine): “Hegel had reconciled 
“the discovery of History”—the alleged insight into the individual’s being in the 
most radical sense, the son or stepson of his time, or the alleged insight into the 
dependence of a man’s highest and purest thoughts on his time—with philosophy in 
the original meaning of the term by asserting that Hegel’s time was the end of 
meaningful time [up to this point, STRAUSS has simply been repeating KOJÈVE’s 
error]—the absolute religion, Christianity, had become completely reconciled with 
the world; it had become completely secularized, or the saeculum had become 
completely Christian in and through the postrevolutionary State; history as 
meaningful change had come to an end; all theoretical and practical problems had in 
principle been solved; hence the historical process was demonstrably rational.” 
Unfortunately, STRAUSS is not opposed in principle to this kind of 
“secularization;” see ALTMAN, William H.F. The Alpine Limits of Jewish 
Thought: Leo Strauss, National Socialism, and Judentum ohne Gott, Journal of 
Jewish Thought and Philosophy, v. 17, p. 1-46, 2009. 
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Chapter 6 (I.3.2) 
The Umkehrung of Freiheit 
 
In tracing the intellectual history of the Idea of Progress, J.B. Bury 
notes the influence of J.G. Fichte on Hegel: 
 
Both saw the goal of human development in the realization of “freedom,” 
but, while with Fichte the development never ends as the goal is 
unattainable, with Hegel the development is already complete, the goal is 
not only attainable but has now been attained. Thus Hegel’s is what we 
may call a closed system. History has been progressive, but no path is left 
open for further advance.1 
 
Although Bury admits that Hegel’s conception is “antagonistic to Progress 
as a practical doctrine”2—by which he presumably means that Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History offers no incentive to practical action in the future—
he insists that, for Hegel, “History has been progressive” and that “progress 
there has been.” Skeptical about Hegel’s vision of Progress though he is, 
Bury does not, it seems to me, go far enough. In this chapter, I intend to 
show that once Hegel’s conception of “freedom” has been clearly 
understood, even the appearance of Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History begins to fall away. Bury recognizes that, for Hegel, Progress 
comes to an end with Completeness but he is still willing to believe that, 
for Hegel, Progress has taken place. I will show that what appears to be 
Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of History was always simply Logical 
Completeness. To put it another way: Bury thinks that Progress is 
Chronologically Prior to Completeness, i.e. that Progress has occurred but 
is now Complete. I claim that Completeness is Logically Prior to even the 
appearance of Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of History. 
      It is naïve to deny, however, that Hegel made a conscious effort to 
strive for the appearance of Progress; this is strongly suggested by his 
repeated use of the word itself in the classic exposition of his Philosophy of 
History: 
 
                                                
1 BURY, J.B. The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth, New 
York: Dover Publications, 1987 (reprint of 1932 original), p. 255. 
2 BURY, pp. 255-56. “The spirit of Hegel’s philosophy, in its bearing on social life, 
was thus antagonistic to Progress as a practical doctrine. Progress there had been, 
but Progress had done its work; the Prussian monarchical state was the last word in 
history.” Note that this description suggests that GWFH promulgates “the End of 
History” for political and apologetic reasons (i.e. to defend “the Prussian 
monarchical state”). 
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The History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to 
the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.3 
 
One is tempted to discount the importance of the words with which Hegel 
qualifies Progress (i.e. “a progress whose development [is] according to the 
necessity of its nature”) and to emphasize instead the quantifiable 
progression he has already introduced:  
 
The general statement given above, of the various grades in the 
consciousness of Freedom—and which we applied in the first instance to 
the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and 
Roman world only that some are free; whilst we know that all men 
absolutely (man as man) are free,—supplies us with the natural division 
of Universal History, and suggests the mode of its discussion.4 
 
The appearance of Progress rests, to begin with, on the arithmetical 
expression of “the various grades in the consciousness of freedom.” One 
would tend to think that “consciousness of freedom” is a timeless standard 
of measurement—an evaluative criterion—of which an increasingly large 
number of people have become conscious over an extended chronological 
process; progress occurs over time, it is quantifiable and can therefore be 
measured in terms of Freedom.  
 The three sections of this Chapter will chip away at this misconception 
step by step. In Section I.3.2.1, the distinction introduced by Borges 
between intensive and extensive Freedom will be used as basis for the claim 
that Hegel’s arithmetical expression of Progress is highly misleading. Next, 
attention will be turned to Hegel’s conception of Freedom itself. In Section 
I.3.2.2, the results of Ernst Tugendhat’s thoughtful comparison of Hegel’s 
notion of Truth with Hegel’s concept of Freedom will be considered; this 
analysis will reveal what Tugendhat means by Hegel’s “Umkehrung des 
Sinns von Freiheit.” Taking Tugendhat’s more radical suggestions 
seriously, I will then show (in Section I.3.2.3) that there is no hyperbole 
involved in equating Hegel’s Freedom with its exact opposite: Necessity 
(Notwendigkeit). In short: what appears to be a progressive Philosophy of 
History based on the arithmetical increase of (the consciousness of) 
Freedom will be shown to be the necessarily closed circle of Logical 
Completeness where “Freedom” becomes nothing more than the self-
consciousness of this very Necessity.    
 
                                                
3 Philosophy of History, p. 19. 
4 Philosophy of History, p. 19. 
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I.3.2.1. Extensive and Intensive Freedom 
 As already mentioned, the appearance of Progress in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History depends, to begin with, on the arithmetical 
expression of “the various grades in the consciousness of freedom.” A 
useful distinction introduced by Borges helps us to see things more clearly. 
It will be remembered that a central element in her project is to demonstrate 
what I am calling “the Logical and Chronological Parallel.” In her own 
words, she is showing that “…a articulação historico do espírito será visto 
que a ordem desse desenvolvimento não é uma ordem qualquer, regida pelo 
acaso, mas que é a expressão temporal de uma necessidade conceitual.”5 
When she discusses the political articulation of this development, she 
immediately points out that the progress of Freedom involves not only an 
extensive (i.e. quantifiable) aspect but an intensive aspect as well.6 In other 
words, the arithmetical progression from the East, through Greece and 
Rome, to the German World emphasizes the extensive aspect of Freedom.7 
But it is the intensive aspect of Freedom that is responsible for its 
universality (considered extensively) in the German World. 
 
Na passagem do mundo antigo ao mundo moderno, há também um 
desenvolvimento intensivo da idéia de liberdade, pois o Estado moderno 
contém em si o principio da moralidade subjetiva, princípio surgido 
historicamente com o cristianismo.8  
                       
Although Hegel chooses to represent the attractive concept of the 
extensive progress of Freedom as the essence of his Philosophy of History, 
it is in fact his idiosyncratic interpretation of the Incarnation that explains 
the progress of Freedom. It is Christianity’s subjective principle—the 
                                                
5 BORGES, p. 141: “Por sua vez, ao mostarmos a articulação historico do espírito 
será visto que a ordem desse desenvolvimento não é uma ordem qualquer, regida 
pelo acaso, mas que é a expressão temporal de uma necessidade conceitual, o que 
sera observado na relação entre política e religião [see I.1.2.2]—que vai desde a 
identidade imediata destas, no mundo oriental, até uma complementaridade no 
mundo germânico—bem como nos momentos de desenvolvimento histórico da 
política e da religião, tomados isoladamente.”  
6 BORGES, p. 141: “A primera (a política) segue uma ordem crescente no que diz 
respeito ao desenvolvimento da liberdade, na qual há um maior desenvolvimento, 
tanto intensivo quanto extensivo dessa.” Cf. BOURGEOIS, Bernard, Éternité et 
Historicité de L’Esprit selon Hegel. Paris: J. Vrin, 1991; p. 35. 
7 BORGES. P. 141: “Por desenvolvimento extensivo, entendo a atribição de 
“homen livre” a um maior número de indivíduos. A liberdade dos antigos, nesse 
sentido, não era plena no seu aspecto extensivo, pois não abarcava todos os seres 
humanos.” 
8 BORGES, p. 141. 
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abrogation of the division between human being and God that characterized 
the one-sided “Religions of Essence” (see I.1.2.2)—that all are free. In 
other words, his emphasis on the extensive aspect is highly misleading: 
there is no gradual (extensive) accretion in the number of those who are 
free: there is a sudden and unique (intensive) explosion that locates the 
divine essence within Subjectivity.9 Although Hegel naturally does not 
emphasize the fact, the intensive transformation of Freedom caused by the 
Incarnation—as interpreted by Hegel, of course—means that no one was 
Free, in that intensive sense of the word, before Christ. In other words, it is 
an imposture to say that in the Eastern World, for example, one was Free. 
The divine with which the Pharaoh was one, for example, was not really 
the divine.10 Hence, Hegel is forced to make statements like the following:   
 
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as 
such—is free; and because they do not know this they are not free. They 
only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that 
one is only caprice; ferocity—brutal recklessness or passion, or a 
mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of 
Nature—mere caprice like the former. —That one is therefore only a 
Despot; not a free man.11                                                             
 
                                                
9 BORGES, p. 170: “Esse espírito superior [‘revealed in the Christian religion’] 
significa  o irromper de uma dimensão central para o homen moderno, exatamente 
aquela que o diferencia do homen antigo: a capacidade subjetiva de julgar o que é 
moralmente correto.”  
10 Philosophy of History, p. 112: “The Constitution generally is a Theocracy [sc. in 
“The Oriental World”], and the Kingdom of God is to the same extent also a secular 
Kingdom as the secular Kingdom is also divine. What we call God has not yet in 
the East been realized in [subjective] consciousness, for our idea of God involves an 
elevation of the soul to the supersensual. While we [sc. in the German World] obey, 
because what we are required to do is confirmed by an internal sanction [the fact 
that the requirement is internal makes us free!], there [sc. in the Oriental World] the 
Law is regarded as inherently and absolutely valid without a sense of the want of 
this subjective confirmation [note that it is no longer the inadequacy of Eastern 
Man’s conception of God that GWFH now emphasizes but the inadequacy of their 
conception of their own subjective power; thanks to the Incarnation, the two are 
actually the same for GWFH]. In the law [as understood in the Oriental World] men 
recognize not their own will [as they do in the German World], but in entirely 
foreign.” 
11 Philosophy of History, p. 18. 
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The involuntary self-contradiction12 contained in this passage (“one is free” 
vs. “that one is therefore…not a free man”) clearly shows that it is the 
intensive, not the extensive sense of Freedom that Hegel takes seriously. 
 Moreover, once Freedom is understood in this intensive sense, Hegel’s 
claim that “the History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom,” reveals that the end of that process, whether 
understood in a Logical or Chronological sense, is once again revealed to 
be the sich denkende Idee described in the closing pages of the Logic.13 
Progress is the actualization, through self-consciousness, of what has been 
potential (an sich) in Spirit from the beginning.14 In fact, Hegel deliberately 
distinguishes and rejects “perfectability,” defined as “change…for the 
better,”15 from his own Aristotelian conception of Development.16 Nor is 
Spirit’s development merely formal, as in Nature. 
                                                
12 This self-contradiction must be sharply distinguished from Hegelian Dialectic: it 
is neither logical nor conscious. GWFH requires “one to be free” in order to give 
the appearance of progress and this creates a problem for him because true 
“freedom” will only emerge with “the death of God.” 
13 It is only when making the parallel between Logic and the Philosophy of History 
explicit that GWFH feels forced to deny—and it is the only time he does so—
Chronological Completeness. “The Union of Universal Abstract Existence 
generally [sc. “die absolute Idee”] with the Individual,—the Subjective—that this 
alone is Truth, belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated in this 
general form in Logic.—But in the process of the World’s History itself,—as still 
incomplete,—the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of 
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the 
purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is 
realizing itself through them” (Philosophy of History, pp. 25-26; emphases mine). 
When GWFH claims that “the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the 
distinct object of desire and interest” he is excluding himself: he is, by virtue of 
what he is saying, not “still unconscious of the purpose” that he, and he alone, 
knows that “they are fulfilling.” It is only here that GWFH seems to take the 
extensive sense of Freedom seriously: he alone is self-conscious of his universal 
Freedom. But Chronological Completeness is, as I stated in I.2.2, only achieved in 
Absolute Knowledge.  
14 Philosophy of History, p. 54: “The principle of Development involves also the 
existence of a latent germ of being—a capacity or potentiality striving to realise 
itself. This formal conception finds actual existence in Spirit; which has the History 
of the World for its theatre, its possession, and the sphere of its realization.”  
15 Philosophy of History, p. 54: “This peculiarity in the world of mind has indicated 
in the case of man an altogether different destiny from that of merely natural 
objects—in which we find always one and the same stable character, to which all 
change reverts;—namely, a real capacity for change, and that for the, better,—an 
impulse of perfectibility.”  
16 Philosophy of History, p. 54 (emphasis mine): “The principle of Perfectibility 
indeed is almost as indefinite a term as mutability in general; it is without scope or 
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Its expansion, therefore, does not present the harmless tranquility of mere 
growth, as does that of organic life, but a stern reluctant working against 
itself. It exhibits, moreover, not the mere formal conception of 
development, but the attainment of a definite result. The goal of 
attainment we determined at the outset: it is Spirit in its Completeness, in 
its essential nature, i.e., Freedom.17  
 
Having raised the possibility that Hegel’s “Freedom” may be Logical 
Completeness in disguise, the time is ripe to show that whatever else it may 
turn out to be, it unquestionably isn’t what most of us think that it is.  
 
I.3.2.2. Tugendhat on Hegelian Freiheit 
 Ernst Tugendhat places his exposition of Hegel’s conception of 
Freedom only at the very end of Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung; 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen.18 It is not altogether clear whether or 
not Hegel was really his secret target from the beginning; certainly both 
Hegel and Tugendhat’s interpretation of Hegel are important enough to 
justify such an intention. Fortunately, however, an analysis of his book as a 
whole is hardly unnecessary here. But his Hegel interpretation can be 
connected with the book’s central theme by beginning with what he writes 
about Hegel’s treatment of “Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein” in 
paragraph §436 of the Encyclopedia.19 Tugendhat comments as follows: 
                                                                                                   
goal, and has no standard by which to estimate the changes in question: the 
improved, more perfect, state of things towards which it professedly tends is 
altogether undetermined.” It is interesting that GWFH fails to recognize that 
Perfectability may well have no goal, i.e. it continues into the indefinite future 
without a specific τελος.  
17 Philosophy of History, p. 55; emphasis in original. 
18 TUGENDHAT, Ernst, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung; 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979 (hereafter 
“TUGENDHAT”).  
19 “Universal self-consciousness [Selbstbewußtsein] is the affirmative awareness 
[affirmative Wissen] of self in an other self: each self as a free individuality has his 
own absolute independence [absolute Selbständigkeit] …without distinguishing 
itself from that other. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective; each 
has ‘real’ universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself 
recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the 
other and knows him to be free” (Wallace translation, deletion as found in 
TUGENDHAT, p. 344). The sentence with the deletion reads as a whole: Das 
allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein ist das affirmative Wissen seiner selbst im anderen 
Selbst, deren jedes als freie Einzelheit absolute Selbständigkeit hat, aber, vermöge 
der Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit oder Begierde, sich nicht vom anderen 
unterscheidet, allgemeines [Selbstbewußtsein] und objektiv ist und die reelle 
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Wichtig ist aber das Stichwort vom »affirmative Wissen«. Denn diese 
Rede des Affirmativen läßt sich nun von den bejahenden Beziehung eines 
Individuums zu einem anderen Individuum im Sinn des Anerkennens 
ausdehnen auf die bejahende Beziehung jedes der Individuen zu der 
Gemeinschaft, deren Teil sie sind, eine Übertragung, die für Hegel 
ohnehin sehr leicht zu vollziehen ist, weil er auf beide seine Rede von der 
Identität im Unterschied anwenden kann, während man, wenn man diese 
Bejahung als Zustimmung zu den in den »Gesetzen und Einrichtungen« 
(Rechtsphilosophie §144) der Gemeinschaft enthaltenen allgemeinen 
Imperativen oder Normen verstehen muß.20  
                     
This passage forms a bridge between self-determination in general, i.e. 
the book’s central concern, and Hegel’s politics. Tugendhat is showing that 
the relationship between two individuals (“das affirmative Wissen seiner 
selbst im anderen Selbst”) is analogous by extension (Ausdehnung) to the 
relationship between Individual and State; it is within the latter context that 
Hegel’s Umkehrung of Freedom is going to take place. Tugendhat is 
preparing us to realize that, when this reasoning about self-determination’s 
affirmative recognition of another is extended, the Individual will be 
affirming herself in the “Gesetzen und Einrichtungen” of the State. 
Moreover, this passage indicates the crucial bridge between the two types 
of “bejahende Beziehung;” i.e Freedom.  
 
Aber Hegel betont in dem zitierten §436 nicht nur das affirmative 
Verhältnis, sondern auch die Frieheit und »absolute Selbständigkeit« des 
Einzelnen in diesem affirmative Verhältnis.21    
                   
It is at this point that Tugendhat points out there are two different 
“stages” in what he call’s Hegel’s Freiheitsbegriff.22 The sense of Freedom 
Hegel rejects is mere Willkür, usually translated by the English “caprice.” 
This capacity to do whatever you are inclined to do is regarded by Hegel as 
the merely “formal” Freedom of e.g. the Eastern despot; Tugendhat has no 
difficulty in finding the appropriate texts.23 But Tugendhat breaks some 
                                                                                                   
Allgemeinheit als Gegenseitigkeit so hat, als es im freien anderen sich anerkannt 
weiß und dies weiß, insofern es das andere anerkennt und es frei weiß (§436). 
20 TUGENDHAT, p. 344. 
21 TUGENDHAT, p. 345. 
22 TUGENDHAT, p. 153 and p. 345.  
23 TUGENDHAT, p. 345-46: “Dieser Wille ist nach Hegel nur formell frei (Rph §§ 
14, 21), weil er zwar beschließt (§ 12), wählt (§ 14), aber zwischen Inhalten, die 
ihm äußerlich (bzw. innerlich) vorgegeben sind—»es sind die Triebe, Begierden, 
Neigungen, durch sie sich der Wille von Natur bestimmt findet« (§ 11)—, und ohne 
daß er ein Maß für die Entscheidung in sich selbst hat (§ 17). Dann ist er aber in 
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new ground by pointing to an analogy—a most ironic one, as it turns out—
between Hegel and Kant. For the latter, heteronomy in ethical decision 
involved deriving morality ab extra; only by reliance on the (internal) 
categorical imperative was the moral agent truly independent and therefore 
moral. Hegel uses this Kantian language to justify his own sense of true 
Freedom (as opposed to Willkür) as “die bejahende Beziehung jedes der 
Individuen zu der Gemeinschaft.” Moreover, the transition between the two 
is going to be self-determination. 
 
Hegel sagt: der formelle Wille ist noch abhängig. Damit ist Kants Begriff 
der Heteronomie aufgenommen. Die höherstufige Freiheit wird also als 
Autonomie verstanden; der Maßtab ist Selbstbestimmung, Autonomie. 
Auch darin unterschieden sich die beiden Konzeptionen [i.e. Hegel’s and 
Kant’s] also nicht. Aber nun kommt die Frage: was heißt 
Selbstbestimmung?24 
                
 The beauty of Tugendhat’s approach is that he elucidates Freedom 
within the wider context of Hegel’s thought as a whole. Instead of resting 
on the analogy between Selbstbestimmung and true Freedom, he takes a 
step back into Hegel’s epistemology: what he calls Hegel’s 
Wahrheitsbegriff. “Nach dieser aber ist sie dadurch ermöglicht, daß Hegel 
die eigentliche Freiheit—die Selbstbestimmung—als Beisichselbstsein 
bestimmt und dieses im Sinn seines spekulativen Wahrheitsbegriffs 
expandiert hat.”25 For this move, the entire book has prepared his reader.26  
 
Alle diese zusätzlichen Bestimmungen der Wahrheit: daß sie Resultat sei, 
daß sie die ganze Bewegung sei, daß sie nur als System sei und daß sie 
das Ganze sei, sind bloße Folgen der Bestimmung der Wahrheit als 
Idee—als Identität des Subjekts mit der Realität—, Folgen, die sich dann 
ergeben müssen, wenn die Identität a) als Bewegung konzipiert wird und 
wenn diese Bewegung b) allumfassend ist.27  
                           
My reader, on the other hand, will recognize in Tugendhat’s description 
what I have been calling “Logical Completeness.” But Tugendhat has been 
                                                                                                   
Wirklichkeit von seinen Inhalten abhängig (§ 15) und deswegen nicht eigentlich, 
sondern nur formell frei.” 
24 TUGENDHAT, p. 346. 
25 TUGENDHAT, p. 350. 
26 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Sie sehen, die Freiheit im eigentlichen Sinn von 
Selbstbestimmung ist für Hegel nichts anderes als die Realisierung der Struktur des 
spekulativen Wahrheitsbegriff…Wir haben bisher diesen spekulativen 
Wahrheitsbegriff nur nach seiner theoretischen Seite kennengelernt. Wie ist er zu 
verstehen, wenn er praktisch verstanded wird, als Freiheit?”  
27 TUGENDHAT, p. 308. 
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more interested throughout in Hegel’s epistemology rather than in his 
System: for him, therefore, Logical Completeness and the System as a 
whole are “bloße Folgen” from Hegel’s Wahrheitsbegriff: the “identity of 
thinking subject with reality.” There can certainly be no doubt that Hegel’s 
“Absolute Idealism” constitutes the basis for his solution to “The Problem 
of Time.” 
 With this foundation, Tugendhat simply quotes §514 of the 
Encyclopedia—the second paragraph on Sittlichkeit—and let’s Hegel hang 
himself with his own words. 
   
Die frei sich wissende Substanz, in welcher das absolute Sollen 
ebensosehr Sein ist, hat als Geist eines Volkes Wirklichkeit. Die abstrakte 
Diremtion dieses Geistes ist die Vereinzelung in Personen, von deren 
Selbständigkeit er die innere Macht und Notwendigkeit ist. Die Person 
aber weiß als denkende Intelligenz jene Substanz als ihr eigenes Wesen, 
hört in dieser Gesinnung auf, Akzidens derselben zu sein, schaut sie als 
ihren absoluten Endzweck in der Wirklichkeit sowohl als erreichtes 
Diesseits an, als sie denselben durch ihre Tätigkeit hervorbringt, aber als 
etwas, das vielmehr schlechthin ist; so vollbringt sie ohne die wählende 
Reflexion ihre Pflicht als das Ihrige und als Seiendes und hat in dieser 
Notwendigkeit sich selbst und ihre wirkliche Freiheit.28  
            
In a single masterly paragraph, Tugendhat then reveals the authoritarian 
monster lurking in the shadows of Hegel’s abstract philosophemes. He 
explains the implications of Sein replacing Sollen,29 he draws attention to 
the words “ohne die wählende Reflexion”30 (as well as alerting the reader to 
                                                
28 E §514. “The consciously free substance, in which the absolute ought [Sollen] is 
no less an is [ebensosehr Sein], has actuality as the spirit of a nation. The abstract 
disruption of this spirit singles it out into persons, whose independence it, however, 
controls and entirely dominates from within. But the person, as an intelligent being, 
feels that underlying essence to be his own very being—ceases when so minded to 
be a mere accident of it—looks upon it as his absolute final aim. In its actuality he 
sees not less an achieved present, than somewhat he brings about by his action - yet 
somewhat which without all question is. Thus, without any selective reflection, the 
person performs his duty as his own and as something which is; and in this 
necessity he has himself and his actual freedom” (Wallace translation).                          
29 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Das Sollen, sagt Hegel, ist »ebensosehr Sein«: das 
Gesollte wird also nicht mehr, wie in Moralität, von der Subjektivität der 
Objektivität entgegengehalten, sondern es hat Sein, es sind, wie Hegel in der Rph 
erläutert, »die an und für sich seienden Gesetze und Einrichtungen« (§ 144) des 
bestehenden Gemeinwesen, »eine absolute, unendlich festere Autorität und Macht 
als das Sein von Natur« (§ 146).” 
30 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Diese sind für das Individuum, wie Hegel weiter in 
unserem Stück der Enz. Ausführt, »Pflicht«, und zwar eine Pflicht, die es »ohne die 
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Hegelian Vertrauen as the sinister alternative),31 and uses a text from the 
Philosophy of Right to illustrate how conscience is submerged in Hegel’s 
State.32 After summarizing his findings in a closing tour de force,33 he asks: 
“Inwiefern kann denn dann aber Hegel überhaupt noch von Freiheit 
sprechen?”34 That turns out to be a very good question. 
 Perhaps only a German born in 1930 could have written about 
Hegelian “Freedom” with such righteous indignation.35 In any case, it is in 
this context that Tugendhat introduces the useful phrase Umkehrung36 and 
mentions the interesting idea, an idea that will be amplified in the next 
section, that what Hegel means by Freiheit is really its opposite: 
Notwendigkeit.37 To complete his damning indictment of Hegel’s 
Machtidolotrie,38 he leaves the reader in no doubt that the individual’s 
unquestioning loyalty is owed to “the powers that be;” “für das 
gegenwärtig Bestehende.”39 In fact, Tugendhat presents Hegel’s 
achievement as “die Philosophie der Rechtfertigung des Bestehenden.”40 
This emphasis on the justification of the Present is not without connection 
to what I have called “Chronological Completeness.” But neither is it 
                                                                                                   
wählende Reflexion«, also ohne die Freiheit im subjektiven, wählend 
reflektierended Sinn vollbringt, denn sie sind, wie ich wiederum aus der Rph 
ergänze (§ 148), »für einen Willen bindend«.”  
31 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
32 TUGENDHAT quotes Philosophy of Right §152 on the disappearance of “das 
eigene Gewissen” in “die sittliche Substantialität” (p. 349). 
33 TUGENDHAT, p. 349: “Die Möglichkeit eines selbstverantwortlichen, kritischen 
Verhältnisses zum Gemeinwesen, zum Staat wird von Hegel nicht zugelassen, 
vielmehr hören wir: die bestehenden Gesetze haben eine absolute Autorität; was 
vom Individuum zu tun ist, steht in einem Gemeinwesen fest; das eigene Gewissen 
des Einzelnen hat zu verschwinden, und an die Stelle der Reflexion tritt das 
Vertrauen; das ist es, was Hegel mit der Aufhebung der Moralität meint.” 
34 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
35 TUGENDHAT, p. 349-50: “Damit ist der nicht einmal mehr von Hegel zu 
überbietende Gipfel der Perversion erreicht, einer gewiß nicht mehr nur 
begrifflichen, sondern moralischen Perversion, so daß man Mühe hat, sie nur nach 
ihrer begrifflichen Seite zu betrachten.”  
36 TUGENDHAT, p. 349 (emphasis mine): “Der Sinn dieser Umkehrung der 
Freiheit in das, was normalweise für ihr Gegenteil gehalten wird, ist, wie aus dem 
Zusammenhang sowohl des § 484 wie vor allem des vorhin zitierten § 514 
hervorgeht, der, daß das Individuum sich gerade darin frei fühlen soll, daß es die 
von der Macht des Bestehenden ausgehenden Pflichten erfüllt.”  
37 TUGENDHAT, p. 349: “…die »wirkliche Freiheit« wird als »Notwendigkeit« 
verstanden…”  
38 TUGENDHAT, p. 355. 
39 TUGENDHAT, p. 354; emphasis mine. 
40 TUGENDHAT, p. 351; see the sources cited there. 
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unconnected with what Tugendhat calls “Hegels Grundkonzeption:”41 his 
Wahrheitsbegriff.  
 
Dieser Aspekt folgt aus Hegels Grundkonzeption, der Wahrheit als 
Einheit des Begriffs mit der Realität, nur dann, wenn man die Realität, 
das ›Wirkliche‹ mit dem Gegenwärtigen gleichsetzt.”42  
 
 And thus it happens that “Freedom” is not the only word that is twisted 
round in a masterful Umkehrung.43 Due to the fact that Tugendhat has 
successfully embedded Freedom with Hegel’s Grundkonzeption,44 it is the 
meaning of “Truth” that is transformed as well: there is no correspondence 
between conception and object to be achieved but rather an identity to be 
asserted.45 There can be no doubt that Tugendhat achieves some masterful 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen46 (the sub-title of his book) and it is his 
                                                
41 TUGENDHAT, p. 354. 
42 TUGENDHAT, p. 354; emphasis in original. 
43 TUGENDHAT, p. 350 (emphasis mine): “…den Sinn des Wortes »Freiheit« 
umgebogen hat.” The formula I used above (“der Umkehrung des Sinns von 
Freiheit”) is found on the same page.  
44 For the record, I cannot accept TUGENDHAT’s claim that the Absolute Identity 
of Subject and Object is GWFH’s Grundkonzeption; it is SCHELLING’s. One 
might, with better right, say that the Subject and Substance Identity deserves this 
place. But the fact of the matter is that the characteristic and defining move in 
GWFH’s thought is not any particular Identity—no matter how gründlich it may 
be—but a new means towards the end of Identity. In other words, it would probably 
be more accurate to say that GWFH’s Grundkonzeption is the Logical 
Completeness of the Dialectic. In the sense that the end is always Logically Prior to 
the means, TUGENDHAT is correct. But this new means was so fertile, so flexible 
and applicable—above all, so brilliantly innovative—that it will always have pride 
of place when GWFH is discussed. While it is therefore true that GWFH’s 
intentions cannot be understood without reference to SCHELLING (but see 
TUGENDHAT, pp. 316-17) and SPINOZA, his Dialectical means to the Monistic 
end will remain his greatest achievement. Unfortunately, it was precisely the 
confusion of Logical and Chronological Priority in the Dialectic that made it so 
powerful. It was only on the basis of this scandalous confusion that Time in general 
and World-History in particular were integrated into GWFH’s oxymoronic 
Chronological Monism.         
45 TUGENDHAT, p. 350: “Natürlich kann sie das nur sein, weil Hegel unter 
»Wahrheit« gar nicht Wahrheit versteht, sondern etwas ganz anderes, nämlich die 
Einheit von Subjekt und Realität, und jetzt können wir sehen, daß das konkret 
bedeutet: das affirmative Verhältnis der Einzelnen zu ihrem Gemeinwesen.” 
46 TUGENDHAT, p. 350-51: “Denn solange wir uns in Hegels Terminologie 
bewegen, wissen wir gar nicht, was es heißen könnte, nach Wahrheit zu fragen: und 
eine Forderung nach Freiheit kann gar nicht mehr aufkommen, erstens weil jede 
Forderung einen Rückfall in die Eitelkeit der Subjektivität darstellen würde, 
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insight that “indem er [sc. Hegel] den Sinn dieser Wörter umkehrt, vertritt 
er nicht nur eine andere Konzeption sondern die genau 
entgegengesetzte…”47 that will guide my steps in the following section. 
 
I.3.2.3. The Necessity of Freedom 
 In his Hegel’s Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, Thought, and 
History—an honest and interesting attempt to absolve Hegel of his 
commitment to Chronological Completeness, as we shall see in Part II—
Daniel Berthold-Bond uses the relationship between Freedom and 
Necessity to show that “dialectic sets up an “equilibrium” of opposite 
determinations, so that every opposing determination has equal value.”48 
His clearly written description of this relationship is worth quoting in full: 
 
An example may help. Hegel views it as a mistake to regard freedom and 
necessity as polar opposites and as equally legitimate but exclusionary 
alternatives. If they were equal in this way—as the Kantian antinomy has 
it, and as the sceptic has it—the only options for viewing human action 
would be the result of completely canceling one term (by arbitrary fiat) 
[70] and thus seeing oneself either as free in Hegel’s sense of negative 
freedom (= nihilism), [n. 71] or doomed to necessity in Hegel’s sense of 
“merely external necessity” (= tychism, fatalism, “the irrational void of 
necessity” [PhS 443]).49  
                                   
It will be seen that Berthold-Bond is sympathetic to Hegel’s refusal to 
consider Freedom and Necessity “as polar opposites and as equally 
legitimate but exclusionary alternatives.” But he is honest enough to admit 
that this refusal is predicated precisely on Hegel’s sense of what an 
“exclusionary” understanding of both Freedom and Necessity would look 
like. And it will be seen—although Berthold-Bond does not call our 
attention to the fact, for which omission he can be justly faulted—that the 
common sense understanding of Freedom gets lost between Hegel’s own 
“exclusionary alternatives:”50 negative freedom as nihilism on the one hand 
                                                                                                   
zweitens weil, da die Unfreiheit als Freiheit bezeichnet wird, die Freiheit ohnehin 
schon in vollendeter Weise in der Unfreiheit realisiert scheint, und es gar nicht 
mehr zu fordern gibt.”  
47 TUGENDHAT, p. 351; emphasis in original. 
48 BERTHOLD-BOND, Daniel, Hegel’s Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, 
Thought, and History, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989 (hereafter 
“BERTHOLD-BOND”). 
49 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 88. 
50 It would be interesting to investigate the possibility that there is what might be 
called a metalogical use of Understanding in GWFH where alternatives to be 
subsequently synthesized in Concept are first distinguished in a highly exaggerated 
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and a more positive conception, with which necessity will be fully 
integrated, on the other. Oblivious to this omission, Berthold-Bond 
continues: 
 
For these are the only senses of freedom and necessity which are left 
when we disallow any “reciprocal dependence” of the one on the other. 
On the other hand, by seeing that the opposition of freedom and necessity 
is not a polar equilibrium of exclusionary terms, but involves the two 
terms negating each other in a positive way—so that (positive) freedom 
negates external necessity (fate), and (rational) necessity negates negative 
freedom (nihilism)—we arrive at the completer notion of freedom which 
is self-limited by the “real, inward necessity” (SL §35 Zusatz) of duty, 
and of necessity which is the autonomous expression of self-
determination.51 
                       
It will be noted that Berthold-Bond requires the bogey of nihilism—
apparently the more Hegelian Willkür was not objectionable enough for his 
apologetic purposes—in order to sustain this sympathetic reading.52 But the 
essential point is that Berthold-Bond is nevertheless honest enough to draw 
the reader’s attention to a text where Tugendhat’s outlandish suggestion 
(“die »wirkliche Freiheit« wird als »Notwendigkeit« verstanden”)53 is 
confirmed by Hegel’s own words. This text is §35 of the Encyclopedia: 
                                                                                                   
way so as to justify their synthesis. In other words, GWFH requires that the notions 
of commonsense (i.e. what most of us mean by Freedom; e.g. “the power to make 
up our own minds within the context of an externally regulated universe of man-
made or natural law”) be much more one-sided than they in fact are. Only by this 
metalogical one-sidedness can the conceptualized products of dialectical logic be 
justified.  
51 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 88. 
52 Therefore n. 71 (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 191-92) is not one of the best moments 
in his book. He can’t find the word “nihilism” in GWFH so he is forced to derive it 
(via a discussion of irony in the Lectures on Aesthetics) from KIERKEGAARD’s 
use of the word in Concept of Irony! But BERTHOLD-BOND recovers somewhat 
with the valid and important claim that it was the French Revolution that led 
GWFH to take such a dim view of “negative freedom” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 
192). Since the French Revolution was the great world-historical event of their 
lifetimes, it may not be too much to say that the central difference between KANT 
and GWFH—more important than all the distinctions familiar to students of 
philosophy—was that the latter kept faith with the Revolution’s ideas while the 
latter lost hope. The enduring faith of the older man is, from my point of view, 
infinitely more beautiful—sublime in KANT’s sense—than the creation of 
GWFH’s truly beautiful justification for abandoning that faith.  
53 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
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what Berthold-Bond (the abbreviation stands for “Shorter Logic’) cited as 
“SL §35 Zusatz.”   
 Hegel is discussing the old-style Cosmology54 and, in §35 itself—as 
opposed to the Zusatz—he provides a long list of the “polar opposites 
and…equally legitimate but exclusionary alternatives” (to use Berthold-
Bond’s felicitous expression) that form the standard subject matter of this 
discipline.55 In the Addition, Hegel puts it this way: “But to give them a 
satisfactory answer, it is above all things necessary not to claim finality for 
the abstract formulae of understanding, or to suppose that each of the two 
terms in an antithesis has an independent subsistence or can be treated in its 
isolation as a complete and self-centered truth.”56 It is to illustrate this 
general statement with an example that Hegel reveals what his “Freedom” 
really is. 
 
So wurde z. B. der Unterschied von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit in 
Betrachtung gezogen und wurden diese Bestimmungen in der Art auf die 
Natur und auf den Geist angewendet, daß man jene in ihren Wirkungen 
als der Notwendigkeit unterworfen, diesen aber als frei betrachtete.57  
 
Hegel’s first move is to undermine the distinction between Nature, 
governed by Notwendigkeit, and Spirit, where Freedom reigns. Since the 
Hegelian System depends on the Dialectical Synthesis of Logic, Nature, 
and Spirit, it is obvious that this kind of distinction cannot hold. In other 
words, the traditional locus of Freedom in Spirit—in the human being’s 
freedom of choice—is no longer logically distinct from Nature in Hegel’s 
System. It is on the basis of this collapsed distinction that Hegel will 
collapse the distinction between Freedom and Necessity.58  
                                                
54 E §35: “Der dritte Teil, die Kosmologie, handelte von der Welt, ihrer Zufälligkeit, 
Notwendigkeit, Ewigkeit, Begrenztsein in Raum und Zeit, den formellen Gesetzen 
in ihren Veränderungen, ferner von der Freiheit des Menschen und dem Ursprunge 
des Bösen.” In this context, “old-style” really means (as the Zusatz makes explicit) 
“pre-Critical;” i.e. pre-KANT.   
55 E §35 (emphasis mine): “Als absolute Gegensätze gelten hierbei vornehmlich: 
Zufälligkeit und Notwendigkeit; äußerliche und innerliche Notwendigkeit; 
wirkende und Endursachen, oder die Kausalität überhaupt und Zweck; Wesen oder 
Substanz und Erscheinung; Form und Materie; Freiheit und Notwendigkeit; 
Glückseligkeit und Schmerz; Gutes und Böses.”  
56 Encyclopedia Logic, p. 55; Zusatz to E §35. 
57 Zusatz to E §35. 
58 Indeed the roots of Hegel’s synthesis of Freedom and Necessity are, as Shlomo 
Avineri has pointed out, are to be found in SPINOZA. See AVINERI, Shlomo, 
Hegel Revisited in Alasdair MacIntyre ed., Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, 
New York: Doubleday, 1972. 
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Dieser Unterschied ist nun allerdings wesentlich und im Innersten des 
Geistes selbst begründet; Freiheit jedoch und Notwendigkeit, als einander 
abstrakt gegenüberstehend, gehören nur der Endlichkeit an und gelten nur 
auf ihrem Boden.59 
 
Hegel here uses the word “wesentlich” in the technical sense: the 
distinction between Spirit and Nature, from which, suggests Hegel, the 
distinction between Freedom and Necessity is derived, is grounded in the 
Concept’s Second Moment; the moment of Endlichkeit. In Reflexion—the 
essence, as it were, of Wesen—two actually identical things always appear 
as mirror image opposites of each other, as is now the case with Spirit and 
Nature. Therefore one appears to be the locus of Freedom, the other of 
Necessity. But although the independence of Spirit depends on this 
appearance—this is why Hegel says the difference is “im Innersten des 
Geistes selbst begründet”—it is only independent wesentlich; we must 
beware of thinking that this means what we would call “essentially.” Only 
by first distinguishing itself from Nature can Spirit come to recognize itself 
in the Form of Externality (i.e. Nature) and therefore—mediated by the 
Logical Idea that both Spirit and Nature actually are—achieve 
consciousness of itself as the entire process. It is no accident that Hegel’s 
conception Freedom as Necessity cannot be understood apart from Logic, 
Nature, and Spirit and Sein, Wesen, and Begriff. The Logical Completeness 
that binds these Triads together is, as we shall see, indistinguishable from 
Freedom as Necessity.  
For now, however, Hegel is content to show that Freedom and 
Necessity are only aspects of one Logically Complete whole. 
 
Eine Freiheit, die keine Notwendigkeit in sich hätte, und eine bloße 
Notwendigkeit ohne Freiheit, dies sind abstrakte und somit unwahre 
Bestimmungen. Die Freiheit ist wesentlich konkret, auf ewige Weise in 
sich bestimmt und somit zugleich notwendig.60  
 
It seems to me that Hegel is exploiting the usual sense of “wesentlich” 
here; he is, after all, only using Freedom and Necessity as an example.61 
                                                
59 Zusatz to E §35.  
60 Zusatz to E §35. 
61 In the technical sense, Freedom is only concrete as Concept and therefore 
enriched by being the whole of its moments. It should be kept in mind that in E §35, 
GWFH has not yet introduced the reader to his Logic, and therefore to Wesen. He 
himself, of course, presupposes his own System in every sentence he writes. But—
and this is especially true in the Zusätze—he allows himself a terminological 
flexibility not found elsewhere.
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But even though he is no longer going to discuss Freiheit and 
Notwendigkeit in relation to Nature and Spirit—it was this relation, it must 
be remembered, that required him to invoke the logical moment of 
Wesen—it is important for us that he began as he did. Freedom must not be 
understood merely as political Freedom; this is the basic problem with an 
approach like Alan Patten’s.62 Nor is it enough for Ernst Tugendhat to 
show that the Umkehrung of Freedom into its opposite is grounded only in 
Hegel’s albeit related collapsing of opposites like subject and reality. For 
the present, it is enough to listen to Hegel bring his discussion to its 
conclusion, bearing in mind that Freedom is no more restricted to the 
moving bodies of Nature than it is to the political structures of Objective 
Spirit. 
 
Wenn von Notwendigkeit gesprochen wird, so pflegt man darunter 
zunächst nur Determination von außen zu verstehen, wie z. B. in der 
endlichen Mechanik ein Körper sich nur bewegt, wenn er durch einen 
anderen Körper gestoßen wird, und zwar in der Richtung, welche ihm 
durch diesen Stoß erteilt wird. Dies ist jedoch eine bloß äußerliche 
Notwendigkeit, nicht die wahrhaft innere, denn diese ist die Freiheit.63 
 
In fact, this text fits in particularly well with Tugendhat’s analysis of the 
relationship between Individual and Gemeinschaft. It the State is looked at 
as an other, obedience to its Gesetzen and Einrichten is compelled by “eine 
bloß äußerliche Notwendigkeit.” But as Spirit’s objective reflection of 
itself, the State is not external to the Individual. Hegel has thus given us 
what we needed: a definition that confirms Tugendhat’s suggestion. 
Freedom is “true inner necessity” (“Dies ist jedoch eine bloß äußerliche 
Notwendigkeit, nicht die wahrhaft innere, denn diese ist die Freiheit”). 
It is therefore as “inner necessity” that Freedom must be conceived. 
One aspect of this conception is that Freedom can only be understood as a 
Concept—i.e. as a concrete whole—in which its opposition to Necessity, 
an opposition that is wesentlich in the technical sense, is merely a moment. 
It is therefore precisely a necessary moment: as Concept, every moment of 
Freedom, and everything else, is Necessary. And this is a crucial point. But 
more important to grasp is the fact that Freedom is not merely a Concept. 
The most important words in the Zusatz are easy to miss: as concrete, 
Freedom is “…auf ewige Weise in sich bestimmt und somit zugleich 
notwendig” (emphasis mine). It will be remembered from I.1.1.2 that in the 
                                                
62 PATTEN, Alan, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. Compare GUYER, Paul, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; esp. pp. 408-434. 
63 Zusatz to E §35. 
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sich denkende Idee, the dialectical Bestimmungen it contains are self-
consciously recognized as in sich bestimmt.64 Its progressive unfolding—
even or rather particularly when appearing under the guise of timelessness 
(“auf ewige Weise”) is necessary. The reason that Freedom resembles the 
Absolute Idea is not simply because it too is a Concept and is therefore 
susceptible to the Speculative Method. As Hegel claims in the Wissenschaft 
der Logik, it is the Speculative Method itself that that unfolds with what 
might be called “free necessity.”65 
Nor is it only in Logic that this kind of thing occurs: the most 
important application of “Freedom” is, of course, to be found in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History. Nor does he conceal there from the attentive reader 
that his version of Freedom is—to considerably understate the case—
closely connected with Necessity.66 Lest it be thought that it is my intention 
to conceal in a footnote67 the closest Hegel comes to an explicit denial of 
Chronological Completeness, I will return to the passage in question; it can 
now be explained in full. It reads as follows: 
 
But in the process of the World’s History itself,—as still incomplete,—
the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of 
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of 
the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, 
and is realizing itself through them.68 
 
What makes the process of World-History incomplete is not that it has 
not already achieved its “abstract final aim” but that all of those 
                                                
64 Zusatz to E §237 (Wallace, p. 293): “Es kann hiernach auch gesagt werden, die 
absolute Idee sei das Allgemeine, aber das Allgemeine nicht bloß als abstrakte 
Form, welchem der besondere Inhalt als ein Anderes gegenübersteht, sondern als 
die absolute Form, in welche alle Bestimmungen, die ganze Fülle des durch 
dieselbe gesetzten Inhalts zurückgegangen ist.”  
65 WdL, p. 29: “No subject matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with 
a strict immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development; no other 
brings with it this demand in such a degree; in this respect the Science of Logic 
must surpass even mathematics, for no subject matter has in its own self this 
freedom and independence.”  
66 Even on the crudest level this is visible: of the 41 times that GWFH uses cognates 
of “necessity” (including e.g. “the necessities of life”) in his Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History, the word “freedom” is found either in the same sentence (or 
conjoined with it in an adjacent one; this happens twice) 14 times: about a third of 
the cases. 
67 See n. 13 above. 
68 All of the remaining block quotations in this section are continuously quoted with 
no deletions from Philosophy of History, p. 25-7. They will not therefore be cited 
singulatim.  
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participating in that process—as distinct from Hegel himself—have “not 
yet made” this τελος ”the distinct object of [their] desire and interest.” 
Guided by their own “limited sentiments”—it is noteworthy that Hegel’s 
grammar does not bestow upon “them” any independent agency—they are 
unconscious of the purposive process that “is realizing itself through them.” 
When considered in context, this passage reveals that this “not yet” of their 
unconsciousness is merely the last remains of a merely formal and 
therefore purely illusory Freedom; of a Freedom that has not yet become 
one with Necessity. The passage continues:      
 
The question also assumes the form of the union of Freedom and 
Necessity; the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as Necessity, 
while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their 
interest, belongs to the domain of Freedom.  
 
Hegel explains that Necessity is the domain of the purpose that is 
realizing itself through those who are its unconscious instruments. At this 
stage—where Freedom and Necessity are still distinct—the mass of 
mankind conceives of itself as freely following its own subjective purposes. 
As long, therefore, as Freedom and Necessity are separate, there still exists 
a chronological “not yet” in which “the abstract final aim of history is not 
yet made the distinct object of desire and interest.” But Hegel not only 
exempts himself from this unconsciousness: he also knows that Freedom 
and Necessity in general are in fact not distinct at all. Nor does he omit to 
tell us how he knows this: 
 
As the metaphysical connection (i.e. the connection in the Idea) of these 
forms of thought, belongs to Logic, it would be out of place to analyze it 
here. The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned. 
 
“In the Idea,” there exists between forms of thought a “metaphysical 
connection” revealed in the Logic. Hegel is prepared to summarize the 
“chief and cardinal points” whereby the distinction between Freedom and 
Necessity, a distinction on which the proposition that World-History is 
“still incomplete” depends, is illusory. With this introduction, Hegel 
prepares the reader for perhaps the richest and most revealing paragraph in 
the famous Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. In 
this paragraph, we will watch the sole basis of Chronological 
Incompleteness, the precarious “not yet” of a merely formal and 
unconscious sense of Freedom, extinguish itself in the Logical 
Completeness of Freedom and Necessity. 
 Hegel begins by calling attention to the Second Moment of the 
Dialectic: although Spirit and e.g. the Logical Idea—or “God,” as Hegel 
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prefers to call it in the passage—are one and the same, the moment of 
Reflection makes them appear, to the subjective Mind, at least, to be 
separate.   
Philosophy shows that the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis; that, viz. 
between the Idea in its free, universal form—in which it exists for itself—
and the contrasted form of abstract introversion, reflection on itself, 
which is formal existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom, such as 
belongs to Spirit only.  
 
In other words, Subject as “formal existence-for-self, personality, 
formal freedom,” has not yet become self-conscious of itself as Substance 
as well where “the Idea in its free, universal form…exists for itself.” This 
“infinite antithesis” is the condition for the possibility of what most of us 
falsely call “freedom.”  
 
The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the 
one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. 
This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness—the 
polar opposite of the Idea in its general form, and therefore existing in 
absolute Limitation.  
 
As the “substantial totality of things,” Substance in fact contains the 
Subject as well. But at the stage of Reflection, this “universal idea” is 
perceived by the finite mind only as “individual self-consciousness” on the 
one hand and its mirror-like opposite, i.e. “the Idea in its general form,” on 
the other. Because “individual self-consciousness”—the locus of “the 
abstract essence of free volition”—distinguishes itself from the Idea in 
general (i.e. God), it is by definition limited.69 
 
This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization, for the 
universal absolute being; it is the side of its definite existence; the sphere 
of its formal reality, the sphere of the reverence paid to God. 
 
In truth, of course, this opposition is illusory. The only “truth” of this 
moment of particularization and limitation is that it is a necessary moment 
in the process by which “the universal absolute being” can return to and 
therefore know itself. In the “not yet” of merely formal Freedom, God is 
still revered by the vulgar as something external. As Hegel knows, this 
                                                
69 An able explication of GWFH’s claim that God is limited by not being e.g. 
GWFH is WALLACE, Robert M. Hegel’s Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and 
God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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external reverence is predicated on the temporary self-limitation of Spirit.70 
But this polar opposition is extinguished in the Logical Completeness of 
the Concept. 
 
To comprehend the absolute connection of this antithesis, is the profound 
task of metaphysics. This Limitation originates all forms of particularity 
of whatever kind.  
                               
As the profound metaphysician that he is—and, in any case, in strict 
accordance with Spinoza’s omnis determinatio est negatio—Hegel knows 
that all particularity, predicated on the limitation of the Second Moment’s 
“infinite antithesis,” is subject to Aufhebung in “the absolute connection of 
this antithesis.” But before he announces the conceptualization of 
opposition, whether made possible by his metaphysical Logic or his logical 
Metaphysics, he reminds us that his purpose here is merely to account for 
the fact that most of mankind have not yet become conscious of their true 
end. 
 
The formal volition [of which we have spoken] wills itself; desires to 
make its own personality valid in all that it purposes and does: even the 
pious individual wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the antithesis, 
existing for itself, is—in contrast with the Absolute Universal Being—a 
special separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality only, and 
willing that alone.  
 
In short, ignorance of the End is identical with merely formal Freedom. 
But even while that End, as “the Absolute Universal Being,” is actually 
realizing itself, its unconscious and self-limited agents cling to the illusion 
that they are “a special separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality 
only, and willing that alone.” It is only in this illusory world that the 
Freedom that is not yet Necessity preserves its existence.  
 
                                                
70 The italicized “temporarily” is intended to remind the reader of GWFH’s failure 
to distinguish between Logical and Chronological Priority. When applied to World-
History, it can only be temporarily. But in Logic, it cannot be. The problem arises 
because this passage as a whole depends on the isomorphism between a Logical 
development—the necessary reconciliation between the Idea’s necessity and 
subjective Spirit’s merely formal Freedom (see Philosophy of History, p. 27; the 
passage in question is discussed below)—and a Chronological one. This explains 
why he must write of the latter at Philosophy of History, p. 19 (emphases mine): 
“the History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of 
Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature.”    
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In short it plays its part in the region of mere phenomena. This is the 
sphere of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert 
themselves on behalf of their individuality—give it full play and objective 
realization. This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite. He is 
happy who finds his condition suited to his special character, will, and 
fancy, and so enjoys himself in that condition.  
 
By defining “happiness” as nothing more than finding a “condition suited 
to his special character,” the individual, at least in times of peace and 
prosperity, eliminates the antithesis on a purely subjective level. But that 
path to overcoming antithesis is merely phenomenal, as World-History 
clearly shows. 
 
The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of 
happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony,—periods 
when the antithesis is in abeyance.  
 
Logical Completeness requires the antithesis of the Second Moment; 
negativity’s opposition is the lifeblood of the Dialectic. According to 
Hegel, it is fortunate, or rather necessary, that moments of Peace are rare. If 
they were not, the merely formal Freedom of the individual’s will, guided 
by nothing more than its limited desire for conditions in which to enjoy 
harmony by the grace of God, would never give way to “the absolute Idea.”   
 
Reflection on self,—the Freedom above described—is abstractly defined 
as the formal element of the activity of the absolute Idea.  
 
Hegel’s only use for the subjective volition of the individual’s merely 
formal freedom, the condition for the possibility of the chronological “not 
yet” of History’s End, is that it is the Middle Term of the Syllogism by 
which the Absolute Idea is self-realized. Deluded by the belief that they are 
freely pursuing their own individual ends, the unconscious individuals are 
in reality the instruments by which a Necessary End is accomplished. 
 
The realizing activity of which we have spoken is the middle term of the 
Syllogism, one of whose extremes is the Universal essence, the Idea, 
which reposes in the penetralia of Spirit; and the other, the complex of 
external things, objective matter. That activity is the medium by which 
the universal latent principle is translated into the domain of objectivity. 
 
World-History is “the complex of external things, objective matter” in 
which “the Universal essence, the Idea” is being realized. It is being 
realized thanks to that Idea’s reflection into subjectivity: this makes 
possible the purposive activity of unconscious individuals. But reflection is 
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not reality. As the synthesis of the Idea’s Necessity (the major premise) and 
subjectivity’s formal Freedom (the minor), World History as a whole is the 
Syllogism in which Freedom becomes Necessity. And that “becomes” is 
only for the unconscious ones: those whose merely abstract and formal 
Freedom remains compatible with a “not yet.” For Hegel, as for World-
History itself, true Freedom is and always already was Necessity.  
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Chapter 6 (I.3.2) 
The Umkehrung of Freiheit 
 
In tracing the intellectual history of the Idea of Progress, J.B. Bury 
notes the influence of J.G. Fichte on Hegel: 
 
Both saw the goal of human development in the realization of “freedom,” 
but, while with Fichte the development never ends as the goal is 
unattainable, with Hegel the development is already complete, the goal is 
not only attainable but has now been attained. Thus Hegel’s is what we 
may call a closed system. History has been progressive, but no path is left 
open for further advance.1 
 
Although Bury admits that Hegel’s conception is “antagonistic to Progress 
as a practical doctrine”2—by which he presumably means that Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History offers no incentive to practical action in the future—
he insists that, for Hegel, “History has been progressive” and that “progress 
there has been.” Skeptical about Hegel’s vision of Progress though he is, 
Bury does not, it seems to me, go far enough. In this chapter, I intend to 
show that once Hegel’s conception of “freedom” has been clearly 
understood, even the appearance of Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History begins to fall away. Bury recognizes that, for Hegel, Progress 
comes to an end with Completeness but he is still willing to believe that, 
for Hegel, Progress has taken place. I will show that what appears to be 
Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of History was always simply Logical 
Completeness. To put it another way: Bury thinks that Progress is 
Chronologically Prior to Completeness, i.e. that Progress has occurred but 
is now Complete. I claim that Completeness is Logically Prior to even the 
appearance of Progress in Hegel’s Philosophy of History. 
      It is naïve to deny, however, that Hegel made a conscious effort to 
strive for the appearance of Progress; this is strongly suggested by his 
repeated use of the word itself in the classic exposition of his Philosophy of 
History: 
 
                                                
1 BURY, J.B. The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth, New 
York: Dover Publications, 1987 (reprint of 1932 original), p. 255. 
2 BURY, pp. 255-56. “The spirit of Hegel’s philosophy, in its bearing on social life, 
was thus antagonistic to Progress as a practical doctrine. Progress there had been, 
but Progress had done its work; the Prussian monarchical state was the last word in 
history.” Note that this description suggests that GWFH promulgates “the End of 
History” for political and apologetic reasons (i.e. to defend “the Prussian 
monarchical state”). 
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The History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to 
the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.3 
 
One is tempted to discount the importance of the words with which Hegel 
qualifies Progress (i.e. “a progress whose development [is] according to the 
necessity of its nature”) and to emphasize instead the quantifiable 
progression he has already introduced:  
 
The general statement given above, of the various grades in the 
consciousness of Freedom—and which we applied in the first instance to 
the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and 
Roman world only that some are free; whilst we know that all men 
absolutely (man as man) are free,—supplies us with the natural division 
of Universal History, and suggests the mode of its discussion.4 
 
The appearance of Progress rests, to begin with, on the arithmetical 
expression of “the various grades in the consciousness of freedom.” One 
would tend to think that “consciousness of freedom” is a timeless standard 
of measurement—an evaluative criterion—of which an increasingly large 
number of people have become conscious over an extended chronological 
process; progress occurs over time, it is quantifiable and can therefore be 
measured in terms of Freedom.  
 The three sections of this Chapter will chip away at this misconception 
step by step. In Section I.3.2.1, the distinction introduced by Borges 
between intensive and extensive Freedom will be used as basis for the claim 
that Hegel’s arithmetical expression of Progress is highly misleading. Next, 
attention will be turned to Hegel’s conception of Freedom itself. In Section 
I.3.2.2, the results of Ernst Tugendhat’s thoughtful comparison of Hegel’s 
notion of Truth with Hegel’s concept of Freedom will be considered; this 
analysis will reveal what Tugendhat means by Hegel’s “Umkehrung des 
Sinns von Freiheit.” Taking Tugendhat’s more radical suggestions 
seriously, I will then show (in Section I.3.2.3) that there is no hyperbole 
involved in equating Hegel’s Freedom with its exact opposite: Necessity 
(Notwendigkeit). In short: what appears to be a progressive Philosophy of 
History based on the arithmetical increase of (the consciousness of) 
Freedom will be shown to be the necessarily closed circle of Logical 
Completeness where “Freedom” becomes nothing more than the self-
consciousness of this very Necessity.    
 
                                                
3 Philosophy of History, p. 19. 
4 Philosophy of History, p. 19. 
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I.3.2.1. Extensive and Intensive Freedom 
 As already mentioned, the appearance of Progress in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History depends, to begin with, on the arithmetical 
expression of “the various grades in the consciousness of freedom.” A 
useful distinction introduced by Borges helps us to see things more clearly. 
It will be remembered that a central element in her project is to demonstrate 
what I am calling “the Logical and Chronological Parallel.” In her own 
words, she is showing that “…a articulação historico do espírito será visto 
que a ordem desse desenvolvimento não é uma ordem qualquer, regida pelo 
acaso, mas que é a expressão temporal de uma necessidade conceitual.”5 
When she discusses the political articulation of this development, she 
immediately points out that the progress of Freedom involves not only an 
extensive (i.e. quantifiable) aspect but an intensive aspect as well.6 In other 
words, the arithmetical progression from the East, through Greece and 
Rome, to the German World emphasizes the extensive aspect of Freedom.7 
But it is the intensive aspect of Freedom that is responsible for its 
universality (considered extensively) in the German World. 
 
Na passagem do mundo antigo ao mundo moderno, há também um 
desenvolvimento intensivo da idéia de liberdade, pois o Estado moderno 
contém em si o principio da moralidade subjetiva, princípio surgido 
historicamente com o cristianismo.8  
                       
Although Hegel chooses to represent the attractive concept of the 
extensive progress of Freedom as the essence of his Philosophy of History, 
it is in fact his idiosyncratic interpretation of the Incarnation that explains 
the progress of Freedom. It is Christianity’s subjective principle—the 
                                                
5 BORGES, p. 141: “Por sua vez, ao mostarmos a articulação historico do espírito 
será visto que a ordem desse desenvolvimento não é uma ordem qualquer, regida 
pelo acaso, mas que é a expressão temporal de uma necessidade conceitual, o que 
sera observado na relação entre política e religião [see I.1.2.2]—que vai desde a 
identidade imediata destas, no mundo oriental, até uma complementaridade no 
mundo germânico—bem como nos momentos de desenvolvimento histórico da 
política e da religião, tomados isoladamente.”  
6 BORGES, p. 141: “A primera (a política) segue uma ordem crescente no que diz 
respeito ao desenvolvimento da liberdade, na qual há um maior desenvolvimento, 
tanto intensivo quanto extensivo dessa.” Cf. BOURGEOIS, Bernard, Éternité et 
Historicité de L’Esprit selon Hegel. Paris: J. Vrin, 1991; p. 35. 
7 BORGES. P. 141: “Por desenvolvimento extensivo, entendo a atribição de 
“homen livre” a um maior número de indivíduos. A liberdade dos antigos, nesse 
sentido, não era plena no seu aspecto extensivo, pois não abarcava todos os seres 
humanos.” 
8 BORGES, p. 141. 
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abrogation of the division between human being and God that characterized 
the one-sided “Religions of Essence” (see I.1.2.2)—that all are free. In 
other words, his emphasis on the extensive aspect is highly misleading: 
there is no gradual (extensive) accretion in the number of those who are 
free: there is a sudden and unique (intensive) explosion that locates the 
divine essence within Subjectivity.9 Although Hegel naturally does not 
emphasize the fact, the intensive transformation of Freedom caused by the 
Incarnation—as interpreted by Hegel, of course—means that no one was 
Free, in that intensive sense of the word, before Christ. In other words, it is 
an imposture to say that in the Eastern World, for example, one was Free. 
The divine with which the Pharaoh was one, for example, was not really 
the divine.10 Hence, Hegel is forced to make statements like the following:   
 
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as 
such—is free; and because they do not know this they are not free. They 
only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that 
one is only caprice; ferocity—brutal recklessness or passion, or a 
mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of 
Nature—mere caprice like the former. —That one is therefore only a 
Despot; not a free man.11                                                             
 
                                                
9 BORGES, p. 170: “Esse espírito superior [‘revealed in the Christian religion’] 
significa  o irromper de uma dimensão central para o homen moderno, exatamente 
aquela que o diferencia do homen antigo: a capacidade subjetiva de julgar o que é 
moralmente correto.”  
10 Philosophy of History, p. 112: “The Constitution generally is a Theocracy [sc. in 
“The Oriental World”], and the Kingdom of God is to the same extent also a secular 
Kingdom as the secular Kingdom is also divine. What we call God has not yet in 
the East been realized in [subjective] consciousness, for our idea of God involves an 
elevation of the soul to the supersensual. While we [sc. in the German World] obey, 
because what we are required to do is confirmed by an internal sanction [the fact 
that the requirement is internal makes us free!], there [sc. in the Oriental World] the 
Law is regarded as inherently and absolutely valid without a sense of the want of 
this subjective confirmation [note that it is no longer the inadequacy of Eastern 
Man’s conception of God that GWFH now emphasizes but the inadequacy of their 
conception of their own subjective power; thanks to the Incarnation, the two are 
actually the same for GWFH]. In the law [as understood in the Oriental World] men 
recognize not their own will [as they do in the German World], but in entirely 
foreign.” 
11 Philosophy of History, p. 18. 
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The involuntary self-contradiction12 contained in this passage (“one is free” 
vs. “that one is therefore…not a free man”) clearly shows that it is the 
intensive, not the extensive sense of Freedom that Hegel takes seriously. 
 Moreover, once Freedom is understood in this intensive sense, Hegel’s 
claim that “the History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom,” reveals that the end of that process, whether 
understood in a Logical or Chronological sense, is once again revealed to 
be the sich denkende Idee described in the closing pages of the Logic.13 
Progress is the actualization, through self-consciousness, of what has been 
potential (an sich) in Spirit from the beginning.14 In fact, Hegel deliberately 
distinguishes and rejects “perfectability,” defined as “change…for the 
better,”15 from his own Aristotelian conception of Development.16 Nor is 
Spirit’s development merely formal, as in Nature. 
                                                
12 This self-contradiction must be sharply distinguished from Hegelian Dialectic: it 
is neither logical nor conscious. GWFH requires “one to be free” in order to give 
the appearance of progress and this creates a problem for him because true 
“freedom” will only emerge with “the death of God.” 
13 It is only when making the parallel between Logic and the Philosophy of History 
explicit that GWFH feels forced to deny—and it is the only time he does so—
Chronological Completeness. “The Union of Universal Abstract Existence 
generally [sc. “die absolute Idee”] with the Individual,—the Subjective—that this 
alone is Truth, belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated in this 
general form in Logic.—But in the process of the World’s History itself,—as still 
incomplete,—the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of 
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the 
purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is 
realizing itself through them” (Philosophy of History, pp. 25-26; emphases mine). 
When GWFH claims that “the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the 
distinct object of desire and interest” he is excluding himself: he is, by virtue of 
what he is saying, not “still unconscious of the purpose” that he, and he alone, 
knows that “they are fulfilling.” It is only here that GWFH seems to take the 
extensive sense of Freedom seriously: he alone is self-conscious of his universal 
Freedom. But Chronological Completeness is, as I stated in I.2.2, only achieved in 
Absolute Knowledge.  
14 Philosophy of History, p. 54: “The principle of Development involves also the 
existence of a latent germ of being—a capacity or potentiality striving to realise 
itself. This formal conception finds actual existence in Spirit; which has the History 
of the World for its theatre, its possession, and the sphere of its realization.”  
15 Philosophy of History, p. 54: “This peculiarity in the world of mind has indicated 
in the case of man an altogether different destiny from that of merely natural 
objects—in which we find always one and the same stable character, to which all 
change reverts;—namely, a real capacity for change, and that for the, better,—an 
impulse of perfectibility.”  
16 Philosophy of History, p. 54 (emphasis mine): “The principle of Perfectibility 
indeed is almost as indefinite a term as mutability in general; it is without scope or 
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Its expansion, therefore, does not present the harmless tranquility of mere 
growth, as does that of organic life, but a stern reluctant working against 
itself. It exhibits, moreover, not the mere formal conception of 
development, but the attainment of a definite result. The goal of 
attainment we determined at the outset: it is Spirit in its Completeness, in 
its essential nature, i.e., Freedom.17  
 
Having raised the possibility that Hegel’s “Freedom” may be Logical 
Completeness in disguise, the time is ripe to show that whatever else it may 
turn out to be, it unquestionably isn’t what most of us think that it is.  
 
I.3.2.2. Tugendhat on Hegelian Freiheit 
 Ernst Tugendhat places his exposition of Hegel’s conception of 
Freedom only at the very end of Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung; 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen.18 It is not altogether clear whether or 
not Hegel was really his secret target from the beginning; certainly both 
Hegel and Tugendhat’s interpretation of Hegel are important enough to 
justify such an intention. Fortunately, however, an analysis of his book as a 
whole is hardly unnecessary here. But his Hegel interpretation can be 
connected with the book’s central theme by beginning with what he writes 
about Hegel’s treatment of “Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein” in 
paragraph §436 of the Encyclopedia.19 Tugendhat comments as follows: 
                                                                                                   
goal, and has no standard by which to estimate the changes in question: the 
improved, more perfect, state of things towards which it professedly tends is 
altogether undetermined.” It is interesting that GWFH fails to recognize that 
Perfectability may well have no goal, i.e. it continues into the indefinite future 
without a specific τελος.  
17 Philosophy of History, p. 55; emphasis in original. 
18 TUGENDHAT, Ernst, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung; 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979 (hereafter 
“TUGENDHAT”).  
19 “Universal self-consciousness [Selbstbewußtsein] is the affirmative awareness 
[affirmative Wissen] of self in an other self: each self as a free individuality has his 
own absolute independence [absolute Selbständigkeit] …without distinguishing 
itself from that other. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective; each 
has ‘real’ universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself 
recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the 
other and knows him to be free” (Wallace translation, deletion as found in 
TUGENDHAT, p. 344). The sentence with the deletion reads as a whole: Das 
allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein ist das affirmative Wissen seiner selbst im anderen 
Selbst, deren jedes als freie Einzelheit absolute Selbständigkeit hat, aber, vermöge 
der Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit oder Begierde, sich nicht vom anderen 
unterscheidet, allgemeines [Selbstbewußtsein] und objektiv ist und die reelle 
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Wichtig ist aber das Stichwort vom »affirmative Wissen«. Denn diese 
Rede des Affirmativen läßt sich nun von den bejahenden Beziehung eines 
Individuums zu einem anderen Individuum im Sinn des Anerkennens 
ausdehnen auf die bejahende Beziehung jedes der Individuen zu der 
Gemeinschaft, deren Teil sie sind, eine Übertragung, die für Hegel 
ohnehin sehr leicht zu vollziehen ist, weil er auf beide seine Rede von der 
Identität im Unterschied anwenden kann, während man, wenn man diese 
Bejahung als Zustimmung zu den in den »Gesetzen und Einrichtungen« 
(Rechtsphilosophie §144) der Gemeinschaft enthaltenen allgemeinen 
Imperativen oder Normen verstehen muß.20  
                     
This passage forms a bridge between self-determination in general, i.e. 
the book’s central concern, and Hegel’s politics. Tugendhat is showing that 
the relationship between two individuals (“das affirmative Wissen seiner 
selbst im anderen Selbst”) is analogous by extension (Ausdehnung) to the 
relationship between Individual and State; it is within the latter context that 
Hegel’s Umkehrung of Freedom is going to take place. Tugendhat is 
preparing us to realize that, when this reasoning about self-determination’s 
affirmative recognition of another is extended, the Individual will be 
affirming herself in the “Gesetzen und Einrichtungen” of the State. 
Moreover, this passage indicates the crucial bridge between the two types 
of “bejahende Beziehung;” i.e Freedom.  
 
Aber Hegel betont in dem zitierten §436 nicht nur das affirmative 
Verhältnis, sondern auch die Frieheit und »absolute Selbständigkeit« des 
Einzelnen in diesem affirmative Verhältnis.21    
                   
It is at this point that Tugendhat points out there are two different 
“stages” in what he call’s Hegel’s Freiheitsbegriff.22 The sense of Freedom 
Hegel rejects is mere Willkür, usually translated by the English “caprice.” 
This capacity to do whatever you are inclined to do is regarded by Hegel as 
the merely “formal” Freedom of e.g. the Eastern despot; Tugendhat has no 
difficulty in finding the appropriate texts.23 But Tugendhat breaks some 
                                                                                                   
Allgemeinheit als Gegenseitigkeit so hat, als es im freien anderen sich anerkannt 
weiß und dies weiß, insofern es das andere anerkennt und es frei weiß (§436). 
20 TUGENDHAT, p. 344. 
21 TUGENDHAT, p. 345. 
22 TUGENDHAT, p. 153 and p. 345.  
23 TUGENDHAT, p. 345-46: “Dieser Wille ist nach Hegel nur formell frei (Rph §§ 
14, 21), weil er zwar beschließt (§ 12), wählt (§ 14), aber zwischen Inhalten, die 
ihm äußerlich (bzw. innerlich) vorgegeben sind—»es sind die Triebe, Begierden, 
Neigungen, durch sie sich der Wille von Natur bestimmt findet« (§ 11)—, und ohne 
daß er ein Maß für die Entscheidung in sich selbst hat (§ 17). Dann ist er aber in 
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new ground by pointing to an analogy—a most ironic one, as it turns out—
between Hegel and Kant. For the latter, heteronomy in ethical decision 
involved deriving morality ab extra; only by reliance on the (internal) 
categorical imperative was the moral agent truly independent and therefore 
moral. Hegel uses this Kantian language to justify his own sense of true 
Freedom (as opposed to Willkür) as “die bejahende Beziehung jedes der 
Individuen zu der Gemeinschaft.” Moreover, the transition between the two 
is going to be self-determination. 
 
Hegel sagt: der formelle Wille ist noch abhängig. Damit ist Kants Begriff 
der Heteronomie aufgenommen. Die höherstufige Freiheit wird also als 
Autonomie verstanden; der Maßtab ist Selbstbestimmung, Autonomie. 
Auch darin unterschieden sich die beiden Konzeptionen [i.e. Hegel’s and 
Kant’s] also nicht. Aber nun kommt die Frage: was heißt 
Selbstbestimmung?24 
                
 The beauty of Tugendhat’s approach is that he elucidates Freedom 
within the wider context of Hegel’s thought as a whole. Instead of resting 
on the analogy between Selbstbestimmung and true Freedom, he takes a 
step back into Hegel’s epistemology: what he calls Hegel’s 
Wahrheitsbegriff. “Nach dieser aber ist sie dadurch ermöglicht, daß Hegel 
die eigentliche Freiheit—die Selbstbestimmung—als Beisichselbstsein 
bestimmt und dieses im Sinn seines spekulativen Wahrheitsbegriffs 
expandiert hat.”25 For this move, the entire book has prepared his reader.26  
 
Alle diese zusätzlichen Bestimmungen der Wahrheit: daß sie Resultat sei, 
daß sie die ganze Bewegung sei, daß sie nur als System sei und daß sie 
das Ganze sei, sind bloße Folgen der Bestimmung der Wahrheit als 
Idee—als Identität des Subjekts mit der Realität—, Folgen, die sich dann 
ergeben müssen, wenn die Identität a) als Bewegung konzipiert wird und 
wenn diese Bewegung b) allumfassend ist.27  
                           
My reader, on the other hand, will recognize in Tugendhat’s description 
what I have been calling “Logical Completeness.” But Tugendhat has been 
                                                                                                   
Wirklichkeit von seinen Inhalten abhängig (§ 15) und deswegen nicht eigentlich, 
sondern nur formell frei.” 
24 TUGENDHAT, p. 346. 
25 TUGENDHAT, p. 350. 
26 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Sie sehen, die Freiheit im eigentlichen Sinn von 
Selbstbestimmung ist für Hegel nichts anderes als die Realisierung der Struktur des 
spekulativen Wahrheitsbegriff…Wir haben bisher diesen spekulativen 
Wahrheitsbegriff nur nach seiner theoretischen Seite kennengelernt. Wie ist er zu 
verstehen, wenn er praktisch verstanded wird, als Freiheit?”  
27 TUGENDHAT, p. 308. 
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more interested throughout in Hegel’s epistemology rather than in his 
System: for him, therefore, Logical Completeness and the System as a 
whole are “bloße Folgen” from Hegel’s Wahrheitsbegriff: the “identity of 
thinking subject with reality.” There can certainly be no doubt that Hegel’s 
“Absolute Idealism” constitutes the basis for his solution to “The Problem 
of Time.” 
 With this foundation, Tugendhat simply quotes §514 of the 
Encyclopedia—the second paragraph on Sittlichkeit—and let’s Hegel hang 
himself with his own words. 
   
Die frei sich wissende Substanz, in welcher das absolute Sollen 
ebensosehr Sein ist, hat als Geist eines Volkes Wirklichkeit. Die abstrakte 
Diremtion dieses Geistes ist die Vereinzelung in Personen, von deren 
Selbständigkeit er die innere Macht und Notwendigkeit ist. Die Person 
aber weiß als denkende Intelligenz jene Substanz als ihr eigenes Wesen, 
hört in dieser Gesinnung auf, Akzidens derselben zu sein, schaut sie als 
ihren absoluten Endzweck in der Wirklichkeit sowohl als erreichtes 
Diesseits an, als sie denselben durch ihre Tätigkeit hervorbringt, aber als 
etwas, das vielmehr schlechthin ist; so vollbringt sie ohne die wählende 
Reflexion ihre Pflicht als das Ihrige und als Seiendes und hat in dieser 
Notwendigkeit sich selbst und ihre wirkliche Freiheit.28  
            
In a single masterly paragraph, Tugendhat then reveals the authoritarian 
monster lurking in the shadows of Hegel’s abstract philosophemes. He 
explains the implications of Sein replacing Sollen,29 he draws attention to 
the words “ohne die wählende Reflexion”30 (as well as alerting the reader to 
                                                
28 E §514. “The consciously free substance, in which the absolute ought [Sollen] is 
no less an is [ebensosehr Sein], has actuality as the spirit of a nation. The abstract 
disruption of this spirit singles it out into persons, whose independence it, however, 
controls and entirely dominates from within. But the person, as an intelligent being, 
feels that underlying essence to be his own very being—ceases when so minded to 
be a mere accident of it—looks upon it as his absolute final aim. In its actuality he 
sees not less an achieved present, than somewhat he brings about by his action - yet 
somewhat which without all question is. Thus, without any selective reflection, the 
person performs his duty as his own and as something which is; and in this 
necessity he has himself and his actual freedom” (Wallace translation).                          
29 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Das Sollen, sagt Hegel, ist »ebensosehr Sein«: das 
Gesollte wird also nicht mehr, wie in Moralität, von der Subjektivität der 
Objektivität entgegengehalten, sondern es hat Sein, es sind, wie Hegel in der Rph 
erläutert, »die an und für sich seienden Gesetze und Einrichtungen« (§ 144) des 
bestehenden Gemeinwesen, »eine absolute, unendlich festere Autorität und Macht 
als das Sein von Natur« (§ 146).” 
30 TUGENDHAT, p. 348: “Diese sind für das Individuum, wie Hegel weiter in 
unserem Stück der Enz. Ausführt, »Pflicht«, und zwar eine Pflicht, die es »ohne die 
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Hegelian Vertrauen as the sinister alternative),31 and uses a text from the 
Philosophy of Right to illustrate how conscience is submerged in Hegel’s 
State.32 After summarizing his findings in a closing tour de force,33 he asks: 
“Inwiefern kann denn dann aber Hegel überhaupt noch von Freiheit 
sprechen?”34 That turns out to be a very good question. 
 Perhaps only a German born in 1930 could have written about 
Hegelian “Freedom” with such righteous indignation.35 In any case, it is in 
this context that Tugendhat introduces the useful phrase Umkehrung36 and 
mentions the interesting idea, an idea that will be amplified in the next 
section, that what Hegel means by Freiheit is really its opposite: 
Notwendigkeit.37 To complete his damning indictment of Hegel’s 
Machtidolotrie,38 he leaves the reader in no doubt that the individual’s 
unquestioning loyalty is owed to “the powers that be;” “für das 
gegenwärtig Bestehende.”39 In fact, Tugendhat presents Hegel’s 
achievement as “die Philosophie der Rechtfertigung des Bestehenden.”40 
This emphasis on the justification of the Present is not without connection 
to what I have called “Chronological Completeness.” But neither is it 
                                                                                                   
wählende Reflexion«, also ohne die Freiheit im subjektiven, wählend 
reflektierended Sinn vollbringt, denn sie sind, wie ich wiederum aus der Rph 
ergänze (§ 148), »für einen Willen bindend«.”  
31 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
32 TUGENDHAT quotes Philosophy of Right §152 on the disappearance of “das 
eigene Gewissen” in “die sittliche Substantialität” (p. 349). 
33 TUGENDHAT, p. 349: “Die Möglichkeit eines selbstverantwortlichen, kritischen 
Verhältnisses zum Gemeinwesen, zum Staat wird von Hegel nicht zugelassen, 
vielmehr hören wir: die bestehenden Gesetze haben eine absolute Autorität; was 
vom Individuum zu tun ist, steht in einem Gemeinwesen fest; das eigene Gewissen 
des Einzelnen hat zu verschwinden, und an die Stelle der Reflexion tritt das 
Vertrauen; das ist es, was Hegel mit der Aufhebung der Moralität meint.” 
34 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
35 TUGENDHAT, p. 349-50: “Damit ist der nicht einmal mehr von Hegel zu 
überbietende Gipfel der Perversion erreicht, einer gewiß nicht mehr nur 
begrifflichen, sondern moralischen Perversion, so daß man Mühe hat, sie nur nach 
ihrer begrifflichen Seite zu betrachten.”  
36 TUGENDHAT, p. 349 (emphasis mine): “Der Sinn dieser Umkehrung der 
Freiheit in das, was normalweise für ihr Gegenteil gehalten wird, ist, wie aus dem 
Zusammenhang sowohl des § 484 wie vor allem des vorhin zitierten § 514 
hervorgeht, der, daß das Individuum sich gerade darin frei fühlen soll, daß es die 
von der Macht des Bestehenden ausgehenden Pflichten erfüllt.”  
37 TUGENDHAT, p. 349: “…die »wirkliche Freiheit« wird als »Notwendigkeit« 
verstanden…”  
38 TUGENDHAT, p. 355. 
39 TUGENDHAT, p. 354; emphasis mine. 
40 TUGENDHAT, p. 351; see the sources cited there. 
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unconnected with what Tugendhat calls “Hegels Grundkonzeption:”41 his 
Wahrheitsbegriff.  
 
Dieser Aspekt folgt aus Hegels Grundkonzeption, der Wahrheit als 
Einheit des Begriffs mit der Realität, nur dann, wenn man die Realität, 
das ›Wirkliche‹ mit dem Gegenwärtigen gleichsetzt.”42  
 
 And thus it happens that “Freedom” is not the only word that is twisted 
round in a masterful Umkehrung.43 Due to the fact that Tugendhat has 
successfully embedded Freedom with Hegel’s Grundkonzeption,44 it is the 
meaning of “Truth” that is transformed as well: there is no correspondence 
between conception and object to be achieved but rather an identity to be 
asserted.45 There can be no doubt that Tugendhat achieves some masterful 
Sprachanalytische Interpretationen46 (the sub-title of his book) and it is his 
                                                
41 TUGENDHAT, p. 354. 
42 TUGENDHAT, p. 354; emphasis in original. 
43 TUGENDHAT, p. 350 (emphasis mine): “…den Sinn des Wortes »Freiheit« 
umgebogen hat.” The formula I used above (“der Umkehrung des Sinns von 
Freiheit”) is found on the same page.  
44 For the record, I cannot accept TUGENDHAT’s claim that the Absolute Identity 
of Subject and Object is GWFH’s Grundkonzeption; it is SCHELLING’s. One 
might, with better right, say that the Subject and Substance Identity deserves this 
place. But the fact of the matter is that the characteristic and defining move in 
GWFH’s thought is not any particular Identity—no matter how gründlich it may 
be—but a new means towards the end of Identity. In other words, it would probably 
be more accurate to say that GWFH’s Grundkonzeption is the Logical 
Completeness of the Dialectic. In the sense that the end is always Logically Prior to 
the means, TUGENDHAT is correct. But this new means was so fertile, so flexible 
and applicable—above all, so brilliantly innovative—that it will always have pride 
of place when GWFH is discussed. While it is therefore true that GWFH’s 
intentions cannot be understood without reference to SCHELLING (but see 
TUGENDHAT, pp. 316-17) and SPINOZA, his Dialectical means to the Monistic 
end will remain his greatest achievement. Unfortunately, it was precisely the 
confusion of Logical and Chronological Priority in the Dialectic that made it so 
powerful. It was only on the basis of this scandalous confusion that Time in general 
and World-History in particular were integrated into GWFH’s oxymoronic 
Chronological Monism.         
45 TUGENDHAT, p. 350: “Natürlich kann sie das nur sein, weil Hegel unter 
»Wahrheit« gar nicht Wahrheit versteht, sondern etwas ganz anderes, nämlich die 
Einheit von Subjekt und Realität, und jetzt können wir sehen, daß das konkret 
bedeutet: das affirmative Verhältnis der Einzelnen zu ihrem Gemeinwesen.” 
46 TUGENDHAT, p. 350-51: “Denn solange wir uns in Hegels Terminologie 
bewegen, wissen wir gar nicht, was es heißen könnte, nach Wahrheit zu fragen: und 
eine Forderung nach Freiheit kann gar nicht mehr aufkommen, erstens weil jede 
Forderung einen Rückfall in die Eitelkeit der Subjektivität darstellen würde, 
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insight that “indem er [sc. Hegel] den Sinn dieser Wörter umkehrt, vertritt 
er nicht nur eine andere Konzeption sondern die genau 
entgegengesetzte…”47 that will guide my steps in the following section. 
 
I.3.2.3. The Necessity of Freedom 
 In his Hegel’s Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, Thought, and 
History—an honest and interesting attempt to absolve Hegel of his 
commitment to Chronological Completeness, as we shall see in Part II—
Daniel Berthold-Bond uses the relationship between Freedom and 
Necessity to show that “dialectic sets up an “equilibrium” of opposite 
determinations, so that every opposing determination has equal value.”48 
His clearly written description of this relationship is worth quoting in full: 
 
An example may help. Hegel views it as a mistake to regard freedom and 
necessity as polar opposites and as equally legitimate but exclusionary 
alternatives. If they were equal in this way—as the Kantian antinomy has 
it, and as the sceptic has it—the only options for viewing human action 
would be the result of completely canceling one term (by arbitrary fiat) 
[70] and thus seeing oneself either as free in Hegel’s sense of negative 
freedom (= nihilism), [n. 71] or doomed to necessity in Hegel’s sense of 
“merely external necessity” (= tychism, fatalism, “the irrational void of 
necessity” [PhS 443]).49  
                                   
It will be seen that Berthold-Bond is sympathetic to Hegel’s refusal to 
consider Freedom and Necessity “as polar opposites and as equally 
legitimate but exclusionary alternatives.” But he is honest enough to admit 
that this refusal is predicated precisely on Hegel’s sense of what an 
“exclusionary” understanding of both Freedom and Necessity would look 
like. And it will be seen—although Berthold-Bond does not call our 
attention to the fact, for which omission he can be justly faulted—that the 
common sense understanding of Freedom gets lost between Hegel’s own 
“exclusionary alternatives:”50 negative freedom as nihilism on the one hand 
                                                                                                   
zweitens weil, da die Unfreiheit als Freiheit bezeichnet wird, die Freiheit ohnehin 
schon in vollendeter Weise in der Unfreiheit realisiert scheint, und es gar nicht 
mehr zu fordern gibt.”  
47 TUGENDHAT, p. 351; emphasis in original. 
48 BERTHOLD-BOND, Daniel, Hegel’s Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, 
Thought, and History, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989 (hereafter 
“BERTHOLD-BOND”). 
49 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 88. 
50 It would be interesting to investigate the possibility that there is what might be 
called a metalogical use of Understanding in GWFH where alternatives to be 
subsequently synthesized in Concept are first distinguished in a highly exaggerated 
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and a more positive conception, with which necessity will be fully 
integrated, on the other. Oblivious to this omission, Berthold-Bond 
continues: 
 
For these are the only senses of freedom and necessity which are left 
when we disallow any “reciprocal dependence” of the one on the other. 
On the other hand, by seeing that the opposition of freedom and necessity 
is not a polar equilibrium of exclusionary terms, but involves the two 
terms negating each other in a positive way—so that (positive) freedom 
negates external necessity (fate), and (rational) necessity negates negative 
freedom (nihilism)—we arrive at the completer notion of freedom which 
is self-limited by the “real, inward necessity” (SL §35 Zusatz) of duty, 
and of necessity which is the autonomous expression of self-
determination.51 
                       
It will be noted that Berthold-Bond requires the bogey of nihilism—
apparently the more Hegelian Willkür was not objectionable enough for his 
apologetic purposes—in order to sustain this sympathetic reading.52 But the 
essential point is that Berthold-Bond is nevertheless honest enough to draw 
the reader’s attention to a text where Tugendhat’s outlandish suggestion 
(“die »wirkliche Freiheit« wird als »Notwendigkeit« verstanden”)53 is 
confirmed by Hegel’s own words. This text is §35 of the Encyclopedia: 
                                                                                                   
way so as to justify their synthesis. In other words, GWFH requires that the notions 
of commonsense (i.e. what most of us mean by Freedom; e.g. “the power to make 
up our own minds within the context of an externally regulated universe of man-
made or natural law”) be much more one-sided than they in fact are. Only by this 
metalogical one-sidedness can the conceptualized products of dialectical logic be 
justified.  
51 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 88. 
52 Therefore n. 71 (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 191-92) is not one of the best moments 
in his book. He can’t find the word “nihilism” in GWFH so he is forced to derive it 
(via a discussion of irony in the Lectures on Aesthetics) from KIERKEGAARD’s 
use of the word in Concept of Irony! But BERTHOLD-BOND recovers somewhat 
with the valid and important claim that it was the French Revolution that led 
GWFH to take such a dim view of “negative freedom” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 
192). Since the French Revolution was the great world-historical event of their 
lifetimes, it may not be too much to say that the central difference between KANT 
and GWFH—more important than all the distinctions familiar to students of 
philosophy—was that the latter kept faith with the Revolution’s ideas while the 
latter lost hope. The enduring faith of the older man is, from my point of view, 
infinitely more beautiful—sublime in KANT’s sense—than the creation of 
GWFH’s truly beautiful justification for abandoning that faith.  
53 TUGENDHAT, p. 349. 
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what Berthold-Bond (the abbreviation stands for “Shorter Logic’) cited as 
“SL §35 Zusatz.”   
 Hegel is discussing the old-style Cosmology54 and, in §35 itself—as 
opposed to the Zusatz—he provides a long list of the “polar opposites 
and…equally legitimate but exclusionary alternatives” (to use Berthold-
Bond’s felicitous expression) that form the standard subject matter of this 
discipline.55 In the Addition, Hegel puts it this way: “But to give them a 
satisfactory answer, it is above all things necessary not to claim finality for 
the abstract formulae of understanding, or to suppose that each of the two 
terms in an antithesis has an independent subsistence or can be treated in its 
isolation as a complete and self-centered truth.”56 It is to illustrate this 
general statement with an example that Hegel reveals what his “Freedom” 
really is. 
 
So wurde z. B. der Unterschied von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit in 
Betrachtung gezogen und wurden diese Bestimmungen in der Art auf die 
Natur und auf den Geist angewendet, daß man jene in ihren Wirkungen 
als der Notwendigkeit unterworfen, diesen aber als frei betrachtete.57  
 
Hegel’s first move is to undermine the distinction between Nature, 
governed by Notwendigkeit, and Spirit, where Freedom reigns. Since the 
Hegelian System depends on the Dialectical Synthesis of Logic, Nature, 
and Spirit, it is obvious that this kind of distinction cannot hold. In other 
words, the traditional locus of Freedom in Spirit—in the human being’s 
freedom of choice—is no longer logically distinct from Nature in Hegel’s 
System. It is on the basis of this collapsed distinction that Hegel will 
collapse the distinction between Freedom and Necessity.58  
                                                
54 E §35: “Der dritte Teil, die Kosmologie, handelte von der Welt, ihrer Zufälligkeit, 
Notwendigkeit, Ewigkeit, Begrenztsein in Raum und Zeit, den formellen Gesetzen 
in ihren Veränderungen, ferner von der Freiheit des Menschen und dem Ursprunge 
des Bösen.” In this context, “old-style” really means (as the Zusatz makes explicit) 
“pre-Critical;” i.e. pre-KANT.   
55 E §35 (emphasis mine): “Als absolute Gegensätze gelten hierbei vornehmlich: 
Zufälligkeit und Notwendigkeit; äußerliche und innerliche Notwendigkeit; 
wirkende und Endursachen, oder die Kausalität überhaupt und Zweck; Wesen oder 
Substanz und Erscheinung; Form und Materie; Freiheit und Notwendigkeit; 
Glückseligkeit und Schmerz; Gutes und Böses.”  
56 Encyclopedia Logic, p. 55; Zusatz to E §35. 
57 Zusatz to E §35. 
58 Indeed the roots of Hegel’s synthesis of Freedom and Necessity are, as Shlomo 
Avineri has pointed out, are to be found in SPINOZA. See AVINERI, Shlomo, 
Hegel Revisited in Alasdair MacIntyre ed., Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, 
New York: Doubleday, 1972. 
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Dieser Unterschied ist nun allerdings wesentlich und im Innersten des 
Geistes selbst begründet; Freiheit jedoch und Notwendigkeit, als einander 
abstrakt gegenüberstehend, gehören nur der Endlichkeit an und gelten nur 
auf ihrem Boden.59 
 
Hegel here uses the word “wesentlich” in the technical sense: the 
distinction between Spirit and Nature, from which, suggests Hegel, the 
distinction between Freedom and Necessity is derived, is grounded in the 
Concept’s Second Moment; the moment of Endlichkeit. In Reflexion—the 
essence, as it were, of Wesen—two actually identical things always appear 
as mirror image opposites of each other, as is now the case with Spirit and 
Nature. Therefore one appears to be the locus of Freedom, the other of 
Necessity. But although the independence of Spirit depends on this 
appearance—this is why Hegel says the difference is “im Innersten des 
Geistes selbst begründet”—it is only independent wesentlich; we must 
beware of thinking that this means what we would call “essentially.” Only 
by first distinguishing itself from Nature can Spirit come to recognize itself 
in the Form of Externality (i.e. Nature) and therefore—mediated by the 
Logical Idea that both Spirit and Nature actually are—achieve 
consciousness of itself as the entire process. It is no accident that Hegel’s 
conception Freedom as Necessity cannot be understood apart from Logic, 
Nature, and Spirit and Sein, Wesen, and Begriff. The Logical Completeness 
that binds these Triads together is, as we shall see, indistinguishable from 
Freedom as Necessity.  
For now, however, Hegel is content to show that Freedom and 
Necessity are only aspects of one Logically Complete whole. 
 
Eine Freiheit, die keine Notwendigkeit in sich hätte, und eine bloße 
Notwendigkeit ohne Freiheit, dies sind abstrakte und somit unwahre 
Bestimmungen. Die Freiheit ist wesentlich konkret, auf ewige Weise in 
sich bestimmt und somit zugleich notwendig.60  
 
It seems to me that Hegel is exploiting the usual sense of “wesentlich” 
here; he is, after all, only using Freedom and Necessity as an example.61 
                                                
59 Zusatz to E §35.  
60 Zusatz to E §35. 
61 In the technical sense, Freedom is only concrete as Concept and therefore 
enriched by being the whole of its moments. It should be kept in mind that in E §35, 
GWFH has not yet introduced the reader to his Logic, and therefore to Wesen. He 
himself, of course, presupposes his own System in every sentence he writes. But—
and this is especially true in the Zusätze—he allows himself a terminological 
flexibility not found elsewhere.
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But even though he is no longer going to discuss Freiheit and 
Notwendigkeit in relation to Nature and Spirit—it was this relation, it must 
be remembered, that required him to invoke the logical moment of 
Wesen—it is important for us that he began as he did. Freedom must not be 
understood merely as political Freedom; this is the basic problem with an 
approach like Alan Patten’s.62 Nor is it enough for Ernst Tugendhat to 
show that the Umkehrung of Freedom into its opposite is grounded only in 
Hegel’s albeit related collapsing of opposites like subject and reality. For 
the present, it is enough to listen to Hegel bring his discussion to its 
conclusion, bearing in mind that Freedom is no more restricted to the 
moving bodies of Nature than it is to the political structures of Objective 
Spirit. 
 
Wenn von Notwendigkeit gesprochen wird, so pflegt man darunter 
zunächst nur Determination von außen zu verstehen, wie z. B. in der 
endlichen Mechanik ein Körper sich nur bewegt, wenn er durch einen 
anderen Körper gestoßen wird, und zwar in der Richtung, welche ihm 
durch diesen Stoß erteilt wird. Dies ist jedoch eine bloß äußerliche 
Notwendigkeit, nicht die wahrhaft innere, denn diese ist die Freiheit.63 
 
In fact, this text fits in particularly well with Tugendhat’s analysis of the 
relationship between Individual and Gemeinschaft. It the State is looked at 
as an other, obedience to its Gesetzen and Einrichten is compelled by “eine 
bloß äußerliche Notwendigkeit.” But as Spirit’s objective reflection of 
itself, the State is not external to the Individual. Hegel has thus given us 
what we needed: a definition that confirms Tugendhat’s suggestion. 
Freedom is “true inner necessity” (“Dies ist jedoch eine bloß äußerliche 
Notwendigkeit, nicht die wahrhaft innere, denn diese ist die Freiheit”). 
It is therefore as “inner necessity” that Freedom must be conceived. 
One aspect of this conception is that Freedom can only be understood as a 
Concept—i.e. as a concrete whole—in which its opposition to Necessity, 
an opposition that is wesentlich in the technical sense, is merely a moment. 
It is therefore precisely a necessary moment: as Concept, every moment of 
Freedom, and everything else, is Necessary. And this is a crucial point. But 
more important to grasp is the fact that Freedom is not merely a Concept. 
The most important words in the Zusatz are easy to miss: as concrete, 
Freedom is “…auf ewige Weise in sich bestimmt und somit zugleich 
notwendig” (emphasis mine). It will be remembered from I.1.1.2 that in the 
                                                
62 PATTEN, Alan, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. Compare GUYER, Paul, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; esp. pp. 408-434. 
63 Zusatz to E §35. 
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sich denkende Idee, the dialectical Bestimmungen it contains are self-
consciously recognized as in sich bestimmt.64 Its progressive unfolding—
even or rather particularly when appearing under the guise of timelessness 
(“auf ewige Weise”) is necessary. The reason that Freedom resembles the 
Absolute Idea is not simply because it too is a Concept and is therefore 
susceptible to the Speculative Method. As Hegel claims in the Wissenschaft 
der Logik, it is the Speculative Method itself that that unfolds with what 
might be called “free necessity.”65 
Nor is it only in Logic that this kind of thing occurs: the most 
important application of “Freedom” is, of course, to be found in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History. Nor does he conceal there from the attentive reader 
that his version of Freedom is—to considerably understate the case—
closely connected with Necessity.66 Lest it be thought that it is my intention 
to conceal in a footnote67 the closest Hegel comes to an explicit denial of 
Chronological Completeness, I will return to the passage in question; it can 
now be explained in full. It reads as follows: 
 
But in the process of the World’s History itself,—as still incomplete,—
the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of 
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of 
the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, 
and is realizing itself through them.68 
 
What makes the process of World-History incomplete is not that it has 
not already achieved its “abstract final aim” but that all of those 
                                                
64 Zusatz to E §237 (Wallace, p. 293): “Es kann hiernach auch gesagt werden, die 
absolute Idee sei das Allgemeine, aber das Allgemeine nicht bloß als abstrakte 
Form, welchem der besondere Inhalt als ein Anderes gegenübersteht, sondern als 
die absolute Form, in welche alle Bestimmungen, die ganze Fülle des durch 
dieselbe gesetzten Inhalts zurückgegangen ist.”  
65 WdL, p. 29: “No subject matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with 
a strict immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development; no other 
brings with it this demand in such a degree; in this respect the Science of Logic 
must surpass even mathematics, for no subject matter has in its own self this 
freedom and independence.”  
66 Even on the crudest level this is visible: of the 41 times that GWFH uses cognates 
of “necessity” (including e.g. “the necessities of life”) in his Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History, the word “freedom” is found either in the same sentence (or 
conjoined with it in an adjacent one; this happens twice) 14 times: about a third of 
the cases. 
67 See n. 13 above. 
68 All of the remaining block quotations in this section are continuously quoted with 
no deletions from Philosophy of History, p. 25-7. They will not therefore be cited 
singulatim.  
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participating in that process—as distinct from Hegel himself—have “not 
yet made” this τελος ”the distinct object of [their] desire and interest.” 
Guided by their own “limited sentiments”—it is noteworthy that Hegel’s 
grammar does not bestow upon “them” any independent agency—they are 
unconscious of the purposive process that “is realizing itself through them.” 
When considered in context, this passage reveals that this “not yet” of their 
unconsciousness is merely the last remains of a merely formal and 
therefore purely illusory Freedom; of a Freedom that has not yet become 
one with Necessity. The passage continues:      
 
The question also assumes the form of the union of Freedom and 
Necessity; the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as Necessity, 
while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their 
interest, belongs to the domain of Freedom.  
 
Hegel explains that Necessity is the domain of the purpose that is 
realizing itself through those who are its unconscious instruments. At this 
stage—where Freedom and Necessity are still distinct—the mass of 
mankind conceives of itself as freely following its own subjective purposes. 
As long, therefore, as Freedom and Necessity are separate, there still exists 
a chronological “not yet” in which “the abstract final aim of history is not 
yet made the distinct object of desire and interest.” But Hegel not only 
exempts himself from this unconsciousness: he also knows that Freedom 
and Necessity in general are in fact not distinct at all. Nor does he omit to 
tell us how he knows this: 
 
As the metaphysical connection (i.e. the connection in the Idea) of these 
forms of thought, belongs to Logic, it would be out of place to analyze it 
here. The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned. 
 
“In the Idea,” there exists between forms of thought a “metaphysical 
connection” revealed in the Logic. Hegel is prepared to summarize the 
“chief and cardinal points” whereby the distinction between Freedom and 
Necessity, a distinction on which the proposition that World-History is 
“still incomplete” depends, is illusory. With this introduction, Hegel 
prepares the reader for perhaps the richest and most revealing paragraph in 
the famous Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. In 
this paragraph, we will watch the sole basis of Chronological 
Incompleteness, the precarious “not yet” of a merely formal and 
unconscious sense of Freedom, extinguish itself in the Logical 
Completeness of Freedom and Necessity. 
 Hegel begins by calling attention to the Second Moment of the 
Dialectic: although Spirit and e.g. the Logical Idea—or “God,” as Hegel 
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prefers to call it in the passage—are one and the same, the moment of 
Reflection makes them appear, to the subjective Mind, at least, to be 
separate.   
Philosophy shows that the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis; that, viz. 
between the Idea in its free, universal form—in which it exists for itself—
and the contrasted form of abstract introversion, reflection on itself, 
which is formal existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom, such as 
belongs to Spirit only.  
 
In other words, Subject as “formal existence-for-self, personality, 
formal freedom,” has not yet become self-conscious of itself as Substance 
as well where “the Idea in its free, universal form…exists for itself.” This 
“infinite antithesis” is the condition for the possibility of what most of us 
falsely call “freedom.”  
 
The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the 
one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. 
This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness—the 
polar opposite of the Idea in its general form, and therefore existing in 
absolute Limitation.  
 
As the “substantial totality of things,” Substance in fact contains the 
Subject as well. But at the stage of Reflection, this “universal idea” is 
perceived by the finite mind only as “individual self-consciousness” on the 
one hand and its mirror-like opposite, i.e. “the Idea in its general form,” on 
the other. Because “individual self-consciousness”—the locus of “the 
abstract essence of free volition”—distinguishes itself from the Idea in 
general (i.e. God), it is by definition limited.69 
 
This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization, for the 
universal absolute being; it is the side of its definite existence; the sphere 
of its formal reality, the sphere of the reverence paid to God. 
 
In truth, of course, this opposition is illusory. The only “truth” of this 
moment of particularization and limitation is that it is a necessary moment 
in the process by which “the universal absolute being” can return to and 
therefore know itself. In the “not yet” of merely formal Freedom, God is 
still revered by the vulgar as something external. As Hegel knows, this 
                                                
69 An able explication of GWFH’s claim that God is limited by not being e.g. 
GWFH is WALLACE, Robert M. Hegel’s Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and 
God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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external reverence is predicated on the temporary self-limitation of Spirit.70 
But this polar opposition is extinguished in the Logical Completeness of 
the Concept. 
 
To comprehend the absolute connection of this antithesis, is the profound 
task of metaphysics. This Limitation originates all forms of particularity 
of whatever kind.  
                               
As the profound metaphysician that he is—and, in any case, in strict 
accordance with Spinoza’s omnis determinatio est negatio—Hegel knows 
that all particularity, predicated on the limitation of the Second Moment’s 
“infinite antithesis,” is subject to Aufhebung in “the absolute connection of 
this antithesis.” But before he announces the conceptualization of 
opposition, whether made possible by his metaphysical Logic or his logical 
Metaphysics, he reminds us that his purpose here is merely to account for 
the fact that most of mankind have not yet become conscious of their true 
end. 
 
The formal volition [of which we have spoken] wills itself; desires to 
make its own personality valid in all that it purposes and does: even the 
pious individual wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the antithesis, 
existing for itself, is—in contrast with the Absolute Universal Being—a 
special separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality only, and 
willing that alone.  
 
In short, ignorance of the End is identical with merely formal Freedom. 
But even while that End, as “the Absolute Universal Being,” is actually 
realizing itself, its unconscious and self-limited agents cling to the illusion 
that they are “a special separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality 
only, and willing that alone.” It is only in this illusory world that the 
Freedom that is not yet Necessity preserves its existence.  
 
                                                
70 The italicized “temporarily” is intended to remind the reader of GWFH’s failure 
to distinguish between Logical and Chronological Priority. When applied to World-
History, it can only be temporarily. But in Logic, it cannot be. The problem arises 
because this passage as a whole depends on the isomorphism between a Logical 
development—the necessary reconciliation between the Idea’s necessity and 
subjective Spirit’s merely formal Freedom (see Philosophy of History, p. 27; the 
passage in question is discussed below)—and a Chronological one. This explains 
why he must write of the latter at Philosophy of History, p. 19 (emphases mine): 
“the History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of 
Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature.”    
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In short it plays its part in the region of mere phenomena. This is the 
sphere of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert 
themselves on behalf of their individuality—give it full play and objective 
realization. This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite. He is 
happy who finds his condition suited to his special character, will, and 
fancy, and so enjoys himself in that condition.  
 
By defining “happiness” as nothing more than finding a “condition suited 
to his special character,” the individual, at least in times of peace and 
prosperity, eliminates the antithesis on a purely subjective level. But that 
path to overcoming antithesis is merely phenomenal, as World-History 
clearly shows. 
 
The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of 
happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony,—periods 
when the antithesis is in abeyance.  
 
Logical Completeness requires the antithesis of the Second Moment; 
negativity’s opposition is the lifeblood of the Dialectic. According to 
Hegel, it is fortunate, or rather necessary, that moments of Peace are rare. If 
they were not, the merely formal Freedom of the individual’s will, guided 
by nothing more than its limited desire for conditions in which to enjoy 
harmony by the grace of God, would never give way to “the absolute Idea.”   
 
Reflection on self,—the Freedom above described—is abstractly defined 
as the formal element of the activity of the absolute Idea.  
 
Hegel’s only use for the subjective volition of the individual’s merely 
formal freedom, the condition for the possibility of the chronological “not 
yet” of History’s End, is that it is the Middle Term of the Syllogism by 
which the Absolute Idea is self-realized. Deluded by the belief that they are 
freely pursuing their own individual ends, the unconscious individuals are 
in reality the instruments by which a Necessary End is accomplished. 
 
The realizing activity of which we have spoken is the middle term of the 
Syllogism, one of whose extremes is the Universal essence, the Idea, 
which reposes in the penetralia of Spirit; and the other, the complex of 
external things, objective matter. That activity is the medium by which 
the universal latent principle is translated into the domain of objectivity. 
 
World-History is “the complex of external things, objective matter” in 
which “the Universal essence, the Idea” is being realized. It is being 
realized thanks to that Idea’s reflection into subjectivity: this makes 
possible the purposive activity of unconscious individuals. But reflection is 
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not reality. As the synthesis of the Idea’s Necessity (the major premise) and 
subjectivity’s formal Freedom (the minor), World History as a whole is the 
Syllogism in which Freedom becomes Necessity. And that “becomes” is 
only for the unconscious ones: those whose merely abstract and formal 
Freedom remains compatible with a “not yet.” For Hegel, as for World-
History itself, true Freedom is and always already was Necessity.  
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Chapter 7 (I.3.3) 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History 
 
 In this chapter, the broad outlines of Hegel’s Philosophy of History 
will be considered in the context of two specialized problems that 
determine those outlines. In I.3.3.1, I will consider Hegel’s decision to 
divide his account of World-History into four parts as opposed to the more 
typically Hegelian Triad. This will involve taking a last look at the 
relationship between Logical and Chronological Priority. In I.3.3.2, an 
architectonic feature of his Philosophy of History that is frequently 
overlooked, the triadic cycle of governments ending with Monarchy, will 
receive consideration. This topic will provide additional support to what I 
have called “an immanentist reading” of Hegel’s Philosophy of History.  
 
I.3.3.1. The Four-fold Division of Hegel’s Philosophy of History 
It has been shown that when Hegel claims “the History of the world is 
none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress 
whose development according to the necessity of its nature,” his words are 
carefully chosen. The progress of freedom is itself a necessity and that it is 
not even in terms of freedom that this apparent progress occurs: it is “the 
consciousness of Freedom.”  
 
In the process before us, the essential nature of freedom—which involves 
in it absolute necessity—is to be displayed as coming to a consciousness 
of itself (for it is in its very nature, self-consciousness) and thereby 
realising its existence.1 
 
In other words, Freedom—once purged of “an infinity of 
misunderstandings, confusions, and errors”2—is revealed to be the 
necessary process by which self-consciousness comes to be conscious of 
itself. It has been easy to show that the word “Freedom” does not mean 
what the French Revolutionaries meant by it.3 But it is not enough to point 
out that Freiheit has suffered an Umkehrung in which it has come to mean 
its opposite. It has, in fact, disappeared altogether. It is simply a 
                                                
1 Philosophy of History, p. 19. 
2 Philosophy of History, p. 19: “But that this term “Freedom,” without further 
qualification, is an indefinite, and incalculable ambiguous term; and that while that 
which it represents is the ne plus ultra of attainment, it is liable to an infinity of 
misunderstandings, confusions and errors, and to become the occasion for all 
imaginable excesses,—has never been more clearly known and felt than in modern 
times.”  
3 See RITTER, Joachim, Hegel and the French Revolution. Translated by Richard 
Dien Winfield. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982. 
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Dialectical Development masquerading in political-ethical garb: it is 
merely the Logical Completeness of the Concept. 
Since the Concept only becomes the sich denkende Idee at the very end 
of an apparently timeless and thoroughly circular process,4 Hegel’s only 
remaining problem is to apply the Logical self-determination of the 
Concept, i.e. “the necessary process by which self-consciousness comes to 
be conscious of itself,” to the Chronological process of World-History. This 
he can only do only by temporarily making us believe that “Freedom” 
actually means something that it doesn’t. Successive grades of self-
consciousness must now be Chronologically distinguished, as he insisted 
that the Logical moments of the Concept never were or could be, and this is 
why he needs the arithmetical imagery of the Freedom of One, Few, and 
All and the division of World History into four Ages or Worlds.5 These 
gradations are needed in order to convert a Logical Process into a 
Chronological one. Nor does he completely conceal the fact that this is 
precisely what he is doing when he takes the time to justify the existence of 
these divisions.  
 
Universal history—as already demonstrated—shows the development of 
the consciousness of Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent 
realization of that Freedom. This development implies a gradation—a 
series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, 
which result from its Idea.6  
 
Having made this point, Hegel is completely honest about the fact that his 
readers have already encountered something similar before. The necessary 
self-unfolding of an Idea until it reaches its actualization in self-
consciousness is also the proper domain of Logic.  
 
The logical, and—as still more prominent—the dialectical nature of the 
Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined—that it assumes successive 
forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process of 
transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer 
and more concrete shape;—this necessity of its nature, and the necessary 
                                                
4 See ABOULAFIA, Mitchell. The Self-Winding Circle: A Study of Hegel’s System. 
St. Louis: Warren Green, 1982. 
5 Philosophy of History, p. 19: “The general statement given above, of the various 
grades in the consciousness of Freedom—and which we applied in the first instance 
to the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and Roman 
world only that some are free; whilst we know that all men absolutely (man as man) 
are free,—supplies us with the natural division of Universal History, and suggests 
the mode of its discussion.”  
6 Philosophy of History, p. 63. 
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series of pure abstract forms which the Idea successively assumes—is 
exhibited in the department of Logic. Here we need adopt only one of its 
results, viz. that every step in the process, as differing from any other, has 
its determinate peculiar principle. In history this principle is idiosyncrasy 
of Spirit—peculiar National Genius.7 
 
A certain amount of dishonesty enters when Hegel claims that in the 
Philosophy of History he is adopting only one of Logic’s results; in fact, he 
is going well beyond that. He is in fact imposing the “the dialectical nature 
of the Idea in general” on a Chronological process. By virtue of the fact 
that the Logical Idea “assumes successive forms which it successively 
transcends,” it looks enough like the Idea of Progress to fulfill Hegel’s 
pedagogical or political needs despite the fact that it involves the deliberate 
and scandalous confusion of Logical and Chronological Priority. There are, 
of course, compensations. The fact that this Logical process is “self-
determined” makes it look enough like Freedom to satisfy the hopes of 
Hegel’s readers, especially those who forget that the philosopher is in 
deadly earnest when he says that the result constitutes a “progress whose 
development” is “according to the necessity of its nature.” 
But there is another aspect of this imposture. It is certainly ironic that 
the one result Hegel admits he is taking from Logic, i.e. the notion that 
“every step in the process, as differing from any other, has its determinate 
peculiar principle,” is closely related to the most important difference 
between his Logic and Philosophy of History. This brings us to the subject 
at hand: given Hegel’s evident affection for Triads, why does he divide 
World-History into four phases and not three?8  
Others have explained this division solely in terms of Hegel’s 
Nationalism. It is certainly true that his approach is predicated on the great 
importance of Volksgeist in his thinking. My goal, however, is to show how 
this four-fold division is related to the Logical and Chronological Parallel. 
A four-fold division, already visible in Hegel’s Anthropology (I.1.2.1), is 
well adapted to solving the central problem that arises when applying a 
timeless Logical structure to a Chronological process.  
This problem relates specifically to the Second Moment of the Triad. 
In Logical terms, the antithetical mirror images of Reflection are 
simultaneous. But logical simultaneity does not translate well into a 
chronological process. Naturally Hegel does not explain his translation 
                                                
7 Philosophy of History, p. 63. 
8 This is particularly remarkable because the threefold division into Ancient, 
Medieval, and Modern History was ready at hand. But such a partition gives pride 
of place to Time; GWFH has no intention of allowing this. 
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technique: blurring the distinction between Logical and Chronological 
succession is crucial for constructing Hegel’s elaborate cathedral of 
thought. But a valuable clue to the structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History can nevertheless be found in the Science of Logic. Hegel is 
explaining why it is difficult to understand the Second Moment: 
 
But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory 
content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space 
and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition 
and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without 
reciprocal contact.9 
 
Although Hegel is describing the difficulties formal thinking 
encounters when it confronts the Concept, his words can also be applied to 
what happens when a “temporal succession” like World-History is 
conceptualized. In the case of World-History, it is not the fault of “ordinary 
conception” that the content “sinks…into…time:” it is the Idea itself that 
has done so. The “contradictory content” of the Second Moment, appearing 
in the Form of Externality (i.e. in Time) can only “come before 
consciousness” as “held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession.” 
Although Hegel is describing the difficulties that arise for formal thinking 
when considering a Logical process, the same structural difficulty arises for 
conceptual thinking when contemplating a Chronological process. As long 
as Hegel can treat the Greek and Roman Worlds as one from a Logical 
perspective, i.e. as together constituting the Second Moment, he can “save 
the phenomena,” in this case, the given material of World-History, by 
acknowledging that these two Worlds are distinct in space and time, as 
indeed they are, and thus that there are four grades of the Spirit’s 
development instead of the anticipated three. 
In fact, Hegel lays the foundations for this approach only a few pages 
after the passage cited above in the Science of Logic. He is trying to show 
that the triadic structure of the Concept is not its essential feature. Having 
given a canonical definition of the Third Moment (“as self-sublating 
contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy, of 
simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, 
is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal”), he adds: 
 
If one insists on counting, this second immediate is, in the course of the 
method as a whole, the third term to the first immediate and the 
mediated.10  
                                                
9 WdL, §1798. 
10 WdL, §1801. 
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This is simply another way of stating what we have heard before: the 
Third Moment, as “the negative of the negative,” is the “second 
immediate” simply because the First Moment was the first. The Second 
Moment, on the other hand, was mediated by the First. Thus the Third is a 
return to the immediacy of the First. But there are, says Hegel, other ways 
of counting: 
 
It is also, however, the third term to the first or formal negative and to 
absolute negativity or the second negative;11 
 
Hegel intends to show that the Third Moment is also the Fourth. The 
“first or formal negative” is the negative other to the First Moment. 
Considered as such, it is only the first half of the Second Moment. The 
second half of that Second Moment emerges in the infinite antithesis of the 
dialectic itself: “the absolute negativity” of Reflection engenders a mirror 
image of the merely first and formal negative and that “second negative” is 
also logically distinct from the First Moment. Once the moment of 
antithesis (or “absolute negativity”) arises, both parts of that dialectic are 
mediated by each other. In other words, the dialectical opposite of the first 
negative is no longer the immediate First Moment, in response to which it 
arose in the first place, but a new and mediated second negative that can 
only be the other of that first negative. The sentence continues:      
 
…now as the first negative is already the second term, the term reckoned 
as third can also be reckoned as fourth, and instead of a triplicity, the 
abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity; in this way, the negative or 
the difference is counted as a duality.12 
 
In other words, when the Second Moment is conceived of as 
containing a duality, there are actually four moments in the process and not 
three. Although Hegel does not link this way of counting to the “formal 
thinking” that “makes identity its law,” it does introduce a distinction 
where before there was infinite contradiction. It also suggests how a 
conceptualized Chronological process could easily be presented as a 
quadruplicity. 
Unfortunately, Hegel does not choose to explain these matters to us 
with any clarity when discussing the four-part structure of World-History. 
He is only willing to state the matter with apodictic certainty: 
 
                                                
11 WdL, §1801. 
12 WdL, §1801. 
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Since it is, as spirit, only the movement of its activity in order to know 
itself absolutely, to free its consciousness from mere direct naturalness, 
and to come to itself, as they appear in the process of liberation, are 
four.13    
 
Why Spirit’s movement “to free its consciousness from mere direct 
naturalness” necessarily involve precisely four different “principles of the 
different forms of its self-consciousness” Hegel does not tell us. But he 
offers a clue. This occurs when he explains why the Nation is the means 
through which this process is accomplished.   
 
§347. To the nation, whose natural principle is one of these stages, is 
assigned the accomplishment of it through the process characteristic of 
the self-developing self-consciousness of the world-spirit. In the history 
of the world this nation is for a given epoch dominant, although it can 
make an epoch but once (§346).14  
 
It would seem that Hegel’s motive in saying this is simply to justify the 
actions of the particular World-Historical Nation while it holds center 
stage.15 But two words catch our attention: it is its “natural principle” that 
explains why each of the four Nations constitutes the stages “of the self-
developing self-consciousness of the world-spirit.” The importance of these 
words is apparent in the text Hegel cites here (§346).   
 
Since history is the embodiment of spirit in the form of events, that is, of 
direct natural reality, the stages of development are present as direct 
natural principles. Because they are natural, they conform to the nature of 
a multiplicity, and exist one outside the other.16  
 
While it is only the sentence that comes next that applies to §347,17 it is this 
passage that sheds some light on our present problem. Hegel has made it 
clear that Nations are “direct natural principles.” His justification for the 
claim that History consists of “stages of development” is that it constitutes 
“the embodiment of spirit” in “direct natural reality.” It seems likely that 
                                                
13 Philosophy of Right, p. 219; §352. 
14 Philosophy of Right, p. 217-8; §347. 
15 In contrast with the absolute right of this nation to be the bearer of the current 
phase in the development of the world-spirit, the spirits of other existing nations are 
void of right,  
and they, like those whose epochs are gone, count no longer in the history of the 
world.  
16 Philosophy of Right, p. 217; §346. 
17 Philosophy of Right, p. 217: “Hence, to each nation is to be ascribed a single 
principle, comprised under its geographical and anthropological existence.” 
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this natural setting for a spiritual process is analogous to the Chronological 
and Logical Parallel. It is only in Nature that the Idea appears in Time. 
Because the chronological element in World-History is inescapable, Hegel 
uses the “natural principle” of the Nation to mediate18 between timeless 
Spirit and Nature’s externalized multiplicity dispersed discretely in Time 
and Space.19 On this account, it is because a spiritual process is being 
embodied in a natural reality that causes the logically simultaneous 
dialectic of the Second Moment to “exist one outside the other” in 
chronological succession. To put it another way: it is in accordance with 
Nature that each of the “natural principles” of the four Nations sees itself as 
distinct.20 But from a higher Spiritual perspective, neither Nature nor 
History, existing necessarily in Time, can confer particularity and 
discreteness to the Nations.  
 
Der denkende Geist der Weltgeschichte aber, indem er zugleich jene 
Beschränktheiten der besonderen Volksgeister und seine eigene 
Weltlichkeit abstreift, erfaßt seine konkrete Allgemeinheit und erhebt sich 
zum Wissen des absoluten Geistes, als der ewig wirklichen Wahrheit, in 
welcher die wissende Vernunft frei für sich ist und die Notwendigkeit, 
Natur und Geschichte nur seiner Offenbarung dienend und Gefäße seiner 
Ehre sind.21 
 
Only as embodied in a Chronological process do the Beschränktheiten der 
besonderen Volksgeister have any existence: only in Nature, as the domain 
of Time, and History is there the necessity of quadruplicity. But Nature and 
History merely minister to Spirit’s Revelation: they are only handmaidens. 
A conceptualized World-History, or rather the denkende Geist der 
Weltgeschichte that actively conceptualizes it, abstracts from the spatio-
                                                
18 As in E §548: “Der bestimmte Volksgeist, da er wirklich und seine Freiheit als 
Natur ist, hat nach dieser Naturseite das Moment geographischer und klimatischer 
Bestimmtheit; er ist in der Zeit und hat dem Inhalte nach wesentlich ein besonderes 
Prinzip und eine dadurch bestimmte Entwicklung seines Bewußtseins und seiner 
Wirklichkeit zu durchlaufen;—er hat eine Geschichte innerhalb seiner. 
19 See E §552: “Der Volksgeist enthält Naturnotwendigkeit und steht in 
äußerlichem Dasein (§483); die in sich unendliche sittliche Substanz ist für sich 
eine besondere und beschränkte (§549 u. 550) und ihre subjektive Seite mit 
Zufälligkeit behaftet, bewußtlose Sitte, und Bewußtsein ihres Inhaltes als eines 
zeitlich Vorhandenen und im Verhältnisse gegen eine äußerliche Natur und Welt.”   
20 E §552: “Aber es ist der in der Sittlichkeit denkende Geist, welcher die 
Endlichkeit, die er als Volksgeist in seinem Staate und dessen zeitlichen Interessen, 
dem Systeme der Gesetze und der Sitten hat, in sich aufhebt und sich zum Wissen 
seiner in seiner Wesentlichkeit erhebt, ein Wissen, das jedoch selbst die immanente 
Beschränktheit des Volksgeistes hat.”    
21 E §552. This passage immediately follows the one quoted in the previous note. 
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temporal limitations of Weltlichkeit and thereby achieves Wissen des 
absoluten Geistes. And it is only here that the real Revelation occurs. The 
real Offenbarung is not temporal, as History and Nature necessarily are, but 
manifests itself in accordance with the Logical Completeness of Vernunft: 
it is the ewig wirkliche Wahrheit. And as such it is a Triad. In this way, the 
universally recognized distinction between Greeks and Romans gains its 
logical justification. 
       
I.3.3.2. Putting Monarchy Last: Substance as Subject 
 
The East knew and to the present day knows only that One is Free; the 
Greek and Roman world that some are free; the German World knows 
that All are free. The first political form therefore which we observe in 
History, is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third 
Monarchy.22 
 
In addition to showing how Hegel collapses, not once but twice,23 the 
Greek and Roman Worlds into one, this passage emphasizes an aspect of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History that his apologists prefer to ignore.24 But 
unlike the decision to divide his account of World-History into four 
Nations, Hegel expends some considerable effort—especially in the 
Philosophy of Right—to justifying the placement of Monarchy at the end of 
the historical process. Although his critics have always enjoyed 
emphasizing Hegel’s monarchist sympathies,25 they seldom bother to 
explain its philosophical basis. I would like to offer such an explanation 
here, an explanation that will connect the End of History, Hegel’s 
                                                
22 Philosophy of History, p. 104. 
23 For GWFH’s emphasis on Rome as Aristocracy, see Philosophy of Right, p. 221; 
§357. “THE ROMAN EMPIRE:—In this empire the distinctions of spirit are 
carried to the length of an infinite rupture of the ethical life into two extremes, 
personal private self-consciousness, and abstract universality [Notice that the this 
description contains within itself the Greek moment of democracy and individuality 
but locked in conflict with its opposite]. The antagonism, arising between the 
substantive intuition of an aristocracy and the principle of free personality in 
democratic form, developed on the side of the aristocracy into superstition and the 
retention of cold self-seeking power [this analysis is another example of GWFH’s 
Caesarian sympathies], and on the side of the democracy into the corrupt mass.” 
24 See, for example, Alan PATTEN. 
25 Leading the way was an ardent German nationalist: see HAYM, Rudolf, Hegel 
und seine Zeit, Berlin: Rudolf Gärtner, 1857. See also TUNICK, Mark. Hegel’s 
Justification of Hereditary Monarchy, History of Political Thought, v. 12, p. 481-
496, 1991. 
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encounter with Napoleon, his criticism of Spinoza, and an immanentist 
reading of his Philosophy of History.  
Hegel’s defense of Monarchy as the ultimate regime is found in §279 
of the Philosophy of Right. 
 
But in the next place subjectivity exists in its truth only as a subject, and 
personality as a person…Hence, the element which implies absolute 
decision is not individuality in general but one individual, the monarch.26  
 
Clearly it is on the importance of “subjectivity” and “personality” that this 
defense depends. But §279’s contribution is to translate these generalities 
into one particular person and one distinct subject.27 And this translation is 
directly related to the Hegelian conception of Freedom: only in the 
individual person of the monarch can the Spirit reach full self-
consciousness. 
 
This real freedom of the idea, since it gives its own present self-conscious 
reality to every one of the elements of rationality, imparts to the function 
of consciousness the final self-determining certitude, which in the 
conception of the will is the copestone. But this final self-determination 
can fall within the sphere of human liberty only in so far as it is assigned 
to an independent and separate pinnacle, exalted above all that is 
particular and conditional.28 
 
It is nevertheless the claims of “personality” and “subjectivity” in general 
that are fulfilled in Hegel’s monarch: the King himself need not be an 
extraordinary individual. This is indeed the aspect of Hegel’s monarch 
upon which his defenders must rely: the King need only dot the proverbial 
‘i.’29 It would appear that there is only room for one extraordinary person in 
                                                
26 Philosophy of Right, p. 181; §279. The deleted sentence refers to the role of the 
other forms of government in a constitutional monarchy. “In the constitution, which 
has matured into rational reality, each of the three elements of the conception has its 
own independent, real, and separate embodiment.”   
27 Zusatz to §279; Philosophy of Right, p. 181-2: “Personality, further, or 
subjectivity generally, as infinite and self-referring, has truth only as a person or 
independent subject.”  
28 Zusatz to §279; Philosophy of Right, p. 184. 
29 Addition to §280; Philosophy of Right, p. 288-9: “It is often maintained that the 
position of monarch gives to the affairs of state a haphazard character. It is said that 
the monarch may be ill-educated, and unworthy to stand at the helm of state, and 
that it is absurd for such a condition of things to exist under the name of reason. It 
must be replied that the assumption on which these objections proceed is of no 
value, since there is here no reference to particularity of character. In a completed 
organization we have to do with nothing but the extreme of formal decision, and 
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Hegel’s System and that is Hegel himself. In fact, his defense of monarchy 
should be examined not in a political context but in relation to Absolute 
Knowledge. 
 Hegel is willing to admit that his argument that “the constitution which 
has matured into rational reality” must have a hereditary monarch at its 
head, lest it lack “subjectivity” and “personality,” is notably difficult to 
accept.30 But he can count on the Christian values31 of his listeners when he 
arraigns the Jewish32 Spinoza’s Substance for lacking what Hegel’s 
monarchy unquestionably has: 
 
But because for Spinoza, on the other hand, there exists only absolute 
universal substance as the non-particularized, the truly real—all that is 
particular and individual, my subjectivity and spirituality, has, on the 
other hand, as a limited modification whose Notion depends on another, 
no absolute existence.33 
 
Nor is it merely “my subjectivity” that deus sive natura lacks: Hegel 
emphasizes that it is “personality” as well.34 When Hegel speaks in general 
                                                                                                   
that for this office is needed only a man who says “Yes,” and so puts the dot upon 
the “i.” The pinnacle of state must be such that the private character of its occupant 
shall be of no significance.”  
30 Zusatz to §279; Philosophy of Right, p. 182: “The conception of monarch offers 
great difficulty to abstract reasonings and to the reflective methods of the 
understanding.”  
31 LHP, p. 288 (Volume 3): “His [sc. SPINOZA’s] philosophy has only a rigid and 
unyielding substance, and not yet spirit; in it we are not at home with ourselves. But 
the reason that God is not spirit is that He is not the Three in One.”  
32 LHP, p. 252 (Volume 3):  “The dualism of the Cartesian system Spinoza, as a 
Jew, altogether set aside. For the profound unity of his philosophy as it found 
expression in Europe, his manifestation of Spirit as the identity of the finite and 
infinite in God, instead of God’s appearing related to these as a Third—all this is an 
echo from Eastern lands.” It is easy to see why GWFH insists that Substance must 
be grasped as Subject as well; it is only this—“the Third” as “Christ”—that 
separates him from “the East.” Cf. LHP, p. 258 (Volume 3): “The difference 
between our standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this, that through 
the agency of Christianity concrete individuality is in the modern world present 
throughout in spirit.” See also LHP, p. 260-1 (Volume 3), especially on “warped 
and stunted.” On GWFH and the Jews, see YOVEL, Yirmiyahu, Dark Riddle: 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews, University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1998.  
33 LHP, p. 287 (Volume 3). 
34 LHP, p. 287 (Volume 3): “Because negation was thus conceived by Spinoza in 
one-sided fashion merely, there is, in the third place, in his system, an utter blotting 
out of the principle of subjectivity, individuality, personality, the moment of self-
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terms about Spinoza, it is easy to see the clear parallel between his 
criticisms on the one hand and his defense of the monarchical principle on 
the other: 
 
True individuality and subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the 
universal, not merely something clearly determinate; for, as clearly 
determinate, it is at the same time Being-for-itself, determined by itself 
alone. The individual, the subjective, is even in being so the return to the 
universal; and in that it is at home with itself, it is itself the universal. The 
return consists simply and solely in the fact of the particular being in itself 
the universal; to this return Spinoza did not attain.35  
                     
In fact, the close parallel becomes very obvious when the reader is asked to 
determine whether the following sentence comes from the Spinoza section 
of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy or from the Philosophy of 
Right: “Personality expresses the conception as such, while person contains 
also the actuality of the conception. Hence the conception becomes the idea 
or truth, only when it receives this additional character.”36 
 Despite Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza, it is obvious that his own thought 
is a modification of Spinoza rather than a repudiation of it. In fact, his 
modifications are very simple and can be reckoned as three: (1) he 
dispenses with the geometrical method, already detached from Spinozism 
by Jacobi,37 (2) he adds the element of “personality” by insisting that the 
                                                                                                   
consciousness in Being. Thought has only the signification of the universal, not of 
self-consciousness.”  
35 LHP, p. 261 (Volume 3). 
36 Philosophy of Right, p. 181; §279. 
37 For the influence of JACOBI’s Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to 
Herr Moses Mendelssohn on the young GWFH, see PINKARD, Terry, Hegel: A 
Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 30-3. More revealing 
is RÜHLE, Volker, Jacobi und Hegel; Zum Darstellungs- und Mitteilungsproblem 
einer Philosophie des Absoluten, Hegel-Studien v. 24, p. 159-182, 1989. For the 
detachment of the geometrical method from SPINOZA, see JACOBI, Friedrich 
Heinrich, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, translated 
by DI GIOVANNI, George, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1994. For GWFH on SPINOZA’s geometrical method, see the following 
from LHP, p. 263-4 (Volume 3): “The whole of Spinoza’s philosophy is contained 
in these definitions, which, however, taken as a whole are formal; it is really a weak 
point in Spinoza that he begins thus with definitions. In mathematics this method is 
permitted, because at the outset we there make assumptions, such as that of the 
point and line; but in Philosophy the content should be known as the absolutely 
true. It is all very well to grant the correctness of the name-definition, and 
acknowledge that the word “substance” corresponds with the conception which the 
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True must be expressed “not only as Substance, but equally as Subject”38 
and (3) he substitutes a “Three in One” element for Spinoza’s resolved 
dualism of thought and extension, deus sive natura.39 Nor does Hegel 
conceal the fact that Spinozism is a moment in, and the inevitable origin of, 
his own thought.40 
 Hegel’s first presentation of his Philosophy of History, his first 
presentation of his History of Philosophy as well, is found in a single 
                                                                                                   
definition indicates, but it is quite another question to determine whether this 
content is absolutely true. Such a question is not asked in the case of geometrical 
propositions, but in philosophic investigation it is the very thing to be first 
considered, and this Spinoza has not done.” 
38 PhG, p. 10. GWFH’s Spinozism is clearly proved by this passage’s context. “Es 
kömmt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich durch die Darstellung des Systems selbst 
rechtfertigen muß, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern 
ebensosehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken. Zugleich ist zu bemerken, 
daß die Substantialität [as conceived by SPINOZA] sosehr das Allgemeine oder die 
Unmittelbarkeit des Wissens [Substance as “Thought”] als diejenige, welche Sein 
oder Unmittelbarkeit für das Wissen ist [Substance as “Extension”], in sich 
schließt.—Wenn, Gott als die eine Substanz zu fassen [according to Spinoza], das 
Zeitalter empörte [the traditional charge that Spinozism was Atheism], worin diese 
Bestimmung ausgesprochen wurde, so lag teils der Grund hievon [GWFH 
introduces his objection to SPINOZA] in dem Instinkte, daß darin das 
Selbstbewußtsein nur untergegangen, nicht erhalten ist, [i.e. Spinoza’s Substance 
does not give due regard to (my) self-conscious Subjectivity] teils aber ist das 
Gegenteil [GWFH is about to reject the pure Idealism of Subjectivity as well], 
welches das Denken als Denken festhält, die Allgemeinheit, dieselbe Einfachheit 
oder ununterschiedne, unbewegte Substantialität [i.e. Subjectivity alone becomes 
SPINOZA’s Substance] und wenn drittens [as in FICHTE] das Denken das Sein der 
Substanz als solche mit sich vereint [a unity of which GWFH approves] und die 
Unmittelbarkeit oder das Anschauen als Denken erfaßt, so kömmt es noch darauf 
an, ob dieses intellektuelle Anschauen nicht wieder in die träge Einfachheit 
zurückfällt [i.e. Subjectivity remains disconnected from Substance], und die 
Wirklichkeit selbst auf eine unwirkliche Weise darstellt.” There is something to be 
said for the view that GWFH regarded this disconnection as the basis of Time; see 
I.2.2.1.  
39 GWFH makes it clear at LHP, p. 288 (Volume 3) that he is synthesizing Jakob 
BOEHME and SPINOZA on this point. “But the reason that God is not spirit is that 
He is not the Three in One. Substance remains rigid and petrified, without 
Boehme’s sources or springs; for the individual determinations in the form of 
determinations of the understanding are not Boehme’s originating spirits, which 
energize and expand in one another (supra, pp. 202, 203).”  
40 LHP, p. 257 (Volume 3): “It is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin 
by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the 
essential commencement of all Philosophy.” 
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stunning paragraph in the last chapter of the Phenomenology.41 Without 
using any proper names, Hegel causes the Middle Ages, the Crusades, 
Luther, Descartes, Spinoza,42 Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel 
himself, to pass before our dazzled inner eye.43 Hegel is present in three 
ways: as narrator, as part of the chronological procession, and finally, as 
the whole of the process.44 This amazing procession is not something 
external to himself: it is just as immanent within him as the entire 
Phenomenology has been.45 And he can only describe this immanence in 
                                                
41 The paragraph (PhG §803) that begins: “Die Bewegung, die Form seines Wissens 
von sich hervorzutreiben, ist die Arbeit, die er als wirkliche Geschichte vollbringt.” 
42 “Indem es so zunächst die unmittelbare Einheit des Denkens und Seins, des 
abstrakten Wesens und des Selbsts, selbst abstrakt ausgesprochen und das erste 
Lichtwesen reiner, nämlich als Einheit der Ausdehnung und des Seins—denn 
Ausdehnung ist die dem reinen Denken gleichere Einfachheit, denn das Licht ist—
und hiemit im Gedanken die Substanz des Aufgangs wieder erweckt hat, schaudert 
der Geist zugleich von dieser abstrakten Einheit, von dieser selbstlosen 
Substantialität zurück, und behauptet die Individualität gegen sie.” It will be seen 
that SPINOZA constitutes the moment of extreme negativity where Subjectivity is 
concerned: his substance annihilates the Self. In this sense, SPINOZA remains a 
characteristically Jewish thinker with respect to a proto-Nazi Selbstvergottung; see 
the Appendix to Chapter 1 in ALTMAN, William, The German Stranger: Leo 
Strauss and National Socialism. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010.  
43 J.N. FINDLEY mentions most of these in his commentary on p. 591 of the Miller 
translation of PhG. 
44 GWFH describes his own achievement as building on KANT’s insights about 
Time. But he describes that achievement in comparison with SPINOZA’s: “…so 
daß wie vorhin das Wesen als Einheit des Denkens und der Ausdehnung 
ausgesprochen wurde [SPINOZA’s achievement], es als Einheit des Denkens und 
der Zeit zu fassen ware [this is GWFH’s achievement: the Logical and 
Chronological Parallel]; aber der sich selbst überlaßne Unterschied [this too is 
GWFH’s insight: Time is merely the manifestation of Nature’s difference from 
Spirit], die ruhe- und haltlose Zeit fällt vielmehr in sich selbst zusammen [Kant’s 
discovery of the unreality of Time was a great breakthrough but needed to be 
completed]; sie ist die gegenständliche Ruhe der Ausdehnung [GWFH celebrates 
his derivation of Time from (Extension’s) Space; the process so well described by 
HEIDEGGER] diese aber ist die reine Gleichheit mit sich selbst, das Ich 
[apparently what GWFH means is that when Time collapses, the chronological 
process of World-History as Substance can become immanent in the I as Subject].” 
45 “…die Substanz hat, als Subjekt [GWFH himself], die erst innere Notwendigkeit 
an ihr, sich an ihr selbst als das darzustellen, was sie an sich ist, als Geist [a duty 
GWFH has now discharged by writing the PhG: the (subjective) path from Subject 
to Substance]. Die vollendete gegenständliche Darstellung [but the PhG is not 
complete until the (objective) path from Substance to Subject has been traversed as 
well] ist erst zugleich die Reflexion derselben oder das Werden derselben zum 
Selbst [in fact, as PhG §803 will show, the two paths are mirror images of each 
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terms of Spinoza’s Substance: indeed the paragraph chronicles the process 
by which Substance achieves the apparently Christian Subjectivity of 
Self.46 Substance and Subject must be united in self-consciousness: by the 
time the paragraph has ended, Hegel can proclaim that each has passed 
over into the other.47 
 With this kind of procession passing through his own consciousness, it 
is little wonder that the appearance of Napoleon in Jena in October 1806, 
just as he was finishing the Phenomenology, made such a deep impression 
on the thirty-six year old Hegel. It was comparatively easy for the penniless 
philosopher to recognize “the World-Spirit on horseback.”48 But it was 
hardly more difficult for Hegel, who had just completed one of the most 
innovative and brilliant books ever written, to see Napoleon as merely an 
unself-conscious reflection of himself. Nor was he without objective 
grounds for seeing things this way. As the future proved, the stunning 
reversal of Prussia’s humiliation at Jena just nine years later at Waterloo 
coincided with Hegel’s own emergence into prominence as the foremost 
philosopher of his day and Prussia’s most brilliant defender. Hegel is, 
                                                                                                   
other].—Eh daher der Geist nicht an sich, nicht als Weltgeist sich vollendet, kann er 
nicht als selbstbewußter Geist seine Vollendung erreichen [only as Weltgeist can 
GWFH bring his book to an end: Absolute Wissen requires both paths].” It will be 
seen that GWFH achieves Chronological Completeness with the PhG. Nor did he 
ever subsequently doubt that he had done so.  
46 The completion of this process is announced in the following sentence: “Oder Ich 
ist nicht nur das Selbst, sondern es ist die Gleichheit des Selbsts mit sich; diese 
Gleichheit aber ist die vollkommne und unmittelbare Einheit mit sich selbst, oder 
dies Subjekt ist ebensosehr die Substanz.” The important role GWFH has played in 
this process is indicated by the sentence that precedes this one in the text. 
47 PhG, §804: “Der Geist aber hat sich uns gezeigt, weder nur das Zurückziehen des 
Selbstbewußtseins in seine reine Innerlichkeit zu sein [as in FICHTE’s Idealism], 
noch die bloße Versenkung desselben in die Substanz und das Nichtsein seines 
Unterschiedes [as in SPINOZA], sondern diese [doubled] Bewegung des Selbsts, 
das sich seiner selbst entäußert und sich in seine Substanz versenkt [externalized in 
Time, Nature, and History], und ebenso als Subjekt aus ihr in sich gegangen ist [i.e. 
it returns out of this Versenkung], und sie zum Gegenstande und Inhalte macht 
[Spirit achieves self-consciousness by this return], als es diesen Unterschied der 
Gegenständlichkeit und des Inhalts aufhebt [the Substance is no longer external but 
merely a Reflection of the Subject, as the Subject likewise is of Substance].”  
48 “This morning I saw the Emperor [Napoleon]—this world-soul (diese 
Weltseele)—ride through town . . . It is a marvelous feeling to see such a 
personality, concentrated in one point, dominating the entire world from horseback . 
. . It is impossible not to admire him” (Hegel to Niethammer, 13 Oct 1806). 
BUTLER, Clark and SEILER, Christiane, Hegel: The Letters. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984. 
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moreover, the last Professor of Philosophy whose claim to being one of 
History’s greatest thinkers is undisputed. He remains the Napoleon of 
Philosophy: he had made the whole of it his own. 
 It is much easier to dismiss Hegel’s bizarre notion of the End of 
History than to explain why it is a plausible view. But to Hegel’s credit, it 
must be acknowledged that he lived in a period of crisis that proved 
remarkably hospitable to great or rather stunning achievements. In defense 
of Hegel, one might ask whether there has yet arisen a greater musician 
than Beethoven, likewise born in 1770?49 The early successes and ultimate 
failure of the French Revolution arguably remain the most important events 
of Modern Times. For all his substantial achievements, Bonaparte (born 
1769) was a towering colossus of unpredictable Subjectivity; how could 
any of Hegel’s contemporaries deny its intoxicating claims? Hegel had 
been fifteen when the Pantheismusstreit over Lessing’s Spinozism rocked 
the German intellectual world and changed it forever. The fact that 
Schelling and Hölderlin were Hegel’s roommates,50 both towering geniuses 
in their own right with whom he endlessly discussed the Greeks, Nature, 
and the εν και παν, would make anybody, even a person without Hegel’s 
intellectual gifts and energetic tenacity, feel rather special. He could boast a 
personal relationship with Goethe and was able to meet Kant as an equal, 
making the latter’s static Categories dance to the dialectic’s tune. Above 
all, there are his books and the beautiful thoughts they contain to be 
considered. Where had there ever been such insight into the Past? When 
had there ever been seen such a towering and all-embracing intellect? The 
great compliment he pays to the equally comprehensive Aristotle by 
concluding his Encyclopedia with a quotation from the Metaphysics (§577) 
is made in the complete confidence of his own evident superiority. He 
accomplished something stupendous and knew perfectly well that he had 
done so.    
  It is noteworthy that Hegel repeatedly emphasizes the unconsciousness 
of even the greatest individuals in World-History. Unlike Hegel, they don’t 
know what they are doing. 
 
                                                
49 One might consider for comparison the remarks of the fictional pianist 
Kretschmar about BEETHOVEN and “the end of the Sonata” in MANN, Thomas, 
Doktor Faustus. 
50 BAUM, Manfred, Metaphysischer Monismus bei Hölderlin und Hegel, Hegel-
Studien vol. 28, pp. 81-102, 1993 and HENRICH, Dieter, Between Kant and Hegel: 
Lectures on German Idealism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993 are 
particularly insightful, not least of all because both emphasize the crucial role of 
F.H. JACOBI, who brought on the Pantheismusstreit.  
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348. At the summit of all actions, including world-historical actions, stand 
individuals. Each of these individuals is a subjectivity who realizes what 
is substantive (§279, note). He is a living embodiment of the substantive 
deed of the world-spirit, and is, therefore, directly identical with this deed. 
It is concealed even from himself, and is not his object and end (§344). 
Thus they do not receive honour and thanks for their acts either from their 
contemporaries (§344), or from the public opinion of posterity. By this 
opinion they are viewed merely as formal subjectivities, and, as such, are 
simply given their part in immortal fame.51 
                                                   
Except insofar as he knew better than to expect “honor and thanks” either 
from contemporaries or “the public opinion of posterity,” this description 
hardly applies to Hegel. But the statements he makes here don’t refute the 
notion that he is a “world-historical” individual; they confirm it. He excels 
those he describes and could only describe them as he does because he 
knows it. It is Hegel who had consciously, as we saw in the last Chapter of 
the Phenomenology, shown himself to be “a subjectivity who realizes what 
is substantive.” In paragraph §344 of the Philosophy of Right, twice cited in 
the passage above, he offers a clue as to the chief difference between 
himself and Napoleon: “Yet are they the unconscious tools and organs of 
the world-spirit, through whose inner activity the lower forms pass 
away.”52 Napoleon had destroyed the Holy Roman Empire; in Hegel’s 
Lectures on the Philosophy of History, the Past is preserved in its entirety. 
The Greeks have not passed away: no friend of Hölderlin could have 
possibly thought that. But Hegel has not only relived the Greeks. It has all 
been preserved in him, through his agency and as the self-conscious 
realization of “what is substantive.”   
Nor could it have been very different: it is only through the individual 
Subject that a self-conscious unity with Substance can be achieved. No less 
than a worldly Kingdom does the Kingdom of the Spirit needs a King. 
Hegel’s personal achievement of Absolute Knowing is needed to complete 
the edifice but what he accomplished is closer to dotting an ‘i’ than most 
would think. Be that as it may, Hegel rivals Napoleon and Caesar and 
excels them both. Both Napoleon and Caesar have crossed into Germany 
from the West and therefore unconsciously prepared Hegel’s way. Hegel 
consciously returns the favor: he alone can explain what they have done. It 
is the German World—in the person of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel—
that has realized the unity of Substance and Subject. He is a mighty 
conqueror in the realm of the Spirit. No one has a better claim to realizing 
Nietzsche’s ideal: it was Hegel who had already been “the Roman Caesar 
                                                
51 Philosophy of Right, p. 218; §348. 
52 Philosophy of Right, p. 217; §344 (emphasis mine). 
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with Christ’s soul.”53 It is in Hegel’s ingenious System that an immanent 
Trinity informs a domain of limitless extent: it is no longer only Gaul that 
has been divided into three parts. But his is no merely external conquest; he 
has absorbed everything he could learn about the World and found thereby 
that it was always already immanent in him. Substance can only become 
conscious of itself through the agency of Subject. It has done so through 
“Hegel.” 
 
 
                                                
53 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and 
R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1968, §983. 
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Part II. 
Introduction 
 
 With the analysis of Hegel’s Philosophy of History now in place, it 
becomes a much easier matter to reveal its scandalous aspects; indeed, they 
are already implicit in the foregoing analysis. But it was impossible to 
begin with the simpler matter: the order of the two parts could not have 
been reversed. It is far more difficult—and therefore requires more effort 
and pages—to explain and defend Hegel’s conception of Time than to 
attack it. Part II will therefore be considerably shorter than Part I. Despite 
its comparative brevity, however, it will duplicate the structure of Part I 
even if this results in short sections and miniscule chapters. Central to the 
organization of Part II is the distinction between Right and Left 
Hegelianism,1 a distinction that grows directly out of what I have called 
“The Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” I would like to 
suggest that both schools were “one-sided moments” in Hegel’s sense; 
neither adequately captured the truth about Hegel.2 The Right Hegelians 
correctly perceived that there was no place for the future in Hegel’s thought 
but could only succeed in making Hegel look foolish or old-fashioned as a 
result.3 The Left Hegelians correctly perceived that if there were to be an 
End of History, it would occur in the future; their error was to imagine that 
Hegel had shared this attractive point of view and thus they radically 
distorted his intentions.4 The inadequacy of both Right (II.2) and Left 
Hegelianism (II.3) is therefore rooted in Hegel himself and his inevitable 
failure to solve the problem of Time (II.1).    
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 AVINERI, Shlomo, Hegel Revisited in Alasdair MacIntyre ed., Hegel: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, p. 329-348. New York: Doubleday, 1972. 
2 BURBIDGE, John, Where is the Place of Understanding in George di Giovanni 
ed., Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 171-182. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1990; p. 178: “Neither the right-wing, nor the left-wing interpretation of 
Hegel is right.” 
3 See PARKINSON, G.H.R. Hegel’s Concept of Freedom in Michael Inwood, 
Hegel, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985; p. 173, last paragraph. 
4 The second half of this sentence applies only to “Hegel scholars” of Left Hegelian 
orientation; the first applies to “the Young Hegelians,” many of whom were in open 
revolt against GWFH. The former category deserves serious scholarly attention. For 
the latter, see LÖWITH, Karl, Einleitung to Die Hegelsche Linke, Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, pp. 7-38, 1962. 
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Part II. Section 1. (II.1) 
The Scandal of Time 
 
 The title of this section is misleading because Hegel’s scandalous 
views about Time are inseparable from what makes his thought scandalous 
in general. To that extent, this section could also have been called “The 
Scandal of Absolute Knowledge” or “The Scandal of Philosophy.” But the 
purpose of Part II is to show why Hegel’s confusion of Logical and 
Chronological Priority, and therefore Logical and Chronological 
Completeness, is the Achilles heel of his philosophy, i.e. that which 
inevitably renders Hegelian philosophy scandalous as a whole. Before 
considering two scandalous symptoms of “The Problem of Time in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History”—the well-known difficulty Hegel encounters when 
beginning each his books (Chapter 8; II.1.1) and the seldom noticed but 
almost perfectly pervasive equivocation on the crucial word “moment” 
(Chapter 9; II.1.2)—a few general remarks are in order. 
 
The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of 
such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the 
goal where it can set aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual 
knowing—that is what I have set myself to do.5   
 
This passage indicates what might have been called “The Scandal of 
Philosophy.” The scandal of the End of History, mediated by what I have 
called “Chronological Completeness,” follows from what Hegel here calls 
“the form of Science” in Absolute Knowledge: i.e. what I have called 
“Logical Completeness.” Just as true Time does not end in the Present, so 
also does philosophy in the traditional sense—i.e. “the love of wisdom”—
necessarily and eternally search outside or beyond its limits. Hope, 
Wanderlust, and yearning are all predicated on the beyond: on that which is 
outside of us whether in a temporal, spatial, or spiritual sense. Such 
openness to the beyond is human but it is not Hegelian. This sentence 
gestures towards the scandalous essence of Hegel’s achievement; although 
I have concentrated on the suppression of one particular kind of “beyond,” 
i.e. the Future of tick-tock Time’s “spurious infinite,” it is a pervasive 
hostility to any jenseits that is determinative and characteristic of Hegelian 
thought.6  
                                                
5 PhG (Miller), p. 3; HW 3.13. 
6 SCHULZ, Walter, Hegel und das Problem der Aufhebung der Metaphysik in 
Günther NESKE (ed.), Martin Heidegger zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Pfullingen: 
Neske, 1959, pp. 67-92, at p. 68: “Hegels eigene Metaphysik ist Aufhebung der 
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 The choice of “The Scandal of Time” is not entirely arbitrary, 
however. The skeptical can doubt that there exists any true wisdom while 
the ultimate scandal in Hegel’s thought, i.e. the substitution of Hegel’s 
“Absolute Knowledge” for God,7 is hardly accessible or persuasive in the 
anti-theological intellectual climate that has been dominant since the First 
World War. “Time” is a far better place to reveal the scandal of Hegel’s 
thought because no matter what we may privately think about “God” or 
“wisdom,” we all believe in tick-tock time and bear its shackles on our 
wrists.8 We take Time for granted, as a constitutive part of human 
existence, as indeed it is. The central irony in Hegel’s thought is that 
although both his “Philosophy of History” and his “History of Philosophy” 
pioneered our ability to make events in time the legitimate objects of 
philosophical inquiry, he himself did not take Time for granted and indeed 
could not have done so. The archeology presented in Part I has had the goal 
of explaining how such a strange thing is possible, i.e. how he could have 
achieved such an amazing but scandalous result.   
 The “Scandal of Time” is therefore merely the most accessible 
remnant of what makes Hegel’s thought truly scandalous in a theological 
sense: his repudiation or rather appropriation of God’s Wisdom. In fact, it 
is no mere remnant: in the traditional view, Wisdom is timeless and God 
dwells in eternity. Hegel secularizes these concepts: there is no Time in 
Hegel’s system because there had never been any Time in God’s eternal 
Wisdom. Hegel’s “philosophy” stands at a moment of theological transition 
that we post-Hegelians can only recover with considerable archeological 
effort: we have forgotten how hostile traditional philosophy had always 
                                                                                                   
Metaphysik des Jenseits in eine Metaphysik, die den Gegensatz von Jenseits und 
Diesseits überhaupt und als solchen zu negieren sucht.” 
7 As far as atheism is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between the denial of 
God’s existence—although I deny their claims, with mere atheists I have no 
quarrel—and “a decidedly non-theistic vindication of God.” For the latter, see 
STRAUSS, Leo, Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil in Studies 
in Platonic Political Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 174-
191, 1983, at p. 181. STRAUSS’s NIETZSCHE is not objectionable qua atheist but 
rather insofar as he “makes atheism religious.” 
8 Even McTAGGART, J. Ellis, The Unreality of Time, Mind (n.s.), vol. 17, n. 68 
(Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474, 1908 does not undertake to prove the non-existence of 
change or indeed of discrete moments. For the theological connections, cf. GEACH, 
Peter, Cambridge Philosophers III: McTaggart. Philosophy, vol. 70, n. 274, pp. 567-
579, 1995. p. 572: “As I indicated, disbelief in the reality of time reinforced 
McTaggart’s inherited atheism. Traditional Jewish or Christian or Muslim theism 
treats of an eternal God who created and providentially controls a changeable 
world; any such theism must be rejected if time is a delusion. For loss of belief in 
God, McTaggart thinks, we need not mourn.” 
 169 
been to Time. This hostility was based on God. Hegel doesn’t simply 
ignore or reject God as so many philosophers after him have done with a 
clean conscience; he does something infinitely more impious: he usurps the 
place, or rather the eternal perspective, of God.9 This, then, is the 
primordial scandal in Hegelian thought although the fact that he presents 
his philosophy in Trinitarian terms is the scandal that would make a pious 
Christian tremble for the sake of his immortal soul.10  
 Trembling, of course, is foreign to Hegel’s project because one only 
trembles in the face of what is beyond one’s knowledge. There is no such 
entity in Hegel’s system. This is why the first passage I analyzed in the 
Introduction was about the stars. If Hegel cannot rationalize the 
configuration of Kant’s “the starry heavens above me,” then there is 
eternally no rational order to be sought there. The possibility that our 
knowledge might expand in the future, that we could come to know more 
about the stars and the mysteries of Outer Space, these interrelated 
possibilities are antithetical to Hegel’s project: the nature of boundless 
space is as irrational as the infinite time mankind could devote to plumbing 
its secrets. In short, “The Scandal of Time” was therefore already implicit 
in Hegel’s astronomy. The “epistemological humility” intrinsic to 
philosophy qua “love of wisdom” is merely the subjective correlate of 
“Astronomy’s Epistemological Future;” neither can find a place within the 
closed circle of Hegelian science.  
 
 
 
                                                
9 The contrast between GWFH and e.g. McTAGGART should be noted. Notice that 
the place of Time in KANT’s Transcendental Aesthetic cannot be separated from a 
critique of pure reason  that makes room for the noumenal Ding an sich. 
10 For a noteworthy attempt to present GWFH as a Christian, see KÜNG, Hans, The 
Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel’s Theological Thought as a 
Prolegomena to a Future Christology. Translated by J.R. Stephenson. New York: 
Crossroad, 1987; especially at p. 409: “Was not Hegel (if we look, not at his 
system, but at himself as a man) marked by a pathos to know the real God? On his 
long toilsome way from Stuttgart to Tübingen to Bern, Frankfurt and Jena, and from 
there via Bamberg, Nuremberg and Heidelberg to Berlin, did he not wage an 
impressively truthful struggle through an orthodoxy gone rigid on the one side and 
the Enlightenment and Kantian moralism on the other, pressing forward to a deeper 
understanding of Christianity, going from an Enlightenment-style to a speculative 
religiosity, and hence from a rejection of Jesus through a more detached 
indifference to a thinking affirmation of Jesus Christ?” In addition to answering 
these two questions with “No,” I note the parenthesis in the first: it is “Hegel” that 
KÜNG presents as a Christian, not Hegel.     
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Chapter 8. (II.1.1) 
Beginning with the End 
 
The reason that Hegel has difficulty beginning his books is that the 
only justification for the place he must begin is always found at the end, i.e. 
in “Absolute Knowledge.” It is only in the context of Logical 
Completeness, in relation to the Concept, that Hegelian science becomes 
possible. But science cannot be presented as that which “becomes” in the 
present or emerges, for example, from Hegel’s own intention to supersede 
“the love of wisdom.” Science is the truth and the true is the whole. 
Constitutive of Hegel’s conceptualization of Science is the pervasive claim 
that the Concept is logically prior to its moments. Although its moments 
must be presented first as a matter of exposition and the Concept 
introduced as if it synthesized the moments presented beforehand, the truth 
is entirely different: the moments are derived from the Concept. In other 
words: the Chronological Priority given to any Concept’s moments is 
merely an unfortunate matter of exposition, i.e. the way in which Science 
must be presented or exposed to the public.11 
Consider how the paragraph from Phenomenology of Spirit about 
superseding “the love of wisdom” quoted in the Introduction to this section 
continues: 
 
The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and 
only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it…To show 
that now is the time for philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science 
would therefore be the only true justification of any effort that has this 
aim, for to do so would demonstrate the necessity of the aim, would 
indeed at the same time [zugleich] be the accomplishing of it.12  
 
If Hegel began honestly, i.e. with his intent to give an account of the whole, 
he would be required to begin with what is first for us, in this case, with an 
account of the Present that would “show that now is the time for 
philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science.”13 But to begin with his 
intent would be to admit that he is merely “Hegel” and that his viewpoint is 
purely subjective; to address the needs of the present would be to grant 
something other than his philosophical system—in this case, a set of 
political, social, and philosophical conditions prevailing at the Present—
                                                
11 The problem receives special treatment in FULDA, Hans Friedrich, Das Problem 
einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik (2nd edition), Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1975. 
12 PhG (Miller), p. 4-5; HW 3.13. 
13 The relevant data for such an account can be found in Differenzschrift and 
Glauben und Wissen. 
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objective reality.14 Science requires that he must rather derive both present 
conditions and his own intent with respect to philosophy from the scientific 
result reached at the end of the process.  
This approach is the inevitable but scandalous result of Hegel’s 
solution to “The Problem of Time.” There is no Time in the Concept.15 It is 
only as a matter of exposition that its moments appear to be logically prior 
to the Concept; the fact that exposition requires that they be granted 
Chronological Priority must not confuse us as to the Concept’s Logical 
Priority. Nor can we imagine the “moments” derived from the Concept in a 
logical sense to be constitutive elements out of which the Concept emerges 
in a chronological sense. Hegel makes a rare slip in the youthful 
Phenomenology when he writes that the necessity underlying his intent and 
“the justification of any effort that has this aim” would occur zugleich (i.e. 
“at the same time”); intent and fulfillment may be logically simultaneous 
but it is a scandal to assert that they are simultaneous in a chronological 
sense as well. But this slip is characteristic of Hegel’s application of the 
Logical/Chronological Parallel: the imposition of Logical Completeness on 
a chronological process and the scandalous suppression of Time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 While it is true that neophytes read the history of philosophy from the point of 
view of their own present concerns—and tend to find their own conceptions 
mirrored in the great thinkers of the past—a thorough philosophical education 
requires the subordination of our own perspective to that of the author or, at the 
very least, it requires the will to this subordination. A proof that this subordination 
is impossible will not be forthcoming since its existence would refute that which it 
purported to prove. 
15 For a recent exposition of KOJÉVE on this point, see NICHOLS, James H. Jr., 
Alexander Kojéve: Wisdom at the End of History, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2007, pp. 34-8.  
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Chapter 9 (II.1.2) 
The Hegelian Moment 
 
II.1.2.1. A Momentary Lapse 
 But this slip is mild compared to the far more serious error that Hegel 
makes in the sentence deleted in the previous passage from the 
Phenomenology: 
 
The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and 
only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it. But the 
external necessity, so far as it is grasped in a general way, setting aside 
accidental matters of person and motivation, is the same as the inner, or in 
other words it lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential 
existence of its moments [wie die Zeit das Dasein ihrer Momente 
vorstellt]. To show that now…16  
 
Hegel’s intent is to prevent any separation between his intent and its 
fulfillment: the former will be justified “at the same time” as its 
accomplishment. To that end, the internal necessity that will determine 
throughout the various steps to be described in “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit” is logically inseparable from the intent and ability of Hegel, i.e. the 
pure philosophical residue of “Hegel” after “setting aside accidental 
matters of person and motivation,” to present them as such.  
 The scandal is that this is the only passage in Hegel’s mature writings 
where the word “moment” is applied to Time.  Never again would Hegel be 
so foolish as to reveal his awareness there could be no logical “moment” in 
his sense (das Moment) if there was not always already der Moment.  
 
II.1.2.2. Borsche’s History of das Moment 
 In a few brilliantly conceived pages from an article in the Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie devoted to “Moment,” Tilman Borsche makes 
a great contribution to the proper understanding of Hegel.17 Beginning with 
the distinction between der Moment and das Moment (p. 100), he divides 
his treatment of the modern use of Moment in into three parts: “The 
Metaphysical Moment” (p. 100-1), “The Timeless Moment” (p. 101-2), and 
most importantly for the understanding of Hegel, “The Logical Moment.” 
Although his comments on Cusanus (p. 101), Leibniz (p. 100, 101-2), and 
                                                
16 PhG (Miller), p. 3; HW 3.13. 
17 BORSCHE, Tilman, “Moment” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, Basel / Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 
1984, volume 6, pp. 100-108 (hereafter “BORSCHE”). In the section that follows, I 
will cite this article in the text by parenthetical page numbers. 
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Descartes are important,18 attention here will be confined to three key 
figures in the third section: Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. 
    
II.1.2.2.1. Kant 
 No serious student of Hegel will be surprised to discover that the most 
important precedent for his use of das Moment in a logical sense is found in 
Kant. After mentioning that Kant, while discussing physics, uses das 
Moment as a translation for the Latin momentum, Borsche adds (p. 102): 
“Folglich ist (der oder das) M. in zeitlicher Bedeutung kaum zu finden.” 
Particularly since he notes an exception, it is interesting that he uses the 
word “folglich” here; this suggests a zero-sum conflict between a timeless 
(zeitlos) or timely (zeitlich) use of the term. Borsche then proceeds to the 
main point: 
 
Daneben aber gewinnt das Wort in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft eine 
neue, auf Hegel vorausweisende Bedeutung. Dort werden die logischen 
Funktionen des Verstandes in Urteilen in zwölf «M.» gegliedert.19 
 
Having revealed this important fact, Borsche next makes an important 
observation about Kant’s usage: 
 
An diesem Sprachgebrauch wird deutlich, daß unter M. unselbständige 
Entitäten zu verstehen sind, die aus der Zergliederung einer Einheit, in 
bezug auf welche allein sie Bedeutung haben, hervorgehen. Folglich sind 
sie von Teilen, aus denen ein Ganzes zusammengesetzt ist, streng zu 
unterschieden.20 
 
Once again, Borsche suggests a zero-sum antithesis: one can conceive of 
moments either as parts out of which a whole will be constructed or as the 
parts that always already presuppose the whole. One wonders if these two 
cases of either/or are linked: certainly the paradox of the temporal use of 
“moment” is that time itself must be composed or built up from an infinite 
number of constitutive “moments” that are, considered individually, 
timeless. In any case, Borsche draws the important conclusion: 
 
                                                
18 Given the relationship between GWFH’s first use of das Moment in the context 
of “Good Friday” (see my “Preface”) and the central purpose behind 
SCHELLING’s use of the term (see II.1.2.2.2.) it is interesting that LEIBNIZ used 
“moment” while grappling with the problem of Cartesian dualism: “omne enim 
corpus est mens momentanea, seu carens recordatione.” For the citation and 
context, see BORSCHE, p. 102 and 102 n. 10. 
19 BORSCHE, p. 103. 
20 BORSCHE, p. 103. 
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Bei Kant bleibt dieser logische Gebrauch des Terminus «M.» auf die 
Sphäre der Urteile beschränkt. Hegel wird ihn universalieren, indem er, 
kurz gesagt, alles Begreifliche als ein M. der absoluten Idee bestimmt.21 
 
Kant therefore constitutes what might be called “the first moment” of both 
the Entstehungsgeschichte of Hegel’s characteristic use of the word das 
Moment and its Hegelian Begriff. Naturally, I do not regard the fact that it 
is both of these things at the same time (zugleich) as accidental.  
 
II.1.2.2.2. Schelling 
 “Nach Schelling’s Ansicht aus der Zeit um 1800 ist es «die einzige 
Aufgabe der Wissenschaft…die Materie zu construiren».22 The only 
appropriate comment on this scandalous project is that it actually was 
unavoidable for German Idealism.23 To a considerable extent, the actual 
existence of tick-tock time is inseparable from the actual existence of the 
material world: take away the latter, and the former will disappear zugleich. 
In any case, Borsche documents Schelling’s use of “moment” in relation to 
three different triads, all connected with what he called “science’s only 
task.” Since the material world exists in three dimensions, Schelling assigns 
their construction to three scientific processes, each of which he calls “a 
moment.”24 Borsche wisely refuses to explain the details of this 
construction but quotes a text requisite for showing that, for Schelling, it 
                                                
21 BORSCHE, p. 103. But consider also: “Trotz dieser unauffälligen Entstehung 
läßt sich der Ursprungsort der neuen Bedeutung bei Hegel recht genau bestimmen, 
dagegen sind ihre Quellen nur vermutungsweise zu eruiren.”  
22 BORSCHE, p. 103; the citation is found at 104 n. 1. 
23 See WINFIELD, Richard Dien, Space, Time and Matter: Conceiving Nature 
Without Foundations in HOULGATE, Stephen (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of 
Nature, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998, pp. 51-69 (hereafter 
“WINFIELD, Space, Time and Matter”), for the implications of this project for 
GWFH (p. 62): “To avoid a similar vicious circularity, matter must be constituted 
without any material factors. Consequently, the very ideality and formality of space, 
time, place and formal motion qualify them as resources in nature that can serve to 
account for matter.” 
24 BORSCHE, p. 103: “Die erste Entwurf zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe findet sich im 
System des transzendentalen Idealismus, nach ihm müssen «in der Construktion der 
Materie drei M. unterschieden werden.» Diese drei M. der Konstruktion werden in 
der Natur durch deren drei Grundkräfte repräsentiert (Magnetismus, Electrizität, 
chemische Prozeß), die sich damit auch als «die allgemeinen Kategorien der 
Physik» erweisen und zugleich die drei Dimensionen der Materie (Länge, Breite, 
Dicke) hervorbringen.” It is doubtless a necessary feature of this “construction” that 
the derivation of one triad from the other be zugleich. 
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must not be understood as taking place “in time.”25 In accordance with his 
Transcendental Idealism, it ultimately becomes necessary for Schelling to 
derive Nature from self-consciousness,26 and the word “moment” is also 
instrumental for making this amazing transition.27 Borsche comments: 
 
Von hier aus nun wird die Wahl des Ausdrucks «M.» verständlich. Da das 
System ein Versuch ist, wie der Autor in der Vorrede sagt, «die gesammte 
Philosophie als das, was sie ist, nämlich als fortgehende Geschichte des 
Selbstbewußtseyns» vorzutragen, kommt es «hauptsächlich darauf an, die 
einzelnen Epochen derselben und in denselben wiederum die einzelnen 
M.» aufzufinden und al seine notwendige «Stufenfolge» darzustellen.28 
 
 Not only does the evolution of the material world from self-
consciousness have a “history,” that history is progressive (fortgehende) in 
the sense that it proceeds step-by-step (Stufenfolge); Schelling is evidently 
not resolutely committed to the Tilgung of time.29 This is not to say that 
time is Schelling’s chief concern in this process: he only needs the three 
“moments” of self-consciousness in order to create a parallelism with the 
Naturkräfte, themselves describes as “moments.”30 But Borsche, whose 
real concern is the evolution of das Moment in Hegel’s sense, wisely makes 
the crucial observation: 
 
                                                
25 BORSCHE, p. 103: “Die Begründung dieser Konstruktion kann hier nicht 
gegeben, doch muß wenigstens darauf hingewiesen werden, «das diese 
Unterschiedung nur zum Behuf der Speculation gemacht werde, daß man sich nicht 
vorstellen müsse, die Natur durchlaufe jene M. etwa wirklich, in der Zeit, sondern 
nur, sie seyen dynamisch oder, wenn man dieß deutlicher findet, metaphysisch in 
ihr gegründet.»” SCHELLING is espousing the remarkable position that time really 
exists.  
26 FACKENHEIM, Emil L. The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, p. 87. 
27 BORSCHE, p. 104: “«In den drei Kräften der Materie und in den drei M. ihrer 
Construktion» lassen sich die «drei Akte des Ichs…in der ersten Epoche des 
Selbstbewußtseyns» (Ich als Empfundenes, als Empfindendes, als produktive 
Anschauung) wiederfinden. Schelling versucht zu zeigen, daß sie sich «wirklich 
entsprechen» und folgert, daß «jene drei M. der Natur eigentlich drei M. in der 
Geschichte des Selbstbewußtseyns.»” In an email to the author of 3 January 2010, 
BORSCHE expressly denied that he had written this article with any attempt to 
amuse the reader. 
28 BORSCHE, p. 104. 
29 BORSCHE, p. 104: “Die Schellingische Übertragung des Ausdrucks «M.» ist 
also durchaus von dessen zeitlicher Bedeutung her zu verstehen.” 
30 BORSCHE, p. 104: “Auf diese Weise hofft er [sc. SCHELLING], den 
«Parallelismus der Natur mit dem Intelligenten» sichtbar machen zu können…” 
 176 
Es überrascht daher nicht, daß sowohl in dieser wie in anderen Schriften 
der gleichen Zeit «der M.» zumeist in seiner gewöhnlichen Bedeutung 
erschient. Die übertragende Bedeutung, nicht durch den veränderten 
Artikel lexikalisch abgehoben wie bei Hegel, führt auch nicht zu einer 
terminologischen Fixierung.31  
 
At this stage in the evolution of das Moment, it is still very much der 
Moment, a word which Schelling can therefore use both in the customary 
(zeitlich) sense but also in the service of creating his “parallelism.” Because 
Schelling can only derive nature from the evolving history of self-
consciousness, he is not ruthlessly committed to imagining this 
“parallelism,” no matter how unlikely his project may otherwise be, as 
simply zeitlos; he thereby does not reach the acme of absurdity. But he is 
getting rather close: Borsche points out that Schelling is imagining a 
parallelism “…der darin bestehen soll, daß die «verschiedene[n] M. der 
Evolution des Universums» den «unveränderlichen und für alles Wissen 
festehenden M. in der Geschichte des Selbstbewußtseyns» entsprechen.”32 
In other words, he is beginning to imagine a “history of self-
consciousness,” progressively arranged in stages as it may be and linked to 
the parallel development of the universe as it must be, as composed of fixed 
and unchangeable “moments” that are logical rather than temporal.   
 
II.1.2.2.3. Hegel 
As a matter of a priori dialectical logic, Hegel needed only to 
synthesize the positions of Kant and Schelling in order to reach his own 
characteristic use of das Moment. The parallelism between Mind and 
Nature that Schelling needed his “moments” to explain or justify was now 
taken as a fact: Hegel revealed the unity of subjective and objective in what 
he called “the true philosophy.”33 Like Kant, Hegel could therefore use his 
                                                
31 BORSCHE, p. 104. 
32 BORSCHE, p. 104. Both quotations are from SCHELLING’s System des 
transzendentalen Idealismus. For all citations to SCHELLING in this section, see 
BORSCHE, p. 104. 
33 HW 429-30 (Glaube und Wissen; emphasis mine): “Nachdem auf diese Weise 
durch die Totalität der betrachteten Philosophien der Dogmatismus des Seins in den 
Dogmatismus des Denkens, die Metaphysik der Objektivität in die Metaphysik der 
Subjektivität umgeschmolzen [ist] und also der alte Dogmatismus und 
Reflexionsmetaphysik durch diese ganze Revolution der Philosophie zunächst nur 
die Farbe des Innern oder der neuen und modischen Kultur angezogen [hat], die 
Seele als Ding in Ich, als praktische Vernunft in Absolutheit der Persönlichkeit und 
der Einzelheit des Subjekts,—die Welt aber als Ding in das System von 
Erscheinungen oder von Affektionen des Subjekts und geglaubten 
Wirklichkeiten,—das Absolute aber als ein Gegenstand und absolutes Objekt der 
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“moments” to describe parts of something that was always already a whole. 
But the “whole” that was Kant’s concern was very much on the subjective 
side; Hegel’s “whole,” by contrast, presupposed the success of what 
Schelling had called “die einzige Aufgabe der Wissenschaft.” Considered as 
the culmination of a triadic Hegelian Begriff, Hegel’s “das Moment” is 
therefore restored to the Kantian timelessness of its first subjective and 
therefore one-sided “moment” at a higher level having passed through 
Schelling’s “moment” of temporal indeterminacy that unifies the objective 
and subjective. In order to advance the most unlikely step of the Idealist 
project—the “construction” of the material world from self-
consciousness—Schelling had needed to restore motion to his “moments:” 
productive of the three dimensions as Naturkräfte, these dynamic forces 
were themselves “moments” of self-consciousness’s history. As the 
“moment” of opposition in this Momentbegriff, Schelling’s der Moment is 
simultaneously zeitlich and zeitlos; Hegel’s das Moment can finally be 
restored to a Kantian timelessness only after Schelling’s evolutionary 
Momente have done their work by annihilating the distinction between 
subjective self-consciousness and objective nature. 
Whatever truth it may capture, the foregoing description in Hegelian 
terms of a non-textual Momentbegriff belongs as much to the realm of a 
priori philosophical speculation as to actual historical facts. As it happens, 
Borsche explains that the historical a posteriori origins of Hegel’s das 
Moment are even more closely connected to “the problem of time in 
Hegel’s philosophy of history.” 
As late as 1801, Hegel is still using the word “moment” 
indiscriminately in Kant’s,34 Schelling’s,35 as well as in the conventional 
sense;36 the latter may incidentally constitute the missing “antinomy of 
                                                                                                   
Vernunft in ein absolutes Jenseits des vernünftigen Erkennens sich umgewandelt 
und diese Metaphysik der Subjektivität, während andere Gestalten derselben auch 
selbst in dieser Sphäre nicht zählen, den vollständigen Zyklus ihrer Formen in der 
Kantischen, Jacobischen und Fichteschen Philosophie durchlaufen und also 
dasjenige, was zur Seite der Bildung zu rechnen ist, nämlich das Absolutsetzen der 
einzelnen Dimensionen der Totalität und das Ausarbeiten einer jeden derselben zum 
System, vollständig dargestellt und damit das Bilden beendigt hat; so ist hierin 
unmittelbar die äußere Möglichkeit gesetzt, daß die wahre Philosophie, aus dieser 
Bildung erstehend und die Absolutheit der Endlichkeiten derselben vernichtend, mit 
ihrem ganzen, der Totalität unterworfenen Reichtum sich als vollendete 
Erscheinung zugleich darstellt.” 
34 HW 2.146 (“Bouterweks Anfangsgründe der spekulativen Philosophie”). 
35 HW 2.109 (Differenzschrift). 
36 HW 2.43 (Differenzschrift). 
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time”37 (see Preface) to which he directed the reader in the 1800 
Systemfragment.38 But in 1802, something new appears and Borsche 
documents the first appearance of the characteristically Hegelian das 
Moment in Glaube und Wissen. There it is used in the context of Hegel’s 
historical description (Darstellung)39 of prior stages—“the Kantian, 
Jacobian, and Fichtean philosophy”—of progress towards “the true 
philosophy.”40 
 
                                                
37 Particularly insightful is BAUM, Manfred. Zur Vorgeschichte des Hegelschen 
Unendlichkeitsbegriff. Hegel-Studien v. 11, pp. 89-124, 1976, pp. 103-9. 
38 HW 2.43 (Differenzschrift): “Das Vernünftige muß seinem bestimmten Inhalte 
nach, nämlich aus dem Widerspruch bestimmter Entgegengesetzter, deren Synthese 
das Vernünftige ist, deduziert werden; nur die dies Antinomische ausfüllende und 
haltende Anschauung ist das Postulable. Eine solche sonst postulierte Idee ist der 
unendliche Progreß, eine Vermischung von Empirischem und Vernünftigem; jenes 
ist die Anschauung der Zeit, dies die Aufhebung aller Zeit, die Verunendlichung 
derselben; im empirischen Progreß ist sie aber nicht rein verunendlicht, denn sie 
soll in ihm als Endliches, als beschränkte Momente, bestehen,—er ist eine 
empirische Unendlichkeit. Die wahre Antinomie, die beides, das Beschränkte und 
Unbeschränkte, nicht nebeneinander, sondern zugleich als identisch setzt, muß 
damit zugleich die Entgegensetzung aufheben; indem die Antinomie die bestimmte 
Anschauung der Zeit postuliert, muß diese—beschränkter Moment der Gegenwart 
und Unbeschränktheit seines Außersichgesetztseins—beides zugleich, also 
Ewigkeit sein.” For an English translation, see HEGEL, G.W.F., The Difference 
Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, translated by H.S. Harris 
and Walter Cerf. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977, pp. 111-12. 
39 See BRAUN, Hermann, Spinozismus in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel-
Studien, vol. 17, pp. 53-74, 1982 at p. 72 for an insightful discussion of Darstellung 
as opposed to Vorstellung.  
40 BORSCHE, p. 105: “Der neue Bedeutung des Begriffs entseht erst im Jahr 1802, 
und zwar in Zusammenhang mit den Arbeiten am Kritischen Journal der 
Philosophie. Mit diesem Journal stellten Schelling und Hegel die Aufgabe, durch 
eine Kritik der philosophischen Bildungen der Zeit zur wahren Philosophie 
hinzuführen. Hegels Aufsatz Glauben und Wissen, der letzte Kritische Beitrag in 
Journal, bringt diese Absicht zur Vollendung. In ihm wird, wie die Untertitel schon 
ankündigt, «die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer 
Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichteschen Philosophie» durchlaufen. Erst 
in diesem «vollständigen Cyclus» der Formen einer Sphäre wird sichtbar, daß in 
einzelnen von ihnen nichts anderes sind als «Dimensionen der Totalität», die sich 
jede für sich absolut setzen. Durch diese Einsicht aber tritt zugleich «die wahre 
Philosophie, aus dieser Bildung entstehend, und die Absolutheit der Endlichkeiten 
derselben vernichtend», indem sie sich den «Reichthum» den früheren Bildungen 
unterworfen hat, zur Totalität vollendet in Erscheinung.” Cf. ROCKMORE, Tom, 
Hegel’s Circular Epistemology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, p. 
113. 
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Was in der Darstellung selbst noch als selbständige Gestalten, als zum 
System ausgearbeitete Philosophien auftrat, wird nun am Schluß der 
Darstellung in Begriff der wahren Philosophie—zu «M.» derselben 
«herabgesetzt».41 
 
Although these previously self-standing systems are prior in time to “the 
true philosophy,” they are not “moments” of its development because that 
process is unfolding in time (even though it is and has); they can only be 
integrated as “moments” into a characteristically Hegelian process—one 
that just happens to have unfolded in time as well—once it is complete.42 
Many themes come together in a “moment” that prepares the ground for 
“the end of history.” In any case, Borsche has revealed the historical origins 
of the Logical/Chronological Parallel, its two worlds knotted together by 
the new usage of “das Moment.” Not without humor, Borsche comments: 
“Von diesem Moment an ist der neue Gebrauch des Begriffs «M.» bei 
Hegel allgegenwärtig.” 
 
II.1.2.3. A Moment to Consider 
 Having found in Borsche a guide to the Entwicklung of Hegel’s use of 
das Moment, it is appropriate to briefly reflect on the significance of that 
use. If “the problem of time” is the Achilles heel of the Hegelian System, 
attention to Hegel’s use of das Moment is Paris’s arrow. In this section, 
Hegel’s “Moment” will be briefly considered as problematic on a variety of 
levels: historical, etymological, and philosophical.  
 
II.1.2.3.1. Historical Critique 
 From an historical perspective, the most important point is simply that 
the origin of das Moment in Hegel’s sense is Hegel himself. Confronted 
with a clear-cut and therefore post-Hegelian difference between der and 
das Moment, it is easy for the modern reader to assume that Hegel, having 
consulted a lexicon, simply used one term in preference to another. But this 
is not the case and unless our own lexicon contains an historical apparatus, 
it will give the unwary reader the impression that it was perfectly legitimate 
for Hegel to use das Moment in a non-temporal sense because unlike der 
Moment, the former is by definition non-temporal. The problem here is that 
the only non-temporal meaning of das Moment before Hegel had nothing to 
do with a one-sided stage in a logical development: unlike Hegel, Kant 
                                                
41 BORSCHE, p. 105. 
42 BORSCHE, p. 105: “Diese Art von Integration selbtändiger Bildungen zu einem 
umfassenden und damit wahreren Ganzen, in dem jene Endlichkeiten «aufgehoben» 
sind, wird fortan zu einer Grundfigur des Hegelschen Philosophierens…” 
 
 180 
made no effort—at least in print43—to show that his table of judgments are 
interconnected through a dialectical process by means of which one evolves 
from another. By embedding his new version of das Moment in the context 
of “development,” “stages,” “process,” and “evolution”—all of which 
presuppose motion in time—Hegel both preserved and concealed the 
connection of his das with der Moment.  
 
II.1.2.3.2. Etymological Critique 
 Although many other classic writers do both, Cicero never uses the 
word momentum to mean either “a very short period of time, instant, 
moment” or “a movement, impulse, push”; he does, however, reveal the 
meaning that connects the two: “a decisive stage in a course of events, 
change of situation.”44 Calculus offers another example of how the 
physicist’s momentum is connected to the temporal “moment” of the man 
on the street: differentiating an equation allows us to calculate 
instantaneous velocity or momentum at any given point or moment. 
Linguistically, the nodal point is the second of the following notions: “that 
which exerts a decisive influence or turns the scale.” Whether it is the 
moment from which momentum arises or that particular moment to which a 
new momentum in retrospect imparts special significance, the etymological 
root of “moment” is motion: what makes any given moment momentous is 
the momentum visible in that which moves. And movement is meaningless 
without time.45  
While every German verb is a Zeitwort, the verb “to move” deserves 
this description in a double sense. The relativity of time and space is 
predicated on the fact that motion cannot be defined by either one of them 
in isolation. This was no less obvious to Hegel that it is to us despite the 
fact that he was influenced by the infinitesimal calculus but not by Einstein. 
One would think that the nodal point of space and time in a pre-Einstein 
context is the identity of the logical antinomy created by the contrast 
between the infinite boundlessness of both and the radical finitude of the 
                                                
43 See DÜSING, Klaus, Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel’s Thought in LIMNATIS, 
Nectarios G. (ed.), The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, p. 97-122. London: 
Continuum, 2010, p. 119 n. 17. 
44 Oxford Latin Dictionary (1982), p. 1129; see definitions 1, 5, and 6. Definition 7b 
will be quoted below; this sense is attested by Seneca, Tacitus, Livy, Lucretius, and 
Caesar. 
45 WINFIELD, Space, Time and Motion, pp. 57, 61, and 59: “Since, however, 
motion presupposes the passage of time, time itself cannot involve a self-externality 
of space relying on the movement of bodies to distinguish space from itself at 
different moments.” 
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vanishing points of each;46 Hegel, of course, has his own reasons for 
generating the line and plane from the point rather than a moment of time.47 
The more important thing is that, as a subspecies of movement in general, 
every process, development, or evolution necessarily involves time. In fact 
“a timeless process” is unthinkable except by suspending the absolute 
opposition between the finite and the infinite.48        
 
II.1.2.3.3. Philosophical Critique 
“Which came first, the chicken or the egg?”  
This well-known conundrum is really a question about Chronological 
Priority and, without a transcendent and eternal God to create ex nihilo the 
first chicken—or egg, for that matter—the problem is insoluble in time. 
Given that Hegel can tolerate no insoluble questions—he is, after all, at war 
with Kant—it is easy to see why time must undergo Tilgung in Hegel’s 
system. A Hegelian solution to this conundrum is: the chicken comes first. 
But for Hegel, this chicken is not the antithesis of the merely momentary 
egg; both “egg” and “chicken,” as other-excluding opposites, belong only 
to the moment of Verstand or Reflection. They are, in fact, the merely one-
sided moments of a continuous, eternal, and circular process that is the real 
chicken: a dialectical chicken that is precisely the circular and therefore 
non-temporal process—as opposed to a linear sequence unfolding in time—
that connects egg to chicken to egg without either end or beginning.49 
                                                
46 See WINFIELD, Space, Time and Matter, pp. 58-9 and 61: “With identifiable 
spatio-temporal locations, the ideal of self-transcendence of point into line and line 
into plane can be tied to a succession of temporal moments, constituting motion as 
the double-sided becoming where time transpires in terms of a succession of 
different places and space extends itself in terms of the sequence of time.” 
47 Were one to begin with the objective reality of the external world, one would 
work in the opposite direction: a series of abstractions beginning with solid objects 
ending after two stages with the point, from which, in term, the moment—which 
arguably has no natural existence—could then be derived.  
48 See BAUM, Manfred. Zur Vorgeschichte des Hegelschen Unendlichkeitsbegriff. 
Hegel-Studien v. 11, pp. 89-124, 1976. 
49 “As it was in the beginning, so now and ever shall be; world without end; Amen.” 
Just as the transcendent God who creates ex nihilo is the only basis for solving this 
conundrum in Time, so also is substitution of an immanent “God” who pours 
himself forth into all things the only basis for a solution that uses time as a mere 
moment of an eternally present process. GWFH preserves the first God’s eternity—
an eternity only made possible by the abyss dividing Man from God—for himself, 
the heir of “Christ” who tilgt this abyss. See WESTPHAL, 219: “Here [sc. the 
Tilgung of Time at the end of PhG] the temptation is all but irresistible to think that 
whatever has gone on previously in the text, Hegel has finally and abruptly 
introduced a transtemporal, super-human Absolute, since such a being seems the 
only appropriate subject for this timeless knowledge.” Cf. VIELLARD-BARON, 
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 It would be a serious error to disconnect our conception of what it is to 
be a chicken from the chicken itself: subject and object are not separable in 
Hegel. Only by ignoring the dialectical element in all knowledge can we 
understand the egg as something different from the chicken. This 
separation depends equally on an epistemological and a metaphysical 
confusion: only the Begriff is capable of expressing both what actually is 
and what can be known. Insofar as the dialectical chicken—the process that 
contains both “chicken” and “egg” as merely one-sided moments—is a 
whole, it can doubtless be made to appear as timeless but within this 
whole, precisely because it contains “moments,” time has not been 
subjected to Aufhebung: it has been both preserved and concealed.  
 
II.1.2.3.4. Towards a Theological Critique 
 As I indicated in the Preface, this is merely the direction in which my 
thinking about “The Problem of Time in Hegel” is tending. At the center of 
this new concern are Glauben und Wissen (1802) and the writings close to 
it, in particular Differenzschrift (1801)50 and Naturrecht (1802-3). It does 
not seem to be accidental that the first use of “moment” in the new sense 
occurs in a passage that makes reference to the “speculative Good Friday”51 
and points forward to the die Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes at the 
conclusion of the Phänomenologie.52 In addition, Hegel’s critique of F.H. 
Jacobi in Glauben und Wissen contains his most revealing attacks on the 
reality of time.53 Given the connection between time and the Philosophy of 
Nature in Hegel’s mature System, the connection in Hegel’s mind between 
God the Son and the Philosophy of Nature is revealing.54 Having given 
Himself over into temporal particularity as Jesus, God is annihilated on the 
Cross in order to be resurrected in Realphilosophie.55 As an historical event 
                                                                                                   
Jean-Louis, L’Idee Logique, L’Idee de la Philosophie et la Structure Théologico-
Historique de la Pensée de Hegel, Hegel-Studien v. 38, p. 61-82, 2003 on “la hiéro-
histoire de philosophie.” 
50 For the treatment of time in the Differenzschrift, see RAMETTA, Gaetano, Il 
Concetto del Tempo: Eternità e «Darstellung» speculative nel pensiero di Hegel, 
Milano: Franco Angelo, 1989, pp. 105-7, n. 57. 
51 HW 2.431. 
52 HW 3.590. See MURRAY, Michael, Time in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34 n. 4, pp. 682-705, 1981. 
53 HW 2.322-92, in particular pp. 342-3 and 347-8. 
54 HARRIS, H.S., Hegel’s Development: Night Thoughts, p. 155. 
55 Cf. THEUNISSEN, Michael, Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologische-
politischer Traktat, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970, p. 282 (emphasis mine): 
“Christus ist auferstanden, weil sein Tod ein Moment des göttlichen Lebens war, die 
letzmögliche Radikalisierung der der Negativität des Urteils, des im ewigen 
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in “the divine life” that is zugleich the necessary tipping point of a timeless 
process, the “death of God” is the primal “moment” that reveals “the 
theological origins of the problem of time in Hegel’s thought.”56 
 
II.1.2.3.5. Critical Conclusion 
In the meantime, we need to attend more carefully to what Hegel 
actually writes in his mature works and recognize his absolute but 
unacknowledged dependence on what might be called “Zeitwörter.” As an 
example of this method, consider the following sentence from Wissenschaft 
der Logik: 
 
Sondern es kann nur die Natur des Inhalts sein, welche sich im 
wissenschaftlichen Erkennen bewegt, indem zugleich diese eigene 
Reflexion des Inhalts es ist, welche seine Bestimmung selbst erst setzt und 
erzeugt.57 
 
Hegel’s intent is to describe a scientific method that corresponds to its 
timeless content: the content itself produces the implicit moments that 
already constitute the whole. We need to attend more closely not only to his 
verbs (bewegt and erzeugt) but also to his adverbs (zugleich and erst). 
Empirical observation will show that Hegel’s entire method of exposition 
depends throughout on Zeitwörter and we need to read him against the 
grain by asking why.  
In short, Hegel can only solve the insoluble problem of Chronological 
Priority by substituting Logical Priority and then (a) ignoring that any form 
of “Priority” always already presupposes time, (b) incorporating 
movement—possible only in time—as atemporal logical moments in a 
process outside of and indeed prior to time, and (c) deceiving us about his 
scandalous solution. In Part II, Section 3, I will return to “(c)” and argue 
that the scandal is in the solution, not in its concealment, because Hegel’s 
                                                                                                   
Insichsein des dreieinigen Gottes begründet ist und mit der Erschaffung der 
Erscheinung erstmals gefällt wurde.” 
56 Cf. BAUM, Manfred, Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik, Bonn: Bouvier, 
1986, p. 61-7. 
57 HW 5.515. The passage is introduced by rejecting the methods of SPINOZA, 
KANT, and FICHTE: “Der wesentliche Gesichtspunkt ist, daß es überhaupt um 
einen neuen Begriff wissenschaftlicher Behandlung zu tun ist. Die Philosophie, 
indem sie Wissenschaft sein soll, kann, wie ich anderwärts erinnert habe, hierzu 
ihre Methode nicht von einer untergeordneten Wissenschaft, wie die Mathematik 
ist, borgen, sowenig als es bei kategorischen Versicherungen innerer Anschauung 
bewenden lassen oder sich des Räsonnements aus Gründen der äußeren Reflexion 
bedienen.” 
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ability to deceive us depends on a logically and chronologically prior act of 
self-deception. 
 
II.1.2.4. Arantes on Hegel 
Those who find my use of the word “scandal” scandalous will derive 
some support from the important work of Paulo Eduardo Arantes;58 his 
Hegel: A ordem do tempo (2000) is a thoughtful attempt to harmonize 
Hegel’s conception of Time with our own and thereby to absolve Hegel of 
the scandal of systematically confusing Chronological and Logical Priority. 
Arantes recognizes the distinction and admits that Hegel “deduces”59 our 
Time—he calls it “a primeira manifestação exterior do negativo e da 
contradição”60—from the chronologically posterior but logically prior 
Concept.61 Most importantly, he directly addresses Hegel’s pervasive 
equivocation on the word “moment.”62 In addition to distinguishing a 
“momento real” from a “momento ideal”63—a distinction for which he can 
                                                
58 ARANTES, P. A., Hegel: A ordem do tempo. Traduçâo e prefácio de Rubens 
Rodrigues Torres. Sao Paulo: Hucitec, 2000. Hereafter: “ARANTES.” This version 
is a Portuguese translation of the author’s doctoral dissertation, written in French.  
59 ARANTES, p. 354. 
60 ARANTES, p. 173; “primeira” denotes Chronological Priority, “exterior” 
preserves the Logical Priority of the Concept. This description depends heavily on 
ARANTES’s useful explication at p. 89-93 of GWFH’s remarks on HERACLITUS 
in LHP, p. 286-7. Note in particular the use of the word “moments” in the passage 
ARANTES quotes at the bottom of p. 92: “In time we have the moments of Being 
and non-being manifested as negative only, or as vanishing immediately; if we wish 
to express both these moments as one independent totality, the question is asked, 
which physical existence corresponds to this determination [the answer is “fire,” not 
“time”]” (LHP, p. 287).  
61 Cf. ARANTES, p. 91: “…reencontraremos o momento do tempo, como momento 
constitutivo e subordinado.” 
62 In addition to ARANTES, p. 55-7 and p. 349-50, see the translator’s comments at 
p. 14. 
63 ARANTES, p. 349. Cf. CIRNE-LIMA, Carlos, Beyond Hegel: A Critical 
Reconstruction of the Neoplatonic System, http://www.cirnelima.org/, 2006, p. 138: 
“Time is the process of emergence and disappearance of subidentities. We have 
already seen that they emerge. But do they disappear? Yes, whenever there is an 
internal contradiction that may arise due to the change in the network of 
oppositions, or an external opposition, something inevitable in a network of 
relations that is so complex and in perpetual movement. The rise and disappearance 
of subidentities in the web of subidentities constitute the real time. The prius et 
posterius here, in this world of changes and transformations have as real time what 
happens in the web of the Universe, between the rise and disappearance of a being 
or real thing. The non-identity between the rise and disappearance, as procedural 
flux,—by abstraction—becomes the ideal time prevailing in the world of pure 
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only find tenuous textual warrant in the early Jena writings64—he comes 
close to raising precisely the right question in a footnote.65 But even those 
who find his concluding summary of Feuerbach’s common sense critique66 
less compelling than his own ingenious defense of Hegel’s qualified loyalty 
to natural Time in “Egoidade e Temporalidade”67 will easily discover the 
problem with his denial that Hegel is even taking a “risco calculado” in 
scandalously reversing Chronological and Logical Priority: 
 
Em certo sentido, é possível dizer que esse movimento [sc. “um retorno 
que faz com que o imediato se encontre posto segundo seu ser 
verdadeiro”] combina pressuposição do posterior e posição do anterior; 
                                                                                                   
quality and pure quantity.—Here is the derivation of the ideal time. Real time is the 
real distance between the real quantity and the real quality from the beginning to the 
end of this movement.” 
64 In other words, before GWFH developed his characteristic use of das Moment. 
See ARANTES, p. 66-7, particularly “os momentos do tempo” at p. 67. On the 
peculiarities of the Jena period, see KOYRÉ, Alexandre. Hegel à Iéna in Etudes 
d’histoire de la pensée philosophique. Paris: Gallimard, 1971, BOUTON, 
Christophe, Temps et Esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel de Francfort à Iéna. 
Paris: J. Vrin, 2000, and HORSTMANN, Rolf-Peter, Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen in 
PÖGGELER, Otto (ed.), Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie, p. 43-58, 
Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1977. A fascinating study of GWFH’s development 
is BAPTIST, Gabriella. Ways and Loci of Modality: The Chapter “Actuality” in the 
Science of Logic between its Absence in Jena and its Disappearance in Berlin in 
George di Giovanni ed., Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 127-143. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990. 
65 ARANTES, p. 56 n. 3: “Estaríamos autorizadas a sugerir uma contaminação 
recíproca entre determinação lógica e determinação temporal, ou trata-se apenas de 
expressôes metafóricos, que mantêm apenas elos longínquos com o “gênio” 
especulativo da língua?” In fact, the contamination is not reciprocal; the Dialectic 
depends on Time and despite GWFH’s best efforts, it is the common sense 
embodied in the language that occasionally betrays his attempt to reverse this 
natural priority. 
66 ARANTES, p. 371-75 and FEUERBACH, Ludwig, Vorlesungen über Logik und 
Metaphysik (Erlangen 1830-1831), edited by ASCHERI, Carlo and THIES, Erich, 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976, p. 16-18: “Die Zeit sebst 
w[urde] genannt die Erscheinungsform der Einheit des Seins und Nichts; sie stellt 
aber selbst diese Wahrheit dar.” In addition to this passage, LUCKNER, 
Genealogie der Zeit: Zu Herkunft und Umfang eines Rätsels, Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1994, p. 103, n. 50 directs the reader to TRENDELENBURG, Adolf, 
Logische Untersuchungen. 
67 ARANTES, p. 147-63; cf. WdL, p. 843: “By reason of this freedom [sc. with 
which “the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance” into Nature], the 
form of its determinateness is also utterly free—the externality of space and time 
existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity.” 
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ou seja, o fato de que a ordem do tempo seja em parte outra, que não a do 
Conceito (tal determinação deve ser tratado antes de tal outra, apesar ou a 
conrepelo da ordem de aparição delas), longe de ser um simples risco 
calculado, ganha um sentido mais rico pelo fato de ser captado à luz da 
reflexão.68    
 
The central problem with all attempts to make Hegel consistent with 
himself is that “o ordem do tempo” is always already presupposed, even in 
the allegedly atemporal “moments” of “the concept in movement.”69 
Arantes performs a valuable service by calling attention to Hegel’s claim in 
the Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Heraclitus laid the 
foundations for the Concept by recognizing that Time “is the first form of 
Becoming.”70 But Time has already entered Hegel’s account of the History 
of Philosophy even before Heraclitus makes his entrance as its third 
“moment:” despite the anachronism involved,71 Time is already implicit in 
his decision to begin the process with Parmenides.72 Precisely because 
                                                
68 ARANTES, p. 349. 
69 In a chapter called “Le concept en mouvement” in JARCYK, Gwendoline, 
Système et Liberté Dans la Logique de Hegel (2nd edition), Paris: Éditions Kimé, 
2001, she writes at p. 30: “…car l’enterprise d’auto-réalisation, ou le mouvement 
auto-réalisateur, est en même temps, et de façon paradoxale, un mouvement de 
regression, de réductio, étant donné qu’il se fonde sur le déjà-là intemporel.” 
70 ARANTES quotes LHP, p. 286 at p. 90. Cf. HOULGATE, Stephen, The Opening 
of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity, West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 
2006, p. 284. 
71 See KIRK and RAVEN for the chronological priority of HERACLITUS. An 
interesting apologia for such anachronisms is found in BUTLER, p. 301-08 (his 
final chapter is “Empirical versus Rational Order in the History of Philosophy”); on 
PARMENIDES-HERACLITUS specifically, see BUTLER, p. 39 (emphases mine): 
“If Heraclitus had no knowledge of Parmenides, the Hegelian dialectical 
reconstruction of history differs from the historical order. Yet the rational 
reconstruction need not be invalidated by such a procedure (see the Introduction 
and final chapter to this work).” Compare KÜNG, p. 390: “The generation which 
succeeded Hegel (and this is true not only of Marx, but also of such skilled 
historians as Ranke, Droysen and Burckhardt) were no longer able to discern that 
everything proceeds reasonably in world history, or that the whole of history is the 
step-by-step dialectical self-unfolding of the Spirit.” 
72 GWFH ignores, and indeed must ignore that PARMENIDES offered a 
deliberately fraudulent account of “the Way of Opinion,” the result of deriving 
reality from the interplay of opposites, as GWFH will later try to do. See 
MOURELATOS, Alexander P.D. The Route of Parmenides. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970. 
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“Time is pure change,”73 every change, every process, and every beginning 
always already presupposes Time.74  
By beginning his system with Being, by showing how Being and 
Nothing enter into their inevitable dance—a dance, it should be added, to 
the music of Time—and then pretending to derive Becoming as an 
atemporal result of the preceding but strictly logical “moments,”75 Hegel’s 
“eternity” inevitably depends on the prior but concealed incorporation of 
Time.76 Hegel’s need to distort Parmenides’ Being,77 to fudge the moment 
of Nothing,78 and to commit the Heraclitus anachronism are strictly 
secondary phenomena—as indeed Hegel’s entire Philosophy of History is 
merely a secondary phenomenon, a mere symptom—with respect to the 
primordial “problem of time.” 
 
II.1.2.5. Hösle and Wandschneider on Time 
Justly famous for Hegels System (1987),79 Vittorio Hösle’s most 
important contribution to the problem of time is found in a 1983 article he 
co-authored with Dieter Wandschneider.80 This article’s conclusion offers 
an ingenious solution to the apparently irreconcilable conflict between “the 
end of history” and the open-ended progress into the future desiderated by 
Hegel’s defenders, a solution that creates an unlikely link between Hegel 
and Platonism: 
 
Als Vollendung der Idee kann sie nur ideal, nur im Begriff des Begriffs 
erreicht werden, der sie als solcher über die Endlichkeit und damit 
                                                
73 In addition to LHP, p. 286-7, see ARANTES p. 90 and 95.  
74 As a monument to GWFH-induced abandonment of common sense, see 
FLEISCHMANN, Eugène, La Science Universelle ou La Logique de Hegel, Paris: 
Librairie Plon, 1968; p. 57: “Processus, mouvement, rapport etc., tout cela n’est que 
l’œvre du penser qui ni situe pas dans les objets eux-mêmes.” 
75 Consider the ease with which temporality can be read back into GWFH by 
OHASHI, Ryosuke, Zeitlichkeitsanalyse der Hegelschen Logik; Zur Idee einer 
Phänomenologie des Ortes. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1984. 
76 On “the emergent character of Hegel’s eternity,” see WESTPHAL, Merold, 
History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology (3rd edition), Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998; p. 219-22.  
77 The Being of Parmenides is changeless precisely because it is not everything: it is 
emphatically not “Sein, reines Sein, ohne alle weitere Bestimmung.”   
78 See DÜSING, p. 132. 
79 HÖSLE, Vittorio, Hegels System: Der Idealismus der Subjectivität und das 
Problem der Intersubjectivität. 2 vols. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987 (hereafter 
“HÖSLE”). 
80 WANDSCHNEIDER, Dieter and HÖSLE, Vittorio, Die Entäusserung der Idee 
zur Natur und ihre zeitliche Entfaltung als Geist bei Hegel. Hegel-Studien 18 
(1973), p. 173-199 (hereafter “WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE”). 
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Zeitlichkeit der Realisierung in der Tat erhaben ist. Nur so, scheint es, 
kann die drohende Aporie von Fortschritt und Vollendung für die 
Hegelauslegung vermieden werden.81 
 
The “end of history” is merely “ideal” and only on the conceptual level 
does the Hegelian Begriff reach completion; in comparison with this 
conceptual perfection, Realisierung in der Tat, which can only occur in 
time, never reaches, and merely resembles, the completeness of the Begriff 
and therefore necessarily admits of further progress.82 It would be difficult 
to imagine a solution less consistent with Hegel’s own conception of der 
Begriff than this attempt to divide it from reality: “Die Idee vollendet sich 
im Begriff ihrer Vollendung. Dennoch kann nicht gesagt werden, daß die 
Vollendung damit realisiert sei.”83 At the center of this distinction is an 
implicit but on-going assumption that since time is real in der Tat, Hegel 
must necessarily regard it as such.  
 The most interesting result of this assumption is not the ingenious 
solution of die drohende Aporie but a remarkable willingness to see time at 
work throughout Hegel’s system. 
 
Daß die Wissenschaft der Logik mit dem «Sein» beginnt und mit der 
«absoluten Idee» endet, ist im Hinblick auf den Denkvollzug des Geistes 
zeitlich, dialektisch-logisch hingegen als überzeitlicher 
Prinzipierungszusammenhang zu fassen. Die logische und zeitliche 
Perspective haben ihre spezifische Berechtigung, und erst im absoluten 
Geist, in der Philosophie, kann es gelingen, dies begreifend zu vereinen.84 
 
Their willingness to see time as necessarily implicit in Hegel’s Logic from 
beginning to end is refreshing. But the chronological element in the Logic 
must once again be ignored so that “the logical Idea” (i.e. the end result of 
the Logic) can pass over into time in the Philosophy of Nature.  
 
Nur an sich ist die logische Idee göttlich, überzeitlich, Ihre Realisierung 
gehört notwendig der Zeit an, sie ist gleichsam die Weltwerdung Gottes, 
so wie die Erhebung der Welt in den Geist umgekehrt deren Verklärung 
und Heiligung bedeutet.85 
                                                
81 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 196-7. 
82 For a reference to the distinction between Begriff and reality in Hegels System, 
see HÖSLE, vol. 2, p. 311: “Ein wichtiger Gesichtspunkt bei einer genauen Klärung 
dieses Problem—das hier nicht näher untersucht werden kann, dessen Lösung 
jedoch ein wichtiges Desiderat ware—scheint mir zu sein, daß es zum Begriff 
einiger (aber nicht aller) Entitäten gehört, real andere voraussetzen.” 
83 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 196. 
84 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 198. 
85 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 198. 
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In order to synthesize Hegel’s true position with another that, in accord 
with post-Hegelian prejudice,86 is much more “time-friendly,” 
Wandschneider and Hösle must blur the distinction between the end of the 
Logic with the end of the System as a whole.  
 This blurring is required because it is only as a result of the logical 
Idea’s passing over into time in Nature that the authors can discover in the 
System as a whole a pseudo-Platonic and utterly un-Hegelian gap between 
conceptual completeness and temporal realization: 
 
Eine anschließende, «absolute» Philosophie wird und kann die Geschichte 
offenbar nicht verwirklichen, weil deren Realisierung—mag sie immer 
ein Leitbild und Ziel des Geistes sein—beständig von der 
Nichtelminierbarkeit des Natürlichen durchkreuzt und vereitelt wird.87 
 
It will be noted that this description of “the absolute Philosophy” is no 
longer based on the necessarily one-sided aspect of the “the logical Idea”: 
the authors are intent on solving die Aporie that threatens the entire System. 
And given the solution they will offer at the end, one needs to read 
carefully in order to see that a statement like the following is true only for 
the end of the Logic:  
 
Vollendet ware die Entwicklung dann wenn die Totalität der Idee erreicht 
ist. Als Totalität kann sie indes nie realisiert sein, insofern Realisierung 
wesentlich das Setzen von partikulären Bestimmungen der Idee bedeutet. 
Das gilt selbst noch für die Bestimmung «absolute Idee»: Als isolierte 
Bestimmung ist auch sie offenbar nur ein «Moment» der Totalität der 
Idee, nicht diese Totalität selbst.88  
 
In fact, this blurring is pervasive. Since “time” only enters the 
Hegelian System at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, the best 
points made by Wandschneider and Hösle often seem at odds with the text:    
 
Es ist dies die Art und Weise, wie sich die logische Idee expliziert: In 
Gestalt der Wissenschaft der Logik etwa, in der die Ideale Totalität des 
                                                
86 Cf. LAKEBRINK, Bernhard, Hegels Metaphysik der Zeit in Studien zur 
Metaphysik Hegels, p. 135-148, Freiburg: Rombach, 1969, p. 146: “Raum und Zeit 
sind nach Hegel nur minimale, ja die minimalsten Entitäten dieser Welt, leere 
Behälter, die auf ihre Erfüllung warten. Sie zu beherrschenden Prinzipien der 
Hegelschen Ontologie zu machen, den Logos selbst zu temporalisieren und zu 
historisieren, wie man das heutzutage versucht, ist einfach absurd.” 
87 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 196. 
88 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 196. 
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Logischen nun diskursiv, in der Sukzession von Zeilen, Seiten, und 
Kapiteln eines Buchtexts zeitlich enfaltet wird. Diese Logik ist ein Werk 
des Geistes, und das heißt eben: sukzessives Auseinanderlegen dessen, 
was an sich außer der Zeit ist, aber der Zeit zur Realisierung seiner 
Bestimmungen bedarf.89 
 
They are correct, of course, because—as I have been arguing—time is the 
suppressed condition for the possibility of the entire process by which each 
Begriff is constituted by one-sided “moments” that drive the process 
forwards. And, as I have already indicated, the authors sometimes seem 
quite close to admitting this.90 But even when a more textual approach 
emphasizes that time enters the picture only with Nature,91 the authors tend 
to defend this view by extra-textual means,92 for example by introducing 
the word “Naturmoment”:  
 
Das hiermit notwendig implizierte Naturmoment aller geistigen Tätigkeit 
ware folglich als Grund jener Irritation zu begreifen, die ein 
Zufallselement in die geistige Entwicklung hineinträgt mit der 
Konsequenz, daß die zeitliche Entfaltung der Idee dadurch nicht mehr in 
ihrer logischen Reinheit, Notwendigkeit, und Vollständigkeit, sondern 
gleichsam verschleiert, deformiert, und verkürzt erscheint.93  
 
In short: the important conclusion that the rest of the System will inevitably 
unfold in time, i.e. in a way that falls short of the completeness of the 
                                                
89 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 198. 
90 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p.188: “Die trennende Tätigkeit des 
Verstandes—der, so Hegel, «verwundersamsten…, der absoluten Macht» 
(Phänomenolgie. 27)—ist unerläßliche Voraussetzung des Denkens, und hier wird 
in der Tat ein zeitlicher Aspekt des Geistes sichtbar.” 
91 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 195: “Derartige Kontingenzen gehen nun 
aber, soweit zu sehen ist, wesentlich auf das Konto jener Natürlichkeit, von der sich 
der Geist wohl prinzipiell losgesagt hat, die aber damit keineswegs getilgt ist. Im 
Gegenteil: Es hatte sich gezeigt, daß es vielmehr zur Bestimmung des Geistes 
gehört, sich äußerlich zu setzen, um die immanente Dialektik auszutragen.” 
92 Another example of this procedure is explained at WANDSCHNEIDER and 
HÖSLE, p. 177: “177: “Zum besseren Verständnis kann es hilfreich sein, jenes 
Prinzip der Veräußerlichung einer inneren Struktur anhand eines «innerlogischen» 
Übergangs zu studieren: Der Fortgang vom «Begriff» zum «Urteil» bietet 
giwissermaßen ein logisches Modell dessen, was sich auf andere ontologischer 
Ebene als «Erschaffung» der Natur aus der Idee—traditionell-theologisch 
«Schöpfung» genannt—vollzieht.” Cf. p. 182 n. 18. 
93 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 195. The passage continues: “Dieses 
Naturmoment, das den Geist nicht in seiner Substanz betrifft, die immanente 
Notwendigkeit seiner Entwicklung aber durch Kontingenzen stört, muß seiner 
Unvermeidlichkeit willen gleichwohl Ernst genommen werden.” 
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Begriff, is here made to depend not only on an extra-textual Naturmoment, 
but on what they call the “Naturmoment aller geistigen Tätigkeit,” i.e. the 
necessarily temporal character of Spirit.94 This is all the more jarring 
because the authors claim at the start that they will rely exclusively on 
“system-immanent Argumentation.”95 On the other hand, they are perfectly 
honest about the gaps in the argument that Hegel has left for them to fill.96 
 The most distinctive feature of Hösle’s97 solution to “the problem of 
time” is to admit that while it enters the System at the beginning of the 
Philosophy of Nature (i.e. in das Naturmoment), time only becomes central 
in—and is indeed constitutive of—the Philosophy of Spirit. He 
accomplishes this result by means of the following analogy: Space : Time :: 
Nature : Spirit.98 What makes this form of argumentation systemimmanent 
is that it is plausible on a formal or structural level without being textual.99 
                                                
94 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 189: “Im Sinne fortschreitender Befreiung 
von der Natur macht es somit eine Entwicklung, durch das zeitliche 
Sichselstoffenbaren des Geistes scheint als der Prozeß seiner Ablösung von der 
Natur verstanden zu können.” 
95 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 173: “Wohlgemerkt: Da es in folgenden 
wesentlich darum geht, zu klären, inwieweit diese Fragen [sc. “Das Verhältnis von 
Idee, Natur, und Geist”] im Rahmen des Hegelschen Systementwurfs selbst 
beantwortbar sind, kann die Argumentation nur systemimmanent sein. Externe 
Motive Hegelschen Denkens, zeitgeschictliche Einflüsse, Hegels philosophische 
Entwicklung usw.: All das sind außerordentlich wichtige Aspekte der 
Hegelauslegung, die aber dort, wo es allein um die innere Konsistenz eines 
philosophischen Systems zu tun ist, nicht nur nicht thematisch, sondern letztlich 
ohne Beweiswert sind.” Notwithstanding, HÖSLE and WANDSCHNEIDER cite 
the relevant connection to SCHELLING at p. 183 n. 19. 
96 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 188 (emphasis mine): “Freilich ist die 
Frage nach der eigentümlichen Leistung des Geistes damit zunächst nur 
verschoben, denn es kann weitergefragt werden: Weshalb gibt es Denken nur in der 
Zeit? Warum ist die dialektische Entfaltung der Idee im denken nicht zeitlos? Bei 
Hegel selbst finden sich diesbezüglich nur sehr indirekte Formulierungen.” 
97 Note that this “solution” plays no part in WANDSCHNEIDER, Dieter, Raum, 
Zeit, Relativität: Grundbestimmungen der Physik in der Perspektive der Hegelschen 
Naturphilosophie, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982. 
98 HÖSLE, Vol. 2, p. 310: “Die Proportion Raum : Zeit = Natur : Geist hat ferner 
die äußerst wichtige systematische Auswirkung, daß Hegel nur der Geist—und 
nicht die Natur—eine Geschichte hat. Die Entwicklung des Geistes findet in der 
Zeit, nicht in Raum statt: «Die Weltgeschichte …ist…die Auslegung des Geistes in 
der Zeit, wie die Idee als Natur sich in Raume aulegt» (12.96f.). Cf. 
WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 187 n. 23: “Allgemein verhält sich, Hegel 
zufolge, der Raum zur Zeit wie die Natur zum Geist.” See p. 97 n. 26 above. 
99 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 187: “Die Analogie von Zeit und Geist ist 
hier zunächst formal aus der Systemstruktur begründet worden.” 
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Naturally Hösle admits that the introduction of time takes place in 
Nature;100 his ingenious move is to link it solely to Spirit:101 
 
Die Proportion Raum : Zeit = Natur : Geist hat ferner die äußerst wichtige 
systematische Auswirkung, daß Hegel nur der Geist—und nicht die 
Natur—eine Geschichte hat.102  
 
Although there is little textual basis for this analogy103—and none for this 
“extremely important consequence”—Hösle certainly does his best with 
what evidence there is.104 The stakes, indeed, are very high and in the 
article, the authors support their claims with considerable eloquence.105 It is 
important to grasp that the final gap between merely “ideal” Begriff and 
necessarily incomplete Realisierung in der Tat depends entirely on Spirit’s 
                                                
100 HÖSLE, Vol. 2, p. 309: “Raum und Zeit sind als die ersten Bestimmungen der 
Naturphilosophie grundlegend für die ganze Realphilosophie, und zwar verhält sich 
nach Hegel der Raum zur Natur ähnlich wie die Zeit zum Geist.” 
101 The decision to link time exclusively to Spirit as opposed to Nature is too 
Kantian for GWFH; see WINFIELD, Space, Time and Matter, p. 55, 57, and 60: 
“Once more, this very formality [sc. “time is as abstract and ideal as space”] leaves 
no room for injecting the very concrete distinctions between objectivity and 
subjective consciousness that Kant will add by treating time as a pure form of 
subjective intuition.”  
102 HÖSLE, Vol. 2, p. 310. Note that this approach denies GWFH any prescience 
where DARWIN is concerned: “Allerdings hat Hegels Zuordnung der Zeit zum 
Geist zur Folge, daß Hegel keine Entwicklung der Natur kennt” (p. 311). See p. 113 
above. 
103 More can be found at BONSIEPEN, Wolfgang. Hegels Raum-Zeit-Lehre; 
dargestellt anhand zweier Vorlesungs-Nachschriften. Hegel-Studien v. 20, p. 9-78, 
1985, see p. 51, 70-73. 
104 HÖSLE, Vol. 2, p. 309: “In der Anmerkung zu §258 vergleicht Hegel den Raum 
mit der Objectivität, die Zeit mit der Subjectivität: «Die Zeit ist dasselbe Prinzip als 
das Ich = Ich des reinen Selbstbewußtseins; aber dasselbe oder der einfache Begriff 
noch in seiner gänzlichen Äußerlichkeit und Abstraktion» (9.49; vgl. 2.348, 3.584, 
12.103). Was kann dies Behauptung, wenn überhaupt, für einen Sinn haben? M.E. 
läßt sie sich aus dem von Hegel mehr implizit vorausgesetzten als explizit 
begründeten «Gesetz der superponierten Formen» erklären, nach dem die 
Mikrostrukturn des Systems dessen Makrostrukturen abbilden. Demnach entspricht 
die Zeit als die erste negative Kategorie der Natur der Negation der Natur als 
ganzer, also dem Geist, während im Raum sich das Wesen der Natur noch in 
völliger Unmittelbarkeit ausdrückt.” HÖSLE supplements his case with some 
remarks about music from the Lectures on Aesthetics (p. 310). Cf. BRAUER, Oscar 
Daniel, Dialektik der Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Metaphysik der 
Weltgeschichte, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1982, p. 152-5. 
105 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 192: “Die Natur ist die ewige Wiederkehr 
des Gleichen, der Geist hingegen Fortschritt in der Zeit, Geschichte.” 
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necessarily historical manifestation. More importantly, once we agree that 
Spirit is necessarily historical,106 the entire System—considered as a 
production of Spirit—must necessarily unfold in time.  
 This particular Auswirkung of the analogy is, of course, extra-textual 
and as such can only weaken the truth-claims of an explicitly 
systemimminant project that aims to save Hegel from die drohende Aporie. 
But it creates an interesting link between the defense offered by Hösle and 
Wandschneider (on the one hand) and the critique I have developed in this 
dissertation. It will be noted that their defense of Hegel depends on the 
same claim upon which my critique is based: time is the basis for the 
Hegelian System. Consider the following passage: 
 
Das sukzessive Sich-für-sich-selber-Offenbaren des Geistes macht bereits 
einen eigentümlichen Prozeßcharakter sichtbar, der sich für alles Geistige 
als konstituiv erweisen wird. Dieses dem Geist immanente Werden, sein 
wesensmäßig geschichtlicher Charakter soll im folgenden näher 
beleuchtet werden.107 
 
All of the expressions used here—“sukzessive Sich-für-sich-selber-
Offenbaren des Geistes”, “eigentümliche Prozeßcharakter…der sich für 
alles Geistige als konstituiv”, “das dem Geist immanente Werden”, and its 
“wesensmäßig geschichtlicher Charakter”— validate my on-going 
argument that time is immanent in the System from the start. 
Wandschneider and Hösle are therefore perfectly correct to emphasize the 
temporal basis of many Hegelian expressions: 
 
Im Zusammenhang mit der konkreteren Begriffsstimmung des Geistes 
finden sich bei Hegel immer wieder zeitliche Prädikate wie «Prozeß», 
«Werden», «Bewegung», «Entwicklung», «Entfaltung», «Fortschritt» 
usw.108 
 
                                                
106 Note that such a notion creates a common ground between GWFH and 
HEIDEGGER. In addition to WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 187 n. 24, see 
DE BOER, Karin. Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with 
Hegel. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 
107 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 186. 
108 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 186. The passage continues: 186: “Hier 
ergibt sich indes eine Schwierigkeit: Prozessualität kommt zunächst einmal dem 
naturhaft Seienden zu, weil und insofern es—im Gegensatz zur Idee—raumzeitliche 
Existenz besitzt. Der Geist aber, so war deutlich geworden, gehört als solcher nicht 
mehr der Natur an…Auch hier gilt, das Hegels eigene Ausführungen mehr oder 
weniger thetisch gehalten sind…Damit soll nicht gesagt sein daß das Problem vom 
Hegelschen Denkansatz her nicht zu klären sei.” 
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 The difference between us is that they are defending Hegel on the basis 
of the same evidence I am using to expose his scandalous solution to “the 
problem of time.”109 The defense offered by Wandschneider and Hösle 
must claim that Hegel simply failed to make explicit the temporal character 
of his project: “Der Prozeßcharakter des Geistes wird zwar immer wieder 
hervorgehoben und bekräftigt, aber eine explizite Begründung sucht man in 
den einschlägigen Texten vergeblich.”110 Naturally I am offering a very 
different account of why these texts cannot be found. In the last analysis, it 
all comes down to das Moment; for all their astute observations about 
“Process,” “Becoming,” “Development”111 etc., Wandschneider and Hösle 
fail to recognize the necessarily temporal implications of “the Hegelian 
Moment.”   
 
Hier ist daran zu erinnern, daß es dem Geist obliegt, die Dialektik der Idee 
zu realisieren. Wie dargelegt, heißt das, daß er die logischen 
Bestimmungen als solche setzen, sie also zunächst einmal festhalten und 
auseinanderhalten muß. Daß dies nicht etwas ist, das sich von selbst 
versteht, ergibt sich daraus, daß in der Sphäre des Logischen ja gerade 
keine isolierten Bestimmungen angetroffen werden, sondern jede, 
entsprechend ihrer dialektischen Natur, mit ihrer Gegenteil behaftet, 
«Moment» in einem übergreifended Zusammenhang ist.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
109 WINFIELD, Space, Time and Motion, p. 60: “Indeed it is time’s constitutive 
reference to space that permits the sequence of the categories of space and time to 
be, like that of all categories in the philosophy of nature, a merely conceptual 
ordering. The move from point to line to plane is not temporal in character because 
it itself involves no continuous differentiation of spatial backdrops. A hopeless 
paradox would, of course, arise if the transtion from space to time were temporal, 
rather than categorical, for then the emergence of time would be preceded by a 
passage of time.” 
110 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 186. 
111 FULDA, Hans Friedrich, Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft 
der Logik (2nd edition), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975, p. 197: 
“Insofern nun das Allgemeine sic him reinen Denken zum Besonderem entwickeln 
soll, ist es daher auf ein Medium angewiesen, eine Ordnung des Früher und 
Später—die Zeit, in welcher die Entwicklung stattfinded kann.” 
112 WANDSCHNEIDER and HÖSLE, p. 189. 
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Part II. Section 2. (II.2) 
The Scandal of Right Hegelianism 
 
 As Hegel would have pointed out, Right Hegelianism can only exist in 
opposition to Left Hegelianism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, on 
the other hand, Right Hegelianism could once again become, at least in 
some sense, Hegelianism simplement. But it could only be a Hegelianism 
that is itself the result of a dialectical movement: it is the negation of a 
negation. Let’s consider the post-Hegel development of Hegelianism as an 
Hegelian Triad: 
 First of all, there was Hegel himself. Thanks to the Problem of Time, 
there were certain internal tensions in this original Hegelianism. These 
tensions gave rise to the Young Hegelians who opposed the closed 
circularity of Hegel’s System. Thus arose the dialectical Moment of 
Reflection: both Left and Right Hegelians claiming to represent the 
exclusive Wesen of Hegelianism. The resolution of this antithesis could 
only be a synthesis of the two antagonistic positions. This synthesis is what 
I will call “New Right Hegelianism” and it will be the subject of Chapter 
11 (II.2.2). It has emerged from the negation of Left Hegelianism but it also 
preserves it as a “moment;” this preservation is what makes it “New.” To 
that extent, then, it is Left Hegelianism. But its opposition to Left 
Hegelianism remains absolute: it has simply found a new way to achieve 
the End of History.  
A few historical remarks are necessary.  
Up until 1918, Right Hegelianism remained a surprisingly plausible 
and defensible position. Despite the rise of dangerous Left Hegelian 
movements—from Social Democracy and Socialism to Bolshevism—the 
status quo demonstrated a truly remarkable resilience. Germany resisted 
Republicanism in 1848 and the French Third Republic was manifestly in 
Germany’s interest. The Kingdom of Prussia had succeeded in creating the 
Second Reich; as Kaiser, its King had—for a second time—made a 
Napoleon serve the German World’s interests. The new Reich’s 1871 
constitution preserved and extended the social and political principles of 
Right Hegelianism in a theoretical sense while the Prince von Bismarck, its 
cunning architect, consistently showed himself, particularly in his 
inconsistencies, to be a master of its practical application. The achievement 
of German Unification through Bismarck’s Realpolitik was pure 
Hegelianism:113 the nationalistic and republican ideals of 1848 bowed to 
                                                
113 Cf. MEINECKE, Friedrich, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (1907) or rather 
Cosmopolitanism and the National State, translated by Robert B. Kimber, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 197: “From this point of view [sc. 
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the rational realities of 1871. The preservation of the monarchical principle 
found its perfect expression in Kaiser Wilhelm the Second who ascended 
the throne in 1888. 
 If Arthur Schopenhauer could only play the role of disgruntled Brahms 
to Hegel’s towering Beethoven, Friedrich Nietzsche, the most famous 
German thinker between Hegel’s death and the First World War, could do 
even less. In 1888, he could still deny that Germany had any philosophers: 
 
One asks: can you point to even a single spirit who counts from a 
European point of view, as your Goethe, your Hegel, your Heinrich 
Heine, your Schopenhauer counted? That there is no longer a single 
German philosopher—about that there is no end of astonishment.114 
 
As if to prove himself right, Nietzsche lapsed into insanity the following 
year: Hegelianism had survived its vituperative critic. Nor is it entirely 
clear that Nietzsche was ever as anti-Hegelian as he claimed to be.115 The 
amor fati of the Übermensch is simply a more accessible version of 
Absolute Knowledge, the “Eternal Return” serves only to make the real 
rational, while the transcendent God of Hegel’s “Unhappy Consciousness” 
had been proclaimed dead long before Zarathustra came along. Nietzsche’s 
self-image as the post-historical “untimely one” is a gross imposture: his 
post-Hegelian individualism owes more to both hope and despair than 
reality.116 And his failure to finish The Will to Power—to create a System 
that consistently puts Becoming first—shows that Hegel had the last laugh. 
 Nor did the outbreak of the World War per se deal a blow to Right 
Hegelianism: quite the contrary.117 The prodigious national War Effort, the 
readiness of a People to sacrifice itself for the State, was a pan-European 
phenomenon. Nothing except a whole-souled commitment to Hegelian 
Sittlichkeit can explain the willingness of a generation to endure the 
                                                                                                   
“the liberation of political thinking from nonpolitical, universalistic ideas” by 
means of “the transition from conjectural to empirical thinking, from ideal and 
speculative to realistic thinking”], Hegel, Ranke, and Bismarck are the three great 
liberators of the state.”  
114 NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols; “We Germans.” 
115 HOULGATE, Stephen, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity, 
West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 2006, p. 345-6. 
116 See HOULGATE, Stephen, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
117 KIESEWETTER, Hubert, Von Hegel zu Hitler; Eine Analyse der Hegelschen 
Machtstaatideologie und der politischen Wirkungsgeschichte des 
Rechthegelianismus, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974, p. 195-201 (“Die 
Hegelianer und der Erste Weltkrieg”). 
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unspeakable horrors of the Western Front.118 It was the hundred-year Peace 
between 1815 and 1914 that had seemed un-Hegelian. The fact that France 
was the only Republic among the major combatants, unless one insists on 
including the Americans, demonstrates just how strong the State remained. 
As Verdun proved, the citizens of the Third Republic were just as 
committed to it as the Germans were. And even the United States were so 
Hegelianized by the experiences of Modern War that only the verb “was” 
now applied to a singular it where a plurality had once been. 
 But this particular War, in which Germany stood almost alone and was 
soundly beaten as a result, was a disaster for Right Hegelianism, at least in 
its original form. Despite the fact that only the certainties of Hegelian 
Sittlichkeit that made it possible for the Germans to fight as long and 
effectively as they did, these proved insufficient in practice. The 
“Dolchstoß” legend was invented to counteract this terrible truth.    
Hegel had deliberately distinguished German Freedom from the merely 
formal Anglo-American alternative. This was one of Right Hegelianism’s 
two great mistakes. Anglo-American Freedom proved itself to be more 
flexible, effective, and powerful than the more compact German model 
Hegel had celebrated: to put it more simply, it won.119 The other great 
mistake was Right Hegelianism’s underestimation of Left Hegelianism. 
The price of giving Germany a second chance to win the War in 1918 was 
allowing Lenin to return to Russia: the result was the Soviet Union. When 
the War was over, it was now Hegel’s “Germanic World” that looked like a 
mere epoch: the future belonged to the Republicans in the West and the 
Left Hegelians in the East. Flexible enough to temporarily ally even with 
Communism, Anglo-America defeated the Right Hegelians of Germany a 
second time.120 Only then, with Germany divided between them, did the 
                                                
118 MEINECKE, Friedrich, Die Deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und 
Erinnerungen, Wiesbaden: E. Brockhaus, 1947, p. 28: “Der deutsche 
Machtstaatsgedanke, dessen Geschichte mit Hegel began, sollte in Hitler eine ärgste 
und verhängnisvollste Steigerung und Ausbeutung erfahren.”  
119 It is unclear how GWFH would have responded to an ad oculos refutation of this 
kind; certainly his critique of Anglo-Americanism is conceptual as well as 
empirical. To some extent, this is the question raised by FUKUYAMA’s 
“Hegelianism,” a topic that will receive attention beloiw. But for what it may be 
worth, I would suggest that it is very unlikely that GWFH could have embraced any 
link between Logical Completeness and liberal, i.e. limited, institutions; thanks 
primarily to the idea of progress and the separation of Church and State, they are 
antithetical.   
120 See STERN, Alfred. Philosophy of History and the Problem of Values. The 
Hague: Mouton, 1962, p. 21: “It is well known that Fascism drew its inspiration 
from the right wing Old-Hegelians, while Communism is the intellectual child of 
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Great War between West and East become both rational and real. And by 
1989, it was becoming clear that Left Hegelianism had lost it. When 
Francis Fukuyama announced “The End of History” in his influential 1989 
article of that name,121 he initiated the rebirth of Right Hegelianism, i.e. the 
birth of “New Right Hegelianism.” Before examining that scandalous 
rebirth, it is useful to consider what Hegel wrote about the Americas, with 
particular attention to his comments on Anglo-American “freedom” 
(Chapter 10; II.2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
the leftist Young-Hegelians. It was said that the two opposing Hegelian factions met 
finally in the mortal embrace of the battle of Stalingrad.” 
121 FUKUYAMA, Francis, The End of History? in The National Interest 16, p. 3-
18, 1989 (hereafter “FUKUYAMA”). 
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Chapter 10. (II.2.1) 
Hegel on the Americas 
  
 Hegel’s comments on the Americas follow the exact same pattern as 
does the Zusatz from the Philosophy of Nature about the stars considered in 
the Introduction: it is only after showing why nothing more is to be 
expected Logically that he allows for a Chronological bis jetzt: i.e. it is only 
at the end of his account that he calls America “the land of the future.”122 
 After a geographical introduction, Hegel introduces the History of the 
New World in explicitly political terms: “With the exception of Brazil, 
republics have come to occupy South as well as North America.”123 To a 
liberal ear, this may sound hopeful: Brazil alone is holding back the march 
of Freedom and Progress. But Hegel was scarcely a Republican. It is not 
merely that Hegel rejects Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” he rejects the form of 
government on which it is based. As we shall see, the only “future” that 
Hegel allows for America will be the abandonment of the republican form 
in order to become a true State, i.e. a Constitutional Monarchy of the type 
that already exists in Europe. But the closest Hegel comes to making an 
actual prediction is his speculation (likewise made at the end of the 
passage) that there may be “a contest between North and South America” 
in the future. For that contest he prepares the reader from the beginning. “In 
comparing South America (reckoning Mexico as part of it) with North 
America, we observe an astonishing contrast.”124 
 The details of this contrast are interesting in their own right, 
particularly because it is very easy to miss Hegel’s meaning. In the account 
of the Americas as a whole, Hegel’s almost exclusive emphasis is on the 
United States of America; i.e. on North America. And this emphasis would 
seem to rest on his prejudice that it is superior to the South. He specifically 
mentions the freedom and prosperity of the North in contrast to the political 
turbulence and the dependence on military force in the South; thus he 
would seem to favor the one and reject the other.125 The same would seem 
                                                
122 Insufficient work has been done on this subject, as indicated by BUCK-MORSS, 
Susan, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2009. 
123 Philosophy of History, p. 83. 
124 Philosophy of History, p. 83. 
125 Philosophy of History, p. 83-4: “In North America we witness a prosperous state 
of things; an increase of industry and population civil order and firm freedom; the 
whole federation constitutes but a single state, and has its political centres. In South 
America, on the contrary, the republics depend only on military force; their whole 
history is a continued revolution; federated states become disunited; others 
previously separated become united; and all these changes originate in military 
revolutions.”  
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to apply to his statement about the religious contrast: Hegel, as a Lutheran, 
would appear to be less sympathetic to the Catholic South than to the 
Protestant North.126 But these appearances are misleading. Hegel quickly 
shows himself to have no more use for the “freedom and prosperity” of the 
North than for its peculiar style of “Protestantism.” In fact, I would suggest 
that the prognosticated “contest between North and South America” has in 
fact already begun: Hegel the defender of War is a secret partisan of the 
South, where “republics depend on military force.” 
 He begins his War with an account of the specific kind of political 
“freedom” encountered in the North America. He describes the “industrious 
Europeans” who first “betook themselves to agriculture”127 and created a 
polity, as it were, as an afterthought. 
 
Soon the whole attention of the inhabitants was given to labor, and the 
basis of their existence as a united body lay in the necessities that bind 
man to man, the desire of repose, the establishment of civil rights, 
security and freedom, and a community arising from the aggregation of 
individuals as atomic constituents; so that the state was merely something 
external for the protection of property.128  
 
The magic word “freedom” is found once again but one instinctively senses 
that, like the Repulsion that governs the stars, it is merely formal. A State 
that is “merely something external” hardly sounds like the kind to promote 
Hegelian Freiheit. And Hegel has already given us, in the Introduction to 
his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, his opinion of “a community 
arising from an aggregation of individuals as atomic constituents.” Before 
continuing with his account of “the land of the future,” it is important to 
consider in detail what he has already said about the kind of freedom to be 
found there. 
 Hegel is introducing the subject of the relationship between the State 
and the Individual. He points out that the individual Subject does not exist 
apart from the political Substance.129  
 
This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational Will: it 
                                                
126 Philosophy of History, p. 84: “South America, where the Spaniards settled and 
asserted supremacy, is Catholic; North America, although a land of sects of every 
name, is yet fundamentally, Protestant.”  
127 Philosophy of History, p. 84: “These were industrious Europeans, who betook 
themselves to agriculture, tobacco and cotton planting, etc.” 
128 Philosophy of History, p. 84. 
129 Philosophy of History, p. 38: “But the subjective will has also a substantial life 
— a reality — in which it moves in the region of essential being, and has the 
essential itself as the object of its existence.” 
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is the moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the 
individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his 
recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the 
Whole.130  
 
This is the true Hegelian Freedom that Tugendhat discovered in the 
paragraph from the Encyclopedia about Sittlichkeit. It must be sharply 
distinguished from another kind of “spurious” Freedom: 
 
And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit 
attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common Will; as if 
this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his 
relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this 
universal limitation — the mutual constraint of all — might secure a 
small space of liberty for each.131  
 
It will easily be recognized that this is “the aggregation of individuals as 
atomic constituents” for whom “the state [is] merely something external for 
the protection of property.” Of the Freedom made possible by this kind of 
arrangement in comparison with true Sittlichkeit, Hegel is clear:   
 
Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality, Government, and they alone, the 
positive reality and completion of Freedom. Freedom of a low and limited 
order is mere caprice; which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular 
and limited desires.132 
 
 With this description in mind, let us return to Hegel’s description of 
economic arrangements in the United States. 
 
Universal protection for property, and a something approaching entire 
immunity from public burdens, are facts which are constantly held up to 
commendation. We have in these facts the fundamental character of the 
community — the endeavor of the individual after acquisition, 
commercial profit, and gain; the preponderance of private interest, 
devoting itself to that of the community only for its own advantage.133 
 
Here Hegel’s enmity is readily apparent: although “constantly held up to 
commendation” by Liberals, the Freedom found in the United States is 
unquestionably of “a low and limited order.” Hegel’s defense of Monarchy 
in the Philosophy of Right (see I.3.3.2) should be kept in mind while 
                                                
130 Philosophy of History, p. 38. 
131 Philosophy of History, p. 38. 
132 Philosophy of History, p. 38. 
133 Philosophy of History, p. 85. 
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attending to his comments on more strictly political arrangements;134 his 
contempt becomes more obvious when he describes the moral practices of 
the republic’s wealthiest citizens.135 
 The attack only gains momentum when Hegel turns to religion. 
Although Hegel has refrained from using the dreaded word “caprice” 
(Willkür) when describing the political arrangements of the United States, 
he does not hold back when he attacks the so-called “Protestantism” to be 
found there. 
 
If, on the one side, the Protestant Church develops the essential principle 
of confidence, as already stated, it thereby involves on the other hand the 
recognition of the validity of the element of feeling to such a degree as 
gives encouragement to unseemly varieties of caprice.136 
   
Hegel evidently enjoys himself in ridiculing a religious environment in 
which every individual has their own,137 where enthusiasts are sent into 
spasms in an endless variety of sects,138 and where, in consequence, the 
Church (regrettably, one assumes) “has no independent existence:”   
 
This complete freedom of worship is developed to such a degree, that the 
various congregations choose ministers and dismiss them according to 
their absolute pleasure; for the Church is no independent existence — 
having a substantial spiritual being, and correspondingly permanent 
external arrangement — but the affairs of religion are regulated by the 
good pleasure for the time being of the members of the community.139 
                                                
134 Philosophy of History, p. 84-85: “If we compare North America further with 
Europe, we shall find in the former the permanent example of a republican 
constitution. A subjective unity presents itself; for there is a President at the head of 
the State, who, for the sake of security against any monarchical ambition, is chosen 
only for four years.”  
135 Philosophy of History, p. 85: “We find, certainly, legal relations — a formal 
code of laws; but respect for law exists apart from genuine probity, and the 
American merchants commonly lie under the imputation of dishonest dealings 
under legal protection.” 
136 Philosophy of History, p. 85. 
137 Philosophy of History, p. 85: “Those who adopt this standpoint maintain, that, as 
everyone may have his peculiar way of viewing things generally, so he may have 
also a religion peculiar to himself.”  
138 Philosophy of History, p. 85: “Thence the splitting up into so many sects, which 
reach the very acme of absurdity; many of which have a form of worship consisting 
in convulsive movements, and sometimes in the most sensuous extravagances.”  
139 Philosophy of History, p. 85; GWFH adds (as if he needed to do so): “In North 
America the most unbounded license of imagination in religious matters prevails, 
and that religious unity is wanting which has been maintained in European States, 
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With this bitter portrait of freedom’s excesses now complete—comparable 
to Plato’s description of Democracy in Book VIII of the Republic140—
Hegel is now ready to make his central point: that the “land of the future” 
has a great deal of catching up to do. An abrupt shift from religion back to 
politics suggests the direction of his attack: 
 
As to the political condition of North America, the general object of the 
existence of this State is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity 
for a firm combination does not yet exist; for a real State and a real 
Government arise only after a distinction of classes has arisen, when 
wealth and poverty become extreme, and when such a condition of things 
presents itself that a large portion of the people can no longer satisfy its 
necessities in the way in which it has been accustomed so to do.141 
 
 It will be seen that Hegel admits that the Future will bring changes to 
the Americas: but those changes hardly challenge the notion of the End of 
History. It was never the Present per se that is Hegel’s τελος; as far as 
politics are concerned, for example, it is the reality of the rational State. 
America has not yet attained even the conditions for the possibility of such 
a State, whose reality has already been realized in the Kingdom of Prussia. 
But the day will come when population growth will saturate the continent 
and the impoverished immigrant will no longer find freedom of movement 
and opportunity in the West.142 Hegel’s predictions are chillingly accurate 
simply because they are not really predictions at all: he is merely applying 
the fully realized Concept143 to America’s geographical potentiality. 
                                                                                                   
where deviations are limited to a few confessions.”  
140 ALTMAN, William H.F. “Platão, Democrata?” Lecture at UFSC; 24 May, 2006. 
141 Philosophy of History, p. 86; emphases mine. 
142 Philosophy of History, p. 86: “But America is hitherto exempt from this 
pressure, for it has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely open, and 
multitudes are continually streaming into the plains of the Mississippi. By this 
means the chief source of discontent is removed, and the continuation of the 
existing civil condition is guaranteed. A comparison of the United States of North 
America with European lands is therefore impossible; for in Europe, such a natural 
outlet for population, notwithstanding all the emigrations that take place, does not 
exist… North America will be comparable with Europe only after the immeasurable 
space which that country presents to its inhabitants shall have been occupied, and 
the members of the political body shall have begun to be pressed back on each 
other.”  
143 Philosophy of Right, p. 183; Zusatz to §279: “If by the phrase “sovereignty of the 
people” is to be understood a republic, or more precisely a democracy, for by a 
republic we understand various empirical mixtures which do not belong to a 
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America’s Future is Europe’s Past: once the farmers are defeated, a real 
State will appear.144 Of course any real State will put an end to the reign of 
caprice that currently guides both religion and politics in the United States: 
if we are prepared to take Hegel’s criticisms seriously, we can already 
glimpse the outlines of a revolutionized State—equipped with an 
established Religion, a Standing Army,145 and a King (or Caesar) at its 
head—that will have finally caught up with the past. And for these reasons, 
the United States of America will already have been defeated in its coming 
contest with the South whether or not it emerges victorious.146  
     Therefore, even though the scene has shifted to the West, the play 
remains the same. As he did before with the stars, Hegel appears to 
acknowledge at the very end that the Future may bring changes that we 
cannot know.147 But he has already indicated that the only change to be 
expected is the inevitable transformation of merely formal Freedom into its 
truly terrifying Hegelian alternative. This ghastly American Future is 
Hegel’s scathing response to Kantianism: the Republic has been 
revolutionized and its goal is now conquest, not “Perpetual Peace.” Hegel 
may well modestly admit that is not the Historian’s job to consider the 
Future; he leaves the New World on that note.148 But it is as a Philosopher 
that Hegel speaks. 
 
                                                                                                   
philosophic treatise, all that is necessary has already been said (§273, note). There 
can no longer be any defense of such a notion in contrast with the developed idea.”  
144 Philosophy of History, p. 86: “North America is still in the condition of having 
land to begin to cultivate. Only when, as in Europe, the direct increase of 
agriculturists is checked, will the inhabitants, instead of pressing outwards to 
occupy the fields, press inwards upon each other—pursuing town occupations, and 
trading with their fellow-citizens; and so form a compact system of civil society, 
and require an organized state.”  
145 This is the last point GWFH considers (see Philosophy of History, p. 86); in 
context, his remarks about America’s lack of a Standing Army are written only in 
the mode of bis jetzt and noch nicht. I am tempted to develop this point further. 
146 On the other hand, since GWFH is astute enough to realize the secret of Great 
Britain’s continued mastery (see Philosophy of History, p. 86), he could have 
assumed that the coming contest with the South could be won without bullets. But 
that’s because he conceived of History as ending with Germanic Caesarism, not 
Britain’s equally bellicose Free Trade. 
147 Philosophy of History, p. 87 (emphasis mine): “Dismissing, then, the New 
World, and the dreams to which it may give rise, we pass over to the Old World—
the scene of the World’s History…”  
148 Philosophy of History, p. 87: “What has taken place in the New World up to the 
present time is only an echo of the Old World—the expression of a foreign Life; 
and as a Land of the Future, it has no interest for us here, for, as regards History, 
our concern must be with that which has been and that which is.”  
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In regard to Philosophy, on the other hand, we have to do with that which 
(strictly speaking) is neither past nor future, but with that which is, which 
has an eternal existence —with Reason; and this is quite sufficient to 
occupy us.149 
 
Hegel’s τελος is not the Present. And for just that reason, mankind has 
nothing to hope from Hegel’s “land of the future.” Nor is there any 
certainty that Kant’s faith will yet triumph over Hegel’s knowledge.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
149 Philosophy of History, p. 87. 
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Chapter 11. (II.2.2) 
The Rebirth of Right Hegelianism 
 
It would be more accurate to say that when Francis Fukuyama 
announced “The End of History” in his influential article of that name, he 
initiated the esoteric rebirth of New Right Hegelianism.150  
The word “esoteric” demands some explanation. Although Leo Strauss 
is not mentioned in “The End of History,”151 his influence can be plainly 
seen there by one who has been taught by Strauss “to read between the 
lines.” It was Strauss who rediscovered exotericism: the idea that political 
philosophers conceal their secret teaching (their esoteric message) between 
the lines and therefore covered by a merely exoteric shell.152 In addition to 
certain Straussian expressions,153 Fukuyama makes his debt to Strauss 
obvious in three major ways. (1) He deliberately bases his approach to 
Hegel on Alexander Kojève, Strauss’s close friend and collaborator,154 (2) 
                                                
150 For a response to FUKUYAMA from a position more sympathetic to GWFH, 
see GRIER, Philip T., The End of History and the Return of History in STEWART, 
Jon (ed.), The Hegel Myths and Legends, p. 183-198, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1996. 
151 See BLOOM, Allen, Responses to Fukuyama, National Interest 16, p. 19-21, 
1989 at p. 21. 
152 See in particular Exoteric Teaching in STRAUSS, Leo, The Rebirth of Classical 
Political Rationalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.  
153 The most obvious linguistic Straussianism is FUKUYAMA’s use of the words 
“one is inclined to say” in the following sentence (p. 14): “One is inclined to say 
that the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the 
impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies.” Compare 
STRAUSS, Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983, p. 34: “One is inclined to say that Heidegger has learned the 
lesson of 1933 more thoroughly than any other man.” Just as it is dangerous for 
FUKUYAMA to be expressing so early in the article a critique of Liberalism, so 
also is it dangerous for STRAUSS to claim what he does about HEIDEGGER, a 
former Nazi who never condemned the Holocaust.   
154 For STRAUSS and KOJÈVE, see STRAUSS, Leo, On Tyranny; Including the 
Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. The 
first time Strauss mentions Kojève in print is in STRAUSS, Leo, The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes; Its Basis and Genesis, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1952 (first published Great Britain in 1936). “M. Alexandre Kojevnikoff 
and the writer intend to undertake a detailed investigation of the connexion between 
Hegel and Hobbes” (p. 58, n. 1). This reference is important: STRAUSS had 
identified HOBBES as the creator of Liberalism (see FUKUYAMA, n. 15) and he 
and KOJÈVE apparently intended to revive GWFH’s critique of HOBBES and 
“state of nature” theory generally, on which see AHLERS, Rolf, The Dialectic in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History in Robert L. Perkins ed., History and System: 
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he acknowledges the help of two prominent Straussians, Allan Bloom (who 
also translated Kojève) and Nathan Tarcov,155 and (3) he writes the article 
as an exoteric text. The last point is the crucial one. 
It is only in the article’s conclusion that Fukuyama makes explicit his 
dissatisfaction with “The End of History.”156 Up until this point, he has 
been showing that Liberalism’s triumph over first Fascism and then 
Communism has brought History to an end. He has expressed his 
dissatisfaction with those competing ideologies in many places. He has 
presented both Hegel157 and Kojève158 as Liberals and has given us very 
                                                                                                   
Hegel’s Philosophy of History, p. 149-166. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1984; p. 162. GWFH’s reversal of HOBBES (see references to M. RIEDEL 
in AHLERS) is echoed in STRAUSS’s 1932 essay “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The 
Concept of the Political” in SCHMITT, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996. SCHMITT joined the Nazi Party the same day 
HEIDEGGER did: 1 May, 1933.   
155 FUKUYAMA p. 3: “This article is based on a lecture presented at the University 
of Chicago’s John M. Olin Center [. Thanks to them] and to Nathan Tarcov and 
Allan Bloom for their support in this and many earlier endeavors.”  
156 FUKUYAMA p. 18: “The end of history will be a very sad time… Even though 
I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization 
that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian 
offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history 
will serve to get history started once again.”  
157 FUKUYAMA p. 4: “For as early as this [sc. 1806] Hegel saw in Napoleon's 
defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the 
French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the 
principles of liberty and equality…To say that history ended in 1806 meant that 
mankind’s ideological evolution ended in the ideals of the French or American 
Revolutions: while particular regimes in the real world might not implement these 
ideals fully, their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon.”   
158 FUKUYAMA p. 5: “Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent 
events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially 
correct. The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point 
that the vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the 
principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done 
after 1806—abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to 
workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc.—the basic principles of 
the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon.” But some of KOJÈVE’s 
real views—views the Liberal reader will assume that FUKUYAMA regards as 
ironic—emerge in the following sentence and the footnote attached to it (p. 5: “For 
Kojève, this so-called “universal homogenous state” found real-life embodiment in 
the countries of postwar Western Europe—precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-
satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing 
more heroic than the creation of the Common Market [n. 3].” Only in the footnote 
does FUKUYAMA make clear that KOJÈVE regards American Liberalism as 
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little reason to doubt that he is one as well. If Fascism and Communism are 
bad, then why does he not welcome the triumph of Liberalism? This proves 
to be a very important question indeed.  
Before answering, it is important to point out that Hegel was not a 
Liberal: Fukuyama is either a fool or a liar for suggesting anything else. In 
fact, Fukuyama is neither.  He is what Strauss calls “a political 
philosopher:” he is very political in the way he goes about philosophy.159 
Liberalism is generally regarded as true—he is in fact proclaiming its 
universal triumph—and therefore he too appears to be its proponent. He 
attacks its enemies, foreign and domestic.160 Although apparently 
celebrating its victory, he is in fact deploring it. In order to celebrate its 
triumph, he claims that he is merely re-celebrating something Hegel 
recognized in 1806. By proclaiming “the End of History,” Hegel showed 
himself to be a Liberal supporter of the French and American Revolutions. 
But Hegel was in fact none of those things. Hegel would have rejected the 
Liberal version of the “end of history” announced by Fukuyama. 
But Fukuyama realizes and skillfully exploits the emotional repulsion 
that “the end of history” inspires. The first time he mentions the doctrine is 
                                                                                                   
objectionable as Russian Communism (p. 5 n. 3): “Kojève alternatively identified 
the end of history with the postwar “American way of life,” toward which he 
thought the Soviet Union was moving as well.” This view is borrowed from 
HEIDEGGER, who STRAUSS regarded as “the only great thinker of our time” (see 
STRAUSS, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 29), see 
HEIDEGGER, Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph 
Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959; p. 37: “From a metaphysical 
point of view, Russia and America are the same; the same dreary technological 
frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man.”     
159 See On Classical Political Philosophy, the third selection in STRAUSS, Leo, 
What is Political Philosophy? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959; p. 93-4: 
“From this point of view [i.e. that up to which the essay as a whole has led; roughly 
speaking, the perspective of ‘Classical Political Philosophy’] the adjective 
“political” in the expression “political philosophy” designates not so much a subject 
matter as a manner of treatment; from this point of view, I say, “political 
philosophy” means primarily not the philosophic treatment of politics, but the 
political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction to 
philosophy—the attempt to lead qualified citizens, or rather their qualified sons, 
from the political life to the philosophic life.”  
160 FUKUYAMA p. 18 (emphasis mine): “The passing of Marxism-Leninism first 
from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology 
of world historical significance. For while there may be some isolated true believers 
left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, the fact that 
there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern, undermines 
completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history.”  
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in the context of Marxism, not Hegelianism.161 And he makes an interesting 
remark (p. 18) about Marxism’s appeal:  
 
The passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the 
Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical 
significance…the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a 
going concern, undermines completely its pretensions to being in the 
vanguard of human history (emphasis mine). 
 
As long as a movement is generally regarded as “the vanguard of 
progress,” it is strong. Fukuyama is showing that it is Liberalism—not 
Fascism or Communism—that deserves to be considered this. Fukuyama 
would seem to be teaching Liberalism to regard itself as strong: it is only at 
the end of his article that he forces us to go back and reconsider his true 
purpose. 
The key figure, of course, is Hegel. In addition to concealing Hegel’s 
anti-Liberalism, his contempt for economic individualism of the Anglo-
American type, Fukuyama also conceals Hegel’s antagonism to “Perpetual 
Peace.” Fukuyama devotes no little effort to showing why wars between 
Great Powers will disappear at “the End of History.”162 This is hardly 
Hegel’s position: in fact, when Fukuyama finally comes to deploring “the 
end of history,” he us echoing precisely Hegel’s attack on “Perpetual 
Peace.” For neither Hegel nor Fukuyama is War an absolute evil. He 
therefore appears to be reviving Hegel’s vision but he does so in terms that 
are diametrically opposed to that vision. This raises the decisive question: 
is Fukuyama opposed to the End of History per se or simply the Liberal 
version of it that neither he nor Hegel approves? I suggest it is only the 
latter: Fukuyama is in fact ridding Right Hegelianism of its most 
embarrassing claim and attaching that “claim”—in the form of an 
achievement—to the Liberal enemy. Fukuyama’s new version of Right 
Hegelianism—masquerading as the celebration of Liberalism—is merely 
the exoteric cover for something quite different. But what then is 
Fukuyama’s esoteric message? The answer, unfortunately, is to be found in 
his description of Fascism.  
                                                
161 FUKUYAMA (p. 4): “The notion of the end of history is not an original one. Its 
best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical 
development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, 
and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that 
would finally resolve all prior contradictions.” 
162 See his extended discussion of Charles KRAUTHAMMER (FUKUYAMA p. 
15-6). 
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The first thing that Fukuyama chooses to tell the reader about Fascism 
is that it rejects Liberalism for much the same reasons that he eventually 
does.163  
 
In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, 
those of fascism and of communism. The former [n. 11] saw the political 
weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as 
fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved 
by a strong state that forged a new “people” on the basis of national 
excessiveness.  
 
In the footnote to this passage, Fukuyama begins by ridiculing the excesses 
of anti-Fascists.164 He then offers his own definition of the term: 
 
“Fascism” here denotes any organized ultra-nationalist movement with 
universalistic pretensions—not universalistic with regard to its 
nationalism, of course, since the latter is exclusive by definition, but with 
regard to the movement’s belief in its right to rule other people. 
 
Unfortunately, Fukuyama’s description leaves room for an ultra-nationalist, 
belligerent, and arrogant State whose “universalistic pretensions” are 
expressed in terms of spreading Liberalism. In other words, if Liberalism is 
widely believed to be the End of History, an ultra-nationalist State that 
exports it by force would have an exoteric Liberal exterior but a Fascist 
esoteric core.165 Unfortunately, it hardly required much imagination while 
writing this sentence in 2006 to conceive that such a State could actually 
come into being. In any case, Fukuyama’s discussion of Fascism offers 
those of us who are Liberals little comfort: his central objection to it is 
simply that it failed (p. 9):  
                                                
163 FUKUYAMA p. 18: “The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's 
life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth 
daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic 
calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and 
the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.” 
164 FUKUYAMA (p. 9 n. 11): “I am not using the term “fascism” here in its most 
precise sense, fully aware of the frequent misuse of this term to denounce anyone to 
the right of the user.” This should be compared with STRAUSS’s reductio ad 
Hitlerum: he rejects the idea that a view should be rejected simply because HITLER 
held it (see STRAUSS, Leo, Natural Right and History, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953, p. 42-3). Both STRAUSS and FUKUYAMA ward off in 
advance the charge of Fascism. There is a reason for that.  
165 FUKUYAMA feels compelled to conceal this alternative (p. 9 n. 11: “Obviously 
fascist ideologies cannot be universalistic in the sense of Marxism or liberalism, but 
the structure of the doctrine can be transferred from country to country.”    
 211 
 
Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a 
defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of 
the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal 
moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse 
the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of 
success.  
 
Here again is “the wave of the future” motif seen earlier in Fukuyama’s 
discussion of Communism as “the vanguard of progress.” Only an ideology 
that it can present itself in this light can succeed. Today, it is only 
Liberalism that can present itself in that light. Therefore, instead of 
following Heidegger and Kojève in rejecting Communism or Liberalism as 
fostering Nietzsche’s “Last Man,” Fukuyama is suggesting that only a form 
of Fascism that can present itself as advancing the inevitable hegemony of 
Liberalism can succeed where the previous version failed. 
 But the key that unlocks an exoteric text is its internal contradictions, 
as Strauss showed in his 1941 “Persecution and the Art of Writing.”166 In 
the passage just quoted, Fukuyama first tells us that Fascism “was 
destroyed as a living ideology by World War II.” In the very next sentence, 
he adds that this military defeat “amounted to a defeat of the idea as well.” 
But then he points out that it was precisely not the idea of Fascism that was 
rejected: he emphasizes that there “was not universal moral revulsion 
against it [i.e. “fascism as an idea”], since plenty of people were willing to 
endorse the idea.” But their willingness to support it was contingent on its 
success. All that prevents Fascism from once again becoming “a living 
idea” (since there are many who, along with Fukuyama, share Fascism’s 
contempt for “the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of 
community of the West”) is to find a way for it to present itself as “the 
wave of the future.”167 Lest we underestimate Fascism, Fukuyama then 
adds this curious sentence (p. 9):  
 
After the War, it seemed to most people that German fascism as well as 
its other European and Asian variants were bound to self-destruct. 
 
Fukuyama does not say that this majority (“most people”) was correct, 
especially because he has already made it clear that Fascism did not “self-
                                                
166 Reprinted in STRAUSS, Leo, Persecution and the Art of Writing, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952. 
167 BLOOM, Allen, Responses to Fukuyama, p. 21: “I would suggest that fascism 
has a future, if not the future. Much that Fukuyama says points in that direction. 
The facts do too.” Of course BLOOM mentions “the American Left,” not the 
Republican Right, in this connection. 
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destruct.” It therefore becomes difficult to explain why he adds this 
sentence except on the hypothesis that he is calling attention to the 
possibility that—at least in some new variant—it is still “a living 
ideology.” He continues (p. 9): 
 
There was no material reason why new fascist movements could not have 
sprung up again after the war in other locales, but for the fact that 
expansionist ultra-nationalism, with its promise of unending conflict 
leading to disastrous military defeat, had completely lost its appeal 
[emphasis mine]. 
 
Here Fukuyama confirms our suspicions: the only reason that “new 
fascist movements” have not in fact “sprung up again after the war in other 
locales” is that Fascism was discredited by its military defeat. There is 
nothing objectionable about “expansionist ultra-nationalism, with its 
promise of unending conflict” per se: 168 what is objectionable is that this 
project was militarily defeated. But it was defeated only because it lost its 
ability to persuade the majority that it was “the wave of the future.” 
Fukuyama is offering his neo-conservative peers a blueprint for pressing 
their attack on Liberalism: present the United States (under anti-Liberal 
leaders) as spreading Liberalism and you will appear to be the vanguard of 
progress. Then you can be as ultra-nationalist (and apparently religious) as 
you want. And “unending conflict” can continue. As a result, we have 
returned—by a most circuitous route—to Hegel’s true intentions, and 
Fukuyama’s.   
 It is therefore not the political basis of Hegel’s “End of History” that 
Fukuyama is rejecting: by attaching it to Liberalism and the hideous 
triumph of Nietzsche’s “Last Man,”169 he turns Hegel’s most embarrassing 
doctrine into a remarkably effective polemical bludgeon. Fukuyama’s 
innovation is the realization that a Liberal version of “the End of History” 
can be put to use within the Hegelian context as an exoteric cover. Hegel 
had already used words like “Freedom” and “Progress”—the watchwords 
of bourgeois Liberalism—for a similar purpose. But the twin defeats of 
                                                
168 Consider FUKUYAMA’s careful wording in the following sentence (p. 16; 
emphases mine): “But in retrospect it seems that Hitler represented a diseased by-
path in the general course of European development, and since his fiery defeat, the 
legitimacy of any kind of territorial aggrandizement has been thoroughly 
discredited.” 
169 This point is developed in FUKUYAMA, Francis, The End of History and the 
Last Man (1992). For the Fascist appropriation of NIETZSCHE’s Last Man, see 
HEIDEGGER and STRAUSS, conveniently brought together at STRAUSS, Studies 
in Platonic Political Philosophy, p. 34, n. 3.  
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Germany in the 20th Century had made a “New Right Hegelianism”170 
necessary while the defeat of Left Hegelianism finally made it possible. In 
this new version, Anglo-American Freedom has both postponed and 
provided camouflage for Hegel’s “End of History.”171 By committing itself 
to universalizing Freedom by force while entering into “unending conflict” 
with those States still “mired in history,”172 the New World will eventually 
catch up to the Old. And as the previous chapter showed, this was always 
Hegel’s intent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
170 For the Left Hegelian analogue, cf. “a post-Hegelian Hegelianism” at 
BURBIDGE, John W., Hegel’s Open Future in BAUR, Michael and RUSSON, 
John (eds.), Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in Honour of H.S. Harris, p. 176-189, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997, p. 187.   
171 GWFH lays the theoretical foundation of this practical application in the “not 
yet” of the majority’s ignorance of History’s End (see I.3.2.3 above). 
172 FUKUYAMA (p. 15, emphasis mine): “What are the implications of the end of 
history for international relations? Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains 
very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to 
come.”  
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Part II. Section 3. (II.3) 
The Scandal of Left Hegelianism 
 
 To the extent that Left Hegelianism is more attractive than Right 
Hegelianism, it is also less Hegelian. But if Right Hegelianism reveals 
more about Hegel’s own intentions, Left Hegelianism reveals more about 
the unsolved problem at the core of Hegel’s thinking, i.e. “The Problem of 
Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.”  
 This section contains what I regard as the most important findings of 
this dissertation. In the simplest terms, the emergence of Left Hegelianism 
reveals that Hegel, having suppressed Time in his own Logically Complete 
system, was fittingly rewarded by the re-emergence of the Future in 
“Young Hegelians” like Karl Marx. In this inevitable re-emergence, Left 
Hegelianism reveals the scandal implicit in Hegel’s own spurious solution 
to “the problem of time.” In explaining this re-emergence, I will refer to the 
Freudian concept “the return of the repressed” (Chapter 14; II.3.3). I want 
to emphasize from the start that I have no interest in Hegel’s 
psychobiography: it is not “Hegel” himself but rather the Hegelian System 
that is ripe for a Freudian analysis.  
 In Chapter 12 (II.3.1), Daniel Berthold-Bond’s astute defense of a Left 
Hegelian Hegel will set the stage for the alternative I propose: a bifurcated 
Hegel, i.e. one whose unconscious motivations, at odds with his conscious 
intent, makes him ripe for Freudian analysis. Although Berthold-Bond’s 
reading reverses these two aspects—it is not the End of History to which 
his Hegel is consciously committed—his analysis paves the way for this 
dissertation’s most important conclusion. The locus of the latter is Hegel’s 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy and his criticisms of Plato both there 
and in his Philosophy of Right. I will show in Chapter 13 that Hegel 
projects (it is here that Freud first becomes useful) his own dilemma with 
perfect precision onto Plato. Just as Hegel’s Plato did everything that he 
could do to repress the world-historical emergence of “the free infinite 
personality,” so also Hegel’s Philosophy of History reveals the lengths to 
which Hegel would go to repress the emergence of Time, the condition for 
the possibility of the 19th Century’s evolutionary and progressive Zeitgeist 
and the unconscious basis of his own achievements.  
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Chapter 12. (II.3.1) 
Self-Deception in Hegel 
 
 Unlike most Left Hegelian approaches to what Daniel Berthold-Bond 
calls the “The Question of Completion,” his does not try to avoid the 
central problem: 
 
There is no room for dispute that Hegel speaks of the “end of history” and 
the “conclusion” of the development of spirit in Absolute Knowledge. 
What is open to dispute is what Hegel means by this.173   
                
This honesty is most refreshing and it leads him to succinctly state the 
problem as a dilemma:  “…either Hegel’s eschatological vision is of an 
absolute end, where no further progress in history or knowledge is possible, 
or it is an epochal conception, where the completion he speaks of is the 
recurring fulfillment of successive historical epochs, leaving the future 
open to progress.”174 His own thoughtful answer is judiciously indicated by 
the title of the section in which he raises the issue: he calls it “The 
Ambiguity.”175 The title is apt: Berthold-Bond recognizes “…a real 
ambivalence and ambiguity in Hegel’s philosophy.”176 Rather than make an 
effort to play down this ambiguity, he emphasizes it as “an internal 
tension.”177 Despite it, however, he is prepared to argue for a Left Hegelian 
reading: 
 
While I am convinced that a faithful interpretation of Hegel can only 
result in a confirmation of his ambivalence, still, I feel that preference 
should be given to the reading which emphasizes the epochal, 
dialectically open-ended pole of the ambivalence as against the absolutist 
pole.178 
 
An intelligent defense of an epochal reading, one that does not deny “the 
internal tension” underlying “the ambiguity,” is badly needed because an 
absolutist approach destroys the “dialectical principle:” the essence of 
Hegel’s thought. 
 
                                                
173 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 115. 
174 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 115. 
175 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 114-18. 
176 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 115 
177 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 115: “For the ambiguity represents an internal tension 
in Hegel’s philosophy between two goals which he seems to find equally important 
but which stand in complete conflict with each other.”  
178 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 116. 
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This [sc. an epochal reading] is desirable because once the dialectical 
principle is removed (as it unavoidably is under the absolutist reading 
where the strife of becoming is finally overcome), we have removed the 
very soul of Hegel’s anatomy of spirit, effecting a sort of philosophical 
lobotomy.179 
 
In addition to his unusual honesty, the thing that makes Berthold-
Bond’s approach so original is its nuanced reliance on Hegel’s Christianity.  
Although admitting the idiosyncrasy of his unorthodox views, Berthold-
Bond takes Hegel’s Christian imagery seriously and, on that basis, argues 
that “Hegel’s specifically Christian eschatology is central to his conception 
of the End or completion of knowledge and history.”180 But there is an 
important difference: while Christian eschatology takes place “beyond 
history,”181 Hegel’s unorthodox version doesn’t: 
 
Hegel’s Christianity is quite idiosyncratic, however, and he does not 
simply take over the Christian vision of the “end of the world” and the 
creation of the New Jerusalem, but has an unorthodox historical 
interpretation of the eschatological end. As we shall see, it is precisely 
because of this unorthodoxy that Hegel is not necessarily committed to 
the common Christian reading of an apocalyptic End—an absolute close 
of history—but can also be read as proposing a nonabsolutist, epochal 
conception of the End.182  
 
Hegel’s transformation of Christian eschatology—whereby the τελος can 
now occur in history—next allows Berthold-Bond to incorporate a frankly 
post-Christian vision of the future taken from Karl Löwith.183  
 
This means, according to Löwith, that there is no End of historical time 
per se, and when Hegel speaks of the completion of history, he is really 
intending to refer to “the end of the history of the Christian logos.” This 
                                                
179 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 116. 
180 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 117. Cf. FREY, Christopher, Reflexion und Zeit: Ein 
Beitrag zum Selbstvertändnis der Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung vor allem 
mit Hegel, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1973, p. 403-13. 
181 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 120: “It is from this basic tenet of Christian 
eschatology, that there is no historical hope for man but that the salvation and 
redemption of man will occur only at the End of history, or “beyond history,” that 
Hegel’s vision of the consummation of the Christian telos departs.”   
182 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 117. 
183 BERTHOLD-BOND discusses LÖWITH, Karl, Von Hegel bis Nietzsche on p. 
126-28.   
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implies that Hegel views Christianity as something to be superseded 
itself…184  
 
Although Berthold-Bond finds Löwith’s post-Christian reading “tempting” 
because, as he writes, “only under an epochal reading of Hegel’s language 
of completion can we salvage the metaphysics of becoming which makes 
his anatomy of spirit intelligible,”185 he is clearly hesitant to accept it; he 
takes Hegel’s Christianity too seriously. But his primary loyalty is to “the 
metaphysics of becoming” and he is therefore willing to let Löwith point 
the way towards an epochal reading whereby a tension continues to exist 
between Hegel’s preservation of Christian eschatology on the one hand and 
the possibility of a post-Christian epoch on the other.186  
 
If we are to accept Löwith’s reading, as I believe we should, it is 
important to explicitly recognize that it is a reading which stands in 
fundamental tension with the other (apocalyptic) side of Hegel’s 
ambivalence, a side which in fact got the better of him in his directly 
theological musings on history.187 
 
In other words, Berthold-Bond is the mirror-image of Hegel: just as the 
absolutist aspect of Christian eschatology “got the better of him” (i.e. 
Hegel), so also does Löwith’s post-Christian vision of the end of the 
Christian epoch first “tempt” and then persuade, although not without 
considerable misgiving, Berthold-Bond.188  In fact, the most interesting 
aspect of Berthold-Bond’s argument is his insistence on Hegel’s irreducible 
ambivalence: an ambivalence that is clearly more consistent with open-
endedness than final conclusion.189  
                                                
184 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 124. 
185 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 127. 
186 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 118: “…we look in vain for an unambiguous 
formulation of his [sc. GWFH’s] eschatological vision, precisely because he is torn 
in two opposing directions by conflicting desiderata of his philosophy.”  
187 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 128; emphasis mine. 
188 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 128 (emphases mine) leaves the reader in no doubt as to 
how he is able to conquer his own ambivalence. “Hegel fell under the spell of the 
Christian description of the ultimacy of its own Logos, and as a result he 
compromised his Heraclitean metaphysics, against all of his own principles. If we 
wish to accept an epochal reading such as Löwith’s, we must correct it by seeing 
how it is in fact a rereading and reconstruction of Hegel’s eschatology, which is 
necessary to recover the integrity of the Hegelian dialectic from the spell of the 
radical End which crippled it.”  
189 If this is BERTHOLD-BOND’s argument (and not mine) he never makes it with 
sufficient clarity. But it’s an interesting argument and clearly inspired by his 
approach. 
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 In fact, Berthold-Bond’s argument has both its strong and weak points, 
and this is consistent with his balanced presentation. He writes well about 
the Tilgung of Time190 but then seems to promptly miss the point that 
Time’s existence is problematic in Hegel.191 He never considers that his 
emphasis on Erinnerung leads to Hyppolite’s concept of “the immanence 
of history” and he defends his open-ended view with at least one troubling 
analogy.192 But the heart of his argument is interesting and is developed 
through an analysis of four passages; it is only here that the scales finally 
dip in favor of his epochal reading. 
 
But I will argue that they [sc. the Golgotha passage from the 
Phenomenology and two others that make reference to a “new world”] 
will also show—particularly when read with the third “new world 
passage, from the Preface to the Phenomenology—that one side of the 
ambiguity has stronger claims than the other, if consistency with the 
principles of Hegel’s dialectic is to be taken as the criterion of judging.193  
 
Even in his analysis of these passages, Berthold-Bond preserves the 
sense of balance: for each passage he offers both an absolutist and an 
epochal reading.194 But it is in this context of contrasting arguments that he 
introduces his strongest suggestion: that the achievement of the τελος, 
Absolute Knowledge, is in itself transformative and therefore opens up a 
new epoch in history. He states it with caution: 
 
                                                
190 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 129: “By this interpretation, the “annulment of time” 
refers to the eternal form of concepts, what Hegel calls the “inward” (innerlich) 
form of thought as opposed to its “outer” or “external” (äußerlich) form. This 
inward form of thought is precisely the Er-innerung in which past shapes of “outer” 
historical existence become grasped as comprehended history. In this sense, when 
knowledge has (epochally) overcome the antithesis between its thought and its 
objects, its concepts become comprehended in their eternal significance.” He 
doesn’t seem to grasp that for GWFH, Time itself is merely äußerlich although he 
is close. 
191 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 129-30 (emphasis mine): “Christianity is the End or 
telos of human history in the sense that it expresses the ultimate purpose and 
meaning of spirit, but this too must be subject to the world of time, the world of 
change: this purpose and meaning must be worked out and evolved in history.” In 
other words, he needs Time to survive the τελος. 
192 Consider his comparison of GWFH’s to “Marx’s eschatology” (BERTHOLD-
BOND, p. 130): “If Marx is able to speak of a “resolution” of history which still 
allows for historical development, why shouldn’t we permit Hegel to do the same?” 
The answer to this question is that MARX was the only Left Hegelian of the two! 
193 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 133 (emphasis mine). 
194 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 135-38. 
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On the other hand, Hegel may mean that the “outer existence” of spirit—
the historical being of man immersed in the world of praxis—is 
transformed by the speculative comprehension of its past, and itself gains 
a new existence, a new shape, a new world, by this begreifendes 
Erkennen of its history.195  
 
Following Hyppolite’s suggestion that Absolute Knowledge is really the 
Erinnerung (“recollection”) of History, he moves outward, towards the 
future, instead of inward, towards the “immanence of history,” as 
Hyppolite himself had done.  
 
And rather than understanding recollection as a final, transhistorical 
redemption of spirit from this via dolorosa [of the Golgotha passage], I 
would like to see it as an episodic way station, a comprehension of the 
meaning of an epoch, which is made possible only as that epoch reaches 
its consummation, but which always bears within it the seed of a new 
world. By this reading, recollection will not only be a sort of memorial of 
the past but an anticipation of the future, a redemption or resurrection of 
spirit into a new birth in historical time.196  
 
By the time he comes to the Preface of the Phenomenology, he dispenses 
with the paired arguments: “This passage is frankly and straightforwardly 
anticipatory, a looking-forward to a new era in history.”197 Even here, 
however, he doesn’t lose the balanced approach: it is the ambiguity of 
Hegel’s position that he wants to emphasize.198 
 And that is doubtless why he chooses to reveal his own position in a 
section called “Pro and Con.” There is no bravado in Berthold-Bond’s Left 
Hegelianism: it is chastened, serious, thoughtful, and laborious. We cannot 
simply repudiate the absolutist reading, we must rather solemnly sacrifice 
                                                
195 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 136; emphases mine. It will be noticed that he presents 
the absolutist reading of the three passages first and only then his own epochal 
version. 
196 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 137. 
197 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 140. See PhG, p. 6. He doesn’t mention the possibility 
that it is anticipatory only of GWFH’s own achievement of Absolute Knowing—
and therefore the sensitive reader’s as well—coming at the end of the book. 
198 And continues to do so in the section called “Pro and Con” (BERTHOLD-
BOND, p. 140-43) especially at p. 140: “While I have been arguing that Hegel’s 
eschatological vision of the completion of history and knowledge can best be 
understood as referring to the epochal consummation rather than to the absolute 
conclusion of spirit, I have also maintained that the ambiguity between these two 
readings is not ultimately resolved in his philosophy.”  
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it.199 Nor can we delude ourselves into thinking that Hegel himself is a Left 
Hegelian: we must take responsibility for helping him to become one. But 
we do not do so arbitrarily. It is not only because Hegel himself is 
ambivalent but also because the finer part of himself is on the epochal and 
open-ended, not on the absolutist side. 
 
…if being and history are to reach a radical consummation, an “absolute 
final end,” they would at once undermine the very conditions that animate 
the world-spirit. The final satisfaction of being and history would be the 
final death of spirit. This is why I feel we must sacrifice Hegel’s desire to 
portray an absolute, radical, consummation of knowledge and history and 
being, and seek the value of his philosophy in an epochal conception of 
the development of Geist. Only such a sacrifice can avoid the deeper, 
paralyzing sacrifice of the dialectical soul of Hegel’s philosophy.200  
 
The reader must help Hegel to affirm what is living in his own thought, not 
what is dead. 
In order to help the reader to better grasp his own extremely sensitive 
and nuanced position, Berthold-Bond next offers an interesting review of 
the scholarly treatment of the problem. In “Other Views” (p. 143-154), he 
discusses “The Literal (Absolutist) Interpretation,”201 “Epochal 
                                                
199 He literally calls for “a sacrificial renunciation of Hegel’s absolutism” 
(BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 143).  
200 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 143; emphasis in original. The first part of this passage 
I have deleted because it refers to arguments made earlier in the book. I will include 
it here, however: “As with knowledge, which in order to be radically complete 
would have to destroy the very conditions of its own possibility, so too with being 
and history—” (p. 142-43). In short, Berthold-Bond tries to show that dialectical 
progress can never come to rest. 
201 The first of these sections is the weakest: in order to suggest that the Left 
Hegelian reading is that of an embattled minority, he presents the absolutist reading 
as traditional. This leads him to put forward some bizarre representatives of this 
kind of reading.  Berthold-Bond’s emphasis on KIERKEGAARD in this sub-
section, for example, (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 143-44) is somewhat odd: it is 
precisely GWFH’s failure to complete the System that KIERKEGAARD 
emphasizes and appears to attack. And using MARX and ENGELS (p. 144)—who 
rejected this very completion in principle as spokesmen for the ‘Literal 
Interpretation’—is also problematic: they are hardly elucidating why Hegel believed 
in the End of History. Jean HYPPOLITE is here (p. 144), curiously joined with the 
more representative conservatives: Eric VOEGELIN (p. 144-45), Alexander 
KOJÈVE (p. 145), and the Straussian Stanley ROSEN (p. 145; notice that KOJÈVE 
as well was an intimate of STRAUSS; these are Francis FUKUYAMA’s intellectual 
forebears). Citing François CHÂTELET (p. 145) is an imposture for the same 
reason that citing MARX and ENGELS was. See in particular n. 28 (p. 206-07): 
most of those mentioned are trying, like BERTHOLD-BOND himself, to salvage a 
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Interpretations, Hesitant and Otherwise,” and finally “Attempts at a 
Synthetic Interpretation.”202 It is the second of these three sections that is 
most relevant to Left Hegelianism, despite the fact that there are many Left 
Hegelians included among those discussed in the other two sections as 
well. Here Berthold-Bond makes a distinction between those who arrive at 
his own epoch reading “too quickly” and those who begin to show the same 
sort of hesitation that he himself does.203 In this second sub-set, Berthold-
Bond shows the most sympathy for Robert Solomon, who can see “two 
different Hegels.”204 But even the “hesitant” are not nearly hesitant 
enough.205 Among the most interesting passages in the book are those in 
which Berthold-Bond discusses Hegel in relation to Fichte206 and historical 
relativism;207 although he admits that neither are really refuted if we 
embrace the epochal reading he advocates, he still maintains an impressive 
                                                                                                   
usable core from the End of History: this is Left Hegelianism. As for Charles 
TAYLOR (p. 145), BERTHOLD-BOND simply gets it wrong. See TAYLOR, p. 
425-26. 
202 The representatives of this group are Emil FACKENHEIM (who doesn’t address 
the issue directly) and J.N. FINDLAY (p. 150). BERTHOLD-BOND finds an 
interesting quotation in FINDLAY: “Hegel will, however, marvelously include in 
his final notion of the final state of knowledge the notion of an endless progress that 
will have no further term” (p. 153). Thus Findlay finds “only a superficial 
ambiguity” (p. 152) and “essentially collapses into the nonabsolutist version of the 
completion, rather than being a true synthesis of the absolutist and nonabsolutist 
poles” (p. 154). 
203 Karl LÖWITH, Herbert MARCUSE, and Quentin LAUER (p. 146) “…adopt the 
nonabsolutist interpretation all too quickly” as opposed to those who “show a great 
deal of hesitancy in developing their nonabsolutist, epochal reading:” these are 
Robert SOLOMON and Shlomo AVINERI (p. 147). 
204 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 149.  
205 SOLOMON (p. 149) “…draws back from actually advocating the epochal 
interpretation he emphasizes, and hence “celebrates” the Heraclitean Hegel more as 
a matter of inclination than philosophic commitment” while Avinieri’s “…proposal 
finally collapses into the epochal reading without coming fully to grips with the 
absolutist interpretation” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 150). 
206 See his extensive comments on FICHTE at BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 156-57. 
“We must, I think, conclude that Hegel’s opposition to Fichte does in fact backfire 
to a certain extent—that his criticism of the Fichtean vision of the infinitely 
progressive character of spirit is in many ways applicable to his own version of the 
“eternal creation” of spirit. This is the cost of adopting the epochal interpretation of 
completion, and it would be foolish to try to explain it away.”  He also points out 
that GWFH’s attack on the “spurious” infinite was directed largely against FICHTE 
(BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 141). 
207 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 158: “There is, I believe, no way for Hegel to avoid a 
certain sort of historical relativism, if he is at the same time to remain faithful to his 
metaphysics of becoming.”  
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commitment to his own nuanced position.208 But his primary loyalty is to 
the Dialectic209 and he makes a case that we must embrace what is living, 
not what is dead in the Hegelian System.210 Even if Absolute Knowledge is 
an End, it is a transformative End.211 And it is the form of the Dialectic 
itself that must make us give our assent to the epochal reading: the engine 
that got us to the problem in the first place must be allowed to continue on 
its way.212 
                                                
208 Although he does answer the charges quite well; on FICHTE, he writes: “And it 
is just Hegel’s notion of history as an epochal development, where each epoch can 
achieve its “principle” or telos, that allows him to vindicate knowledge from the 
kind of infinitely unrealizable project that he views Fichte’s conception of 
knowledge as condemning us to” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 157). And on historical 
relativism, he distinguishes GWFH’s from William Graham SUMNER’s and John 
DEWEY’s (p. 158-59). Nor does he open the door very wide to an approach like 
FOUCAULT’s: “Since history is the theater of the progressive unfolding of reason, 
each epoch represents what Hegel calls a Gestalt of spirit, and the fulfillment of the 
principle of that Gestalt gives rise to a “new world” or new shape of spirit. Hence 
knowledge is relative to the “principle” of the epoch. But there is a continuity 
between Gestalten, where each stage “is a link in the whole chain of spiritual 
development” (HPh 2:45)” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 159). In Les Mots et les 
Choses, these connections vanish. 
209 This is repeatedly emphasized: “Hence, if we are to retain the integrity of the 
Hegelian dialectic, we should opt for his nonabsolutist, open-ended, epochal 
eschatology” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 155; emphasis mine). “Hegel’s ideal of a 
radical completion to knowledge and being must be set aside, I have argued, in 
order to retain and affirm the integrity of his dialectic” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 
156).  
210 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 155: “If the grand synthesis of thought and being were 
finally to dispense with this dialectical soul, and so alter the metabolism of its life 
as to achieve a final “repose” of spirit, a harmony of thought and being which 
contradicted the dynamic definition of each of its terms, then we would be left with 
a dead synthesis—for all satisfaction brings a natural death.”  
211 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 160: “Our knowledge develops as our world is 
transformed and altered by our historical experience, and hence knowledge is in a 
fundamental sense always incomplete—for knowledge, being historically grounded, 
always has a future development on the horizon—but the course of development is 
itself guided by a universal and eternal Logos, nous, reason, spirit.” Thus the 
(Christian) Logos can remain eternal but be so in History. 
212 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 160 (emphasis mine): “It is this unifying, synthesizing, 
reconciling form of reason which is eternal, and which makes the epochs of history 
a single whole or system. While this whole or system is open-ended, it is yet a 
whole, for the very impulse to development which ensures that it will be open-
ended is an impulse of reason which remains constant through the perpetual course 
of transition.” I suppose such a self-contradiction was unavoidable. 
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Having followed the sinuous course of Berthold-Bond’s argument, I 
would now like to introduce an alternate resolution to “the ambiguity” he 
has astutely recognized in Hegel’s thought, a resolution that the following 
chapter will vindicate. There are, in Robert Solomon’s telling phrase, “two 
Hegels.” But unlike Berthold-Bond, I regard the unattractive Hegel—the 
one who celebrates “the closed circle of science”—as the real Hegel while 
the more attractive, open-ended version is one that Hegel scholars have 
constructed in their own image. But this attractive Hegel is not merely a 
figment of our own wishful thinking although “he” is unquestionably that 
as well. In fact, there are not only “two Hegels” but three because there are 
already two in Solomon’s first: 
 
But here we begin to see the possibility of the deep tension in Hegel’s 
philosophy; on the one hand, he is a philosopher whose main claim is to 
give us a unified all-inclusive world-view, which he calls “the 
Absolute.”213 
 
Insofar as he is still a mere philosopher making claims, Hegel remains the 
man I have called “Hegel.” But the real Hegel—according to Hegel, that 
is—is the knower who gives voice to “the Absolute” in “Absolute 
Knowledge” and the Substance become Subject. In this unity, “Hegel” and 
Hegel are one: Berthold-Bond doesn’t grasp the closed unanimity, the 
scandalous impiety, and the absolute consistency of Hegel’s conscious 
purpose.214 On the other hand, both Berthold-Bond and Solomon are 
correct that there is nevertheless “a deep tension in Hegel’s philosophy” 
because in addition to the conscious Hegel who has emerged from “Hegel,” 
there is yet another unconscious version to be considered, a third Hegel of 
whom neither Hegel nor “Hegel” were aware. This shadowy “third” is 
Solomon’s second Hegel, a Hegel so attractive to Berthold-Bond that he is 
obliged to see “him” as the real Hegel. It is, I will argue, the unconscious 
Hegel—Solomon’s second and my third—who values, just as we do, the 
perpetual changes and transformations that Time alone makes possible and 
who therefore gives to unceasing change the last word:  
 
                                                
213 SOLOMON, Robert C. In the Spirit of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983; p. 14. 
214 When BERTHOLD-BOND writes: “The final satisfaction of being and history 
would be the final death of spirit” (p. 143), he has it reversed: The final satisfaction 
of Spirit (GWFH’s conscious purpose) would be the final death of history. See 
KRONER, Richard. Von Kant bis Hegel. Two Volumes. Tübingen: J.D.B. Mohr, 
1921-24 (who identified “die Antinomie zwischen System und Geschichte” (see 
BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 146) and who is therefore the real architect behind 
BERTHOLD-BOND’s vision, and thus mine.  
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On the other hand, he is the philosopher of change, the phenomenologist 
of forms, who appreciates, as Kant and most philosophers did not, the rich 
variety of forms of experience and the complex transformations between 
them.215 
 
As attractive as this Hegel undoubtedly is, we must not allow our own 
prejudices to delude us:216 we must recognize that one victim of self-
deception is more than sufficient where Hegel is concerned. To put the 
decisive point another way: Solomon’s “second Hegel” was indeed present 
among “the three Hegels” but both Hegel and “Hegel” were unconscious of 
his de-stabilizing presence. It is this unconscious Hegel that Solomon and 
Berthold-Bond prepare us to recognize. Hegel’s critique of Plato will 
confirm his existence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
215 SOLOMON, p. 14. 
216 Consider MALABOU, Catherine, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, 
Dialectic. Translated by Lisabeth During. Hypatia, v. 15, n. 4, 196-220, 2000; p. 
196 (from During’s Abstract): “She takes as her guiding thread the concept of 
“plasticity,” and shows how Hegel’s dialectic—introducing the sculptor’s art into 
philosophy—is motivated by the desire for transformation. Malabou is a canny and 
faithful reader, and allows her classic “maître” to speak, if not against his own 
grain, at least against a tradition too attached to closure and system.” In fact, most 
HEGEL scholars are considerably more attached to the opposite tradition. 
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Chapter 13. (II.3.2) 
Hegel’s Platonic Projection 
 
 There is undoubtedly a sense in which the historical Plato, like Hegel, 
ascribed to the proposition that “the real is the rational and the rational is 
the real.” Taken as a description of the supersensuous realm of Being, it is 
perfectly adequate: for Plato, only the rational Ideas truly are. The Plato 
who can absorb Hegel’s identity on these terms had already absorbed 
Heraclitus along very similar lines long before. Sharply distinguished from 
rational Being that alone is truly real, Heraclitean flux is absorbed by Plato 
as Becoming. As long as the Platonic separation or χωρισµος is retained 
between them, Plato’s metaphysics can be usefully understood as a 
combination of Hegelianism and Heracliteanism. Such a formulation would 
allow Plato to do to Hegel what Hegel did to Plato and indeed everyone 
else: incorporate him into his own philosophical system as a mere 
“moment.” Of course there is a single terrible problem with this particular 
formulation of Platonic metaphysics aside from the obvious anachronism: 
neither Hegelianism nor Heracliteanism can occupy only one side of the 
χωρισµος.  
It is worth belaboring this point. When Heraclitus said: “It is wise to 
agree that All Things are One,”217 he was anticipating Hegel.218 The whole 
point of Hegel’s Identity of the Real and the Rational is that neither has any 
existence apart from the other: there is no dualism between the Ideal and 
what actually exists. The fact that he joins the two reciprocal statements 
with an “and” is precisely the sign of this distinctive χωρισµος-
annihilating Identity. Of course this is not the only such Identity in Hegel’s 
thought: thanks to Logical Completeness, identities abound. The Hegelian 
Dialectic itself is simply Hegel’s innovative means to the ancient end of 
χωρισµος-annihilation. Hegel systematizes Heraclitus, subjectivizes 
Spinoza’s Substance,219 and adds a human-historical dimension to 
                                                
217 HERACLITUS, Fragment 50. 
218 LPH, p. 279: “The advance requisite and made by Heraclitus is the progression 
from Being as the first immediate thought, to the category of Becoming as the 
second. This is the first concrete, the Absolute, as in it the unity of opposites. Thus 
with Heraclitus the philosophic Idea is to be met with in its speculative form; the 
reasoning of Parmenides and Zeno is abstract understanding. Heraclitus was thus 
universally esteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such. Here we see 
land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.”  
219 For useful discussions of GWFH and SPINOZA, see SCHACHT, Richard L. 
Hegel on Freedom in Alasdair MacIntyre ed., Hegel: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, p. 289-328. New York: Doubleday, 1972 and BRAUN, Hermann, 
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Aristotle’s developmental rationalization of natural change.220 But if these 
are the three co-equal persons of Hegel’s Philosophical Trinity—it would 
be blasphemous to assert that the Holy Trinity constitutes anything but the 
pious exterior shell of his teaching—he can have only one human enemy: 
Plato.221 Even Kant is mere epigone in comparison. The classical 
philosopher of the χωρισµος can only be the deadly enemy of the most 
sophisticated χωρισµος-annihilator there has ever been or ever will be.222 
Without ascribing to the End of History, I am perfectly willing to concede 
that Hegel has spoken the Last Word on χωρισµος-annihilation.223 
And that word, of course, is by far the most famous of his Identities: 
“the Real is the Rational and the Rational is the Real.” But this is hardly the 
only piece of anti-Platonism in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right; it is 
merely the most quotable. Before turning to this Identity specifically, it 
                                                                                                   
Spinozismus in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel-Studien, vol. 17, p. 53-74, 
1982.   
220 Compare DI GIOVANNI, George. A Reply to Cynthia Willett in DI 
GIOVANNI, George ed. Essays on Hegel’s Logic, p. 93-98. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990; p. 95: “Meaning is no longer the product of 
forms inherent in nature but the function of goal-directed activity. The heavenly 
spheres of Aristotle’s cosmos are being replaced by the circle of a thought reflecting 
upon itself.”   
221 And this is why GWFH must Hegelianize PLATO, as he does the Lord God who 
created the universe out of nothing with a Word. Note the Medievalism of the 
following synthesis at LPH, p. 25 (Volume 2; emphasis mine): “In Plato Philosophy 
becomes mingled with the knowledge of the supersensuous, or what to us is 
religious knowledge. The Platonic philosophy is thus the knowledge of the 
absolutely true and right, the knowledge of universal ends in the state, and the 
recognition of their validity. In all the history of the migration of the nations, when 
the Christian religion became the universal religion, the only point of interest was to 
conceive the supersensuous kingdom — which was at first independent, absolutely 
universal and true — as actualized, and to determine actuality in conformity 
thereto.” What happened to: “My Kingdom is not of this World”? 
222 Cf. HORSTMANN, Rolf-Peter, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as an 
Argument for a Monistic Ontology, Inquiry, v. 49 n. 1, p. 103-118, 2006 at p. 104: 
“After all, Hegel is the most sophisticated monist of modern times and he is the 
most resourceful.” 
223 On this score, NIETZSCHE—who seems to have taken GWFH’s Christianity 
seriously while ignoring that GWFH had convincingly proved the utter 
impossibility of being “an untimely one”—seems both crude and unoriginal. For 
GWFH’s anticipation of NIETZSCHE’s self-deification, see DESMOND, William, 
Rethinking the Origin: Nietzsche and Hegel in Shawn Gallagher ed., Hegel, History 
and Interpretation, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997; p. 94: “The 
metaphysical magic that conjures away the otherness between God and man is 
black magic. 
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must be pointed out that the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right as a 
whole is the locus classicus of Hegel’s attack on the χωρισµος. Early on, 
the position of the χωρισµος-creators is stated for polemical purposes.224 
The possibility that there is a beyond that we do not know is ridiculed as 
worse than mere ignorance;225 it can only lead to relativism.226 But the 
Platonist’s claim to know the beyond is equally objectionable:  
  
This treatise, in so far as it contains a political science, is nothing more 
than an attempt to conceive of and present the state as in itself rational. As 
a philosophic writing it must be on its guard against constructing a state 
as it ought to be.227  
 
This is not the only passage in the Introduction that appears to be directed 
as much against Kant as Plato; the “ought” is mentioned once again, and 
this time in a way that ingeniously conflates Platonism with Relativism: its 
own worst enemy.228 But Hegel never actually mentions Kant in the 
Introduction—the progenitor of “Perpetual Peace” will get more than his 
share of direct abuse in “International Relations” (see I.3.1)—while Plato is 
named here repeatedly. Even more significant is the fact is that it is an 
observation about Plato that furnishes Hegel with an excuse to introduce 
the Identity of the Rational and the Real. To that passage we must now 
turn. 
      Hegel begins by defining the terms “rational” and “real” that he later 
intends to synthesize. Even before the Identity itself is unveiled, his attack 
                                                
224 Philosophy of Right, p. 4: “On the contrary the spiritual universe is looked upon 
as abandoned by God, and given over as a prey to accident and chance. As in this 
way the divine is eliminated from the ethical world, truth must be sought outside of 
it. And since at the same time reason should and does belong to the ethical world, 
truth, being divorced from reason, is reduced to a mere speculation.”  
225 Philosophy of Right, p. 9: “Since that self-named philosophizing has declared 
that to know the truth is vain, it has reduced all matter of thought to the same level, 
resembling in this way the despotism of the Roman Empire, which equalized noble 
and slave, virtue and vice, honour and dishonour, knowledge and ignorance.”  
226 Philosophy of Right, p. 9: “In such a view the conceptions of truth and the laws 
of ethical observance are simply opinions and subjective convictions, and the most 
criminal principles, provided only that they are convictions, are put on a level with 
these laws.”  
227 Philosophy of Right, p. 11. 
228 Philosophy of Right, p. 11: “If a theory transgresses its time, and builds up a 
world as it ought to be, it has an existence merely in the unstable element of 
opinion, which gives room to every wandering fancy… It is just as foolish to fancy 
that any philosophy can transcend its present world, as that an individual could leap 
out of his time or jump over Rhodes.”  
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on the χωρισµος has increased markedly in directness and intensity:    
 
Now, as to genuine philosophy it is precisely its attitude to reality which 
has been misapprehended. Philosophy is, as I have already observed, an 
inquisition into the rational, and therefore the apprehension of the real 
and present. Hence it cannot be the exposition of a world beyond, which 
is merely a castle in the air, having no existence except in the terror of a 
one-sided and empty formalism of thought.229  
 
The emphasized contrast is perfectly clear: this is a rejection of Platonism. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that Hegel moves directly to Plato in the 
next sentence. What is surprising is that he seems to be challenging the 
notion that Plato was a Platonist; at the very least, his remark appears to be 
a non sequitur.  
 
In the following treatise I have remarked that even Plato’s Republic, now 
regarded as the byword for an empty ideal, has grasped the essential 
nature of the ethical observances of the Greeks.230   
 
Hegel’s point seems to be that although Plato is generally assumed to be 
the exemplar of a philosopher whole builds his “castle in the air,” i.e. in “a 
world beyond,” that in fact his Republic was about something very real: 
“the essential nature of the ethical observances of the Greeks.” In fact, he 
now proceeds to justify the claim that this Hegelianized Plato’s Republic is 
not simply about what ought to be, but about what is; not “the exposition of 
a world beyond” but “of the real and present.”   
 
He knew that there was breaking in upon Greek life a deeper principle, 
which could directly manifest itself only as an unsatisfied longing and 
therefore as ruin. Moved by the same longing Plato had to seek help 
against it but had to conceive of the help as coming down from above and 
hoped at last to have found it in an external special form of Greek ethical 
observance. He exhausted himself in contriving how by means of 
this new society to stem the tide of ruin, but succeeded only in injuring 
more fatally its deeper motive, the free infinite personality [emphasis 
mine].231 
 
The “deeper principle” against which Hegel’s Plato struggles is what Hegel 
                                                
229 Philosophy of Right, p. 10 (emphasis mine). The block quotations that follow 
will be from the passage that begins here; they will be quoted in sequence without 
deletion. 
230 Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
231 Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
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calls “the free infinite personality.”232 In the light of §185,233 the passage to 
which Hegel had previously referred, the Substantial unity of Greek Ethical 
Life was being threatened by Subjectivity. Plato is infused with this 
principle, a real principle that he nevertheless senses is subversive of Greek 
ethical reality, but he creates a series of new ethical observances that will 
hold this subjectivity in check. For example, the exclusion of private 
property in the Ideal City is but one of the ingenious contrivances he 
creates “to stem the tide of ruin.” In other words, it was his own “free 
independent personality” that made it possible for him both to recognize 
(within himself) and to audaciously attempt to neutralize that very impulse 
by creating an Ideal in which that freedom had no place.  
      One might well ask what this interpretation has to do with Platonism. 
There is no metaphysical dualism here and consequently no Idea of the 
Good. Despite these omissions, Hegel’s is perfectly consistent with the 
traditional view: Plato created a City as it ought to be because Plato did not 
like the reality of what is. Hegel’s interpretive innovations would seem to 
be two: he conjures up a Plato—not so much Hegelianized as anti-
Platonic—who fights against himself and he invests the real principle 
against which Plato fights with rationality. In other words, the “what is” 
against which Plato vainly fights is “what ought to be.” And therefore the 
two are one.  
 
Yet he has proved himself to be a great mind because the very principle 
and central distinguishing feature of his idea is the pivot upon which the 
                                                
232 See VIELLARD-BARON, Jean-Louis, Platon et l’idéalisme allemand, Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1979, p. 362-9.   
233 Philosophy of Right, p. 124; §185 (emphases mine): “Plato in his “Republic” 
represents the substantive ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth. But with the 
principle of independent particularity, which broke in upon Greek ethical life at his 
time, he could do nothing except to oppose to it his “Republic,” which is simply 
substantive. Hence he excluded even the earliest form of subjectivity [note the 
opposition of Substance and Subject; thus the Philosophy of Right is best 
understood as GWFH’s anti-Republic], as it exists in private property (§46, note) 
and the family, and also in its more expanded form as private liberty and choice of 
profession [cf. LPH, p. 109-10 (Volume 2); the decision about whether to choose 
“the life of justice” (to say nothing of the philosopher’s choice to return to the 
Cave) is the heart of PLATO’s masterpiece; GWFH’s misunderstanding could not 
be more complete]. It is this defect, which prevents the large and substantive truth 
of the “Republic” from being understood, and gives rise to the generally accepted 
view that it is a mere dream of abstract thought, or what we are used to calling an 
ideal. In the merely substantive form of the actual spirit, as it appears in Plato, the 
principle of self-dependent and in itself infinite personality of the individual, the 
principle of subjective freedom does not receive its due.” 
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world-wide revolution then in process turned: What is rational is real; and 
what is real is rational.234  
 
By “his idea”—i.e. “the pivot upon which the world-wide revolution then 
in process turned”—Hegel does not mean the Idea of the Good or the Ideal 
City. Nor is Hegel saying—although his presentation is anything but 
clear—that Plato’s Idea is Hegel’s identity of Real and Rational. Plato’s 
greatness (according to Hegel) is that he recognized—as proved precisely 
by his attempt to fight against it—the “deeper principle” of “free 
independent personality.” With the Incarnation still four hundred years 
away, Plato is already glimpsing the Revolution of Subjectivity: the 
annihilation of the χωρισµος between God and Man. Although guided by 
that subjectivity, as Socrates was, Plato nonetheless opposed it by creating 
a rational Ideal, a rigorously regulated City, to hold it in check. What Plato 
proposed as “rational,” i.e. the City, was neither real nor rational; what 
Plato opposed was both rational and real. Thus the Identity holds even in 
the case of Plato’s Republic.  
      The Platonic context of this passage, no less than the forced obscurity 
of Hegel’s thought process, reveals how dangerous Hegel recognized Plato 
to be. It seems that Hegel can only defeat a self-defeating Plato. In other 
words: Plato can’t be defeated without Plato’s help. By presenting Plato as 
locked in dubious battle with Subjectivity—and therefore with Hegel’s 
version of “Christ”—Hegel manages to obscure the identity of Plato’s real 
enemy even while unveiling that enemy as himself. Something doubtless 
should be said about Hegel’s scandalous interpretation of Plato’s 
masterpiece. The pivotal and decisive role played by the supposedly 
banished “free independent personality” in Plato’s Republic—the 
dialogue235 is, after all, about whether Glaucon and the rest will choose the 
life of Justice or follow the counsels of Thrasymachus236—is the topic for 
an extended study.237 But the more important point here is that Plato’s real 
enemy is more accurately understood as the identity that Hegel has just 
introduced in so misleading a fashion. As I’ve indicated already, the truth 
about Platonism is that it combines Hegel’s identity, once understood to 
apply only to the super-sensuous realm of Being, on one side of the 
χωρισµος with Becoming on the other. Hegel, on the other hand, is 
investing Becoming with the identity, reserved by Plato to Being, while 
denying any separate realm to Being, now redefined as a mere moment of 
                                                
234 Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
235 For GWFH’s disparaging remarks about the dialogue form in PLATO, see LHP, 
p. 9-15 (Volume II). 
236 See my comments infra on Philosophy of Right §185 above. 
237 See my unpublished manuscript “Plato the Teacher: The Crisis of the Republic.” 
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Becoming. Although invoked by Hegel’s literary technique to witness this 
stunning reversal, “the great mind” of Plato now avails him nothing.238 
Platonism is practically rendered invisible: it is not against Hegel’s own 
χωρισµος-annihilation that Hegel’s Plato unconsciously fights, it is against 
himself, the inevitable wave of the Future, and the man on the street.   
 
Upon this conviction [sc. that the Identity of the Real and Rational is true] 
stand not philosophy only but even every unsophisticated consciousness. 
From it also proceeds the view now under contemplation that the spiritual 
universe is the natural. When reflection, feeling, or whatever other form 
the subjective consciousness may assume, regards the present as vanity, 
and thinks itself to be beyond it and wiser, it finds itself in emptiness, and, 
as it has actuality only in the present, it is vanity throughout.239 
   
       Hegel no longer needs Plato; the Republic is promptly forgotten. In 
fact, the way he used subjectivity to undermine Plato now threatens to 
swamp his own argument: it is now Hegel himself who battles with 
“subjective consciousness.” He hardly seems to care. No doubt he can 
simply invoke some other distinction and show that the subjectivity against 
which he now fights, is—as distinguished from Plato’s nemesis—of the 
merely formal kind. Naturally this kind of “subjective consciousness” is the 
one unprepared to find itself in complete harmony with either Hegel’s State 
or his System. Such subjectivity knows nothing of Hegel’s Freedom or the 
Eternity of Logical Completeness. And Hegel never scruples to call this 
kind of Completeness “the Idea.”  
 
Against the doctrine that the idea is a mere idea, figment or opinion, 
philosophy preserves the more profound view that nothing is real except 
the idea.240  
 
       Having used Plato’s Republic as indirect proof that his identity of the 
Real and Rational is true, Hegel now uses Plato’s word “Idea” to mean 
exactly the opposite of what Plato had originally meant by it. And with his 
enemy neutralized through scandalous linguistic indirection and 
                                                
238 PEPERZAK, Adriaan, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface 
to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1987, p. 91: “It is clear—
and the following paragraphs strengthen this idea—that Plato accomplished the task 
of the philosopher in an exemplary fashion, notwithstanding his historically 
conditioned inability to solve the most essential contradiction constituting the 
ethical problematic. Hegel is able to resolve the tension between the two 
fundamental principles of politics.” 
239 Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
240 Philosophy of Right, p. 10. 
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interpretive misdirection, Hegel finally feels comfortable to state his anti-
Platonism in its purest possible form:  
 
Hence arises the effort to recognize in the temporal and transient the 
substance, which is immanent, and the eternal, which is present. The 
rational is synonymous with the idea, because in realizing itself it passes 
into external existence.241  
 
Here then is Hegel’s primordial linguistic and metaphysical Umkehrung. 
Hegel’s “Idea” is the exact opposite of Plato’s: it that which realizes itself 
in external existence. But Hegel bastardizes Plato more than any mere Neo-
Platonist ever did: the “Idea” doesn’t even descend into the World Soul; it 
is never separate enough to do that. It is eternally immanent. Its immanence 
is probably indistinguishable from what Hegel calls “subjectivity.” In any 
case, the eternal is inseparable from the temporal, the substantial from the 
transient. Why not? The χωρισµος has been annihilated and self-
contradiction is therefore the order of the day; the day that lasts forever. 
But it cannot be accidental that Hegel has chosen to annihilate it in Plato’s 
own presence and, as it were, with his help. 
       To fully understand the unconscious basis of Hegel’s procedure—the 
psychological imperative from which his own portrait of an unconscious 
Plato emerges—it is necessary to turn to his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy.242 Hegel concludes the Introduction to these Lectures with 
three important propositions, all closely connected to the Logical and 
Chronological Parallel.243 The first is that the oldest thoughts are 
necessarily the most abstract—no compliment coming from Hegel244—and 
therefore that none of the older philosophical systems can give any real 
                                                
241 Philosophy of Right, p. 10.  
242 Note the presence of the third proposition I will be discussing at Philosophy of 
Right, p. 11 (mentioned above at p. 73 n. 44); its juxtaposition with GWFH’s claims 
about the unconscious PLATO considered above strengthens the case I will be 
developing in the context of the considerably fuller discussion found in LHP.    
243 The section (entitled “Further comparison between the History of Philosophy 
and Philosophy itself”) begins with the following sentence at LPH, p. 39 (emphasis 
mine): “We may appropriate to ourselves the whole of the riches apportioned out in 
time: it must be shown from the succession in philosophies how that succession [as 
‘apportioned out in time’] is the systematization of the science of Philosophy itself.” 
See DE LAURENTIIS for a recent discussion of this material.  
244 LPH, p. 40: “…that which first commences is implicit, immediate, abstract, 
general—it is what has not yet advanced; the more concrete and richer comes later, 
and the first is poorer in determinations.”  
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satisfaction to our concerns today.245 There are indications even here, 
before Plato is mentioned by name, that he is Hegel’s principal target 
throughout,246 just as he obviously is in the Preface to his Philosophy of 
Right.  
       The second proposition is that the latest philosophical system is 
necessarily the most concrete and therefore the most complete.247 This 
observation is obviously self-serving, especially since it comes from a 
living philosopher who is, moreover, prepared to integrate every previous 
philosopher into his own System, as his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy are about to prove. Only those given to thoughts of a distant 
futurity will realize that a philosopher advancing such a proposition 
encompasses or envisions thereby his own eventual obsolescence. But 
Hegel says nothing about this. Instead, he uses this proposition to buttress 
the first: he claims that we are apt to read our own Modern depths into their 
Ancient shallows.248 But then he makes a most curious statement:  
                                                
245 LPH, p. 41: “In applying this to the different forms of Philosophy, it follows in 
the first place, that the earliest philosophies are the poorest and the most 
abstract…This must be known in order that we may not seek behind the old 
philosophies for more than we are entitled to find; thus we need not require from 
them determinations proceeding from a deeper consciousness.” For the deletion, see 
the following note. 
246 The sentence deleted in the previous note seems to apply with particular force to 
PLATO: it is his “Idea” that is “not yet realized;” hardly the case with GWFH’s. “In 
them the Idea is least determined; they keep merely to generalities not yet realized” 
(LHP, p. 41; emphasis mine). PLATO’s name is only mentioned somewhat later; 
first only in company with ARISTOTLE and then with a larger entourage at LHP, 
p. 46: “Hence the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and indeed all philosophies, 
ever live and are present in their principles, but Philosophy no longer has the 
particular form and aspect possessed by that of Plato and of Aristotle. We cannot 
rest content with them, and they cannot be revived; hence there can be no 
Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, or Epicureans today.” But PLATO is subsequently 
singled out, as will be seen below.   
247 LHP, p. 41: “From this it follows—since the progress of development is 
equivalent to further determination, and this means further immersion in, and a 
fuller grasp of the Idea itself—that the latest, most modern and newest philosophy 
is the most developed, richest and deepest. In that philosophy everything which at 
first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and retained, and it must itself be 
a mirror of the whole history.” This description is clearly self-referential. It is 
likely, moreover, that GWFH believed that no subsequent philosophical system 
would recognize itself to be such.   
248 GWFH calls this “A second consequence has regard to the treatment of the older 
philosophies” at LHP, p. 42. An astute passage about THALES (proverbially “the 
first philosopher”) is used to illustrate this second consequence at LHP, p. 44: “We 
ought not by such deductions to make an ancient philosophy into something quite 
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We are too apt to mould the ancient philosophers into our own forms of 
thought, but this is just to constitute the progress of development; the 
difference in times, in culture and in philosophies, depends on whether 
certain reflections, certain thought determinations, and certain stages in 
the Notion have come to consciousness, whether a consciousness has 
been developed to a particular point or not.   
                                  
 Hegel here admits that he too will “mould the ancient philosophers into 
[his] own forms of thought” but he, unlike those who make the Ancients 
richer than they are, does so only to illustrate “the progress of 
development.” Having already considered his interpretation of Plato’s 
Republic, it is a relatively easy matter to decipher what Hegel really means 
here by “certain reflections, certain thought determinations, and certain 
stages in the Notion.” Although Plato himself cannot allow “the deeper 
principle” of subjectivity to “come to consciousness” as such, Hegel is 
merely showing a just regard to  “the difference in times, in culture and in 
philosophies” by expressing Plato’s one-sidedness in Hegel’s own terms. In 
this case, the Begriff is the reality: subjectivity and objectivity are joined 
conceptually in Logical Completeness. For Plato, the moment of 
subjectivity has not come to full self-consciousness: it is present in Plato’s 
World—it is indeed the Real that is Rational—but Plato cannot see it as 
such. Plato is blind to the “moment” because he does not possess the 
Concept. Hegel is not distorting Plato’s thought, he is merely expressing it 
in terms of its place in “the progress of development.” 
 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel presented us with a profoundly self-
defeating but unconscious Plato, vainly battling against a principle 
(subjectivity) by which Plato himself is actually being motivated. In other 
words, Hegel can conceive of the possibility that “a great mind” could fail 
to realize that the principle it opposed was in fact its own principle. 
Consider in this context Hegel’s failure to realize that his own second 
proposition—i.e. that the last system is necessarily the truest—will 
eventually annihilate the truth-claims of his own. Hegel evidently fails to 
realize that the principle that he has proposed—chronological development, 
Time, History—will be the undoing of itself. Hegel injects Time into 
Philosophy but he needs it to be Finite; hence the scandal of Chronological 
Completeness. “The historical consciousness,” in retrospect, 
unquestionably the Zeitgeist of the 19th Century, was clearly the “deeper 
principle” emerging in Hegel’s day: like Plato, he promotes, advances, 
                                                                                                   
different from what it originally was.” 
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perhaps even creates it. But unlike his self-conflicted Plato, Hegel is 
completely unaware that “the spurious Infinite” of the Future, i.e. “The 
Problem of Time in Hegel’s Philosophy of History,” will undo him in the 
end. 
 Only the hypothesis of self-deception can explain Hegel’s third 
proposition: that each philosophical system belongs only to its own time 
and cannot apply to any other.249  
The first proposition only threatened Hegel potentially; the third requires 
no Future in order to render Hegel himself one-sided and irrelevant.250 Can 
the philosopher of Absolute Knowledge really be saying that his own 
System is merely a creature of his specific place and time? Naturally Hegel 
does not address this issue directly. But the self-referential implications of 
this blanket charge of historical relativism are even more obvious than was 
the case with the first proposition. Hegel is prepared to pay a heavy price to 
diminish the stature of his predecessors:251 the first proposition—from 
which the second and therefore the third logically follow—is important 
enough to risk all their ugly consequences. Except, of course, if there was 
no risk to Hegel involved: he simply failed to see the self-defeating 
consequences. If we ask: “How can such a thing be possible? How can a 
                                                
249 LHP, p. 45 (emphasis mine): “Now, as in the logical system of thought each of 
its forms has its own place in which alone it suffices, and this form becomes, by 
means of ever-progressing development, reduced to a subordinate element, each 
philosophy is, in the third place, a particular stage in the development of the whole 
process and has its definite place where it finds its true value and 
significance…Therefore every philosophy belongs to its own time and is restricted 
by its own limitations, just because it is the manifestation of a particular stage in 
development” For the omitted passage, see two notes below.  
250 LHP, p. 45: “Every philosophy is the philosophy of its own day, a link in the 
whole chain of spiritual development, and thus it can only find satisfaction for the 
interests belonging to its own particular time.”  
251 LHP, p. 45 (emphasis mine): “Its [i.e. each “particular stage in the development 
of the whole process”] special character is really to be conceived of in accordance 
with this determination, and it is to be considered with respect to this position in 
order that full justice [an ironic choice of words since GWFH’s account of the 
Republic has omitted consideration of the fact that the dialogue is about Glaucon’s 
choice to lead the life of justice] may be done to it. On this account nothing more 
must be demanded or expected from it [i.e. an outdated philosophical system] than 
what it actually gives, and the satisfaction is not to be sought for in it, which can 
only be found in a fuller development of knowledge [i.e. in GWFH]. We must not 
expect to find the questions of our consciousness and the interest of the present 
world responded to by the ancients; such questions presuppose a certain 
development in thought.” Note that this is the passage omitted between the 
sentences quoted two notes above.  
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great thinker be so blind?” we have only to remember what Hegel has 
already told us about Plato.  
 Hegel gives himself a typically Hegelian way out of these potential 
problems. In developing the third proposition, he states: 
 
On this account an earlier philosophy does not give satisfaction to the 
mind in which a deeper conception reigns. What Mind seeks for in 
Philosophy is this conception which already constitutes its inward 
determination and the root of its existence conceived of as object to 
thought; Mind demands a knowledge of itself.252  
 
How extraordinary that it is precisely Mind’s knowledge of itself that Hegel 
believes has made—and will forever make—his System the ne plus ultra. 
Only Geist that knows itself as Geist has achieved the Logical 
Completeness of the “consciousness of freedom.” Whenever Mind seeks 
the Begriff that “already constitutes its inward determination,” it will find 
this in Hegel’s System but not in the works of even the most astute among 
the Ancients, like Plato. Only in Hegel will the reading Subject find its own 
Substance in what it reads. This is not the case with the other great 
philosophers:   
 
But in the earlier philosophy the Idea is not yet present in this determinate 
character. Hence the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and indeed all 
philosophies, ever live and are present in their principles, but Philosophy 
no longer has the particular form and aspect possessed by that of Plato 
and of Aristotle.253  
 
It is particularly interesting to listen to Hegel undermine the foundation of 
the Renaissance: there can be, he claims, no genuine revival of the dead 
philosophical systems of the past.254 But even his attack on the Renaissance 
appears to leave room for an important exception: 
 
Mind had for long possessed a more substantial life, a more profound 
Notion of itself, and hence its thought had higher needs than such as 
could be satisfied by these philosophies.255 
 
The thought of the past is therefore not rejected merely because it is past 
but because it fails to have arrived at a Begriff of itself.  
                                                
252 LPH, p. 45-6. 
253 LHP, p. 46. 
254 LHP, p. 46. 
255 LHP, p. 47. 
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 With the three propositions now laid out, Hegel reveals his hand: he 
begins the peroration of his Introduction with the object of his real concern: 
the appeal of Plato today: 
 
When modern times are in the same way called upon to revert to the 
standpoint of an ancient philosophy (as is recommended specially in 
regard to the philosophy of Plato) in order to make this a means of 
escaping from the complications and difficulties of succeeding times, this 
reversion does not come naturally as in the first case.256 
 
Already proved a failure during the Renaissance, the contemporary revival 
of Plato ignores all three of Hegel’s propositions: it is necessarily 
incomplete, it is impoverished by its primitive concerns, and it has no real 
relevance to any but its own time. We would do just as well to live the life 
of a Native American or a Palestinian Shepherd.257 The return to Plato 
would be a barren experience. 
 
On the other hand, the return of the developed, enriched Mind to a 
simplicity such as this—which means to an abstraction, an abstract 
condition or thought is to be regarded only as the escape of an incapacity 
which cannot enjoy the rich material of development which it sees before 
it, and which demands to be controlled and comprehended in its very 
depths by thought, but seeks a refuge in fleeing from the difficulty and in 
mere sterility.258 
 
What a fascinating text! With a rich philosophical development already 
immanent within us, modern students can only find the abstract, because 
not conceptualized, content of the lifeless past a mere escape from the 
liberating constraints of Modern (i.e. Hegelian) thought. Mind must not 
faint before “the rich material” of its own development and “demands to be 
controlled and comprehended in the very depths” by its own thought, 
present in the Modern Philosophy as both Substance and Subject. If reading 
Hegel is an exercise in self-recognition, what more can possibly be 
expected in the way of development? We know more than we thought we 
did and the Ancients know much less than their fame suggests.  
 
                                                
256 LHP, p. 47. 
257 LHP, p. 47: “This discreet counsel has the same origin as the request to 
cultivated members of society to turn back to the customs and ideas of the savages 
of the North American forests, or as the recommendation to adopt the religion of 
Melchisedec which Fichte has maintained to be the purest and simplest possible, 
and therefore the one at which we must eventually arrive.”  
258 LHP, p. 47-8. 
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There slumber in the Mind of modern times ideas more profound which 
require for their awakening other surroundings and another present than 
the abstract, dim, grey thought of olden times. In Plato, for instance, 
questions regarding the nature of freedom, the origin of evil and of sin, 
providence, &c., do not find their philosophic answer.259 
 
But Hegel mentions these interesting topics only in passing. As his earlier 
comments about self-consciousness and Mind recognizing itself as Mind 
have indicated, the real issue that makes his System the ne plus ultra is the 
development of Absolute Idealism in the mutual self-recognition of 
Substance and Subject. 
 
The case is similar with regard to questions regarding the limits of 
knowledge, the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity which had 
not yet come up in Plato’s age. The independence of the within itself and 
its explicit existence was foreign to him; man had not yet gone back 
within himself, had not yet set himself forth as explicit.260  
 
Although Hegel suggests that this is simply one more philosophical 
topic where Plato shows his inadequacy, this is in fact the crux of the 
matter. Plato had resisted the revolution of Subjectivity: consciousness qua 
the “explicit existence” of “the within itself” had not yet made itself its own 
principal object. Without knowing—through the mediation of Hegel’s 
“Christ”—that the χωρισµος between Man and God had been abrogated, 
Plato could not have realized that a search for Truth in the externality of a 
super-sensuous beyond was merely arid abstraction in comparison with the 
rich content made possible by a restless and all-inclusive Logical 
Completeness!  
 But the final proof of Plato’s unconsciousness is visible even to a 
child. Hegel saves his simplest but strongest argument for last: the Greek 
and Roman Worlds—and Plato among them—knew only that some are 
Free. 
 
But the fact that man is in and for himself free, in his essence and as man, 
free born, was known neither by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, nor the Roman 
legislators, even though it is this conception alone which forms the source 
of law. In Christianity the individual, personal mind for the first time 
becomes of real, infinite and absolute value; God wills that all men shall 
be saved.261  
 
                                                
259 LHP, p. 48. 
260 LHP, p. 48-9. 
261 LHP, p. 49. 
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It is therefore as a liberal Christian committed to progress that Hegel draws 
to a close: 
 
It was in the Christian religion that the doctrine was advanced that all men 
are equal before God, because Christ has set them free with the freedom 
of Christianity. These principles make freedom independent of any such 
things as birth, standing or culture.262 
 
With no need to tell his audience about the underlying principles of the 
Hegelian State—in unquestioning obedience to which they will, as citizens, 
find themselves just as reflected as they do in his own System—they are 
thus left with a most uplifting message. Although Plato and the rest are 
certainly well worth studying—we owe so much to these important way-
stations on the long path to our own self-knowledge!—they knew not that 
man as such is free. Imagine listening to the last words of this inspiring 
speech without any prior acquaintance with the rest of Hegel’s System! 
 
The progress made through them is enormous, but they still come short of 
this, that to be free constitutes the very idea of man. The sense of this 
existent principle has been an active force for centuries and centuries, and 
an impelling power which has brought about the most tremendous 
revolutions; but the conception and the knowledge of the natural freedom 
of man is a knowledge of himself which is not old.263 
 
Their brilliant Professor is prepared to show them, through both the History 
of Philosophy and the Philosophy of History, that all of the Past has been 
progressing towards this wondrous End; the “natural freedom of man” he 
inspiringly calls it. The self-conscious certainty of this wondrous vision is 
doubtless young: Hegel himself has only just discovered it. But no matter 
how many years may come and go, it is difficult to see how anything could 
possibly happen that would make such a vision grow old. This, at any rate, 
is what Hegel wishes his youthful audience to believe.264 
 Although “Hegel the deceiver” deserves our serious attention, 
                                                
262 LHP, p. 49. 
263 LHP, p. 49. 
264 Consider the conclusion of his “History of Philosophy” lecture course at LHP, p. 
553-4 (Volume 3): “I have to express my thanks to you for the attention with which 
you have listened to me while I have been making this attempt; it is in great 
measure due to you that my efforts have met with so great a measure of success. 
And it has been a source of pleasure to myself to have been associated with you in 
this spiritual community; I ought not to speak of it as if it were a thing of the past, 
for I hope that a spiritual bond has been knit between us which will prove 
permanent. I bid you a most hearty farewell.”   
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especially given the enduring political danger posed by Right Hegelianism, 
there is now another Hegel and another audience to be considered. 
Although he may have been able to persuade those eager young Heidelberg 
students in 1817265—and the even more impressionable youths entrusted to 
his care at the Gymnasium in Nürnberg—that he was a pious Christian, a 
political Liberal, and a proponent of Progress, he has become, thanks to his 
quarrel with Plato, something quite different for us. Without intruding on 
the ethical questions involved, I would like to suggest that Hegel’s ability 
to deceive others is firmly rooted in his own logically and chronologically 
prior capacity for self-deception.  
In the context of Berthold-Bond’s dilemma, the hypothesis of an 
unconscious Hegel makes the conscious Hegel not only the mirror-image of 
his self-defeating version of Plato but identical to him.266 Hegel’s 
unconscious Plato is at war with himself and with “the deeper principle” 
emerging in his time. But the creator of the Hegelian System is just as 
unconscious of the deeper principle emerging in his: Hegel’s Plato is thus 
best understood as Hegel’s projection. Just as Hegel’s Plato is 
unconsciously motivated by the deeper principle of his time (i.e. 
subjectivity), so also is the unconscious Hegel a product of the nineteenth 
century Zeitgeist, and that in a double sense of that term: the spirit of 
Hegel’s time was Time itself. The conscious Hegel battles against this 
incipient Zeitgeist at the same time that he unconsciously aids and abets its 
eventual triumph. On the conscious level, he is the brilliant and caustic 
critic of Time and in his System, there is no place for this ceaseless process, 
open-ended towards the future, relativizing all certainties including his own 
in its wake, this spuriously infinite, perpetually becoming but never 
conceptualized thing we call “time.” He opposes Time just as his Plato 
allegedly opposed “the free independent personality” in the Republic: he 
creates his allegedly atemporal System as a circular bulwark against its 
destabilizing presence.267  
                                                
265 Six of the seven times that he offered his “History of Philosophy” were in 
Berlin. See editor’s note at LHP, p. 554 (Volume 3). For student reaction, see 
NICOLIN, Günther, Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen, Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1970, p. 245-56 (Heinrich Gustav HOTHO).  
266 BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 117 (emphasis mine): “…Hegel took a wrong turn, an 
unnecessary and self-defeating turn, when he came to suggest an absolute 
completion of history…”  
267 Thus BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 146 (emphasis mine) has lost sight of GWFH and 
confused him with the Zeitgeist: “The main conflict in Hegel is between the view of 
history and becoming which asserts an “absolute validity” that comes with the 
ultimate fruition of the teleological development of spirit, and a second view of 
history and becoming which asserts validity within a process of development that 
goes “ever on and on.” When we actively advocate the second view, and are willing 
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Thanks to his analysis of Plato, Hegel opens the door to a similar 
analysis of himself: his defenders are thus in no position to deny the 
pertinence of a philosopher’s unconscious motivations in Hegel’s own case. 
He considers himself an astute enough psychologist to see what Plato is 
unconsciously doing but in the process, he proves himself to be perfectly 
blind to his own unconscious motivations. In fact, he misunderstands 
entirely what Plato is doing but projects his own situation onto his rival 
with perfect accuracy.268 While lecturing on the Philosophy of History and 
the History of Philosophy, he thinks he can let the genie called “Time” out 
of its bottle with no ill effects on his own timeless project to know the True 
as the Whole. But the Future will out and there’s no way to know what it 
will bring.269 He so underestimates Time’s power that he thinks he can 
apply Logical Completeness to a Chronological Process like History 
without scandalous equivocation. He so misunderstands the wellsprings of 
his own greatest innovation—the Hegelian Dialectic—that he never allows 
himself to grasp that the dialectical movement characteristic and indeed 
constitutive of der Begriff must always already presuppose Chronological 
Priority. The Right Hegelians are right about the conscious Hegel. But the 
Left Hegelians weren’t entirely wrong: it just requires psychopathology to 
prove it. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
as a consequence to view the affronting first view as an unnecessary wrong turn 
in Hegel’s system, we will be able to move beyond indignation to a logically 
consistent and philosophically profound view of the nature of history and the 
meaning of its (episodic, perpetually reoccurring) fulfillment.”  
268 For PLATO as rival, consider the reference to “Platonists” (the last reference to 
any specific philosopher) in the concluding lecture on “The History of Philosophy,” 
found at LPH, p. 552-3 (Volume 3): “The latest philosophy contains therefore those 
that went before; it embraces in itself all the different stages thereof; it is the 
product and result of those that preceded it. We can now, for example, be Platonists 
no longer.”  
269 I continue to be struck by the etymological presence of the Future in Werden. 
Perhaps BERTHOLD-BOND, who is inclined to finding “internal tension” (p. 115) 
everywhere in GWFH, is on the right track when he describes “Hegel’s notion of 
substance” as an attempt to “synthesize Heraclitean becoming with Spinozistic 
permanence.” (BERTHOLD-BOND, p. 116). If the river ran in a circle, perhaps 
you could step in the same river twice. But rivers don’t run in circles; thanks to 
gravity, they flow home to the sea. 
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Chapter 14 (II.3.3) 
The Return of the Repressed 
 
 Aside from the Oedipal Complex,270 the most useful application of 
Freud’s theories to Hegel directly implicates “The Problem of Time in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History.” By attempting to conceptualize a 
chronological process in logical terms, Hegel was forced by the temptations 
of the Logical/Chronological Parallel to presuppose “The End of 
History”—i.e. Chronological Completeness—in the case of a process that 
he persuaded himself could be made rational in the only way that anything 
could be rational: in the context of Logical Completeness. Despite being a 
pioneer in what we would now call “the application of philosophical 
thought to historical developments unfolding in time,” Hegel’s entire mode 
of thinking remained, at least on the conscious level, profoundly and even 
radically atemporal.271 He persuaded himself that the dialectical process 
was strictly logical even when he was conceptualizing the events of the 
past: Time was nothing more than the Logical Idea’s negative 
externalization of itself in Nature, always already restored to eternal unity 
with itself in Spirit.  
 Left Hegelians would have none of this scandalous nonsense. Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature, including its bizarre conception of Time, was tossed 
aside while what remained was made to stand on its feet instead of walking 
on its head. The End of History was postponed until the day after tomorrow 
and the Future burst forth from the shackles in which Hegel had brilliantly 
but unsuccessfully attempted to constrain it: it re-emerged as “the return of 
the repressed.” Left Hegelianism was therefore the inevitable result of 
Hegel’s scandalous solution to “The Problem of Time.”    
                                                
270 The ultimate scandal in GWFH’s thought—i.e. the substitution of “Absolute 
Knowledge” for God—is hardly accessible or persuasive in the anti-theological 
intellectual climate that has been dominant since the First World War (see p. 168 
above); if this were not the case, the application of FREUD’s categories could be 
usefully expanded. In absolute indifference to the man “HEGEL” and his earthly 
father, it would be interesting to show how the Hegelian System as a whole 
represents a murderous assault on “the God of our fathers.” Lest I be misunderstood 
as a Freudian, it should suffice to point out that the author of Moses and 
Monotheism likewise suffered—unconsciously, to be sure—from this particular 
form of the Oedipal Complex.  
271 DÜSING, Klaus, Dialektik und Geschichtsmetaphysik in Hegels Konzeption 
philosophiegeschichtlicher Entwicklung in Hans-Christian Lucas and Guy Planty-
Boujour eds., Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System, p. 127-145. Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt: Fromann Holzboog, 1989; especially p. 142-3. 
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